Wednesday, May 08, 2013
Elder of ZiyonMichael Ross, an ex-Mossad officer, told me that the key to Israel’s in-and-out operations is its advanced electronic warfare system, which was constructed by Unit 8200 (“Israel’s NSA”) and is an advanced form of the “Suter” network that blinded Syrian radars during the IAF’s 2007 attack on Syria’s nuclear facility at al-Kibar. “The software identifies emitters and entry into enemy communications networks,” Ross said. “Then it shuts down some or all enemy emitters or injects misleading information or even malware. To control the skies, you must first control the electromagnetic spectrum. This is now IAF doctrine.” Ross also said that the Fateh-110 missiles had been delivered by Iran no more than a week before they were destroyed, which indicates that either the Islamic Republic is remarkably lax with its shipping manifests or that Israeli assets come and go in Syria like I do my own living room.Here's the ISW slide show:
The last few days have seen a grit-teeth conversation among Syrian dissidents about what to make of Israel objectively aiding their cause. They needn’t disturb their consciences overmuch because the IAF looks right past them and doesn’t even see Syria as an independent country anymore, only an emerging Iranian suzerainty in the Levant. Dr. Shimon Shapira, a retired brigadier general of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), has written a paper unambiguously titled “Iran’s Plans to Take Over Syria,” which emphasizes comments made by Mehdi Taaib, the head of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s think tank, that Syria is “35th district of Iran,” tantamount to Khuzestan, the Arab-populated district of Iran. The architect of this grand strategy is Major General Qasem Suleimani, the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp-Quds Force, who, in an ambitious operation named for himself, has begun the training and financing of 150,000-strong sectarian militia in Syria known as Jaysh al Sha’bi, drawn from fighters from Iran, Lebanese Hezbollah, Iraq, and even the Gulf states. This Basiji-style irregular army, as well as older Syrian formations such as the minorities-staffed Popular Committees and the shabiha (both of which also receive the mullahs’ largesse), stand to inherit the responsibilities of the Syrian Army, and further Iranian interest, in the event of regime collapse.
Lest anyone think that these claims amount to Israel overstating its own security threat, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) has put out a new study about the Persian bulwark keeping Assad alive which legitimates and expands on Shapira’s analysis. ISW also suggests that a major imperative for grounding Syrian aircraft or destroying the Air Force’s infrastructure is to halt to the uninterrupted supply-line of personnel and materiel from Tehran.
The report neatly lays out the history of proven Iranian involvement in Syria such as the assassination of IRGC-QF Brigadier General Hassan Shateri in the Damascus countryside in February 2013, and the prisoner swap deal brokered between the regime and the Free Syrian Army in January, which saw the release of high-ranking officials of the IRGC-Ground Forces including the current and former commanders of IRGC Shohada unit; the commander of 14th Imam Sadegh Brigade (Bushehr province); and members of the 33rd al-Mahdi Brigade (Fars province). All of these units have extensive experience in counterinsurgency tactics, as they deal with provinces of Iran used to tribal and ethnic unrest. As the ISW authors observe: “The forward deployment of high-ranking current commanders of IRGC Ground Forces units is unusual, as IRGC-QF is Iran’s traditional foreign military arm while IRGC-GF is responsible for internal security and conventional operations inside of Iran.”
Moreover, the presence in Syria of agents from Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces, a sub unit of the Iranian Interior Ministry answerable to the Supreme National Security Council (and thus Khamenei himself), suggests that Tehran views Syria much the same way that Moscow views Georgia: as a domestic rather than foreign concern.
How are Iranian agents and weapons arriving in Syria? Through Iranian commercial and sometimes even Air Force planes, which ISW considers the “most critical component of Iranian material support to Syria.” In June 2011, the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned Iran Air for sending military hardware including “missile or rocket components” to Syria, which the IRGC of course dressed this up as medical equipment or innocuous spare parts. Another Iranian airline, Yas Air, was also sanctioned in March 2012 for moving IRGC-GF agents and weapons. In total, the Treasury Department has identified 117 cargo and passenger planes associated with Yas Air, Iran Air, Mahan Air facilitating the regime’s war machine. To quote from the ISW report:
“One Syrian Air Ilyushin-76... has been identified as having travelled between airfields around Moscow, Tehran, and Damascus in 2012. Unauthenticated flight manifest records indicate that this Syrian plane has used Iraqi, Iranian, and Azeri airspace to deliver equipment from Russia. The aircraft reportedly transported over 200 tons of Syrian banknotes printed in Russia over multiple trips in 2012. The aircraft also attempted to transport refurbished Mi-25 Russian attack helicopters in this manner, although Iraqi authorities denied the over-flight request.”
When the U.S. controlled Iraqi’s air space, Iran had to travel via Turkey’s to deliver materiel to Syria. Yet Turkey started interdicting and inspecting Iranian aircraft in March 2011, forcing Iran to revert to Iraqi skyways. Nuri al-Maliki’s assurances to the State Department that he would inspect all flights coming from Iran and headed to Syria would be worthless even if they weren’t mendacious because the Iraqi Air Force in its current state can hardly patrol its own airspace. (Don’t worry, though: the Transport Minster Hadi al-Amiri is a member of the Tehran-supported Badr Organization and widely seen as an accomplice of the IRGC.)
Still another problem is Iran’s enabling of Iraqi Shiite militias in Syria such as Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH), Asai’b Ahl al-Haq (AAH) and the newly formed Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas Brigade (AFAB), which is diverse outfit of Syrian, Iraqi, and Lebanese Hezbollah fighters. Some of these militants are first flown to Tehran for training before being flown back to Damascus, chiefly to guard the Seyyada Zeinab district of the capital, where the daughter of Imam Ali is entombed.
Moving Iranian personnel and hardware within Syria is also best done through air transport. Yet the regime relies almost exclusively on the IL-76 transport plane, of which it currently has only five left in its inventory. Of its main strafing aircraft, the L-39 trainer jet, the Syrian Air Force is down to between 40 and 70. All other fixed-wing aircraft in its order of battle, particularly the MiG and SU attack jets, are Soviet-era, require heavy maintenance and even heavier training to make them mission capable. An intervention that confined itself to Syria’s air traffic would therefore severely hinder Iran’s ability to prop up Assad or further Suleimani’s “takeover” project.
Perhaps seeking to drive this point home, ISW released a helpful slideshow yesterday examining the three ways that such an intervention can be accomplished. The first is to wage limited air strikes on Syrian infrastructure (runways, fuel depots, command, and control centers) without really going after the planes themselves. This would degrade the regime’s ability to receive Iranian air cargo (or IRGC facilitators or repatriating militiamen) as well as then redistribute them around Syria. It would further reduce the regime’s capability to launch air attacks against the opposition, thus improving, albeit not guaranteeing, conditions for a safe zone in the north. The second option is go after some Syrian aircraft and degrading the regime’s ability to transport anyone or anything incoming from Iran around the country (though this option wouldn’t necessarily stop personnel or materiel from entering Syria). The third option is a no-fly zone, which would eliminate the regime’s ability to conduct bombing runs or receive aerial resupply from Iran. It would protect any safe zone established along the Syrian-Turkish border from aerial attack, though not from any ground incursions (here is where trained and well-equipped rebels would be necessary stand-in forces for foreign boots on the ground).
An ISW author of the report is quoted in Foreign Policy:
"I get why people get so amped up about no-fly zones" said Christopher Harmer, senior naval analyst at the Institute for the Study of War. People often tend to think of Iraq, he told the E-Ring, and the 12 year-long complex, high-demand Operation Southern Watch and Operation Northern Watch. Those missions cost an estimated $1 billion per year, combined.
But that was a "full" no-fly zone controlling a large adversarial territory. It would take far less to protect the smaller skies over Syria, which maintains far less air power, defense analysts believe.
"Is the goal to establish a classic no-fly zone, or is the goal to ground the Syrian Air Force?" Harmer said. "Establishing a classic no-fly zone is time consuming and costly; grounding the Syrian Air Force is as simple as sending a few cruisers and destroyers from Norfolk over to the Eastern Med and dropping 250 (Tomahawk) TLAM into Syria."
"That ends the Syrian Air Force in less than an hour."
The actual attack may take a bit longer, like the assault on Libya's air defenses, but still fares better than a sustained no-fly zone.
"Tomahawk TLAM cruise missiles can easily degrade the very limited Syrian Air Force down to almost nonexistence," Harmer contends. "We launch TLAM at the runways, radars, fuel farms, and aircraft themselves, and without U.S. aircraft getting anywhere near the Syrian airspace, we effectively create a no-fly zone -- not by enforcement, but by eliminating the Syrian Air Force."
