Are Jewish ethics just a component of Jewish law, or are they overlapping but distinguishable concepts?
At first blush, it appears that from the perspective of Judaism, Jewish ethics is identical to halacha (Jewish law.) Halacha includes lots of ethical imperatives like charity, kindness to strangers, visiting the sick and honoring one's parents. Legal questions come up with each of these - for example, does one have to listen to their parents' advice when it would be detrimental to the child? The same rabbis that decide whether something is kosher also decide how much charity one must give.
But a little thought shows that while Judaism treats ethics and law similar ways, using similar methodologies and anchoring both in sacred texts, ethics is treated as something beyond the law.
In Pirke Avot, one opinions says that someone who says "what's mine is mine and what's yours is yours" is acting like a resident of the wicked city of Sodom. Why should that be? Clearly, from a legal perspective, he is saying something accurate. Why would such a person be considered to be like the famously evil Sodomites?
One commentator, the Bartenura, says the reason is that the Sodomites did not want any visitors, even though their land had lots of resources and could accommodate guests. This character trait is what made them evil. People risk becoming callous towards others when they insist that what is theirs is theirs, and this starts the slide towards being akin to a Sodomite.
This illustrates the tension in Judaism between halacha and ethics: one is expected, urged and - at times - obligated to act in ways beyond the letter of the law.
This is what the Talmudic phrase lifnim mishurat hadin means (Bava Metzia 30b). It says that people not only can but should act beyond the strict interpretation of halacha. It demands a higher ethical standard.
This is a remarkable concept. Lifnim mishurat hadin appears to exist at the intersection of formal law and ethical aspiration. It seemingly accepts the idea that halacha itself can never be an all encompassing system and it requires ethical concepts beyond halacha to cover all potential questions. The halachic system itself acknowledges its own limitations and encourages people to go beyond them. There are cases where lifnim mishurat hadin were mandated by batei din, Jewish courts, others where it is just encouraged, and stories of people who were praised or going above and beyond what was legally required of them.
There are other similar concepts in halacha where strict adherence to halacha itself is strongly disparaged. A "naval b’reshut haTorah" is a disgusting person who does everything within halachic bounds and not one millimeter beyond. The Talmud states an opinion that Jerusalem was destroyed because people followed only strict law and did not go beyond it.
Some examples make it sound like going above and beyond is praiseworthy, some that it is expected, some that it is mandated. What seems clear is that lifnim mishurat hadin goes beyond the halachic system, yet it can justify itself within the halachic framework by using Deuteronomy 6:18, "Do what is right and good in the eyes of the Lord," as an overarching Biblical source for extra-judicial ethics.
A recent responsum by Rav Yosef Zvi Rimon illustrates this idea of Jewish ethics asserting itself independently of halachic detail.
Soldiers are allowed to seek shelter in the homes of their enemies during wartime. One Israeli soldier asked whether he would be allowed to charge his mobile phone while resting in one such home in Gaza, another asked whether he could take items from another home that was about to be demolished and the items destroyed anyway (presumably because it was hiding a tunnel shaft or was booby trapped.) After looking at this through a strictly halachic viewpoint, Rav Rimon adds that when one is engaged in an obligatory war of self defense, one must not gain any personal pleasure from it as that endangers the moral underpinnings of the war itself. He brings as proof the idea from his own teacher, Rav Aharon Lichtenstein, that when King Saul ignored the commandment to destroy all of Amalek and he justified keeping some animals, "he turned his entire war into something unethical. The war against Amalek is a decree from God. When a person benefits from the results of the war, there is personal enjoyment, and he is not acting solely according to God’s direction. Consequently, the justified killing becomes
murder."
This part of the response is purely ethical, not halachic, but the language is extraordinarily strong in its insistence that one cannot personally gain from spoils of war, even when those gains will not cause any additional loss from the owners.
Concepts like lifnim mishurat hadin and naval b’reshut haTorah show that Jewish ethics are supra-halachic. This means that they can be examined and studied as an independent system, outside the halachic framework. And moreover, it indicates that, unlike halacha, Judaism's ethical standards can be seen as a model for the world, not only Jews.
The Jewish ethical framework may be based on the halachic framework - but it can be decoupled from halacha itself when applied to the world at large. Its rich and deep sources and its unparalleled maturity makes Jewish ethics particularist and universal, ever timely and timeless.
It is an ideal ethical system for everyone.