Jonathan Schanzer: What Victory Looks Like When Your Foe Won’t Surrender
Trump’s problems in fighting Iran are tangible: a naval blockade, drone swarms, and missile attacks on allies. But the struggle can be distilled to one word: ideology. The wars at the beginning of this century were waged to defeat that ideology. We called it the “War on Terror.” And it was a war worthy of waging, even though the word “terror” was a politically correct euphemism for the true enemy, Islamic radicalism. But we gave up for lack of progress. From 2001 to 2021, the United States spent more than $8 trillion. We had the edge against our enemies in terms of firepower. However, we could not credibly declare victory no matter how many battles we won. And we could not win because the other side refused to lose.Why Iran's Rulers Are Not "Rational Actors"
Adherents to jihadism (who make up fewer than 20 percent of the world’s Muslim population) believe that their faith commands them to fight and that victory is inevitable, even if it takes decades. Indeed, they believe they are destined to win, or die trying. As the late, great Middle East scholar Bernard Lewis wrote back in 2006, “For people with this mindset, [Mutually Assured Destruction] is not a constraint; it is an inducement.”
This is the worldview of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. It is the worldview of Iran’s proxies, Hamas and Hezbollah, not to mention the Houthis in Yemen. Adherents to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s 1979 Islamic Revolution view the world this way, too.
When your enemy is the infidel, and your victory is ordained by Allah, your obligation is to keep fighting, even in defeat. Surrender is not an option. The Islamic Republic not only embraces this mindset; it portrays every challenge as a test of will that it must endure. Military losses or economic pain are spun as proof of martyrdom and sacrifice, to be answered with even greater confidence in the revolution.
But just because someone refuses to admit defeat doesn’t mean he is immune to it. The relentless Israeli–American assault on the assets of the regime is undeniably taking its toll. There is still a chance that the regime will collapse amid the demise of its top leaders, the destruction of its key military assets, and the voiding of its cash-generating businesses. If the regime survives all of that, it will still be contending with a population that is not soon to forget the slaughter of more than 30,000 patriots who were murdered for the crime of protesting against their oppressive regime. The Iranian rank and file will likely be aided by the Mossad, the CIA, and other intelligence agencies from countries that sustained attacks by the Islamic Republic over the course of this war. These countries have deep pockets and a grudge. The combined ability of these parties to provide weapons, cash, secure communications, and intelligence to the Iranian people could ultimately tip the scales and topple the regime.
The problem for Donald Trump is that such things take time. And, as we’ve seen, he fears that time will sink him deeper into this war, just as it has sunk America into almost every war it has fought since World War II.
One possible missed opportunity for Trump was to take a page out of the George H.W. Bush handbook. When the United States expelled Iraq from Kuwait in 1991, Saddam Hussein’s regime was defeated militarily in just six weeks. However, the Iraqi government remained in place, and it was not forced to surrender unconditionally. The liberation of Kuwait was the aim, so Operation Desert Storm was deemed a success. What followed was a long-standing effort to isolate the Iraqi regime through a combination of diplomatic and economic pressure, along with UN measures to ensure disarmament and the enforcement of no-fly zones to protect the Iraqi population.
Such a scenario might have been thinkable at the outset of Operation Epic Fury. But the window for that closed when the regime began to wage its asymmetric war in the Persian Gulf. There was no way to leave and save face.
An unequivocal victory is still feasible, but that may be possible only by waging total war. Which is what Trump implied when he warned the regime that a failure to reach an equitable deal through diplomacy would result in Iran getting bombed “back to the stone age.” His words immediately elicited howls of disapproval from the international community, not to mention Trump’s political opponents, who declared such rhetoric out of bounds. But threats such as “a whole civilization will die” violate not a single law of war. Angry rhetoric does not constitute a crime. And in any event, due to the unlikely diplomatic intervention of Pakistan, a window for dialogue was opened.
The cease-fire that followed only 12 hours later was dramatic, but mostly because it was bound to fail. The Iranian regime sent emissaries to Islamabad to deliver one message: It will not capitulate. After 21 hours of fruitless talks, Trump and his chief negotiator, Vice President JD Vance, sensibly took no for an answer.
The next phase of Operation Epic Fury will be a hybrid campaign. The conventional strikes will continue as necessary when targets present themselves—although we have already been told that we may have reached a point of diminishing returns in this regard.
Concurrently, the U.S. will likely continue to wage the economic campaign during which the United States Navy is blocking Iranian tankers and those paying Iran bribes for its tankers to transit the Strait of Hormuz. The Air Force may knock out additional economic assets to deprive the regime of the ability to pay its loyalists. The handbook for sanctions and other financial tools honed since the George W. Bush administration is likely to be deployed, too. This will be a reprise of Trump’s “Maximum Pressure” campaign on steroids.
For Trump, this is now all about legacy and history. If waged wisely, Operation Epic Fury could bring down America’s most determined Middle Eastern foe. It can also help redefine military victory in the modern era. There will be no white flags, no papers signed on a battleship, no suicides in a bunker. We will have to content ourselves with knowing we set the world on a new course—even as, in the wake of a victory, there will almost certainly be an entire class of experts and political opponents who will continue to insist that the whole thing was a dead loss.
If Iran's rulers were "rational actors," they wouldn't have wanted to repeat the experience of the 12-day war in June 2025.Saudi Arabia, the Abraham Accords, and Operation Roaring Lion
Yet they're not. They are not peace-loving. They don't prefer compromise over conflict. Iran's rulers believe - literally - that they are on a mission from God.
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's title was "Supreme Leader," implying that he was the divinely ordained guardian of Iran.
For nearly half a century, every American president pledged that Iran's theocrats would be prevented from acquiring the nuclear capabilities that could lead to the fulfillment of their grand ambition: "Death to America!" Yet no serious actions were ever taken.
If Mr. Trump had not struck when he did, then Tehran might have acquired nukes while continuing to build up an enormous arsenal of drones and missiles, leading to a war that future presidents could not win, or could win only at an exorbitant cost in blood and treasure.
This conflict was about degrading an American enemy's capabilities, not its intentions.
Their hatred of America, Israel and the West has not abated. They continue to believe it is their duty to wage jihad.
Saudi policy toward Israel will depend largely on how the war with Iran ends. Four main scenarios stand out, each affecting in different ways the likelihood that Saudi Arabia will join the Abraham Accords.
In a prolonged war with no clear outcome but continued regional erosion, Saudi Arabia is likely to remain cautious. Quiet coordination with the United States and Israel would still carry strategic value, but the public and regional costs of open normalization would stay high. Riyadh would likely deepen its hedging—expanding quiet security cooperation, investing more in regional alternatives, and holding back from a formal agreement.
In a stable ceasefire without a decisive outcome, the chances of gradual warming are likely highest. Riyadh could present the outcome as inconclusive while arguing that it opens a window to reshape the regional order. If this is coupled with some form of arrangement in Gaza and on the Palestinian track, phased normalization could again become a realistic option. This scenario comes closest to more optimistic assessments, which hold that the prospect of an agreement has not disappeared but now depends on effective mediation and the management of a new regional order. (Rothem, 2025; Ross, 2025).
If the conflict settles into a pattern of recurring rounds of fighting, Saudi policy is likely to remain deeply ambivalent. Strategically, the case for a regional alignment would continue to strengthen; politically, however, each new round would heighten public and Arab sensitivities and push back any move from quiet cooperation to open normalization. In this scenario, there would be growing strategic need for an alliance alongside limited political room to act.
In a scenario in which the Iranian regime is replaced, or at least significantly weakened, the picture would be more complex. On one hand, the immediate Iranian threat would recede, potentially easing the sense of urgency that has driven part of the logic for normalization. On the other, such a shift could open a window for a new regional order in which Saudi Arabia would seek to consolidate its gains, reinforce its position, and anchor itself in a U.S.-backed regional architecture. Thus, in this scenario, normalization would not necessarily accelerate immediately, but if a less threatening regional order takes shape, it could become politically easier for Riyadh, even if less strategically urgent.
The war therefore will not shape the Saudi approach to normalization in a single direction. Some scenarios increase the strategic case for normalization, others reduce its urgency, and still others widen the gap between strategic interest and political feasibility.
Conclusion
Before the war, the prospects for Saudi–Israeli normalization were improving even as the path toward it grew longer, however the war has changed the way the Saudis view the issue. Riyadh no longer sees normalization as a bilateral deal with Israel, but as part of a broader question: what regional order will emerge after the war, what will Saudi Arabia’s place be within the new order, and what alternative regional options will it have. As long as the outcome of the war remains uncertain, Saudi policy will stay gradual, cautious, and hedged. If, however, conditions begin to take shape for some form of regional settlement with a Palestinian track, and there is a clearer picture of the Iranian threat, the overall likelihood of Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords may not only hold but increase. The prospects have improved; the path has lengthened; and the meaning of normalization has changed.Top of Form










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