Tuesday, March 17, 2026

Note:I am writing as a Jewish thinker, not a Christian theologian. I am not arguing from within the Christian tradition about how it should read its own sources. I am arguing from outside — using a philosophical framework rooted in Jewish ethical methodology — that the theological genre examined here fails by standards universal to moral reasoning, standards that the strongest elements of Christian moral thought itself affirms. Where this essay engages Christian theology, it does so analytically, not confessionally.


The Uncontested Ground

A new theological genre has emerged in the wake of Gaza, and it has largely gone unanswered on the terrain that matters most.

Books like Christ in the Rubble by Munther Isaac, Being Christian After the Desolation of Gaza, and the anthology Theology After Gaza are not simply political critiques wrapped in religious language. They constitute a coherent theological system, with its own internal logic, its own epistemology, and its own account of what Christian faithfulness requires. Taken together, they represent a serious intellectual project, and they deserve a serious intellectual response.

They have not received one.

Christian Zionism, which is the natural constituency for a counter-argument, has largely responded to this genre by retreating to biblical geography. The land was promised, the return was prophesied, the restoration of Israel fulfills scripture. These arguments may be compelling within their own tradition, but against opponents who are arguing about justice and the prophetic tradition's concern for the oppressed, scripture-based Zionism is not playing the same game. It concedes the entire moral-reasoning space by default. Palestinian Christian theology has effectively occupied the moral high ground not because its arguments are sound, but because its opponents have declined to contest them on those terms.

That is the gap this essay attempts to fill.

The framework I am drawing on is Derechology, a system of moral reasoning I have been developing as a form of "moral engineering," applying structural insights from Jewish ethical methodology to construct universal, secular moral analysis. It is not a Jewish theology. It is a method, and methods can be used by anyone. My claim is that this framework can do what Christian Zionism has failed to do: engage Palestinian Christian theology on its own chosen terrain — moral reasoning, prophetic justice, and the ethics of violence — and demonstrate that its conclusions do not follow from the premises it uses to reach them.

I submit that Gaza theology replaces structured moral reasoning with a system in which suffering determines moral truth, moral categories are collapsed into one another, and conclusions are fixed in advance. This produces emotionally compelling but analytically unreliable moral judgments, and it does so not despite claiming the prophetic tradition but by systematically dismantling the analytical tools that tradition requires.


What Gaza Theology Is Actually Doing

The books in this genre are emotionally powerful, and the emotion is not fraudulent. Their authors have witnessed genuine suffering. Munther Isaac is a Palestinian Christian pastor who has ministered in Bethlehem while Gaza was bombed. The suffering of Gazans is real. A serious response cannot dismiss it, and this one will not. For the record: a framework that defended Israeli conduct categorically, without applying the same standards of scrutiny this essay demands of its opponents, would fail the identical test applied here.

But moral authority and emotional authority are not the same thing. The most consequential move in Gaza theology is not the reporting of suffering: it is the theological interpretation of what suffering proves. And that interpretation is where careful analysis must begin.

Across all three books, a single foundational axiom operates: moral authority resides with the victim. The framing in Isaac's book is explicit, that the divine presence is located with those under the rubble,  meaning not merely that God is present with the suffering (a theologically defensible claim with deep roots in the tradition) but that the victim's perspective generates moral truth. Suffering does not merely witness to tragedy; it testifies to guilt.

This is a significant claim. It is largely unargued but rather presupposed. And once presupposed, it does enormous downstream work: moral authority is relocated away from doctrine, law, and structured reasoning, and into the experience of those who suffer. The practical consequence is that disagreement with the victim's narrative becomes morally illegitimate rather than factually contestable: not an error to be corrected but a form of complicity to be condemned. Questioning the framework's conclusions does not invite rebuttal; it triggers indictment. This is not a feature of robust moral reasoning. It is a sign that the framework has foreclosed the inquiry it claims to be conducting.


The Epistemic Problem: Claims as Axioms

Jewish ethical tradition insists on emet — the obligation to truth — as a precondition for moral reasoning, not a byproduct of it. Of course, this is not a specifically Jewish insight; it is shared across traditions. The commandment against bearing false witness is foundational to the Hebrew Bible that Christians read as their own scripture. The prophetic literature is filled with condemnations of dishonest scales, of those who call evil good and good evil, of testimony that serves predetermined conclusions. Any framework claiming continuity with this tradition must audit its own factual premises before proceeding.

Gaza theology does not do this. It proceeds axiomatically.

Consider the term "genocide." In Theology After Gaza, it appears in the preface as settled fact — not a charge to be established but a characterization already in place. Genocide, legally and morally, requires demonstrated intent to destroy a people as such. The Genocide Convention does not define genocide as high civilian casualties in urban warfare. It does not define it as disproportionate force, collective punishment, or ethnic cleansing. It requires specific intent — dolus specialis — directed at the destruction of a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group as a group.

Whether that intent can be demonstrated in Israel's conduct in Gaza is a factual and legal question. It is not answered by casualty figures, no matter how high. It is not answered by quoting politicians making statements about destroying Hamas. It requires sustained evidentiary analysis of military targeting decisions, command structures, stated objectives, and patterns of action — analysis that distinguished legal bodies have conducted and contested without consensus. 

Gaza theology treats this question as closed.

This closure has a diagnostic consequence worth making explicit. A moral framework is falsifiable when there exists some possible evidence that could revise its conclusions. Ask of this framework: what Israeli action, conducted under the same conditions of ongoing Hamas attack, tunnel infrastructure, hostage crisis, and explicit genocidal intent from the other side, would not constitute evidence of genocide within this system? If the answer is that no such action exists — that the conclusion is entrenched regardless of what evidence might show — then the framework is not a moral analysis. It is a verdict with supporting documentation assembled afterward. Israel's policies of warning to the population to move out of harm's way, of facilitating thousands of tons of food and aid into Gaza during active hostilities, of pausing campaigns to allow vaccine distribution and hundreds of other examples, are either ignored or twisted by Israel's critics as more evidence of atrocities. The unfalsifiability is not incidental; it follows directly from locating moral authority in suffering rather than in structured evaluation of acts and intentions.

A methodologically rigorous audit asks: what definition (of genocide, of apartheid, of occupation, of colonialism) is being used? Is it stable? Is it applied consistently? Would the same standard, applied to comparable situations, produce comparable conclusions? These are the minimum conditions for moral reasoning rather than moral performance.


The Category Problem: Fusing What Must Be Distinguished

The most consequential analytical failure in Gaza theology is what might be called category fusion — the collapse of four morally distinct phenomena into a single moral object.

War involves organized armed conflict between parties with recognized combatants and rules governing conduct. Atrocity refers to specific violations of those rules: targeting civilians, torture, execution of prisoners. Structural injustice describes ongoing systemic conditions — occupation, discrimination, unequal legal treatment — that exist apart from active combat. Genocide is a legal category with a specific intent requirement.

These categories are related but not interchangeable. A war can be just even if it contains atrocities. Structural injustice can exist without genocide. Atrocities do not automatically constitute genocide. The legal and moral consequences of each category differ dramatically. (Whether Israel is guilty of atrocities or structural injustice are separate questions requiring separate analysis — neither, in any case, implies genocide.)

In the Gaza theology genre, these categories are merged. Once merged, any evidence of one becomes evidence of all. High civilian casualties — a feature of any urban warfare, especially when one party embeds combatants in civilian infrastructure — become evidence of genocidal intent. The existence of the blockade, a structural policy meant to protect Israeli civilians, is folded into evidence of elimination. October 7th is described as contextualized, reactive violence arising from oppression. Israeli military responses are described as colonial elimination. One side's violence is categorized as structural; the other's as atrocity. Crucially, neither categorization is argued, they are assumed.

This category fusion has a specific logical consequence beyond unfalsifiability: it makes the framework incapable of distinguishing better from worse conduct. If all Israeli military action is genocide by definition, then there is no meaningful moral difference between a strike that kills twenty civilians and one that kills two thousand, between targeting a Hamas commander and targeting a hospital, between a war fought with discriminating means and one fought without them. Moral categories exist precisely to make these distinctions. A framework that erases them cannot guide conduct. It can only pronounce verdicts.

The Christian traditions that Palestinian theologians draw on are not uniform on the ethics of war . Just War theory, developed in the Western Latin tradition by Augustine and Aquinas, is not universally accepted across Christendom. Eastern Orthodox Christianity, the tradition of a substantial portion of Palestinian Christians, has historically taken a more morally austere position: that killing in war, even when unavoidable, carries moral cost requiring penitential response. That tradition, if taken seriously, demands more rigorous analysis of how wars begin, who sustains them, and who bears responsibility for their conditions, not less. The categorical precision that Gaza theology abandons is not a Western imposition. It is what serious moral reasoning about violence requires, regardless of tradition.

Palestinian Christian theology claims the prophetic mantle while dismantling the analytical tools that prophetic justice requires.


Suffering, Agency, and the Prophetic Tradition

The liberation theology tradition from which Gaza theology draws its strongest arguments contains genuine insight. Its insistence that theology must not float free of material conditions — that a gospel indifferent to poverty, displacement, and political oppression is an impoverished gospel — has real roots in the Hebrew prophets, in Amos and Micah and Isaiah. To acknowledge this is not to concede the argument. It is to engage it honestly.

But liberation theology's core claim, that the locus of moral authority shifts toward the suffering, requires examination it rarely receives. There is a crucial distinction between saying that God is present with those who suffer and saying that those who suffer occupy a privileged epistemic position from which moral truth is generated. The first is a claim about solidarity. The second is a claim about who gets to define reality. The Gaza theology books consistently move from the first claim to the second without acknowledging that they have done so.

The Hebrew prophetic tradition, which Isaac invokes extensively, does not support this move. Amos condemns Israel for its treatment of the poor. But the poor in Amos are not exempt from moral analysis by virtue of their poverty. The widow, the orphan, the stranger — protected categories throughout the Hebrew Bible — are protected because of their vulnerability, not because vulnerability confers moral infallibility. The prophets address all parties as moral agents capable of faithfulness and sin, not as pure vessels of divine testimony insulated from evaluation.

There is a deeper problem. Gaza theology's reduction of Palestinian identity to victimhood is, paradoxically, a form of dehumanization. It removes agency. It renders the question of Hamas's stated intentions, Hamas's military tactics, Hamas's governance of Gaza, Hamas's explicit theological commitment to the elimination of Israel, and the documented participation of thousands of non-Hamas Palestinian civilians in the October 7 massacre, largely irrelevant to the moral conclusions the books reach. To take those questions seriously is to treat Palestinians as agents rather than as sufferers, which the framework cannot accommodate without disrupting its own architecture.

A moral framework that functionally exempts one party from analysis is not a framework for justice. It is a framework for a verdict already reached.


The Pursuer: Restoring a Missing Variable

Jewish law has long developed the concept of the rodef — the pursuer. The principle addresses a problem that moral philosophy in every tradition must eventually confront: what obligations arise when someone is not merely threatening harm as a single act, but is on a sustained trajectory toward it? The rodef is distinguished from the ordinary aggressor precisely by this trajectory, the ongoing direction of movement toward lethal harm that creates continuing moral urgency, increasing with every moment of inaction.

The reason to introduce this concept here is not to import a specifically Jewish legal category into a Christian debate. It is to name a variable that Gaza theology's framework structurally omits, and whose omission makes reliable moral evaluation of this conflict impossible.

Any serious moral analysis of the use of force must account for sustained lethal trajectory. The question is not only what happened in a specific strike or operation but what ongoing intention and capacity the force was responding to. This maps onto what multiple Christian traditions recognize as the problem of the unjust aggressor — the party whose ongoing threat to others creates legitimate grounds for intervention. What the rodef concept contributes is precision about trajectory rather than episode: the moral situation is created not merely by a completed act but by a sustained direction of movement that continues unless interrupted. Omit this variable and you cannot correctly evaluate the use of force. You can only evaluate its outcomes, which is not the same thing.

Gaza theology's framework omits this variable entirely. October 7th is described as the opening of "the genocide," contextualizing the massacre of 1,200 civilians — many tortured, many burned alive, many taken hostage — as a response to prior Israeli oppression. Even granting the political context, this framing treats October 7th as an episode arising from conditions rather than the expression of a sustained, institutionally embedded, explicitly articulated intent to destroy.

Hamas's founding documents call for the destruction of Israel and the killing of Jews. They are still in force, despite the 2017 revised document that softened some language. Hamas officials stated after October 7th that the operation was intended to be the first of many. Hamas's tunnel infrastructure — built under hospitals, schools, and civilian housing — represents a structural decision, made deliberately, to embed military assets within civilian populations. Under the laws of war and under basic ethical reasoning, moral responsibility for resulting civilian casualties rests primarily with the party that creates the shield, not the party that must confront it.

These factors do not play a meaningful role in the moral conclusions the books under examination reach. Hamas is not seriously evaluated as a moral agent with a record and a trajectory. Its governance of Gaza — including the execution of political opponents, suppression of civil society, and systematic diversion of humanitarian resources to military construction — does not inform the framework's judgments. Its explicit theological commitment to annihilationist war is not analyzed as a relevant variable. The omission is structural — the framework cannot incorporate this variable without collapsing the architecture that produces its conclusions.

Restoring the concept of sustained lethal trajectory does not predetermine the analysis. It opens it. It insists that all parties be evaluated as moral agents with intentions, capacities, and directions of movement. It asks whether there is an ongoing trajectory of violence that creates continuing moral urgency — a question that has an answer in this conflict, an answer that the Gaza theology genre is structurally prevented from seeing.


The Double Standard as Theological Method

The internal contradiction at the heart of Gaza theology is not incidental. It is structural, and it reveals itself most clearly in the response to October 7th.

Any moral framework is valid only if it applies identical evaluative standards to all agents. This is the minimum definition of a standard rather than a preference. Gaza theology fails it systematically, and the failure operates in both directions simultaneously: Israeli violence is evaluated without the context that might complicate condemnation, while Palestinian violence is contextualized in ways that functionally dissolve condemnation before it can form.

Consider how each side's violence is treated within the framework. Israeli military action is evaluated in isolation from the threats that produce it. The hostage crisis, the documented Hamas use of civilian infrastructure as military cover, the sustained trajectory of genocidal intent articulated in Hamas's own words — none of these factors play a meaningful role in the moral analysis. What plays a role is the outcome: Palestinian civilians died, therefore Israel committed an atrocity, therefore the theological verdict is condemnation. Context for Israeli action is not merely underweighted. It is structurally excluded.

Palestinian violence receives precisely the opposite treatment. The Kairos Palestine document, the foundational text of this theological movement, does not merely acknowledge Palestinian violence; it constructs a causal argument that transfers moral responsibility for it entirely to Israel. "If there were no occupation, there would be no resistance, no fear and no insecurity," the document states, presenting Palestinian violence not as the chosen acts of moral agents but as the mechanical outputs of Israeli input. Under this logic, Palestinian violence has no independent moral standing requiring evaluation. It is Israel's responsibility by definition, before any specific act is examined.

The October 7th massacre made this structural double standard impossible to conceal. Munther Isaac delivered a sermon the day after the massacre that described it in terms of Palestinian endurance — framing the murder of 1,200 civilians around "the strength of the Palestinian man who defied his siege." Later, under significant pressure, he offered a more qualified position: "What happened on 7 October was evil. No one can approve the murder and abduction of civilians and children. But I refuse to ignore the context. What happened on 7 October was the desperate act of people who have known nothing other than the siege of Gaza." 

The structure of that statement repays close attention. The condemnation is entered, then immediately bracketed by context — context that, within the framework's own logic, explains and therefore partially dissolves the moral weight of the act. That same contextual generosity is nowhere operative when Israeli military actions are evaluated. Israeli operations are not described as responses from people who have known nothing but rocket fire, tunnel infiltration, and the sustained genocidal declarations of their neighbors. Israeli context does not soften Israeli verdicts. Palestinian context dissolves Palestinian verdicts. The asymmetry is total and operates in both directions simultaneously.

The 2025 Kairos II document, issued more than two years after October 7th with full knowledge of what the massacre involved, confirms that this asymmetry is not a temporary failure of nerve but a settled theological position. It reaffirms "the right of all colonized peoples to resist their colonizers,"  framing resistance as simultaneously a political right and a theological calling. While including a caveat against civilian killings, the document consistently portrays resistance not merely as a political response but as a faith-driven act rooted in divine calling and religious conscience.  The caveat against civilian deaths is formal. The sanctification of resistance is substantive. When the two conflict — as they did on October 7th — the framework's actual priorities are visible.

This double standard is load-bearing to Gaza theology. Remove it and the framework cannot reach its conclusions, because those conclusions depend on applying maximum scrutiny to Israeli actions while granting structural exemption to Palestinian ones. Apply the same standard in both directions — evaluate both sides' violence in light of the threats each faces, the alternatives each had, the stated intentions each holds, and the moral agency each exercises — and the predetermined verdict dissolves. What remains is a genuine moral inquiry that might produce genuinely complicated conclusions. That, precisely, is what the framework is designed to prevent.

The test is simple: would the same contextual generosity extended to Hamas operatives carrying out October 7th be extended to Israeli military planners responding to ongoing attack, documented genocidal intent, and a hostage crisis? If not — if context humanizes one party while the other's context is structurally irrelevant — then what is being practiced is not ethics. It is weaponized false morality.

The prophetic tradition these books claim as their inheritance was not a tradition of selective indignation. Amos condemned Israel. Jeremiah condemned Judah. The prophets did not exempt their own people from moral analysis on grounds of historical suffering or national solidarity. The standard was consistent precisely because consistency was what made it a standard rather than a preference. Gaza theology, for all its prophetic self-presentation, does not meet the prophets' own test.


On Repentance: The Correct Order of Operations

The books in this genre conclude, consistently, with a call to repentance. Western Christians must repent of their complicity. The Church must reckon with its support for Zionism. The demand is urgent, the language searing.

The Jewish concept of teshuvah — repentance, literally "returning" — is among the most morally serious acts available to human beings. Christian theology has a direct parallel in the Greek concept of metanoia,  the change of mind and direction that stands at the center of the New Testament's moral vocabulary. Both traditions agree on the essential structure: genuine repentance is a complete turning, grounded in honest reckoning with what one has actually done, oriented toward genuine correction. It is not a performance. It is not the expression of solidarity with a cause. It is moral transformation, and both traditions insist that it must be rooted in truth to be real.

This is precisely why false repentance is not a virtue in either tradition. It is a corruption of the concept. To repent on the basis of a false account of what occurred is to perform the form of moral seriousness while evacuating its content. The Hebrew Bible is explicit on the related question of moral responsibility: accountability attaches to the specific acts of specific persons, not to inherited guilt or associative complicity. To demand that Western Christians repent for Israel's conduct on the basis of confessional solidarity — because many Christians support Israel — attributes guilt by association rather than by act. The prophetic tradition that Gaza theology invokes consistently repudiates exactly that move.

More fundamentally, the call to repentance in these books arrives before the moral work that would justify it. Casualty figures are cited not as data to be analyzed but as proof of what has already been decided. Expert claims — genocide, apartheid, ethnic cleansing — are treated not as conclusions to be argued but as premises from which to reason. The demand for repentance precedes rather than follows the establishment of truth, judgment, and responsibility.

In both Jewish and Christian moral understanding, the correct sequence runs in one direction only: truth, then judgment, then responsibility, then repentance. Gaza theology reverses this entirely. A call to repentance that bypasses truth is not moral seriousness. In the very prophetic tradition it claims to represent, it bears a closer resemblance to the false prophecy that tradition consistently and forcefully condemns.

The Gaza theology call to repentance is not a desire to improve oneself; it is a call to condemn fellow Christians under the pretense of religious imperative.


What This Framework Offers

This is not a defense of every Israeli military decision in Gaza.  Specific targeting choices, specific civilian casualty events, specific policy decisions can and should be evaluated on their merits by anyone willing to apply consistent standards. A framework that insists on methodological rigor applies that insistence to all parties, without exception and without predetermined conclusions.

What this analysis contests is the methodological structure Gaza theology uses to reach its conclusions — a structure that treats contested legal categories as settled facts, collapses morally distinct phenomena into a single object of condemnation, locates moral authority in suffering rather than in reasoned evaluation, functionally exempts one party from analysis, applies context asymmetrically in both directions, and demands repentance before establishing truth. These are not failures specific to writing about Gaza. They are failures of method that would corrupt any moral analysis to which they were applied.

Christian Zionism has not made this argument adequately, because it has been fighting on the wrong terrain, defending the legitimacy of Jewish sovereignty through scripture rather than defending the integrity of moral reasoning against its methodological opponents. Palestinian Christian theology has been permitted to claim the high ground of justice and prophetic tradition largely uncontested, while its actual methods have gone unexamined.

The concepts required for that examination are available across traditions. The obligation to truth that Jewish tradition calls emet is the same obligation enshrined in the commandment against false witness that both traditions share. The repentance that Jewish tradition calls teshuvah and Christian tradition calls metanoia both insist that genuine moral turning is grounded in truth, not performed ahead of it. The concept of the sustained lethal trajectory that Jewish law names with precision maps onto what multiple Christian traditions recognize as the unjust aggressor whose ongoing threat creates legitimate grounds for intervention. These are parallel developments from overlapping moral intuitions, and they are available to anyone willing to use them consistently.

The derechological contribution is to insist that these tools actually be deployed — honestly, symmetrically, and without predetermined conclusions. Not as an attack on compassion, which is genuine and morally required, but as a defense of the analytical conditions under which compassion can produce reliable moral judgments rather than misdirected ones. Mourning Palestinian civilian deaths is not only compatible with this framework; it is required by it. What the framework refuses is the move from mourning to verdict without the analytical work that the distance between those two things demands.

A grief that mistakes itself for a verdict is not justice. It is sorrow with a predetermined conclusion — and both the tradition these books invoke and the people whose suffering they describe deserve better than that.




Buy EoZ's books  on Amazon!

"He's an Anti-Zionist Too!" cartoon book (December 2024)

PROTOCOLS: Exposing Modern Antisemitism (February 2022)

   
 

 

  • Tuesday, March 17, 2026
  • Elder of Ziyon

I was interviewed by Lauri Regan at the Middle East Forum podcast. The topic was the Palestinian draft constitution, which is a much more dangerous document than you might realize - it is essentiially designed to help destroy Israel, not build a Palestinian state. 

Here's the interview:




Here are the slides.

Monday, March 16, 2026

From Ian:

Profiles in Terror
For those who need reminding, the late 1970s were a truly awful stretch for the United States of America: from stagflation at home to the Soviet Union and friends on the march in Afghanistan, Africa, and Central America, to the Khomeini revolution in Iran. David Frum's account of the period, How We Got Here, should be required reading for anyone under 40 now complaining that Ronald Reagan's conservatism didn't amount to a hill of beans in staving off national disaster. We were, as they say, thisclose.

Now comes Jason Burke, a veteran journalist for the United Kingdom's Guardian, with a timely reminder that the early 1970s also stank. The Revolutionists is an extensively reported chronicle of the leading figures of the time in violent pursuit of radical change, whether communist revolutions in Europe and elsewhere or the eradication of the state of Israel. Burke makes a plausible but understated case that the terrorism problem that seized the world by the lapels on September 11, 2001, has to be understood in the context of its origins and evolution over the previous 30 years.

Burke's subtitle is "The Story of the Extremists Who Hijacked the 1970s." The operative word is "hijacked," not in a metaphorical sense but literally, as in smuggling guns and bombs aboard commercial airplanes, commandeering them shortly after takeoff, forcing pilots to fly to hijacker-friendly Middle East destinations, and demanding of governments the release of previously captured and incarcerated extremists plus millions in ransom. Mostly, the hostages survived, but only after being thoroughly terrorized by the hijackers' threat to blow up the airplane and its passengers, sometimes seat-belted for days in their own excrement on a blisteringly hot tarmac with little food or water, sometimes subjected as well to deranged lectures on the justice of the Palestinian cause or the class conflict leading inevitably to proletarian revolution. It is astonishing now to read of the seeming ease with which armed extremists passed themselves off as ordinary passengers through minimal security.

There were literally hundreds of such attempted hijackings, the vast majority of them successful, in the period from 1968 to 1980—that is, in the wake of the stunning Israeli victory over massed Arab armies in the 1967 Six-Day War, which landed Israel control of the West Bank, Gaza, the Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights, and Jerusalem. In Burke's telling, Palestinians who cheered the onset of the war wept at its conclusion—feeling "grief equivalent to a bereavement," as he writes. One was Leila Khaled, who would go on to join George Habash's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, where she won fame as an early female perpetrator of hijackings and other terror attacks in Europe. The "armed struggle" was on.

Without making a polemic of it, Burke destroys any lingering doubt about the interconnectedness of the violent extremists of the time. Most terrorists in the Palestinian cause were homegrown, but their training camps and havens in the Middle East hosted communist radicals from West Germany, Central America, and Japan. Fusako Shigenobu, leader of the communist Japanese Red Army, became so concerned about security in her homeland she moved her base of operations to Beirut under the PFLP umbrella. The notorious "Carlos the Jackal" was born Ilich Ramírez Sánchez from Caracas, Venezuela. In the Arab world, he was known as Saleem Mohammed. His surge to global notoriety began in London in 1973 with his assassination attempt on Joseph Edward Sieff, the Jewish president of the retail chain Marks & Spencer.
Andrew Pessin: Tobias Gisle, We Need to Talk About the Most Influential Academic Fraud of the 20th Century
The Middle East is not the only part of the world that endlessly complains about being hard done by the West, and nurses and nurtures a culture of revanchism and militarism against the mean West from inside dictatorships. This is an apt description of Russia. This is exactly Putin’s ideology. All poor Russia needs is a little more space. A little more Lebensraum for the biggest country in the world. Therefore, justice demands that it should be free to invade its neighbours at will. Most people in the West alternate between disbelief and fear at this ludicrous suggestion. Yet this is exactly what the Arab-led activism championed by Said suggests. The reasoning is equally absurd. The reason that the Arabs and Muslims have such rubbish lives is that Arab lands used to be colonized long ago and that there is that terrible humiliation of there being a tiny Jewish state covering 0.17% of “Arab lands.” Instead of laughing in disbelief, we give Said and all his acolytes the best professorships in the lands of the West. Incidentally, when Said tried to claim victimhood for the Arabs, he missed something fundamental about Israel and Zionism. Israel may have been established by desperate refugees fleeing persecution, but the secret of Israel’s success is precisely that it is not revanchist. If I would go around complaining all day that the Nasser regime stole my children’s grandfather’s house in Alexandria, all Israelis would tell me to get a life and move on. Of course, we remember the Holocaust and the persecution, but this is not the focus. We are looking to the future, not looking for revenge.

Orientalism theory is black and white thinking with the goal of fermenting victimhood and revanchism among Arabs and Muslims. This is reflected in Said’s political legacy, where he bravely stood against the chance at statehood for Palestinians in the 1990s so that we could have a few more decades of good ol’ war instead.

It’s high time we rid ourselves of this theory. Said and Foucault both explain nothing and do nothing for the Middle East. The entire field needs a new paradigm. The real Middle East needs theories that challenge each and every phenomenon that hurts the people who live here. Authoritarianism, oppression of women, reliance on oil, sectarianism, and of course political Islam and the other debunked, useless ideologies of the Middle East. We don’t need any more theories that blame Israel and the West for all the problems of the region. We certainly don’t need “orientalism.”

The idea is the theoretical equivalent to people insisting they are “anti-racist” while at the pro-Palestine demonstration with Hamas flags fluttering and “Khaybar, Khaybar, ya Yahud” filling the Autumn breeze.

Enough with the indulgence of this poison.
Khaled Abu Toameh: Hamas Crimes No One Talks About
As international attention is focused on the Iran war, Hamas has stepped up its crackdown on the Palestinian people as part of its effort to reassert control in Gaza. Hamas has murdered, arrested, assaulted, or summoned for interrogation dozens of Palestinians for allegedly speaking out against the terror group.

Gaza-born political activist Hamza Howidy wrote last week: "Since the war with Iran began, Hamas's thugs have intensified their brutal, savage, barbaric campaign against Gaza's own residents. The people in this photo are just some of many who have been executed, shot, kidnapped, or brutally tortured in recent weeks. The list of atrocities grows by the day, and the sheer sadism on display goes beyond anything comprehensible.... The 'crime' those people committed? Saying their own opinions."

"What makes this even worse than the suffering of those victims itself is the silence of the people who built entire careers screaming about Palestinian suffering. The same commentators, the same 'human rights advocates,' the same influencers, and the same media outlets that spent months positioning themselves as the moral conscience of the world, packaging Palestinian pain into clout, followers, and book deals, have gone completely dark....The Palestinians left to die under Hamas's boots are apparently the wrong kind of Palestinians."

Another Gaza-born political activist, Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib, wrote on March 12: "Hamas terrorists conducted a parade in their trucks inside the al-Mawasi tent zone for the displaced. These gunmen are the same ones who are killing, kidnapping, torturing, and shooting Gazans every single day; they're making their presence known to say "shut up & pay us taxes"! They hide in tent areas and use civilians as shields to lessen the chance of being struck by Israeli drones and air strikes."
From Ian:

Mark Dubowitz and Richard Goldberg: Glimpsing Victory in Iran
As military pressure intensifies, the political dimension becomes increasingly important. Washington is targeting its messaging to IRGC personnel, military officers, and senior officials: Surrender brings amnesty; continued loyalty risks ruin. That logic may already be visible in what appears to be Phase 2. Roughly 3,000 members of an elite protest-suppression unit reportedly received warning messages that they were being targeted. Within a day, their headquarters near Tehran’s Azadi Stadium lay in ruins.

Phase 1 degrades military power and holds hostage the regime’s economic lifelines. Phase 2 raises the cost of repression inside Iran. Drones operating over Tehran have reportedly struck and killed IRGC and Basij personnel manning checkpoint units. For the first time, repression forces may fear for their own survival just as protesters have for years.

Phase 3 could present itself in more ways than sudden collapse—perhaps looking more like sustained erosion: a weakened regime, tightening economic pressure, diplomatic isolation, and eventually internal upheaval. The announced selection of Mojtaba Khamenei as the new supreme leader may accelerate that erosion rather than stabilize it. A polished cleric in the mold of Hassan Rouhani could again provide the IRGC political cover and revive illusions of moderation abroad. Mojtaba offers no such illusion. His elevation signals a harsher, weaker, more corrupt order—and therefore a more fragile one.

Phase 3, however, belongs to the Iranian people. Without sustained American pressure, Mojtaba and the IRGC will declare victory. That cannot be allowed. The regime has always feared domestic unrest more than external attack, which is why it repeatedly shuts down internet access during protests. Restoring connectivity would give Iranians a tool that the regime understands all too well.

Protesters also need the means of self-defense. January’s massacre of more than 30,000 Iranians by regime security forces remains a brutal reminder of what peaceful demonstrators face when confronting a coercive state. The United States should declare its commitment to Iran’s territorial integrity while arming the opposition—not only among Kurdish, Baluchi, and Arab minorities in the periphery, where local resistance could tie down security forces, but also among Persians in major cities.

With continued dominance in the air and deep penetration on the ground, Israel should continue striking the repression apparatus while America supports the political conditions for internal fracture.

The Islamic Republic has survived for 47 years because it has proved adaptive, ruthless, and willing to absorb immense pain. But it has never faced simultaneous leadership decapitation, military degradation, economic strangulation, regional isolation, and internal legitimacy collapse on this scale. That does not guarantee the regime’s end. It does mean that something once improbable is now imaginable: The long arc of the Islamic Republic may finally be bending toward an end. If that happens, military force will have created the opening.

Operation Epic Fury is only two weeks old. The campaign has already delivered major wins for American national security, and more are likely to emerge in coming days. But something much bigger and more historic is starting to come into view—something that can be unlocked with a little more patience from the American public as the United States degrades Tehran’s ability to wage war outside its borders and Israel degrades the regime’s ability to wage war against its own people.

Victory can be defined in many ways when a campaign delivers multiple layers of success in destroying capabilities that threaten the United States. But the ultimate goal should be enabling the Iranian people to rid the world of this radical, terror-sponsoring regime. And achieving that goal—total victory—seems ever more possible.
Josh Hammer: What is Victory in Operation Epic Fury?
At this point in the campaign, it is uncontested that wholesale regime change is the most desirable outcome. The pursuit of regime change as a goal unto itself is often now disparaged, coming in the aftermath of the failed neoconservative boondoggles earlier this century. But it ought to be axiomatic that there are some foreign regimes that behave in a manner that redounds to the American national interest, and there are some foreign regimes that behave in a manner that is contrary to the American national interest. It is natural and logical that we would wish for the latter types of regime to be heavily reformed or outright replaced — especially with the local populace leading the way.

Perhaps even more to the point: One does not take out a 37-year-ruling despot like Ali Khamenei, as the American and Israeli militaries did in the opening hours of the present operation, and not hope for full-scale regime change. Indeed, all people of goodwill should be hoping for that outcome — for the Iranian people to rise up like lions and throw the yoke of tyranny off their necks once and for all, delivering a long-sought victory for the American national interest in the process.

But it’s entirely possible that full-scale regime change won’t happen. The people of Iran just witnessed tens of thousands of their countrymen brutally gunned down during the anti-regime uprisings of late December and early January. They are an unarmed populace facing Nazi-esque regime jackboots, in the form of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Basij paramilitary.

All of that, then, raises one final question: Is it possible for there to be victory in Operation Epic Fury, and for the Iranian regime to be neutralized as a threat to the United States and our interests, if there isn’t full-scale regime change in Tehran?

In theory, the answer is yes. Venezuela provides a model. But in practice, the answer is murkier.

Delcy Rodriguez, the current leader, is a hardened Marxist-Leninist in the mold of her two immediate predecessors, Hugo Chavez and Nicolas Maduro. But Rodriguez has been fully cooperative with the United States since the astonishing January operation to extract Maduro for the simple reason that she has no real choice in the matter: She remains in power, yes, but only on the condition of an “offer” presented by Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio that, to borrow from Vito Corleone in “The Godfather,” she “can’t refuse.” Accordingly, Rodriguez has thus far been fully cooperative in areas such as American oil extraction and the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with the United States.

In theory, a similar arrangement is possible with a decimated, chastened regime in Tehran. And some experts predict that such an arrangement will characterize the regime in Iran a year or two from now. In practice, however, there is the ever-thorny problem that has frustrated and perplexed Westerners for decades when they attempt to reason with zealous Islamists: Radical, 72-virgins-in-heaven-aspiring Muslims do not fear death. A socialist like Rodriguez can, ultimately, be reasoned with; an Islamist like Mojtaba Khamenei (or his successor), probably not.

The cleanest solution to the Iran quagmire at this particular juncture — and the one that most clearly fulfills Trump’s “unconditional surrender” victory criterion — is indeed full-scale regime change. That is certainly the outcome that would be best for the neutralization of the Iranian threat and the corresponding advancement of the American national interest. I’m far from certain it will happen. But every alternative scenario only raises additional questions. So, like many others, I pray that the Iranian people seize this unique moment in history and take their destiny into their own hands.
Mojtaba Khamenei escaped death by seconds in same strike that killed his father
Mojtaba Khamenei, Iran’s new supreme leader, survived the February 28 US-Israeli strike on Tehran’s leadership compound because he had stepped outside shortly before missiles hit his residence, according to leaked audio obtained by The Telegraph. The recording, attributed to a senior official in the office of the late Ali Khamenei, provides one of the fullest accounts yet of the strike that killed Iran’s former supreme leader and other senior regime figures.

According to the report, the compound was hit at 9:32 a.m. local time in what appeared to be a coordinated attempt to kill members of the Khamenei family and senior Iranian leadership at the same time. The Telegraph said the audio was independently verified and came from remarks delivered by Mazaher Hosseini, identified as head of protocol in Ali Khamenei’s office, during a March 12 meeting in Tehran.

Hosseini said Mojtaba Khamenei had gone into the yard moments before the strike and was heading back upstairs when the building was hit. According to the report, he suffered a leg injury, while his wife, Zahra Haddad-Adel, and their son were killed instantly.

The leaked recording also described the deaths of other people inside the compound, including Mojtaba Khamenei’s brother-in-law, Misbah al-Huda Bagheri Kani, and Mohammad Shirazi, the chief of Ali Khamenei’s military bureau. Hosseini said the strikes hit multiple parts of the office complex simultaneously, including residences associated with several members of the Khamenei family.
  • Monday, March 16, 2026
  • Elder of Ziyon

Much of the legal debate about Israel's conduct in Gaza has focused on proportionality — whether the civilian harm caused by specific strikes was excessive relative to the military advantage gained. A War on the Rocks article by Orbach, Boxman, Henkin, and Braverman makes a crucial clarification that has been largely absent from that debate: under international law, proportionality is assessed strike by strike, not cumulatively across an entire campaign. The scale of destruction in Gaza cannot, by itself, constitute evidence of disproportionality. Each attack must be evaluated against its specific military objective and the foreseeable harm at the moment of decision.

But proportionality and distinction — the two principles that dominate public discourse about Gaza — are not the only ethical considerations governing how armies fight. There is a third, and it is the one Israel's critics most consistently ignore: the obligation to protect one's own forces, and the corresponding right to transfer risk away from soldiers when military necessity demands it.

The Law is Not a One-Way Street

Every major Western military manual incorporates force protection as a legitimate — and legally recognized — limiting factor on the obligation to minimize civilian harm. The operative concept is "feasibility." Additional Protocol I, Article 57, requires that precautions in attack be taken only insofar as they are "feasible," defined in authoritative commentary as "practicable or practically possible, taking into account all circumstances ruling at the time, including humanitarian and military considerations." Force protection is explicitly a military consideration. Precautions that would expose attacking forces to disproportionate risk are, by definition, not feasible — and therefore not required.

The British Army's Joint Service Publication 383, the authoritative UK manual on the law of armed conflict, states this plainly and goes further: it explicitly draws an operational lesson from the Second Battle of Fallujah, noting that commanders may accept greater incidental harm to civilians in order to reduce friendly casualties. The American DoD Law of War Manual establishes the same principle: precautions are required only when consistent with "mission accomplishment and the security of the force." The Australian, Canadian, and German military manuals adopt identical frameworks. No major democratic army has ever accepted the proposition that international law requires its soldiers to absorb unlimited casualties as the price of protecting enemy-controlled civilian populations.

It reflects a genuine ethical principle: military ethics does not operate on a single axis. It requires balancing competing obligations — to minimize civilian harm on one side, and to protect the lives of soldiers on the other. A commander who unnecessarily sacrifices his troops to reduce civilian casualties has made the less ethical choice, because he has spent real human lives on a calculation the law never required him to make.

What Gaza Actually Looked Like

To understand why the risk-transfer argument is not merely legally correct but operationally unavoidable, it is necessary to understand what Israeli forces actually faced in Gaza. Hamas did not simply hide among civilians. Over nearly two decades of governing the Strip, it transformed the entire urban environment into a prepared military battlespace. It constructed a subterranean tunnel network of extraordinary scale, depth, and redundancy, systematically integrated with civilian infrastructure — beneath homes, hospitals, schools, and mosques. Above ground, it embedded weapons caches, command nodes, and ambush positions throughout the residential fabric of Gaza's cities. Israeli forces reported approximately 14,000 booby-trapped structures in Rafah alone by September 2024.

The tactical consequence of this preparation is that in Gaza, almost any building may conceal a tunnel shaft, a weapons cache, a command node, or an ambush — and fighters cleared from one area can reappear behind advancing units through the tunnel network and re-contest or booby-trap previously secured ground. Classical infantry tactics — clear, hold, move forward — become a mechanism for feeding soldiers into prepared kill zones. An army that insists on dismounted infantry operations without standoff firepower in this environment is not making a more ethical choice. It is using its soldiers as human mine-clearance, advancing them into booby-trapped buildings and tunnel systems so that the rubble is produced by their bodies rather than by munitions. The law of armed conflict does not require this. No military manual endorses it. 

The scale of destruction in Gaza that critics treat as self-evident proof of disproportionality is, in large part, the physical signature of Hamas's own military architecture. Preserving those structures was incompatible with neutralizing the threat they contained. This is why the Orbach et al. analysis notes that comparable urban battles — Mosul, Raqqa, Marawi, Nahr el-Bared — produced destruction rates of 65 to 95 percent in their core combat areas, under military forces no one has accused of war crimes for the rubble they left behind.

The Covenant Between Army and Soldier

There is a dimension to this that goes beyond legal doctrine. Every democratic society that maintains an army enters into an implicit covenant with the men and women it asks to risk their lives: the state will send them into danger only for legitimate purposes of national defense, and will do everything within its power to bring them home. This covenant is functional as well as moral. Armies that squander their soldiers' lives unnecessarily destroy the trust that makes military effectiveness possible. Recruitment, morale, unit cohesion, the willingness of soldiers to follow orders under fire, all depend on soldiers believing that their commanders and their government regard their lives as precious.

To risk soldiers' lives not because the mission requires it, but to satisfy the demands of foreign critics or to generate more favorable headlines, is a perversion of this covenant. It treats soldiers as a moral currency to be spent on optics. The argument that Israel should have sent more infantry into Gaza's 14,000 booby-trapped structures — should have accepted more dead soldiers — to reduce civilian casualties and harm to civilian facilities caused by Hamas's deliberate human shielding is a demand that Israel spend its soldiers' lives on a reputational calculation. That is theater, not ethics.

Jenin: The Controlled Experiment

Israel already ran this experiment. In the 2002 Battle of Jenin, the IDF made a deliberate choice to fight building by building rather than use air power, specifically to minimize civilian casualties. The cost was severe: 23 Israeli soldiers killed, including 13 in a single devastating ambush on Salah ad-Din Street when fighters detonated a building they had lured troops into. By any objective measure, this was an extraordinary act of military self-sacrifice. No army was required to fight this way. Israel chose to.

The world accused Israel of a massacre anyway. Palestinian spokesmen falsely claimed hundreds of civilians had been killed. Amnesty International and major media outlets amplified the charge. The United Nations eventually concluded that roughly 52 people died in Jenin, the majority of them combatants.

Israel did not receive any credit for going beyond the law in risking soldiers' lives to reduce civilian harm. 

A standard that cannot be met no matter what Israel does is a constraint whose purpose is condemnation, not protection. Israel fighting with maximum infantry exposure and minimum firepower produced accusations of a massacre. Israel fighting with standoff firepower in Gaza produced accusations of genocide. The variable that produces the accusation is not Israeli conduct. It is the fact that Israel is fighting at all.

Israel should therefore optimize for the actual law — which requires balancing civilian protection against force protection, not sacrificing the latter entirely on the altar of the former. Jenin was arguably the less ethical choice, not the more ethical one. Israel exceeded every legal obligation, spent soldiers' lives it was not required to spend, and gained nothing — on the contrary.

Where the Law Places Responsibility

There is a final consideration the "risk transfer" critique systematically elides. Additional Protocol I, Article 51(8) establishes that the defending party bears responsibility for harm caused by its own violations of international humanitarian law. Hamas's use of human shields — embedding military command nodes under hospitals, storing weapons in schools, running tunnel shafts through residential buildings including children's bedrooms, refusing to construct civilian shelters or grant civilians access to its own tunnels — is a grave violation of international humanitarian law, and the civilian casualties that result from it fall on Hamas under Article 51(8).

An attacking force that takes all feasible precautions, warns civilians, adjusts and cancels strikes when civilian presence is detected, and fights within the bounds of proportionality — as the available evidence indicates Israel did, achieving fewer than one death per munition deployed during the war's most intense aerial phase — has discharged its legal obligations. The deaths that result from a defender's deliberate strategy of shielding military assets with civilian bodies fall on the defender. Hamas built its entire military doctrine around the expectation that the world would assign those deaths to Israel instead. The world largely obliged. This is a failure of moral reasoning, not a failure of Israeli conduct.

The risk transfer critique, properly understood, demands that Israel alone among the world's armies accept unlimited liability for an enemy's war crimes. Every military manual says that is not required. The law of armed conflict places responsibility with Hamas. Jenin proved that meeting the critics' demands produces only more demands. 

When choosing how to attack, military planners must chose the method that minimizes civilian casualties, all else being equal. But risking lives of soldiers in favor of civilian lives is not international law under any interpretation. And the responsibility for the lives of civilians killed belong squarely with the defending force that uses them as human shields.

The conclusion is not cynicism about civilian harm — the manuals, the law, and Israeli practice all demonstrate otherwise.  The conclusion is that the critics' framework was never about civilian harm to begin with.

(h/t Irene)



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Integralism is back. 

You may not have heard the word, but you've seen its effects — in the post-liberal intellectual movement, in the Heritage Foundation's ideological realignment, in the network of thinkers who've concluded that liberal democracy doesn't just need reform, it needs replacement.

Integralism is not a new idea. It emerged from 19th and early 20th century European Catholic political thought, where traditionalist thinkers argued that civil governments had an obligation to operate under the authority of the Church — that the liberal separation of church and state was not a neutral arrangement but an active political error, a usurpation of the proper order of things. Its most visible expressions were associated with authoritarian regimes in Spain, Portugal, and Latin America. After the Second Vatican Council in the 1960s, the Church itself moved toward affirming religious liberty, which put official Church teaching at odds with integralism's core claims. The ideology retreated to the margins of academic theology, where it remained for decades.

The revival began quietly around 2012, when Oxford philosopher Thomas Pink argued that the Church had never actually abandoned its pre-conciliar political theology — that Vatican II had been misread. By the mid-2010s a small group of American academics had developed a modern version of the argument. The leading figures were Adrian Vermeule, a Harvard constitutional law professor; Patrick Deneen, a Notre Dame political theorist; Chad Pecknold, a theologian at Catholic University; and journalist Sohrab Ahmari. Their online home was a website called The Josias, where integralist political theory was developed and debated in relative obscurity.

Then the political disruption of the 2016 Trump election created a new audience for root-cause critiques of liberal democracy. Deneen's 2018 book Why Liberalism Failed became a significant seller in conservative intellectual circles. At this point the movement made a strategic decision: change the name. "Integralism" carried historical associations with European fascism and antisemitism that made it politically toxic in an American context. The movement's own leaders documented the transition, experimenting with "political Catholicism" and "Christian realism" before settling on "postliberalism" — a label that described what they opposed rather than what they proposed, and sounded considerably less radical. By 2021, Vermeule, Deneen, and their allies had completed the rebrand with a Substack newsletter called Postliberal Order.

Not every postliberal is an integralist. Postliberalism is a wider tent, encompassing Protestant nationalists, Orbán admirers, and various critics of liberal proceduralism who have no particular commitment to Catholic political theology. But a significant wing of American postliberalism overlaps with or descends directly from integralist arguments, even when it avoids the label. And that wing has acquired institutional weight. When Kevin Roberts, the newly appointed president of the Heritage Foundation, attended the 2021 National Conservatism conference and publicly aligned Heritage with the national conservative movement — reversing Heritage's own position from two years earlier — it signaled that this tendency had moved from academic journals to the commanding heights of American conservative institutions.

The diagnosis these thinkers offer is serious and deserves a serious answer. Liberal proceduralism, they argue, was never truly neutral. It embedded substantive commitments about autonomy, about the bracketing of transcendence from public life, about the priority of rights over duties — and then pretended those commitments were just the absence of commitments. The resulting society didn't stay neutral. It dissolved. Family breakdown, opioid deaths, pornography as a mass medium, institutional distrust at historic highs: integralists look at all of this and say liberalism did this, and patching liberalism won't fix it.

They're not entirely wrong about the problem. The problem is their solution. 

Their solution is a specific theological-political hierarchy: God, Church, State, Citizens. The state enforces moral order defined by the Church. Authority flows downward. Legitimacy is doctrinal. Correction, when it comes, comes from ecclesiastical hierarchy.

Any moral-political system needs an internal mechanism to recognize when its own principles are being used to justify persecution, scapegoating, or civic degradation — and that mechanism must function without relying on the goodwill of its current leaders. Call this the correction standard. It isn't a bar any particular system is guaranteed to clear. But any system that cannot clear it is not a moral order. It's an enforcement order waiting for the wrong enforcer.

I have pointed out that antisemitism is a metric to measure the morality of systems. Any political, moral or social system that allow antisemitism is not a moral system, by definition. The hatred of Jews or Judaism or the Jewish nation has been rationalized by sophisticated thinkers across centuries. It has attached itself to high-minded frameworks and emerged from them looking like a conclusion rather than a crime. 

That makes antisemitism uniquely diagnostic. A system that cannot identify why antisemitism is wrong at a structural level — not merely inconvenient, not merely regrettable, but a reasoning failure detectable from within the system's own principles — will also fail to identify other forms of systematic moral distortion. Antisemitism is the stress test precisely because it is so old, so elaborate, and so persistent. Pass it and your correction mechanism is real. Fail it and you've told us something important.

Integralism, unfortunately, fails it structurally.

Classic integralism places Catholic doctrinal authority at the apex of the political order. Jews are, by definition, outside that hierarchy. The best integralism has historically offered Jews is toleration as a subordinate category — the Augustinian "witness people" doctrine, permitted to exist in Christian society in permanently diminished civic status as living proof of the Old Testament's authenticity. That isn't protection from antisemitism. That is antisemitism, in theological dress.

The integralist regimes of the 19th and early 20th century didn't drift into antisemitism despite their principles. They expressed it through their principles. The framework contains no internal audit, no correction mechanism, no appeals process outside the hierarchy itself — which is to say, outside the historical source of the problem.

Modern integralists like Vermeule and Deneen don't espouse explicit antisemitism, and some actively disavow it. But good intentions are not a structural safeguard. Consider what has happened in the broader postliberal space. Candace Owens, who converted to Catholicism and has been warmly received in integralist-adjacent Catholic media, has made statements about Jews and Israel that are antisemitic by any rigorous definition. Tucker Carlson has platformed explicitly antisemitic voices, used demographic replacement rhetoric, and drifted toward treating Jewish institutional influence as a legitimate political grievance. 

Serious integralist thinkers would say these figures represent a hijacking — that they don't understand post-liberal ideas and shouldn't be held against them. But that response misidentifies the problem. The issue is not whether Owens and Carlson are integralist theorists. They aren't. The issue is that a movement explicitly claiming to restore moral order has shown no robust internal capacity to identify or repel antisemitic drift among adjacent allies — not when that drift serves broader anti-liberal goals, not when it's popular, not when calling it out is costly. That is not a hijacking problem; it is a correction mechanism problem. A framework that can be steered toward the oldest civilizational pathology in Western history, without its own principles generating an alarm, has told us everything we need to know about how it would function with state power behind it.

So where does that leave the right? It is philosophically exposed. 

The traditional conservative answer — call it fusionism — holds that free markets, limited government, and religious faith naturally reinforce each other, producing what its advocates called "ordered liberty": a society where people are free because their families, churches, and communities have formed them into people capable of governing themselves. It's an appealing vision. Yet integralists point to fifty years of family breakdown, addiction, and cultural dissolution and ask what exactly got ordered. The vision assumed its supporting institutions would remain healthy without political protection. They didn't.

A more sophisticated conservative answer draws on the political philosophy embedded in the American Founding — the idea that the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution already contain a moral order grounded in natural law, the self-evident truths that governments exist to protect rights inherent to human beings as such. This is more robust than simple fusionism because it doesn't depend on economic outcomes. But integralists mount a serious counterargument: the Founders' natural law was a product of Enlightenment rationalism, which is philosophically thinner than the centuries-deep tradition of Catholic moral theology going back to Aquinas. And the practical evidence is hard to dismiss — the Founders' framework has demonstrably failed to reproduce itself culturally across generations.

A third answer, Protestant nationalism, says integralism is a foreign import — that American Christianity is evangelical and biblical, not Catholic and hierarchical, and that restoring Christian moral culture doesn't require taking orders from Rome. This has real political force as a coalition argument. As a philosophical response to integralism it falls short, because it doesn't actually refute integralism's core challenge. It just asserts a different Christian preference.

None of these answer the question integralism is actually asking: where do the values that sustain a free society come from, and what do you do when they erode?

At this point, most people assume there are only two options: ground morality in God and religious authority (and fight out exactly which version of God and religion is the one people must follow), or accept the secular drift that integralists correctly diagnose as catastrophic. That is a false binary, and accepting it is what leaves the right philosophically defenseless.

The Enlightenment tried to derive morality from reason alone and produced frameworks too thin to sustain themselves culturally. But that failure doesn't mean the project is impossible. It means that particular attempt was insufficient. Rigorous moral reasoning doesn't require either divine authority at the top or secular relativism at the bottom. The assumption that it must produce one or the other is itself the error. There is a third path: moral reasoning that is transparent, auditable, pluralism-respecting, and capable of identifying its own failures — not because God commands it or because secular consensus endorses it, but because the reasoning holds and can be shown to hold.

What would that require? A framework in which authority comes from demonstrated coherence rather than institutional position. A correction mechanism that doesn't depend on the hierarchy being virtuous. A structure that accommodates genuine moral pluralism without collapsing into relativism. And — this is the test — a set of principles from which antisemitism can be identified as a reasoning failure, not merely a political liability.

That is the framework I am working on.

That framework doesn't yet have a prominent place in the debate on the right. It needs one. Because the alternative is a choice between liberal proceduralism that cannot defend itself and a theocratic politics that has already shown us, repeatedly, where it leads.

Any philosophy that cannot structurally guard against antisemitism is not merely incomplete. It is, by definition, an immoral philosophy — because it has no reliable way to distinguish moral order from moral catastrophe. That's not a Jewish complaint. That's a philosophical indictment. And it applies with full force to the most intellectually serious attempt the right has yet produced to answer the civilizational crisis it has correctly identified.




Buy EoZ's books  on Amazon!

"He's an Anti-Zionist Too!" cartoon book (December 2024)

PROTOCOLS: Exposing Modern Antisemitism (February 2022)

   
 

 

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This blog may be a labor of love for me, but it takes a lot of effort, time and money. For 20 years and 40,000 articles I have been providing accurate, original news that would have remained unnoticed. I've written hundreds of scoops and sometimes my reporting ends up making a real difference. I appreciate any donations you can give to keep this blog going.

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