Coming together again: What D-day teaches about Israel, Iran, and unity
For many, an unanswered question prevails: Why is it that Europe, the United Kingdom, and Canada fail to recognize the similarities between the Germany of World War II and Iran?Restraining Israel Is Not the Answer
There can be little doubt that these countries, by their desire to remain “neutral,” have become party to the projection of a dangerous negativity toward Israel and the Jewish people.
A most disturbing question is why those who came together to confront Hitler fail to see the Iranian leader’s plan to emulate him. It was Hitler’s Germany that barbarically killed six million Jews, and today it is Iran that openly states its desire to eliminate Israel, home to the world’s largest number of Jews.
The ultimate observation is that the Jew was the whipping boy of the past and is the whipping boy of today; the only difference is who holds the whip.
And what of the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, a political and economic alliance embracing Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman, all of which have been attacked by Iran?
While Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has compared Iran’s proxy network and regional expansion in the Middle East to Hitler’s pre-World War II annexation of Austria and the Sudetenland, neither Saudi Arabia nor the others respond militarily to Iran’s assault on their respective countries.
The coming together of Israel and the US in their fight against Iran – which began on February 28 – epitomized the meaning of togetherness. Yet does it follow that this union has the support of America’s man in the street?
Yaakov Katz’s excellent article in last week’s Magazine highlights the increasing lack of support for Israel from the US public, embracing a high proportion of its younger generation, which will be voting for a new president in just over two years. It is the public that ultimately decides the policy of a country; and, observing which way the wind is blowing in the US, it does not look good for Israel.
The increasing possibility that Israel cannot rely indefinitely on support from the US brings us to the question of how we in Israel – possibly alone – will be successful in confronting those who wish to eliminate us.
Donald Trump is not known for hewing to convention, but this week he seemed to rerun a standard Beltway drama. During a phone call on Monday, the president called Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu "crazy" and pressured him to rein in the Israeli offensive in Lebanon. Two days later, the State Department announced it had brokered a ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon.Alan Baker: Can the Oslo Accords model still deliver peace after October 7?
The seeming crackup in the Bibi-Trump bromance thrilled Israel’s critics and perturbed the Jewish state’s supporters. Some hope the close working relationship between Trump and Netanyahu is drawing to a close, others fear the entire bond between Washington and Jerusalem to be severed. Israel’s opponents think Trump’s actions to restrain Bibi show that the Jewish state is a strategic liability. But in reality, frictions like this between the two sides are common because of the value Israel provides the United States.
The most recent shouting has been over how to conclude the conflict with Iran. Israel and the United States severely damaged the Islamic regime’s leadership and war machine during their bombing campaign, but since it has not collapsed, their different priorities have emerged. Trump wants the Gulf Arabs’ oil to reach global markets again and to gain control of Iran’s enriched uranium without a return to major combat. Netanyahu wants Hezbollah to stop attacking northern Israel with drones and other long-range weapons. The mullahs claim the fighting in southern Lebanon, which Hezbollah started, is a serious obstacle to further negotiations about an interim agreement, so Trump is trying to find a workable compromise.
This sort of thing happens at the denouement of nearly every war that Israel has had to fight. The American goal in Middle Eastern conflicts usually is for its allies—including Israel—to successfully defend themselves, and then to reestablish peace in the region as quickly as possible. Threats to globally significant infrastructure, such as the Suez Canal or Persian Gulf oil refineries, make Washington nervous. More often than not, after fending off the initial attack, Jerusalem prefers to crush its opponents on the battlefield and destroy their ability to threaten the Jewish state for years or even decades.
This occurs regardless of how warmly the White House regards Israel. After the pan-Arab attempt to destroy Israel in 1948 failed and Israel gained the initiative, Harry Truman halted David Ben-Gurion’s counteroffensive. A decade later during the Suez crisis, Dwight Eisenhower forced Israel and its British and French allies to withdraw from Egypt. Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger stopped Israel just short of encircling and annihilating much of the Egyptian Army at the end of the Yom Kippur War. Ronald Reagan forcefully condemned Israel's operations in Lebanon in the 1980s, and George H.W. Bush did everything he could to keep Israel from responding to Saddam Hussein’s unprovoked missile attacks in the first Gulf War.
Both strategies have shown their value at times. Eisenhower thought sparing Gamal Abdel Nasser would win over Third World opinion in the Cold War, but all he did was empower a dictator who cozied up to the Soviet Union and undermined our allies. America would have benefited from a Nasser-less Egypt. Hezbollah rewarded Reagan’s concern for Lebanese civilians by bombing the U.S. embassy and a Marine barracks in Beirut, going on a decades-long spree of international terrorism, repeatedly attacking Israel, and immiserating generations of Lebanese. But if Anwar Sadat had been thoroughly humiliated in 1973 and lost the forces he needed to maintain his grip on power, he could not have spoken in the Knesset in 1977 and then made peace with Israel the next year.
Local realities further complicate any return to the Oslo model. The Hamas massacre of October 7, 2023, fundamentally altered Israel’s security assumptions. The belief that territorial compromises, international guarantees, and external monitoring arrangements could provide sufficient security has been severely weakened. For many Israelis, the events of October 7 demonstrated that ultimate responsibility for national security cannot be delegated to international actors.
At the same time, increasing international pressure for immediate Palestinian statehood bypasses the very negotiating framework established by Oslo. The accords envisaged that permanent-status issues would be resolved through direct agreement between the parties. Efforts by foreign governments and international organizations to recognize Palestinian statehood in advance of negotiations effectively prejudge issues that were expressly reserved for negotiation. Such initiatives undermine the contractual foundations of the peace process and further erode confidence in international guarantees.
This dynamic is closely related to the widespread international promotion of the “two-state solution.” While the concept has become a diplomatic slogan, it was never included in the Oslo Accords. The accords intentionally left all final-status arrangements open for negotiation. Whether the eventual outcome would involve two states, a federation, a confederation, or another arrangement was to be determined exclusively by the parties themselves. The transformation of the two-state formula from a possible negotiated outcome into a predetermined international prescription departs from the original logic of the peace process.
Further complicating matters is the absence of a unified and authoritative Palestinian leadership capable of serving as a reliable negotiating partner. At the same time, Israel faces its own internal political and governance challenges, which affect national cohesion and international perceptions of stability.
Against this backdrop, the Abraham Accords offer an alternative and more encouraging model. Announced in 2020, these agreements demonstrated that Arab states and Israel can establish peaceful, productive, and mutually beneficial relations based on shared interests and direct engagement. The accords emphasize coexistence, mutual understanding, cultural exchange, and regional cooperation. Their success suggests that meaningful progress is achievable when parties choose pragmatic cooperation over confrontation.
The central lesson remains unchanged. International forums, judicial bodies, and unilateral recognition initiatives were never intended to replace direct negotiation. Efforts to impose solutions from outside may satisfy short-term political interests, but they cannot create the trust, legitimacy, and mutual acceptance necessary for durable peace.
As long as international actors continue to bypass rather than encourage negotiation, instability is likely to persist. A viable and lasting peace can emerge only from direct engagement between the parties themselves.
Until conditions exist for such negotiations, Israel will continue to rely primarily on its own capabilities to safeguard its security and national interests.



















