Tuesday, February 11, 2014
Elder of ZiyonThis analysis by J. E. Dyer is a must read:
...To the escalating [anti-American] rhetoric, we can add two other circumstances that have not existed before, when Iran was issuing threats about the U.S. military. One is the voyage of Sabalan and Kharg to the Americas.
All things being equal, we wouldn’t necessarily expect Iran to add political freight to this expedition. In other respects, Iran is keeping it on the down-low, making no announcements about the task force’s progress around Africa, and celebrating no fraternal stops along the way (although these stops – for fuel – have to be occurring). That’s not normal. One of the purposes of sending your navy out to show the flag is to actually show the flag. But Iran’s not doing that.(1)
The possibility certainly exists that the Iranians want to keep as low a profile as possible until Kharg, the supply ship with the big hold, has discharged whatever cargo she may be carrying. The continued silence about the task force’s movements would tend to corroborate that theory. I have no doubt that U.S. intelligence knows where the two ships are (the Iranians may imagine that they are hiding the ships’ movements from the Israelis by avoiding publicity). But the seemingly furtive nature of the Iranian transit suggests that there might be something on Kharg that the U.S. wouldn’t like.
I’ve mentioned before that Kharg could be delivering missiles (or other weapon systems) to Iran’s pals in Central America. Shahab-3s for the missile complex reportedly being developed in northwestern Venezuela are one obvious possibility. Kharg would be used because of her immunity as a naval vessel from search and seizure. The U.S., or other nations in the region – such as Colombia and Panama – would care most about certain kinds of weapon systems, and would be more likely to try to intercept commercial cargo ships carrying them. But because Iran is under UN sanctions which prohibit exporting weaponry (in particular, UNSC Resolution 1747), a commercial ship could be stopped solely for that reason, even if it carried nothing more than small arms.
...If Iran is “preparing the battle space” by trying to surround Israel with threats, she will try to demonstrate to the U.S. that she can pose unacceptable threats to us, even if it’s through one-off, Hail-Mary-type actions. The little frigate, Sabalan, is probably not a player.(3)
That’s where the Kharg comes in. What is she delivering in the Americas – and where will she deliver it?
The possible answers are tied to the scenarios by which Iran could hold the United States at risk. There are two principal categories of scenario: terrorism, and missiles launched from other countries in the Americas. Kharg could be carrying cargo relevant to both.
Terrorism against American homeland targets could take a number of forms, for most of which there would be no need to deliver cargo via Kharg. Chemical and biological weaponry would be the most likely forms of terrorist tool Kharg could deliver. There are any number of ways the agents of Hezbollah, Hamas, al-Shabaab, or other terror groups known to operate in the Americas could move such agents into the U.S.
On the other hand, it wouldn’t really take Kharg to deliver these items, nor would it be as important to introduce them via a country like Venezuela, where Iran can be certain of official approval.
Kharg’s unique value is in being able to deliver large items that can’t be hidden from inspection with deceptive packaging. Medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and missile systems (including mobile launchers and command vehicles) are the obvious possibilities. The map shows threat rings for the extended-range Shahab-3 if launched from Venezuela, Nicaragua, or Cuba.
If we assume Iran does not yet have a nuclear warhead, the main option for making this threat a true deterrent, at least potentially, is the use of chemical warheads. Conventional high explosive warheads would be alarming to the public, but would not be a daunting enough threat. They would do comparatively little damage before triggering a response of some kind from the United States. Of course, chemical warheads delivered via ballistic missile would themselves have only limited effects in the area of impact. Missile delivery is not the way to achieve the most lethal effects with chemical weapons.
That said, two things are worth reiterating. One, the U.S. does not have a constant-ready missile defense network that would protect the central and southeastern United States from an MRBM threat emanating from the south. We are unprotected on this axis. Shifting to a footing of 24/365 alert and anti-missile protection – e.g., by deploying Patriot systems in the continental U.S. or Navy Aegis ships offshore – would constitute a new, un-resourced requirement. We’d have to cut back defense operations elsewhere to meet it.
Two, our ability to react against the “shooter” is limited by the forces we have ready today. We don’t have extra ships and aircraft to deploy for a deterrent presence in Central America. We could react after the fact with B-2 bombers, and possibly other conventional forms of attack, such as submarine-launched cruise missiles and ballistic missiles with conventional warheads. But we would have to attack to mount a response, in (most probably) Venezuela or Cuba, and that response would be inherently escalatory.
It’s quite possible that our current administration would view that as a bridge too far. Realistically, I think the military would view the prospect with strong disfavor. Our ready forces would not have such a preponderance of power, or such advantages of geography, that we could do it easily and without inconvenience.
Bottom line: MRBMs down south would constitute a material transformation of our security footing in the hemisphere. It’s a development we couldn’t live with.
But what would Obama do if the Iranians presented it as a fait accompli? The one thing we can count on is that he would not take decisive action to eliminate the threat. For Iran – and her potential henchmen in Central America or the Caribbean – that would be the important factor. They could very well calculate that getting MRBMs into the hemisphere could give them leverage over the U.S. in negotiations, as the missiles in Cuba did for Khrushchev and the Soviet Union in 1962.
There's lots more. Read the whole thing.
...To the escalating [anti-American] rhetoric, we can add two other circumstances that have not existed before, when Iran was issuing threats about the U.S. military. One is the voyage of Sabalan and Kharg to the Americas.
All things being equal, we wouldn’t necessarily expect Iran to add political freight to this expedition. In other respects, Iran is keeping it on the down-low, making no announcements about the task force’s progress around Africa, and celebrating no fraternal stops along the way (although these stops – for fuel – have to be occurring). That’s not normal. One of the purposes of sending your navy out to show the flag is to actually show the flag. But Iran’s not doing that.(1)
The possibility certainly exists that the Iranians want to keep as low a profile as possible until Kharg, the supply ship with the big hold, has discharged whatever cargo she may be carrying. The continued silence about the task force’s movements would tend to corroborate that theory. I have no doubt that U.S. intelligence knows where the two ships are (the Iranians may imagine that they are hiding the ships’ movements from the Israelis by avoiding publicity). But the seemingly furtive nature of the Iranian transit suggests that there might be something on Kharg that the U.S. wouldn’t like.
I’ve mentioned before that Kharg could be delivering missiles (or other weapon systems) to Iran’s pals in Central America. Shahab-3s for the missile complex reportedly being developed in northwestern Venezuela are one obvious possibility. Kharg would be used because of her immunity as a naval vessel from search and seizure. The U.S., or other nations in the region – such as Colombia and Panama – would care most about certain kinds of weapon systems, and would be more likely to try to intercept commercial cargo ships carrying them. But because Iran is under UN sanctions which prohibit exporting weaponry (in particular, UNSC Resolution 1747), a commercial ship could be stopped solely for that reason, even if it carried nothing more than small arms.
...If Iran is “preparing the battle space” by trying to surround Israel with threats, she will try to demonstrate to the U.S. that she can pose unacceptable threats to us, even if it’s through one-off, Hail-Mary-type actions. The little frigate, Sabalan, is probably not a player.(3)
That’s where the Kharg comes in. What is she delivering in the Americas – and where will she deliver it?
The possible answers are tied to the scenarios by which Iran could hold the United States at risk. There are two principal categories of scenario: terrorism, and missiles launched from other countries in the Americas. Kharg could be carrying cargo relevant to both.
Terrorism against American homeland targets could take a number of forms, for most of which there would be no need to deliver cargo via Kharg. Chemical and biological weaponry would be the most likely forms of terrorist tool Kharg could deliver. There are any number of ways the agents of Hezbollah, Hamas, al-Shabaab, or other terror groups known to operate in the Americas could move such agents into the U.S.
On the other hand, it wouldn’t really take Kharg to deliver these items, nor would it be as important to introduce them via a country like Venezuela, where Iran can be certain of official approval.
Kharg’s unique value is in being able to deliver large items that can’t be hidden from inspection with deceptive packaging. Medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and missile systems (including mobile launchers and command vehicles) are the obvious possibilities. The map shows threat rings for the extended-range Shahab-3 if launched from Venezuela, Nicaragua, or Cuba.
If we assume Iran does not yet have a nuclear warhead, the main option for making this threat a true deterrent, at least potentially, is the use of chemical warheads. Conventional high explosive warheads would be alarming to the public, but would not be a daunting enough threat. They would do comparatively little damage before triggering a response of some kind from the United States. Of course, chemical warheads delivered via ballistic missile would themselves have only limited effects in the area of impact. Missile delivery is not the way to achieve the most lethal effects with chemical weapons.
That said, two things are worth reiterating. One, the U.S. does not have a constant-ready missile defense network that would protect the central and southeastern United States from an MRBM threat emanating from the south. We are unprotected on this axis. Shifting to a footing of 24/365 alert and anti-missile protection – e.g., by deploying Patriot systems in the continental U.S. or Navy Aegis ships offshore – would constitute a new, un-resourced requirement. We’d have to cut back defense operations elsewhere to meet it.
Two, our ability to react against the “shooter” is limited by the forces we have ready today. We don’t have extra ships and aircraft to deploy for a deterrent presence in Central America. We could react after the fact with B-2 bombers, and possibly other conventional forms of attack, such as submarine-launched cruise missiles and ballistic missiles with conventional warheads. But we would have to attack to mount a response, in (most probably) Venezuela or Cuba, and that response would be inherently escalatory.
It’s quite possible that our current administration would view that as a bridge too far. Realistically, I think the military would view the prospect with strong disfavor. Our ready forces would not have such a preponderance of power, or such advantages of geography, that we could do it easily and without inconvenience.
Bottom line: MRBMs down south would constitute a material transformation of our security footing in the hemisphere. It’s a development we couldn’t live with.
But what would Obama do if the Iranians presented it as a fait accompli? The one thing we can count on is that he would not take decisive action to eliminate the threat. For Iran – and her potential henchmen in Central America or the Caribbean – that would be the important factor. They could very well calculate that getting MRBMs into the hemisphere could give them leverage over the U.S. in negotiations, as the missiles in Cuba did for Khrushchev and the Soviet Union in 1962.
There's lots more. Read the whole thing.
