How Benjamin Netanyahu transformed Israeli politics in 30 years
Shimon Peres, the world-renowned statesman who had served in multiple governments for an aggregate 24 years, was dethroned by a political novice nearly three decades his junior, the woefully inexperienced Benjamin Netanyahu, who had not been a minister for one day.Johnathan Tobin: Who should speak for Israel? The case for Caroline Glick
The electoral upset was explained by circumstances – a wave of terror attacks that followed, and mocked Peres’s peace promises. No one understood that a new era in the history of the Jewish state had just begun: the Bibi era, an epoch that has his name written all over it, and our future teetering under its weight.
What was this era about, what were its benefits, what were its costs, and what should follow its steadily approaching end?
Netanyahu’s finest hour came not during his aggregate 18 years as prime minister, but in between them, as Ariel Sharon’s finance minister.
With his first premiership having ended in a ringing defeat, Netanyahu set out to prove he could not only talk, but also do. What he thus did – massive cuts in social spending, sharp tax cuts, a set of privatizations, and a package of financial reforms – helped lead the Israeli economy to international stardom. It also showed that Netanyahu, unlike most politicians, had convictions.
Then again, that achievement was not the Bibi era’s main feature. His economic reforms accelerated, but did not launch, Israel’s journey from socialism to capitalism. That transition had been triggered by the 1985 Stabilization Plan. In fact, reforms mostly starred in Netanyahu’s rhetoric, but not in his deeds.
As prime minister, he delivered some infrastructure development – most notably the Jerusalem-Tel Aviv fast train – but when it came to complex structural problems, he avoided ambitious action. Yes, his open-skies policy cut flight prices, but more urgent issues, like the quality of the school system, the shortage of hospitals and doctors, the political system’s deformities, and the crime crisis in the Arab sector, were accepted fatalistically as fixtures of Israeli life.
As this column claimed already 15 years ago, by the time he returned to the premiership, Netanyahu had “lost his own reformist drive” (“Bibi the third’s failed premiership,” July 1, 2011).
As far as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s leftist critics are concerned, the last thing Israel needs is someone representing the country abroad who enthusiastically supports his policies, and is ready to do intellectual and verbal combat with the government’s opponents. If that doesn’t make sense, then welcome to Israeli politics.October 7 exposed the West’s dangerous illusion about Iran - opinion
That basic conundrum explains the firestorm that has greeted the floating of the idea that Netanyahu might name veteran journalist and current adviser Caroline Glick to the post of consul general in New York City. Glick was a senior contributing editor at JNS and hosted “The Caroline Glick” show on JNS TV before being named as Netanyahu’s international affairs adviser in February 2025.
In many ways, she is an ideal candidate for such a post. She was born, raised and educated (at Columbia and Harvard universities) in the United States. As a result, she speaks unaccented idiomatic American English, unlike most of Israel’s diplomats.
After making aliyah, she served in the Israel Defense Forces, where she worked as coordinator of negotiations with the Palestinian Authority during the period of the Oslo Accords. After becoming a journalist, she was embedded with the U.S. Army during the invasion of Iraq and worked as a frontline war correspondent. Since then—and outside of a brief stint running for the Knesset in 2019—she’s been covering and commenting on the issues that are at the forefront of Israeli public policy and diplomacy.
Moreover, as someone who worked with Netanyahu for a while in the 1990s and then again in the last year, she understands the prime minister’s views as well as anyone.
October 7 was not merely a security breach; it was a fundamental turning point that shattered a global delusion. To understand why Israel was so catastrophically blindsided, we must examine the fact that for decades, the West and Israel operated under the comfortable delusion that money, prosperity, and the responsibilities of governance could “tame” an ideological movement.
This catastrophic error in Gaza, the belief that Hamas could be “bought,” was not just an Israeli failure. It is the exact same flaw currently poisoning the international approach to the Islamic Republic of Iran, particularly regarding its nuclear program.
The illusion of prosperity
Prior to October 7, Israel and the United States – operating under the assumption that economic prosperity could tame radicalism – approved the flow of vast amounts of capital into the Gaza Strip.
High-paying work permits were issued for Gazans to work in Israel, and the Strip saw the rise of modern shopping centres and palm-fringed boulevards.
The assumption was simple: If we give them a middle-class life, they won’t want to lose it. We believed that Hamas, burdened by the duties of statecraft and the management of a growing economy, would choose the survival of its “mini-state” over the bloody pursuit of its charter. We assumed they knew that a major attack would mean their total destruction, and that they feared that destruction.
The reality of the death cult
We were wrong. October 7 proved that jihadist forces do not view the world through the lens of material profit and loss. For them, this world is an “abode of passage,” a temporary and hollow stage. Prosperity is not a goal; it is a tactical lull used for “Taqiyya” (strategic deception) while they prepare for the only world that matters: the afterlife – as they see it.
In this ideology, life is not something to be protected; it is a currency to be spent.
When a movement views its own children as future martyrs, uses its civilians as human shields to gain divine and political merit, and values a glorious death over a comfortable life, traditional economic leverage is useless. You cannot deter those who perceive their own annihilation as a shortcut to paradise.















