Israel and its Arab Gulf Allies Are Still On The Same Page (Daled Amos) ~ Elder Of Ziyon

Friday, June 20, 2025

Israel and its Arab Gulf Allies Are Still On The Same Page (Daled Amos)

By Daled Amos

The New York Times is at it again.

If the paper is to be believed, Israel Further Alienates Would-Be Arab Allies in Attacking Iran. In other words, by attacking the world's primary supporter of international terrorism, Israel has isolated itself from supportive Arab Gulf states even more. The article claims to have uncovered a reversal in the progress in the dynamic between Israel and the Arab Gulf states:

Gulf governments that were once warming to Israel — seen as a potential ally in their battle to contain Iran — have decided that courting Iran with diplomacy is more pragmatic.

And of course, this is true to an extent--from the beginning. Courting Iran with diplomacy is the pragmatic course for the Gulf states to take, and it is not surprising that the Saudis, for example, would hedge their bets. Consider when Biden publicly called Saudi Arabia a pariah during the Democratic presidential debates :

I would make it very clear we were not going to, in fact, sell more weapons to them. We were going to, in fact, make them pay the price and make them in fact the pariah that they are. There's very little social redeeming value of in the present government in Saudi Arabia, and I would also as pointed out I would end the subsidies that we have and the sale of material to the Saudis, where they're going in and murdering children. And they're murdering innocent people, and so they have to be held accountable.

That kind of talk did not endear the US to the Saudis. That comment, along with the Biden administration's clear disinterest in the Abraham Accords, added to the distance between the Biden Administration and Saudi Arabia. The Washington Free Beacon reported in June 2021 that the Biden State Department discouraged referring to the agreement by name, and when asked in May 2021, Press Secretary Jen Psaki told reporters:

We are not following the tactics of the prior administration. Aside from putting together a peace proposal that was dead on arrival, we don’t think [the previous administration] did anything constructive to really bring an end to the longstanding conflict in the Middle East.

It was not surprising when, in March 2023 (months before October 7th), the Saudis, Iran, and China announced an agreement to resume diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The Carnegie Endowment explained:

For Saudi Arabia, the China-brokered deal is a pragmatic security choice that goes beyond hedging and balancing against Washington.

The European Council on Foreign Relations published a piece on their website in September 2024 about Iran's Hormuz Peace Endeavor (HOPE), which was intended to serve as an alternative to the Abraham Accords. Saudi participation signaled its lack of confidence in the Biden administration:

The Iranian HOPE initiative was never seen as credible in Riyadh. The kingdom was also unprepared to accept the initiative’s ultimate aim of accelerating the US retrenchment from the region, which would further solidify Iran’s military influence in the Gulf. At the same time, the fragility of US security guarantees, as well as the risk of an Iranian backlash, left Riyadh hesitant to fully embrace the Abraham Accords.

The point is that the Gulf hedging strategy and openness to maintaining "friendly" relations with Iran today are not some new policy in response to Israel defending itself from the Iranian threat. It is part of a cautious approach in that area of the region.

When it pursues its point using the UAE as an example of a growing distance between it and Israel, the article is no more believable:

Yet despite the Emirati government’s deep distrust of Iran, to many in the country there is only one party to blame for the escalating violence: Israel, which launched a devastating attack on Iran last week, igniting the fiercest conflagration in the history of the Israeli-Iranian conflict.

After the New York Times makes this simplistic claim, it then undercuts itself just two paragraphs later with the acknowledgement that "depending on how the war ends, some Gulf countries may gradually put partnership with Israel back on the table."

Even with the Saudis' public "strong condemnation and denunciation of the blatant Israeli aggressions against the brotherly Islamic Republic of Iran," one has to wonder if those public expressions mirror what the Kingdom and the other Gulf states believe privately.

According to Egyptian-American writer Hussein Aboubakr Mansour,

While many of those who understand the evils of the Islamic Republic of Iran have responded with euphoria and talk of a “new Middle East,” prudence demands caution. Enthusiasm obscures deeper complexities, and transformative moments rarely unfold according to our most optimistic visions.

Gulf states are very much caught between a rock and a hard place. [While] they are quietly applauding the further weakening of Iran, they face real risks and have to play their cards carefully.

The New York Times comes close to acknowledging this dilemma and the complexity of the situation the Gulf states find themselves in:

While some in the Gulf are cheering on the bombing of Iran, the events of the past week have reinforced a belief that Israel is a rogue actor operating outside the international system and that Western powers have allowed it to do so.

The remark that "some in the Gulf are cheering on the bombing of Iran" links to a comment by journalist Saleh al-Fahid on X in response to a post by Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, the former Emir of Qatar. Al Thani posted:

...We must emphasize here that it is not in the interest of the Gulf states to see their large neighbor, Iran, collapse. Such a development would inevitably lead to a devastating destabilization of our region, with dire consequences for all. To avoid this, the Gulf states must announce a clear and explicit position through their decision-making centers to immediately halt this madness initiated by Israel, the full extent of whose impact on the region has yet to be fully understood...[translated from the Arabic by Google Translate.]

Al Fahid responds

Your Excellency, the former Minister, what you expressed in this tweet reflects Qatar's well-known position on the Iranian regime, but not all Gulf states necessarily agree with you. You cannot claim to know the Gulf's interests better than they do.

Beyond the official positions of Gulf governments, many Gulf citizens believe that Iran is a greater threat to them than Israel, that the overthrow of the mullahs' regime is in the Gulf states' best interests, and that the price of this regime's demise, however painful, harsh, and costly, is far less than the state of attrition that this regime has been practicing against the Gulf states for four decades.

The truth is that some Gulf states view the mullahs' regime as a guarantee for regional balance. Other Gulf states view the mullahs' regime as a long-term existential threat. [translated from the Arabic by Google Translate.]

Pity that the New York Times article did not quote al-Fahid outright--it would have provided the much-needed balance that the article so sorely lacks.

The enmity that The New York Times claims now exists between the Gulf states and Israel is more clearly understood as a more nuanced and complex dynamic. And it is not an issue of rejection of Israel, as the New York Times is so eager to claim.

Mansour suggests that, from Israel's perspective, Iran's defeat will have a mixed result:

...Many pundits responded almost immediately to the Israeli attacks with hopeful predictions of a new era of Arab-Israeli amity. Unfortunately, such predictions are premature. It is much more likely that, despite private admiration and cooperation, public acknowledgment and overt alignment with Israel will remain restrained...

...Of all the Middle East’s leaders, the Gulf monarchs are most likely to put ideology second to practical and achievable goals. Their admiration for Israel, therefore, won’t translate into an enthusiastic embrace born of gratitude or generosity. On the contrary, the removal of the Iranian threat reduces, rather than increases, their incentive to make meaningful concessions to Israel.

Indeed, the Gulf states may quietly reach out to the now weakened Iranian regime. With their archenemy crippled, vulnerable, and desperate, these countries have a rare opportunity to extend a lifeline, albeit conditionally. In exchange for clear, enforceable guarantees that Tehran abandon its aggressive regional ambitions, they might decide that it’s possible to rehabilitate Iran as a subordinate regional actor. This move would enable them to leverage their newfound advantage, enhancing their strategic weight against Israel and the United States, and their standing on the world stage. Such maneuvers, blending quiet collaboration with Israel alongside a cautious and conditional outreach to Iran, reflect a longstanding desire to maintain the regional balance of power, which in this case means making sure that neither Israel nor Iran become dominant.

Whether the Middle East would have been different if Trump had won his second term in 2020 is a moot point. A key component of the Abraham Accords and the improved Israel-Arab relations was based on Israel's military strength vis-a-vis Iran, and not just the economic opportunities it could bring to the table. With the opportunity to cut Iran down to size, the Gulf states will want to maintain stability in the region. Whatever they decide, Israel will be included in the picture.