Zionist Occupied Government 2015

Today I am joining 1500 people - mostly religious Jews - for the annual NORPAC mission to Washington DC where we will be meeting with most members of Congress to push for a stronger relationship between the US and Israel.

The top agenda item, of course, is Iran.

It makes no sense to speak to members of Congress against the framework agreement, since that is already in place. So the goal is to ensure that the goals of the agreement, as stated by administration officials, to ensure that there is no way that Iran could get nuclear weapons, are strictly adhered to.

So, for example, Vice President Biden gave a speech a couple of weeks ago defending the deal. He said:

First, some have worried that the President and administration are willing -- even eager -— to settle for a deal so badly that we’ll sign a bad deal. The right deal is far better than no deal. But if what’s on the table doesn’t meet the President’s requirements, there will be no deal.

And a final deal must effectively cut off Iran’s uranium, plutonium, and covert pathways to the bomb. If it doesn’t, there will be no deal.

The final deal must ensure a breakout timeline of at least one year for at least decade or more. If it doesn’t, no deal.

And a final deal must include phased sanction relief, calibrated against Iran taking meaningful steps to constrain their program. If they do not, no deal.

And a final deal must provide verifiable assurances the international community is demanding to ensure Iran’s program is exclusively peaceful going forward. If it doesn’t, no deal.

The second argument I hear is that no deal is worth the paper it’s written on, because Iran will simply cheat. And it’s true that Iran could try to cheat, whether there’s a deal or not. Now they didn’t cheat under the interim deal -— the Joint Plan of Action -— as many were certain they would. But they certainly have in the past and it would not surprise anyone if they tried again. However, if they did try to cheat, under a deal that we're talking about, they would be far more likely to be caught. Because as this deal goes forward, we’ll also put in place the toughest transparency and verification requirements, which represent the best possible check against a secret path to the bomb.

Iran will be required to implement the Additional Protocols, allowing IAEA inspectors to visit not only declared nuclear facilities, but undeclared sites where suspicious, clandestine work is suspected.

Folks, let me tell you what this deal would do in relation to intrusive inspections: Not only would Iran be required to allow 24/7 eyes on the nuclear sites you’ve heard of -— Fordow and Natantz and Arak -- and the ability to challenge suspect locations, every link in their nuclear supply chain will be under surveillance.

For the next 20 to 25 years, inspectors will have access to Iran’s uranium mines and uranium mills, centrifuge production sites, assembly and storage facilities; all purchases of sensitive equipment will be monitored.

And, as part of the transparency requirements under the final deal, Iran will have to address the IAEA concerns about the possible military dimensions of Iran’s past nuclear research.

The problem is that Iran interprets the deal much differently, and if Iran's statements are to be taken at face value - then Congress should block the bad deal.

We need to educate the lawmakers, even the ones that signed a letter supporting the President's negotiating stance, that the agreement must adhere to the standards that the administration has claimed to insist on.

We will be providing the members of Congress with scorecards on how to judge the agreement to see whether its points are consistent with the imperative to deny any chance for Iran to obtain nuclear weapons.

It is an uphill battle.

The last time I went on this mission, in 2009, less than a thousand people attended. But that was enough that the halls of the congressional offices were filled with yarmulka-wearing Jewish men and their wives and daughters.