Howard Jacobson: I am obsessed with the ignorance of the Jew-haters
I need a new hobby to take my mind off my obsession. The catch, of course, if you happen to have an obsessive personality, is that you become obsessed with your new hobby. In my teenage years, on my father’s advice, I played table tennis to take my mind off falling in love with every girl I met. I was quickly obsessed. I lived and would willingly have died for the game.Gerald Posner: The Genocide Case Against Hamas
Even in my dreams I played table tennis, competing against faceless, impregnable opponents. Back the ball came no matter how hard I hit it, until I woke in the early dawn, defeated and exhausted. When I described my condition to my doctor, he advised me to find a new hobby. “What, like falling in love with every girl I meet?” I asked with a twisted laugh. He put a stethoscope to my chest. “That would certainly be more normal,” he said.
The obsession I need a hobby to take my mind off today is Jew-hating. Its omnipresence. Its implacability. Its inexplicable rage, as though it’s the Jew-hater rather than the Jew-hated who has reason to be aggrieved. Above all what obsesses me is the paradox of its uncouth ignorance appealing most to the educated.
Not in the wild or in a zoo do Jew-haters find a home but on the campuses of our best universities, where they might be expected to have read a little history or know the meaning of simple words. Could it be that the ultimate aim of education is anti-Semitism? I serve the question into the darkness, but only a ball comes back, twice as hard as I hit it.
As in my table tennis years, the nights are the worst. The minute my eyes close the Jew haters appear, not marching – my bed is not big enough to accommodate any sort of demonstration – but sitting packed tight in lecture theatres, wearing black armbands and that closed expression favoured by people who never question themselves. “Shalom aleichem,” I begin. Peace be upon you. They don’t chant the customary “Aleichem shalom”, in return.
I begin by filling in the blanks in their knowledge. Tell them Jesus was a Jew and would certainly have been a Zionist had he been alive when the Jews were being killed in their tens of thousands in pogroms throughout eastern Europe. I tell them what a pogrom was.
I explain that Zionism was a movement of liberation and self-realization of the sort they support when it’s for Palestinians. Zionists didn’t turn up out of the blue in tanks firing Kalashnikovs. They came carrying shovels and works of philosophy. Some were idealists and dreamers, poets and utopists, others, no doubt, would have been opportunists.
There wasn’t just one kind of Zionist. An early supporter of Zionism, for example, was George Eliot. The name rings no bells, though in my dream at least, a sizeable proportion of the Jew-haters are reading English literature at university. Not the kind of English literature I studied. Not Keats and negative capability. More Edward Said and settler-colonialism.
“She wrote Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda,” I explain. The “she” throws them. Didn’t I say George Eliot? The possibility that this early proponent of Zionism might have been trans causes a brief perplexity. It would be a good idea for me to wake up at this moment. Count their confusion a victory. But my obsession forces me to continue throwing words and ideas into the unresponsive blackness.
I move on to genocide. The genocide, they invariably call it. The definite article is not accidental. We are talking about a genocide like no other. “This is not just genocide, this is IDF genocide.”
Seldom can that little word “the” have been sent on so deadly an errand. Not only does its definiteness brook no question as to the genocide’s existence, it reduces in significance and atrocity, indeed it replaces, any other genocide we might have heard about. Out you go, Jews. We have new, more deserving victims.
What the International Institutions OmittedBen-Dror Yemini: How Terror's Victims Became the Targets of Blame
The earlier sections make it possible to be specific about what each institution chose not to examine.
The International Association of Genocide Scholars’ August 2025 resolution found that Israel’s conduct in Gaza met the legal definition of genocide. It mentioned Hamas only twice, in subordinate clauses: once to say October 7 “itself constitutes international crimes,” and once to describe Israel’s actions as a “response.” It did not analyze the Hamas Covenant as evidence of intent, did not examine the killings of October 7 against Article II, and did not say which international crimes it had in mind. That silence is harder to explain than an oversight. In December 2023, the association had published its own peer-reviewed policy brief by the genocide scholar Sara Brown. She concluded that Hamas’s attacks on Israeli civilians were acts of genocidal violence and recommended that IAGS say so. The association ignored those recommendations, and its 2025 resolution went the other way. This was the most widely cited scholarly finding of genocide in the conflict, from the professional association of the people whose job is to apply the framework — and it had the counter-argument in its own publication series nearly two years before it wrote a resolution that skipped past it.
The UN Commission of Inquiry’s September 2025 report ran 72 pages. It examined statements by Israeli leaders — Gallant’s “human animals,” Netanyahu’s reference to Amalek, Herzog’s remarks about responsibility — and concluded that they were “direct evidence of genocidal intent.” It applied no comparable analysis to Article 7 of the Hamas Covenant, to Sinwar’s 2017 promise to discuss “when we will wipe out Israel,” to Deif’s order on the morning of October 7 to take up “a cleaver, an axe,” or to Ghazi Hamad’s pledge to repeat the attack “again and again.” Nor has the Commission since. Its June 2026 report, which found that Israel targeted Palestinian children as part of an ongoing genocide, revisits October 7 only to recap its own earlier findings: that Hamas committed war crimes and crimes against humanity against Israeli children, and according to its own count, that included dozens killed or “targeted for abduction.” It does not reconsider, with two additional years of evidence, whether that record meets the genocide standard it applies to Israel three paragraphs later.
The Commission’s defenders will say its September report was a legal analysis of Israel’s conduct in Gaza, and that its June 2024 report had already addressed October 7. Both are true. But the Commission’s mandate, set by the Human Rights Council in 2021, covers violations “in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in Israel.” Nothing prevented it from asking the genocide question about October 7. When it examined October 7 in 2024, it found war crimes and stopped. When it examined Israel’s response, it asked the genocide question and answered yes. The choice of which question to ask was the Commission’s alone.
Amnesty International and B’Tselem both concluded that Israel is committing genocide. Amnesty’s own report on October 7 found extermination and cited “statements from Hamas leaders” as evidence the attack targeted civilians, then went no further. B’Tselem called October 7 war crimes and “likely also crimes against humanity.” Neither asked whether it was genocide.
What Explains the Failure of the International Institutions?
One reason is prevention. The Genocide Convention imposes a duty to prevent, and prevention looks forward. By the time most of these reports were written, October 7 was over, and the war in Gaza was continuing. An institution focused on stopping ongoing killing will naturally concentrate on the conduct still happening.
A second is forum. South Africa’s case at the ICJ put Israel’s conduct before a court, and no parallel ICJ case can exist against Hamas — the ICJ hears only disputes between states. Much of the institutional analysis followed that case.
Those explanations account for emphasis but do not account for absence. The prevention rationale cuts the other way: Hamas’s leaders publicly promised to repeat October 7. If prevention is the point, that promise is exactly the kind of statement the duty to prevent exists to take seriously.
I want to be precise about my claim. I am not saying that because these institutions failed to apply the framework to Hamas, their conclusions about Israel are wrong. I think they are wrong, and I explained why in detail in Genocide for Dummies, but that is a separate argument, and it stands or falls on its own evidence.
My claim here is narrower. An institution that applies the Genocide Convention to one party in a conflict and not to the other, when the evidence against the other is at least as strong on the element that matters most, has not shown that it is applying a standard. The burden is on those institutions to explain the difference. So far, none has.
The Falsifiable Standard
I ended Genocide for Dummies with a challenge: tell me what evidence would change my mind, and if you produce it, I will write the correction myself. It is only fair to end this piece the same way: applying the same standard I did to Israel, the case that October 7 was a genocidal act is much stronger than the case against Israel — and that it has never been examined by the institutions that were most eager to use the word.
Here is what would change my conclusion.
First, show me a military rationale. Hamas attacked army bases on October 7. Its defenders will argue those attacks were legitimate targets under the laws of war. Explain then why the same operation also sent terrorists into more than 20 residential communities, with written instructions to “kill as many people as possible” and to target a school and a youth center, if the object was military. Show me that the killing of infants and the elderly in their homes served any military purpose.
Second, show me that Hamas’s 1988 Covenant was only rhetoric. Hamas says its 2017 document replaced the charter’s call to kill Jews with a struggle against “the Zionist project.” If that is true, explain why the conduct on October 7 looked like the 1988 text and not the 2017 one. Explain why a terrorist called his parents to boast, “Your son killed Jews.”
Third, show me that Hamas’s leaders were misunderstood. Put Sinwar’s 2017 promise to discuss “when we will wipe out Israel,” his 2022 “roaring flood,” Deif’s call for cleavers and axes, and Hamad’s “again and again” in their full Arabic context and show me that they meant something other than what they said.
Fourth, show me that the killing of civilians was not the plan. Many people crossed the fence on October 7 — Hamas’s Nukhba forces, terrorists from Islamic Jihad and other groups, and Gazan civilians who followed them through the breaches. Human Rights Watch concluded that killing civilians was a “central aim of the planned attack,” not a plan gone awry. If the atrocities were the work of undisciplined followers rather than the organization, show me the evidence that Hamas’s command made any effort to stop them.
Fifth, on sexual violence, let the investigation finish. The UN Special Representative found that rape and gang rape occurred at multiple sites. The UN’s own investigation did not find that sexual violence was ordered but instead called for a full investigation. There are other investigations now underway. If they uncover credible evidence that the sexual assaults were not directed policy, then it should drop out of the genocide analysis, and I will say so.
That is the standard. It is the same one I set for the case against Israel. The only difference is that no one has yet been willing to apply it here. And until that happens, my conclusion stands: there is a solid case for genocide against Hamas in the October 7 attack.
The forces of darkness are aided by far too many of those considered enlightened. Osama bin Laden, Yahya Sinwar, Hassan Nasrallah and Ali Khamenei would have reason to be pleased.
Their work is being carried out not only by the terrorists who continue in their footsteps. It is also being done by a growing band of those who openly declare that their goal is to defeat the Free World.
This is not Israel's struggle alone. It should have been the struggle of the Free World and of the Muslim world in particular. That is because Muslims are the primary victims of jihad.
The Muslim Brotherhood, from which most jihadist movements emerged, is persecuted in most Arab countries, which understand the danger, while its influence in the West continues to grow.
Over the past quarter-century, 320,405 people have been murdered in Islamic terrorist attacks. Jihadist branches are spreading death in wars that have raged for years in Sudan, Somalia, and Libya. Shiite jihad is wreaking havoc in Iran, Yemen, Lebanon and among the Palestinians.
Most of these centers of violence have nothing to do with the U.S. or Israel.
According to Brown University's Costs of War research, 4.5 million people have been killed since 2001, most of them in Muslim countries.
Even if we accept Hamas's figures, the 75,000 killed in Gaza amounts to 1.6% of the total, and most of those killed are men of fighting age.



















