To Palestinians and their supporters: How’s the resistance going?
This is not a hostile or inconsiderate question. It is perhaps the most important question anyone who actually cares about Palestinians could ask. The resistance strategy—violent, stubborn and uncompromising—has been one of history’s most expensive strategic failures. Yet it continues, sustained in part by a global industry whose financial survival depends on it never ending.Andrew Fox: The ghouls feeding on Hind Rajab’s death
Since 1993, more than $50 billion in international aid has flowed to the Palestinian cause. The U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) has received billions since it was founded in 1949, with the United States alone providing more than $7.3 billion from 1950 to 2016. Private charities devoted to Palestinian relief collectively raise hundreds of millions more annually. There are now thousands of careers, institutions and funding streams whose existence depends on the Palestinian crisis remaining unresolved.
When a problem becomes an industry, the incentive is not to solve it but to sustain it. Who loses their funding when Palestinian refugees are finally settled and integrated? What happens to UNRWA if there are no longer any refugees?
Do the people who most loudly claim to speak for Palestinians actually serve Palestinian interests or do they serve their own? The people most loudly advocating for the Palestinians are frequently the ones with the most to lose from a peaceful, prosperous Palestinian society that no longer requires their services.
What would it look like for Palestinians to succeed? Not in the sense of defeating Israel, but in the sense of their people living well?
Hong Kong, Taiwan and Estonia, among other countries surrounded by hostile neighbors, built prosperity not through military resistance but through trade, rule of law, open markets and human capital development.
What if Palestinian leadership had, at any point, decided that the primary measure of their success is the economic well-being, education and individual freedom of their people? What if, instead of funneling resources into armed factions and international lobbying campaigns, they had built transparent institutions, embraced civil liberties, cultivated a tech sector and made the present Palestinian enclaves a destination for investment? In other words, what if they actually built a vibrant country?
At least one person is trying this by creating a technology hub in Judea and Samaria. Rawabi, the planned Palestinian city developed by entrepreneur Bashar al-Masri, is a tentative proof of concept. It has faced enormous obstacles, many of them political. But it is at least an attempt at a different strategy, and it points toward a different kind of future.
The definition of strategic failure is not losing a single battle. It is pursuing the same approach, decade after decade, and watching it produce more destruction, more poverty, more displacement and more death than the alternatives you refused to consider. One definition of mental illness is doing the same thing over and over, and expecting a different result each time.
The most radical thing that Palestinian leadership could do right now is not to launch another resistance campaign or fire rockets at Israel. It would be to announce, credibly, that henceforth it will measure success by the flourishing of its people; by school-enrollment rates; per capita income; startup formation; and the quality of hospitals, courts and roads.
The strategy of perpetual resistance has produced perpetual suffering. What if Palestinian leaders choose prosperity instead? That would indeed be revolutionary.
The IDF has opened a criminal investigation into the deaths of Hind Rajab and eight others. That is the entire development. No verdict is implied. The announcement identifies no suspect, nor does it specify an offence. Online carrion crows have turned Hind’s death into clickbait by stripping the news of its qualifications and selling an investigation as a verdict.Aviva Klompas: Iran was a regional threat. War with the US changed that
The IDF examination states that troops fired at the approaching family car on 29 January 2024. Five passengers were killed; Hind and her cousin Layan survived the encounter. Hours later, a Palestine Red Crescent ambulance, whose movement had been coordinated, went to recover them. The announcement describes the alleged shelling of that ambulance and records that the girls and two paramedics were later found dead. It does not establish what happened during the intervening hours.
Mark Zlochin’s close reading exposes the misrepresentation. The formal finding concerns the initial fire at the car. The later events remain reports and allegations. His earlier analysis raised unresolved questions about the route and timeline and tested whether the telephone material and available lines of sight supported more than one source of fire. Those questions do not resolve the deaths, and today’s announcement provides no new evidence of criminal guilt.
There is one awkward point for Israel’s defenders. The IDF’s first account said no troops were in the area. Its subsequent examination now acknowledges that troops fired at the car. That correction cannot be wished away, and anyone who repeated the first version should amend their view. The acknowledgement revises the official account of the initial encounter. Hind and Layan, it now says, survived the initial fire, while the ambulance strike and their later deaths remain under investigation. Criminal responsibility remains unresolved.
The carrion feeders have ignored that distinction. They demanded an investigation. The moment one was announced, they called it an admission. Their trick relies on readers confusing suspicion with conviction. They use a dead child for emotional force and borrow legal vocabulary to manufacture authority. Nobody has been charged. No court has tested individual liability in the Hind case or in the separate Tel al-Sultan referral. There is no legal conclusion in either case. For these people, the case is not about truth or justice for Hind Rajab: it is about validating their preconceptions about Israel no matter what.
The IDF’s Fact-Finding and Assessment Mechanism compiles operational material for the Military Advocate General. Reasonable suspicion triggers a military police investigation; prosecutors then assess whether the evidence offers a reasonable prospect of conviction. A referral records suspicion but supplies no answer. The suspected offence may involve negligence in following procedure. The announcement does not say.
I have always maintained that where credible evidence supports a war crime charge, it should be prosecuted. That remains my position. The World Central Kitchen case illustrates the distinction. Australia’s review by Air Chief Marshal Mark Binskin found that the strike was not knowingly or deliberately directed against the charity. It recorded mistaken identification and failures to follow procedures. Binskin made no criminal finding. A catastrophic outcome can warrant criminal scrutiny without establishing deliberate murder.
For years, Tehran’s influence rested on a network that gave it strategic depth. Hamas threatened Israel from Gaza. Hezbollah amassed an arsenal on Israel’s northern border, while serving as Iran’s most powerful regional proxy.
Syria provided the logistical bridge connecting Tehran to Lebanon and the Mediterranean. Iraqi militias extended Iranian influence westward while pressuring American forces. The Houthis gave Tehran a foothold on one of the world’s most important maritime choke points.
That network allowed Iran to keep its adversaries under pressure while minimizing risks to itself. Today, much of that architecture has been degraded.
Hamas remains in control of parts of Gaza, but much of its senior leadership has been killed, large portions of its military infrastructure have been destroyed, and its ability to rearm and reorganize has been sharply constrained by Israel’s operational presence in significant areas of the Gaza Strip.
Hezbollah remains dangerous, yet it is no longer the force it was before the Oct. 7, 2023, attacks. The group has also lost much of its senior leadership, including longtime Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, along with key commanders, weapons stockpile and infrastructure.
Hezbollah now faces growing pressure inside Lebanon from a population exhausted by economic collapse and increasingly unwilling to see the country’s future subordinated to Iran’s regional ambitions. The group still possesses formidable capabilities, but it is increasingly focused on preserving what remains rather than expanding its influence.
Syria may represent the most consequential loss. For decades, the Assad regime served as Iran’s indispensable ally and the critical land bridge connecting Tehran to Hezbollah. The collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s government and the emergence of a new political order have severely disrupted those supply lines and deprived Iran of one of the central pillars of its regional strategy.
In Iraq, Iranian-backed groups continue to wield considerable influence, but they operate in an environment that is increasingly complicated by Iraqi nationalism, domestic political pressures, and growing demands that armed groups answer to the Iraqi state rather than to Tehran.
Only the Houthis retain something approaching their previous freedom of action, continuing to threaten commercial shipping and disrupt maritime trade. Yet even there, Iran’s success reveals its limitations. The Houthis can create instability, but they cannot create regional order.
Iran is being forced to play defense
The result is that Iran increasingly finds itself doing something it spent decades trying to avoid: relying on its own territory and its own capabilities to sustain confrontation.
An equally important shift is taking place elsewhere in the region.
For years, many Arab governments concluded that accommodation was the safest response to Iranian aggression. After months of unrelenting attacks on their territory, that assumption is changing.
Bahrain and Kuwait have launched strikes inside Iran, Saudi forces have joined attacks on Iranian-backed militias in Iraq, and the United Arab Emirates has reportedly provided intelligence and air cover. Persian Gulf states are also deepening cooperation on missile defense, intelligence sharing and maritime security.
In attacking its neighbors, Iran has pushed its adversaries closer together and closer to the United States.
Iran remains powerful, but less so than before
None of this means Iran is on the verge of collapse. Its missile program remains formidable. Its nuclear ambitions are a source of legitimate concern. Tehran retains the ability to disrupt global commerce, and it has repeatedly demonstrated that even a weakened network can impose real costs on other nations.
But there is an important distinction between the ability to disrupt and the ability to shape the regional order. For decades, Iran played offense. Today, it finds itself increasingly on defense.
That could prove to be the most consequential outcome of this war. Not the destruction of the axis of resistance, but the gradual unraveling of the network through which Iran projected power across the Middle East.
The ring of fire has not disappeared, but it has become a ring of embers.



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