Gerald Posner: Genocide for Dummies
There is a question the statistics above cannot answer on their own, and almost nobody thinks to ask it: who, exactly, is Israel at war with?British Historian: "Hamas Must Be Dismantled"
Genocide requires intent to destroy a protected group as such — national, ethnic, racial, religious. Not a government or army or a political movement. That is why the Khmer Rouge, who killed a quarter of Cambodia, were convicted of genocide only as to the Cham and the Vietnamese. So, the threshold question in Gaza is whether the belligerent Israel is fighting is Hamas or the Palestinian people. Most of Israel’s own conduct supports the former inference.
Start with the most obvious fact, which is so obvious that it disappears. Israel negotiates with Hamas—repeatedly, publicly, through Qatari and Egyptian mediators—over ceasefires and hostage exchanges and the return of bodies. There is a ceasefire in force as I write this. Nobody negotiates a truce with a people it intends to erase, because the point of erasure is that there will be no one left to negotiate with. The Wehrmacht did not broker prisoner exchanges with the Jews of Warsaw. The Interahamwe did not sign agreements with the Tutsi. In every case on the recognized list, the perpetrator’s relationship with the victim group was total and one-directional. Here it is bilateral, mediated, and ongoing.
Second, South Africa, which brought the genocide case against Israel before the ICJ in December 2023, identifies “Palestinians” in Gaza as a substantial part of the broader Palestinian national, racial and ethnic group that extends far beyond Gaza. Roughly two million Arab citizens live inside Israel, vote in its elections, sit in its parliament, and have served on its Supreme Court. Some three million Palestinians live in the West Bank. If the intent were to destroy Palestinians as such, one might expect the campaign to reach the group wherever it is found. That is what happened in the actual genocides: the Nazis pursued Jews across a continent, into countries they did not govern; the Hutu Power militias hunted Tutsi from one prefecture to the next.
The Genocide Convention says, “in whole or in part,” and tribunals have held that a geographically limited portion of a group can qualify — Srebrenica was one town. The absence of any campaign against Palestinians in Haifa or Nazareth therefore does not by itself defeat the charge. It does, however, make the claim considerably harder. Why would a state supposedly bent on destroying a people be content to concentrate its military actions only where Hamas governed and attacked from? Under the ICJ’s test, that alternative cannot simply be wished away.
Third, some Palestinians in Gaza publicly make the distinction themselves. In March 2025, hundreds took to the streets of Beit Lahia and Deir al-Balah in the largest anti-Hamas demonstrations since the war began. One protester told CNN that he was oppressed by both the occupation army and Hamas, and that Hamas launched October 7 while Gazans paid the price. Reporting through 2024 and 2025 documented widening anger at a movement that fought from tunnels while civilians absorbed the response.
Those protests do not tell us what all Gazans think, and the victims’ perceptions do not determine the perpetrator’s intent. They establish something narrower: some Gazans distinguish Hamas from Israel’s war against Hamas even while condemning Israel’s occupation and attacks. That distinction is consistent with the alternative inference that Israel’s object was to defeat Hamas, not to destroy Palestinians as such.
The ICC warrants against Netanyahu and his then–defense minister Yoav Gallant allege that Israel’s conduct during the offensive constituted war crimes and crimes against humanity, including starvation as a method of warfare, murder, persecution, and other inhumane acts. But assuming for the sake of argument that what is alleged in the ICC warrants was correct, look at what they do not say. The prosecutor assessed the same evidence everyone else has examined, before the same court that would have to sustain the charge, and he did not charge genocide. He is far from anyone’s idea of an Israeli apologist, and yet he had the option.
This is the distinction the chant of genocide obliterates. There is an enormous legal and moral difference between a state that fights a war brutally, and one that sets out to eliminate a people. The first describes a great many wars, including wars fought by countries whose citizens are now doing the chanting. The second describes a small handful of adjudicated cases in the modern era, aand Gaza does not fit their pattern.
The Battle of Mosul in 2016 and 2017 produced devastation — a city largely destroyed, thousands of civilians killed, an enemy entrenched in residential blocks — and no serious legal analysis called it genocide. The difference was not the destruction. It was the enemy.
Fighting Hamas in Gaza kills Palestinians. That is a fact, and I am not going to soften it with a euphemism. But killing Palestinians while fighting Hamas and killing Palestinians in order to destroy Palestinians are different acts with different names, and the entire architecture of international criminal law rests on keeping them apart.
The historian Simon Sebag Montefiore says, "The October 7 Hamas attacks against Israel...changed everything. It was years in the planning that did what it was meant to do, which was to put the Palestinian issue at the center of the world, unleash the ideology of anti-Zionism in Western universities, and nix the Saudis normalizing agreements with Israel. The only thing it hasn't succeeded in is helping the Palestinian people."The hostages held by Hamas at Al-Shifa Hospital
The speed and intensity of anti-Israel sentiment that has spread like wildfire through Britain took Montefiore "by surprise." "There's nowhere better to live now than Britain or America or France than at any other point in the last 10,000 years. Yet that unprecedented comfort, liberalism and freedom have permitted the hothouse of exciting but intolerant radicalisms such as 'de-colonialization,' anti-Americanism,' 'anti-Westernism,' 'Third-World-ism'...particularly in many cultural, academic and media institutions in this country."
"People absolutely have the freedom to preach the destruction of the liberal democracies that protect them. I'm not in favor of banning or cancelling anybody unless they're encouraging killing. But a lot of the people on the pro-Palestinian marches in this country, for example, were doing just that....They were also filled with extreme ideologues, who were backing Iran, and who were backing Hamas."
While Montefiore has long been a champion of a Palestinian state, he says Britain's "recognition of a Palestinian state, for instance, was a [virtue-signaling] absurdity that achieved nothing. Instead, it revealed Britain's impotence in the Middle East and it rewarded a genocidal organization that is much more nihilistic than humanitarian....Hamas must be dismantled."
In the final months of 2023, the eyes of the global public were firmly fixed on Al-Shifa Hospital in Gaza. As international media heavyweights—including The New York Times, The Washington Post, and The Wall Street Journal—reported extensively on the military operations, the medical crisis, and the conflicting claims of the warring parties, a profound systemic flaw characterized the coverage.Remains of Yehuda Katz, IDF soldier who went missing in 1982 battle, returned to Israel
The mainstream international reporting largely followed the official narratives of the information war. While The Wall Street Journal detailed how Israel released footage attempting to prove the site was used by militants, The New York Times focused on official video releases showing tunnel infrastructure under the besieged hospital, and The Washington Post published deep open-source analyses on the military claims, these major outlets remained confined within a narrow framework: they focused primarily on macro-level military infrastructure, tunnel claims, and institutional statements.
What was missing from virtually all major Western reports during those critical weeks was the forensic reality of the micro-level visual material generated by the actors themselves. While major newsrooms analyzed satellite coordinates and official releases, they overlooked or omitted the immediate, local choreography happening at the gates and in the courtyards of the hospital—including the unhindered movement of local participants documenting the aftermath of the October 7 events.
This investigation closes that gap. It does not offer a general overview of wartime politics; rather, it provides a forensic, image-by-image reconstruction of the path taken by the hostages and their captors. By combining geolocation, frame-by-frame video analysis, and contemporaneous field communications, this dossier challenges the uncritical or restricted framing accepted by major global news outlets in late 2023—providing the definitive record that was missing when the story broke.
The remains of Israeli soldier Sgt. First Class Yehuda Katz, who went missing in the First Lebanon War’s battle of Sultan Yacoub in 1982, were returned to Israel on Tuesday, the military announced, with Israeli leaders hailing the country’s commitment to bring back every missing or fallen soldier.
The battle, 44 years ago, was a skirmish between the Israel Defense Forces and the Syrian army in Lebanon’s Beqaa Valley. It claimed the lives of 21 Israeli servicemen and injured more than 30.
Katz, a tank soldier, went missing during the battle, along with Sgt. First Class Zachary Baumel and Sgt. First Class Zvi Feldman.
Baumel’s remains were recovered with Russian assistance and returned to Israel in 2019, and Feldman’s remains were recovered by Mossad agents in May 2025.
In a statement, the Israel Defense Forces said that in a special operation led by the Military Intelligence Directorate, in coordination with the Mossad spy agency, Katz’s bones were located and brought to Israel for burial. No details were given on where they were found.
The operation was based on intelligence obtained in recent months, according to the military. The IDF added that the finding was made possible due to a “series of intelligence and operational activities that continued for more than four decades, since he fell in battle.”
Earlier on Tuesday, the IDF said that personal findings belonging to Katz were brought back to Israel during the operation and given to his family for inspection. Meanwhile, Katz’s bones were taken for identification and confirmed on Tuesday evening to belong to the slain soldier.
The military said Katz’s family was updated over the years regarding the ongoing efforts to locate his remains and return them to Israel. “Upon completion of the mission, the family was informed of the return of their loved one. Unfortunately, Yehuda’s parents, Sarah and Yosef Katz, did not live to receive the news,” the army said.
In a statement, IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir said, “The return of Yehuda Katz, the last fallen soldier from the Battle of Sultan Yacoub, is a significant moment for the IDF and for the State of Israel.”
“Decades have passed, but our duty toward our fallen has not changed. We will leave none of our people behind,” Zamir added.
The military chief later spoke with Katz’s family, which he told, “After 44 years, the Battle of Sultan Yacoub has come to an end.”
“All those missing from the battle have been returned to Israel. This is a special day for me, both as chief of the general staff and as a soldier of the Armored Corps,” Zamir was quoted as saying. “From the day I enlisted in the Armored Corps, I was raised on the legacy of that battle and on the moral commitment to bring all of our missing home. An entire nation stands united with you and shares in your emotion today.”


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