Wednesday, May 20, 2026

Ideas and arguments are not created in a vacuum. The argument is important but it comes from somewhere. Before you evaluate what a source is saying, it is important to know where that somewhere is.

Source evaluation is the first tool in the sequence, applied before the others, because it informs how to look at everything downstream. A claim assessed without knowing who is making it, why they might be making it, and what they have done with similar claims in the past is a claim you are evaluating blind. You may reach the right conclusion anyway. But you have made the work harder than it needs to be and abandoned the most accessible lever you have.

What are this source’s incentives — what do they gain from being believed, and what do they lose from being doubted? What is their track record on claims of this kind, in this domain, at this level of specificity? What expertise do they actually hold, as opposed to adjacent credentials they are implicitly borrowing? Are they describing something or advocating for something? And when they have been wrong before — as everyone is at some time — how did they respond?

That last question is the most important one, and the least asked.

That is source evaluation. It is the first tool because it is the cheapest — the information is almost always available, it costs nothing but the decision to look, and it tells you more than any other single move about what you are actually dealing with.

Sources that are biased are not automatically disqualified. Everyone is biased. But it is helpful to understand the ecosystem around the claim, whether there are any codewords that they use that might mean nothing to you but everything to their normal audience, and their ability or inability to correct themselves.


The Corrigibility Test

Sources behave differently when accountability arrives, and the behavior is more revealing than the original error. At one end of the spectrum is the immediate, direct, plainly worded correction. “We were wrong about X. Here is what we now know.” At the other end is vehement denial, often together with outrage that anyone can possibly doubt the claim and often blame a conspiracy. When the evidence is undeniable, this turns into: silence, or its close relative, the lawyer-drafted non-apology that technically acknowledges a problem while distributing responsibility so diffusely that no one is actually accountable for anything.

Between those poles sits a range of behaviors worth learning to recognize. A correction buried three days later in paragraph fourteen of an online version of the story tells you something different than a correction that runs where the original ran. A “clarification” that changes the meaning of a claim without acknowledging that the original meaning was wrong is reputation management dressed as transparency. An editor’s note reading “this story has been updated to reflect additional reporting” — without specifying what changed, why, or what the original said — is an institution signaling that the appearance of accountability matters more to it than the practice. And a large number of breaking news stories online get changed hourly without any acknowledgement of change at all.

Institutions under pressure make choices, and the choices reveal priorities. An outlet that corrects errors quickly, prominently, and in plain language has decided that accuracy matters more than the embarrassment of being wrong. An outlet that corrects reluctantly, minimally, and in language designed to obscure what happened has decided the opposite. The error itself tells you something; the correction behavior tells you more.

The New York Times has demonstrated both corrigibility and a stunning lack of the same in the past couple of decades. Unfortunately, it has been going in the wrong direction in recent years.

In May 2003, the Times published a 7,500-word front-page investigation of its own reporter, Jayson Blair, who had fabricated and plagiarized dozens of stories over years of employment. The piece named Blair, named the editors whose oversight had failed, described specific institutional failures at multiple levels, and did not attribute any of them to bad luck or misunderstanding. Executive Editor Howell Raines and Managing Editor Gerald Boyd resigned within weeks. The correction arrived while the story was still breaking — while the Times still had room to manage its response differently — and it was direct, self-implicating, and complete. An institution capable of that kind of accounting earns something real.

Sixteen years later, the same institution published the 1619 Project, whose lead essay included the claim that protecting slavery was among the primary motivations for the American Revolution. Prominent historians challenged the claim specifically and immediately, several of them with no ideological stake in resisting the project’s broader argument. The Times defended the claim, then quietly altered the language in the online version — “one of the primary reasons” becoming “one of the reasons” — without announcement or acknowledgment. The Times’ own fact-checker subsequently stated that the original claim had not been supported by the evidence. The project’s editor described the change as a clarification. The original language was not preserved in the published text for readers to compare.

The underlying historical dispute is a separate matter — historians can argue about the Revolution’s causes, and reasonable people examining the same evidence reach different conclusions. What the correction behavior reveals is independent of that argument. A significant factual claim was challenged by credentialed experts, the challenge proved well-founded, the language was altered without acknowledgment, and the institution described the alteration in terms chosen to minimize what had occurred. Set that beside the Blair response and you have a picture of an institution that can practice genuine accountability when the error is a reporter’s personal misconduct, and retreats to reputation management when the error is ideologically inconvenient. Both data points belong in your assessment of the Times as a source.

A third example from The New York Times suggests that the silent correction is now standard procedure. In December 2023, two Times reporters covering the Gaza war referred to the Israel Defense Forces as “Israeli occupation forces” — the standard formulation used by anti-Israel activists, not a neutral description — in a published online story. The editors caught the language and changed it to “Israeli forces” in a later version. No correction notice appeared. No editor’s note acknowledged that the original language had run. This episode indicates that Times reporters themselves are not as objective as they are supposed to be, and rather than apologize, the newspaper simply pretended it did not happen. A newspaper that insists on transparency from the institutions it covers has seemingly abandoned that standard for itself.

The spectrum runs further in both directions. At the far negative end are sources whose correction behavior has ceased to function as a signal at all — sources whose errors are so systematic, so consistent in their direction, and so resistant to any acknowledgment that the track record itself becomes disqualifying. The EuroMed Human Rights Monitor, a Hamas-linked, Geneva-based organization whose anti-Israel claims have been cited by major news organizations and United Nations bodies, has published claims that are not merely wrong but physically impossible: organ harvesting from decomposed bodies exhumed from graves, weapons that vaporize victims without leaving physical evidence, training dogs to rape on command. These are not claims that require sophisticated geopolitical analysis to evaluate. They require basic knowledge of how organ transplants are done, or how blast physics works, or how dog training works. The organization has not corrected them. It has continued publishing, and outlets have continued citing it.

A source at that point on the spectrum has told you something definitive. The prior does not simply go low — it reaches a floor below which no specific claim from that source can lift it. Citing EuroMed as a source is not caution hedged with appropriate skepticism. It is credulity, and when a credible outlet cites a disqualified source without disclosing the track record, some portion of the outlet’s own credibility attaches to the laundering.

The New York Times has cited EuroMed several times in Gaza war coverage, after it had made the claims of organ harvesting from dead bodies, including the recent column by Nicholas Kristof that repeated EuroMed’s absurd claim that Israeli soldiers had trained dogs to sexually assault Palestinian prisoners. The same institution, in October 2020, declined to cover the Hunter Biden laptop story on the grounds that the New York Post, which broke it, was not a sufficiently credible source.

The Post is a tabloid with a political orientation and a long record of accurate reporting on New York politics and crime. EuroMed is an organization that publishes physically impossible fabrications and has never corrected them. The outlet with the verifiable track record was dismissed, and the outlet with the fabrication record was cited. The laptop story was subsequently confirmed by independent reporting. The EuroMed claims were not - and the Times still stands by that story.

The gap between how the paper acted in 2003 with Jayson Blair and how it acts today could not be wider.

A source with a mixed or uncertain record warrants skepticism — examine their specific claims more carefully before accepting them. A source with a pattern of errors in one direction, on one category of subject, warrants heightened scrutiny — treat claims in that category as requiring independent corroboration before any weight is given them. A source with a documented pattern of fabrication, consistently serving a consistent agenda, with no meaningful correction behavior, warrants disqualification in the relevant domain, meaning their claims carry no evidential weight regardless of what they say.


The Incentive Structure Behind the Byline

Source credibility is not a binary, and sometimes sources with spotty records still get things right. The more precise tool is understanding what incentives a source has for making claims of the specific kind under examination — because those incentives vary considerably within a single source depending on the category of claim.

American mainstream journalism operates under a professional norm against paying sources for stories. The norm is framed as ethical, and it has an ethical dimension, but its underlying logic is epistemological: a source paid for their account has a financial incentive to produce an account whether or not one exists, which corrupts the testimony. That reasoning is sound as far as it goes. What it misses is that unpaid sources have their own incentives, no less distorting. A source who leaks to a reporter without payment is usually doing so because they want something — to damage a rival, to get ahead of a story they cannot suppress, to advance a narrative that serves their interests. Very often news media will quote a witness as if they had found them when in fact they work for a partisan NGO working with the reporter behind the scene on the story. Saying “I have no financial stake in this” is not the same as “I have no stake in this,” and the professional norm conflates the two.

The National Enquirer pays its sources. This practice places it outside the ethical pale of mainstream journalism and is routinely cited as grounds for dismissing its reporting. Examine the incentive structure that payment actually creates, though, and the picture becomes more complicated. A paid source has a financial stake in the story being true — a false accusation against a public figure with resources to litigate exposes both the source and the publication to serious legal liability. The Enquirer’s core business for decades was celebrity wrongdoing, which meant it needed its celebrity wrongdoing stories to be verifiable or it faced catastrophic defamation exposure. Its sources in that category were often direct insiders — employees, associates, people with firsthand knowledge — whose accounts could be checked against documentary evidence. The mainstream outlet relying on an unpaid source with a political axe to grind had no comparable accountability mechanism; the source faced no consequences for being wrong.

The National Enquirer may publish other stories that are unreliable. But what is documented is the Enquirer’s track record on celebrity wrongdoing stories involving public figures with legal resources. It broke the story on Gary Hart’s affair with Donna Rice, which ended his 1988 presidential campaign. In 2007, the Enquirer’s reported that Senator John Edwards — then a leading Democratic presidential candidate, public advocate of family values, husband of a cancer patient — was conducting an affair and had fathered a child with his mistress.

The mainstream press, had been tipped to the same story and declined to pursue it, and continued declining after the Enquirer published, partly on the grounds that the Enquirer had published it. Edwards denied the affair. The mainstream press largely accepted the denial. Edwards confessed in 2008; paternity was confirmed by DNA in 2010.

The outlets that dismissed the Edwards story based on source credibility were wrong about that specific claim, even if their general assessment of the Enquirer’s track record across all categories may be accurate. Different credibility profiles can and do live inside the same masthead and organization. A blanket discount applied to everything the Enquirer published was a meaningful tool applied without the precision the tool requires.

Where the Enquirer’s model falls short is equally worth naming: paying for stories creates pressure to have a story, which means borderline material gets published that a more cautious editor might hold. The model produces reliability in the category where legal exposure is highest and the facts are most verifiable. It produces less reliability where the claim is harder to verify, the subject less litigious, or the volume incentive dominates. The mainstream model produces reliability in categories where unpaid sources have aligned incentives and accountability mechanisms exist. Both models have systematic strengths in some categories and systematic blind spots in others, and the reader who applies a single credibility judgment to either one — in either direction — is using a blunt instrument where precision is available.


Claims vs. Evidence

Most people, when they imagine media distortion, picture a lie — a specific false claim, clearly stated, that can be identified and refuted. In any environment with functioning watchdogs — a free press, opposition researchers, fact-checking organizations, academics whose careers depend on catching errors — being caught in a direct provable falsehood carries serious reputational cost. Sophisticated actors with agendas generally work hard to avoid provable falsehoods. That does not make them honest. It makes them careful, and it means you are looking for the wrong thing if you are hunting for lies.

What you are actually looking for is subtler: omission, the true fact whose absence changes the meaning of the facts present; selective framing, the emphasis that directs attention to one part of the picture; the pattern of what a source consistently gets wrong, in one direction, on one category of subject.

The widely cited claim that 97% of climate scientists agree that human activity is causing global warming became one of the most repeated statistics in debates about climate policy. When you read the abstract of the actual 2013 paper by John Cook et. al you can see that this is not what was found: the authors only counted papers that specifically expressed an opinion on man-made global warming. Most climate papers didn’t say their opinion either way. It was not a survey of climate scientists. The real number of scientists who support the theory is still quite high - over 80% - but even that is somewhat self-selecting: the field of climate science has exploded since the 1990s and there are billions of dollars associated with the idea that it is primarily something humans are responsible for and therefore can solve. None of that necessarily destroys the underlying consensus claim but “the consensus is real and supported by multiple evidence types” is a different and more carefully bounded claim than a single percentage.

The claim routinely attached to the 97% figure in public discourse went considerably further than any of the underlying studies measured: that scientists agreed on specific emissions targets, on specific policy interventions, on the projections of particular models. Every individual source that cited the figure while attaching it to a stronger claim than the study supported was technically accurate about the number and functionally misleading about what it showed. No one was lying; but it was a consistent pattern of omission producing a false impression in the reader — which is how most distortion actually works.

The reader hunting for false claims will find nothing to hold onto. The reader asking whether the claim being made matches the evidence being cited will find the gap immediately. That second reader is doing the right thing, and it requires no specialized knowledge — only the habit of asking what the cited evidence actually shows before accepting what someone says it shows. Anyone reading the Cook et. al. abstract can see that his claim was much narrower than how columnists and politicians characterized it.


The Expertise Problem

Credentials are domain-specific. This is easy to state and sometimes difficult to apply, because expertise generates prestige that does not stay neatly inside its own domain.

Linus Pauling won the Nobel Prize in Chemistry in 1954 and the Nobel Peace Prize in 1962, making him one of only four people to have received two Nobel Prizes. Beginning in the 1970s, he became one of the most prominent advocates for high-dose Vitamin C as a treatment for cancer and a preventive for the common cold. Multiple well-designed clinical trials failed to replicate the effects he described, and the National Cancer Institute eventually concluded that the evidence did not support Vitamin C megadosing as a cancer treatment. Pauling’s Nobel was in chemistry. His claims were in nutritional medicine and oncology, domains where he had no particular standing and where his conclusions did not survive testing.

The mechanism is not unique to Pauling. Genuine expertise generates genuine prestige, and prestige is not domain-specific. An audience that has learned to trust a source in one domain extends that trust into adjacent domains without examining whether the extension is warranted. The source — accustomed to being trusted, habituated to being right, perhaps less current in the literature outside their specialty — may not notice the line they have crossed. Others may cross the line deliberately and use their expertise to silence critics.

The practical move: don’t whether a source is an expert, but what their expertise is in, specifically, relative to this specific claim. A cardiologist’s opinion on the cardiovascular effects of a drug is worth considerably more than their opinion on the drug’s effects on cognition. An economist’s analysis of labor market data is worth considerably more than their analysis of the epidemiological trajectory of an infectious disease. A human rights NGO might make claims about international law based on supporting their current campaign more than what the law actually says. Experts can have informed views outside their primary domain; the credential belongs to the domain, not to the person, and treating it otherwise leads you wrong.

The problem is most acute when experts speak to policy questions that touch their domain without being fully within it. An epidemiologist can model disease transmission with genuine authority. Whether the economic and social costs of a particular containment policy are worth paying is not an epidemiological question — it requires weighing values and evidence from multiple domains, and the epidemiologist’s credential does not travel there. During the COVID-19 period, this distinction collapsed almost entirely in public discourse. Experts in disease transmission were regularly treated as authorities on economic tradeoffs, educational policy, and civil liberties questions that their training gave them no particular standing to adjudicate. The audiences most deferential to expertise were, in this respect, the ones most systematically misled by it — not because the experts were lying, but because neither the experts nor their audiences asked whether the credential applied.


When the Institution Has Decided What It Will Find

Individual sources can be evaluated for expertise, incentives, and track record. Institutions present the same problem at scale, with an additional complication: when an institution’s conclusions consistently align with its funding sources or ideological commitments across many studies and many years, that pattern is itself evidence, independent of the quality of any individual piece of work.

The clearest documented case comes from the tobacco industry. Beginning in the 1950s and accelerating through the 1960s, tobacco companies funded research explicitly designed to manufacture doubt about the link between smoking and disease. Internal memoranda, later produced in litigation, showed that industry scientists understood the health effects of smoking and organized a campaign to obscure them — funding studies designed to produce ambiguous results, placing friendly scientists on editorial boards, and cultivating a public narrative of ongoing scientific uncertainty that the industry’s own private research had long since resolved. The Council for Tobacco Research, presented publicly as an independent scientific body, existed to produce the appearance of legitimate inquiry while its conclusions were predetermined. This is conspiracy in the strict sense: coordinated, intentional, documented.

The pharmaceutical industry’s publication bias problem has no comparable smoking gun but is at least as important. Clinical trials with positive results — that the drug works as hoped — get submitted for publication, accepted by journals eager for significant findings, and enter the medical literature. Trials with negative or null results — the drug does not perform, or performs worse than the comparison — often go unpublished. No central directive is required; the incentives are sufficient. A researcher whose trial produces a null result has a paper that journals are less likely to accept, a finding that does not advance their career, and a result their funder may prefer not to publicize. Multiply those individual decisions across thousands of researchers over decades and the published literature systematically overstates drug efficacy relative to the full evidence base — not because anyone chose to distort it, but because the selection pressure on what gets published is not neutral.

Below that sits a third layer, one that requires no funder pressure and no career calculation at all. Researchers generally do not publish studies that disprove their own hypotheses. A scientist who designs an experiment, runs it, and finds that their hypothesis was wrong faces a result with limited publication prospects, limited professional reward, and real psychological cost. The scientific community’s knowledge is built from the subset of research that gets written up, submitted, and published — a selected sample of all research conducted, skewed toward confirmation, toward positive findings, toward results clean enough to be publishable. The entire field’s collective understanding rests on an archive that contains the successes and buries the failures, which means the knowledge base is more confident and less accurate than the full evidence would warrant. Replication efforts, meta-analyses, and systematic reviews exist precisely to correct for this — but only in fields where those tools are applied rigorously and where null results, when they accumulate, can eventually force a reckoning with what the original literature obscured.

The reader’s job, when assessing institutional conclusions, is to ask what selection pressures apply to this institution’s output and what those pressures would predict about the direction of any distortion. A pattern of conclusions consistently favoring funders, consistently avoiding findings that would threaten institutional relationships, and consistently framing uncertainty in directions that serve preferred outcomes, is relevant information. Actual conspiracies on the level of the tobacco companies are rare, but institutional bias affecting what is presented as objective research is common.


Triangulation

When the media environment itself is compromised — when outlets on opposing sides are each amplifying their own narrative and suppressing the facts that complicate it — a method remains available, though it requires more work than reading a single trusted source.

Identify what each side says about the same event. Extract the facts they share despite their opposing agendas. Treat that overlap as the most reliable core of the story, because those are the facts that survived the most hostile possible scrutiny — each side had every incentive to suppress them and could not.

Beginning with the protests following George Floyd’s death in Minneapolis and extending through Portland, Kenosha, and dozens of other cities over the following months, coverage divided almost perfectly along ideological lines. Left-leaning outlets emphasized the scale and peaceful character of the demonstrations, the legitimacy of the underlying grievances, and the provocation preceding specific incidents of violence. Right-leaning outlets emphasized property destruction, fires, assaults on law enforcement, and the failure of local governments to maintain order. Each account was, within its own frame, defensible. Each account omitted what the other documented.

The reader who consumed only left-leaning coverage came away with a picture of overwhelmingly peaceful protest occasionally marred by isolated violence. That matched the statistical reality that most individual demonstrators at most events were not engaged in violence — and missed the sustained destruction in specific locations over sustained periods. The reader who consumed only right-leaning coverage came away with a picture of urban chaos and institutional capitulation to mob violence. That matched the documented reality of burned buildings and police precincts — and missed the peaceful majority that made the violent minority a minority rather than something representative.

The facts both sides had to acknowledge, because neither could suppress them without obvious bad faith: demonstrations occurred in hundreds of cities; a meaningful minority of locations experienced significant property damage and violence; the overwhelming majority of protesters at the overwhelming majority of events did not engage in violence; specific locations, particularly Portland over an extended period, saw sustained conflict that lasted well beyond any single night. A reader who extracted those shared acknowledgments had something closer to the actual picture than any reader who trusted either account alone.

The method has a critical limitation. Triangulation only works when the two sources are genuinely adversarial and independently reported. Two outlets drawing from the same wire service are one source with two mastheads. The number of news outlets that can afford their own national or international coverage has plummeted. A reader who found three news organizations reporting the same claim and concluded that three independent sources had confirmed it may have found one AP story republished in three places. The independence has to be real — separate reporting chains, separate sources, separate institutional incentives — or triangulation produces false confidence rather than genuine corroboration.


When Good Faith Is Not Warranted

The entire framework of this chapter assumes something worth making explicit: that the sources you are evaluating are at least attempting to engage with reality. Most of the tools — corrigibility assessment, incentive analysis, triangulation, pattern recognition — are instruments for calibrating how much to trust a source that is operating in good faith but imperfectly. They are less useful, and potentially counterproductive, when applied to sources that are not operating in good faith at all.

The Western intellectual tradition is built on an assumption of sincere engagement. Debate, peer review, journalism, and the legal adversarial system all generally presuppose that your interlocutor is genuinely trying to establish something true and is, in principle, open to being corrected by evidence. That assumption is foundational and mostly warranted. It is also, in specific contexts, a vulnerability.

In the 1990s, Holocaust deniers discovered Usenet — the early internet’s public discussion forums — and began spreading their lies.Well meaning experts responded showing their errors. What followed was an iterative development process for the deniers. Every careful refutation told the deniers which arguments were weak and which survived scrutiny. Every documented historical source they were shown allowed them to develop more sophisticated responses to that source. Every logical flaw identified in their reasoning was eventually patched. The people who spent hours meticulously dismantling denier claims were not just wasting their time on the deniers — the deniers were extracting value from them. The output, in only a few months of this process, was a considerably more sophisticated body of denial literature than had existed before the engagement began.

The deniers were not persuadable. They were not arguing in order to find the truth. They were arguing in order to become more convincing, and the good-faith engagement of their opponents was the resource that made them so.

A source that has established a documented pattern of fabrication — that has published claims shown to be physically impossible or outright lies and never corrected them, that continues producing similar claims in service of the same agenda — has forfeited the presumption of good faith that makes engagement worthwhile. Recognizing this isn’t cowardice or closed-mindedness; iIt is an accurate assessment of what you are dealing with, and acting on that assessment is the correct application of the tools this chapter describes.

When a source is disqualified, the productive response is to expose the track record, not to engage with the specific current claim. Showing that a source has published clear falsehoods and never corrected them is more useful to the watchful audience than dismantling its latest claims — because it equips the audience to handle the next claim, and the one after that, without requiring expert analysis each time. The track record is the argument. The specific claim is beside the point.

Engagement remains warranted under one condition: when the bad-faith argument is reaching people who might be persuaded, and who can be served more effectively by seeing the argument answered than by being told the source is disqualified. In that case the target of the argument is not the bad-faith source — it is the people being reached by the source, who may be entirely sincere and who deserve a real answer. The argument is for them, not for the source producing it. Trying to correct the source is a waste of time; inoculating the audience from believing that source is very worthwhile.


Back to Duke

How does any of this help with the David Duke question of Chapter 1?

We need to look at Duke’s entire history, not just his NPR interview in a vacuum.

Even if we accept that Duke has not associated himself with the Ku Klux Klan for decades, if you try to find any of his writings that specifically denounce the Klan’s racist beliefs you will come up short. His claim not to be a racist appears to depend on a strained definition of racism, which we will explore in later chapters.

If you look at his eponymous website, DavidDuke.com, you will find articles that have a completely different tone than his NPR interview. Headlines include “The Giant Jewish Vampire Squid Criminal Bank With Its Blood Funnel Stuck Into the Face of Humanity!” referring to Goldman Sachs, and “Purim: A Festival of Hate and an Insight into How Jewish Supremacists View Gentiles.” Duke and his fellow writers on the site are writing for their audience, and the message is quite different from what Duke says on national news media. He is using NPR as a recruitment tool. One can reasonably expect that the website named after him is closer to his real views.

His track record places him, on claims about Jewish people and racial hierarchy, at the disqualification end of the spectrum. His NPR argument, evaluated as a claim about those subjects, comes from a source with no meaningful presumption of good faith in that domain.

Duke’s argument requires an answer anyway — not for Duke’s benefit, but because it no longer belongs only to him. There are plenty of younger people who parrot Duke’s ideas even if they never heard of him. The arguments themselves are on social media. The people making the arguments may be entirely sincere.. Disqualifying Duke does not disqualify the argument from requiring a response, because the argument has escaped its source.

For now, this chapter argues that you do not have to respect David Duke or assume his argument is made in good faith. But his argument still needs to be answered. We will dismantle the actual argument in later chapters.






Buy EoZ's books  on Amazon!

Reclaiming the Covenant on America's 250th (May 2026)

"He's an Anti-Zionist Too!" cartoon book (December 2024)

PROTOCOLS: Exposing Modern Antisemitism (February 2022)

   

 

 

  • Wednesday, May 20, 2026
  • Elder of Ziyon
It looks like Western anti-Israel "Nakba Day" demonstrations are a lot bigger than the Palestinian ones.

Palestine Today says that the rallies in Khan Younis were "massive."


But it looks like only a few people, maybe a hundred at most.





Here was Al Jazeera's most impressive aerial shot from Ramallah, in the central square that was half empty.








Buy EoZ's books  on Amazon!

Reclaiming the Covenant on America's 250th (May 2026)

"He's an Anti-Zionist Too!" cartoon book (December 2024)

PROTOCOLS: Exposing Modern Antisemitism (February 2022)

   

 

 

From Ian:

Judge Roy K. Altman: A Miscarriage of Journalism at the New York Times
Nicholas Kristof's recent essay in the New York Times about supposed Israeli sex crimes against Palestinian detainees is a travesty - not simply because it's wrong as a matter of fact, or because it regurgitates long-debunked blood libels against the Jewish state at a time of rising antisemitism around the world. It's a travesty because it embraces the erosion of democratic norms.

We assume that our citizens will be prepared to discern truth from fiction. We feel comfortable in that assumption because we've devised a system of laws - based on evidence, burdens of proof, and a time-tested set of rules - to help us assess the veracity of contested claims. Today, this whole system is being undermined by the proliferation of false information, especially on the internet.

It's one thing to have our geopolitical and ideological enemies pushing unverified claims about our closest allies into our cell phones. It's another thing entirely for the New York Times to offer a story that - in its disregard of basic evidence-gathering norms, its unwillingness to investigate the opposing side's position, and its inversion of common sense - violates the fundamental rules of fairness and due process that serve as the bulwark of our democracy.

Kristof accused Israel of using sexual violence against detained Palestinian prisoners as a kind of "standard operating procedure." His claim is not merely that a few rogue Israeli prison guards sometimes behave illegally, as happens in all Western democracies, including our own.

Whether in civil or criminal cases, we have for hundreds of years rejected the technique of allowing anonymous witnesses to advance salacious claims in secret. But Kristof's article relies mostly on anonymous sources whose credibility - much less their political or ideological affiliations - cannot be tested. Moreover, his reliance on anonymity ensures that no one can ever prove him wrong.

The few sources Kristof does name underscore why anonymity is so problematic. Kristof relies heavily on a report by Euro-Med, an organization with known ties to Hamas. Its leader, Ramy Abdu, has advocated publicly for "a million October 7ths," and has repeatedly peddled the allegation that Israel "harvests organs."

When a reporter in our supposed "paper of record" advances a series of allegations that are this severe and pernicious, against an entire nation, we should demand that he produce evidence to match the gravity of his assertions. Kristof has fallen well short of this standard.

The writer is a federal judge in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida.
Seth Mandel: The Truth About the Entertainment Industry and Israel
It’s hard not to enjoy seeing someone speak actual truth to actual power in the entertainment industry. So when the celebrated Hungarian filmmaker Laszlo Nemes was asked by the Guardian about his new WWII movie, Orphan, and the cultural and political implications of its subject, Nemes did the whole world a giant favor.

“There’s an orgy of antisemitism, an absolute, shameless orgy of antisemitism, overtaking the west,” Nemes declares. He’s had enough of the “puritan, moralising, self-righteousness” from people who think of themselves as cultured and enlightened. “I think it’s all anti-humanist regression. And because it’s not identified as this, I think it’s very effective at spreading. And one of its very potent vectors has been antisemitism. … The Jew has always been [cast as] the sort of internal enemy, and I think now [the idea of] the Jew as the internal enemy of the west has reached the dimensions of European antisemitism before the takeover by the National Socialist [Nazi] party.”

His much-awarded 2015 masterpiece Son of Saul, Nemes suggests, would not fare well in this environment, where “anything that’s Jewish is now considered… Nobody would touch it with a 10-foot pole.”

Orphan is also a Holocaust movie, and despite Nemes’s mastering of the subject, this time he has yet to find a U.S. distributor. “You should be able to talk about these things without being ostracized,” he told the Guardian.

Nemes, who is Jewish, said that at conversations ostensibly about his new movie, “people [would] ask me about Gaza, instead of, you know, asking about the movie. [They ask] if I signed this or that petition.”

In other words, is he, you know, a good Jew? “We know how totalitarian mindsets work. … This kind of ideology always attaches itself to the sense of being on the right side of history, being on the righteous side. There’s a very strong, moralizing, puritan surface on which this ideology can attach itself.”

Obviously Nemes is correct in every particular. But it’s worth noting that we have confirmation that he is correct from the very cohort he’s talking about.

Usually, what Nemes calls the “overclass of Hollywood” loves to portray itself as some courageous institution. But occasionally a smug buffoon like Javier Bardem will be so giddy with self-righteousness that he’ll reveal the truth.
JPost Editorial: Leiter’s blunt accuracy maybe undiplomatic, but it his criticism is valid
Sharply criticizing J Street and implying that US Senator Bernie Sanders should not be called a Jew may not have been Israeli Ambassador Yechiel Leiter’s most diplomatic moment. But it was perhaps his most candid – articulating what many Israelis and their supporters quietly believe.

“How can you be pro-Israel and advocate for an arms embargo on a state that’s fighting a seven-front war against Iranian proxies?” Leiter asked of J Street, which bills itself as pro-Israel, pro-peace, and pro-democracy.

His comments in Washington referred to the lobbying organization’s call to end military aid to Israel, including support for weapons systems such as Iron Dome.

“If they said that they were pro-Palestinian, I wouldn’t have a problem meeting with them,” he said. “I meet with pro-Palestinian groups. But when you come and say in such a two-faced manner, ‘We’re pro-Israel, we’re pro-democracy,’ there’s a democratically elected government in Israel. You don’t like [Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu, make aliyah, vote in the next election, and express yourself. Don’t say you’re ‘pro-democracy’ and decry and defy the position of the democratic government of Israel.”

Even as we reject Leiter’s reference to J Street as a “cancer” – believing it is possible to disagree without resorting to toxic rhetoric – we agree with the thrust of his criticism.

Israel is now in the 956th day of a war forced upon it on October 7. The very least it could expect from an organization calling itself pro-Israel is not to lobby against the sale of arms needed to defend itself or accuse it of genocide. That’s a low bar, and one that J Street failed to clear.
From Ian:

Seth Frantzman: Is a ‘New Middle East’ Still Possible?
The real question hanging over the Middle East at the moment is what comes next in the post-Iran-War period. The outcome of the Iran War could resemble that of the 1991 Gulf War. Following that conflict, the state system of the region grew weaker, and extremist groups, led by Al Qaeda, filled the vacuum.

Speaking about Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, President George HW Bush said, “What is at stake is more than one small country; it is a big idea: a new world order, where diverse nations are drawn together in common cause to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind—peace and security, freedom, and the rule of law. Such is a world worthy of our struggle and worthy of our children’s future.”

However, the world order that was ushered in after 1991 did not live up to this aspiration. In the Middle East, in particular, it is clear that it did not. Instead, the Gulf War opened a Pandora’s box, unforeseen at the time. The chaos of the 1990s enabled Osama Bin Laden to plot attacks and receive shelter from the Taliban in Afghanistan. A weakened Saddam Hussein regime did not go away, but limped on until the US invasion of 2003. Various regimes in the region, including Assad in Syria and the Iranians, exploited the chaos in Iraq after 2003. After the Arab Spring of 2011 and the resultant Syrian Civil War, ISIS emerged in Syria and Iraq.

Now, in 2026, we are at a new turning point. Iran is weakened, but it may continue to limp along just as Saddam Hussein’s government did. Iran’s attacks have transformed the Gulf states. They are investing heavily in US armaments, $17 billion in recent purchases, according to The New York Times. Air defenses and armaments will only go so far. A tighter and more formidable security architecture in the region is also needed, which will mean closer partnerships with countries such as Pakistan, Egypt, Israel, and Turkey. The Gulf states may not all agree on which of these four regional countries is the best partner, but they are already seeking them out.

A major question for a changing Middle East is whether a weakened Iran will ditch its proxies. Iran has been supporting Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and militias in Iraq over the last few decades. Are all those groups strong enough to stand on their own without Tehran’s support? Hamas and Hezbollah have fought Israel for years and taken losses, but they are still in control of parts of Gaza and Lebanon. The Houthis appear to be cemented in Yemen as well. Iraq, which has a new prime minister after six months of uncertainty since elections in November, will find it hard to disarm Iranian-backed militias.

Depending on how the recent conflict with Iran is resolved, the likely trend in the Middle East will be a gradual shift away from the chaos that defined the era from 1991 to 2023. The October 7 war has led to a stronger Israel and also led to other countries stepping up to more assertive regional roles, including Turkey and Saudi Arabia, as well as countries that are further away, such as Pakistan. Pakistan has sought to mediate between Iran and the United States, for instance. The next era in the region will focus on the state-to-state relations among these regional powers.
Amit Segal: Was Israel’s War on Iran a Success?
Assessing this new reality, Hayman warns that Khamenei is more radical than his father and is no longer bound by the previous religious decree prohibiting the production of nuclear weapons. Because the Iranian leadership will likely conclude that “only nuclear deterrence can prevent the next war,” Hayman asserts that the defense establishment must operate under the working assumption that a clandestine Iranian nuclear weapons project is already underway.

Israel’s political ambition was the overthrow of the Iranian regime, whereas the IDF’s stated military objective was limited to the attrition of its capabilities.

Hayman’s article also reveals that it took Iran a full 40 hours of aggressive pressure to compel Hezbollah to enter the current campaign. Initially, Hezbollah attempted to deceive both Israel and the Lebanese public into believing their strikes were purely “symbolic.” To create the illusion of compliance with demilitarization agreements, the group intentionally withheld fire from south of Lebanon’s Litani River until March 5. However, Hayman notes that Hezbollah had secretly maintained combat infrastructure and fighters in that southern zone the entire time.

Although Hezbollah has been significantly degraded militarily, Hayman warns that retaining just 10 percent of its pre-November 2024 capabilities still leaves it with a formidable arsenal of approximately 15,000 rockets and missiles.

This looming threat is compounded by a frustrating tactical reality on the ground. Late last week, the U.S. announced a 45-day extension of the ceasefire in Lebanon. Yet, despite this truce on paper, the conflict continues; now the IDF operates under severe American constraints, with President Donald Trump largely prohibiting strikes in Beirut and the Beqaa valley.

Meanwhile, over the past two weeks, drone attacks and cross-border incidents have killed seven Israeli soldiers and civilians, wounding dozens more. While the establishment of the “Yellow Line” buffer zone in southern Lebanon has mitigated some direct fire, holding this territory places IDF forces on the ground at significant risk, Hayman writes.

He concludes with stark recommendations for the path forward. If diplomacy is the chosen route, an airtight, highly “stringent nuclear agreement” is an absolute necessity. Conversely, if the decision is to resume the war, it must be explicitly defined as a campaign to eliminate threats—with the Iranian nuclear program targeted first. While Trump currently appears to be leaning toward the military option, Hayman issues a clear warning regarding any future operation: “Aerial strikes alone will not be enough.”
Seth Mandel: Don’t Cry for Qatar
The Iran war has been pitched mostly as a battle of economic wills: with rising gas prices in the U.S. and cratering oil revenue in Iran. Who will blink first?

But it’s just as important to recognize how each side’s junior partners can influence the broader war strategy. Case in point: This afternoon, President Trump announced he was postponing the next round of planned Iran strikes because the leaders of Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates told him negotiations had made real progress.

And who knows. Maybe it’s even true. But the timing is interesting. Yesterday, the New York Times’ correspondent in Doha published a fascinating article on how the Iran war was crushing the Qatari economy. It turns out that second to Iran, Qatar has the most to lose from a prolonged conflict and the most to gain from a deal.

The article sketches out the Qatari economic miracle. And it is quite the success story. But Qatar’s success has been terrible for the world. And a deal that Qatar is happy with would likely be a deal whose terms are to America’s detriment.

Qatar, let’s remember, does not have clean hands here. When the current phase of the larger U.S.-Iran-Israel war kicked off, on October 7, 2023, the Saudis and Emiratis were engaged in a diplomatic program that was bringing progress and peace to the region—and included concessions for the Palestinians too.

Hamas crushed all that. Which means Hamas’s patrons crushed all that—chiefly Iran, but Qatar too. The understanding that Israeli leaders had with the Qataris was that their involvement would bring stability to Gaza. Instead, it brought some of the worse war the region has seen.

Qatar contributes to any misery one might find in the Middle East but none of the progress. During the Gaza war, Qatar was at times startlingly useless. It had found itself in a position of power because of its wealth and because of its determination to use that wealth for evil purposes. Yet it was mostly unhelpful in putting out the fires it helped start.

Tuesday, May 19, 2026

  • Tuesday, May 19, 2026
  • Elder of Ziyon

I like to swing for the fences. 

In March, at the beginning of the US/Israeli war on Iran, I published a four-part series arguing that Western war theory rests on a category error — treating war as a discrete episode rather than a continuous relationship — and that revolutionary movements have spent decades exploiting that error. Therefore, I proposed an entirely new theory of war that I think aligns more with how reality works than with how international law has evolved. I freely admit that I have no academic expertise in this or many other topics I write about but I will come up with an idea, research it and write about it fairly quickly.

Marcia Kupfer, an independent scholar, was impressed enough with my argument that she invited Michael Walzer — author of Just and Unjust Wars, the book that shaped modern just war theory and long formed part of the West Point curriculum — to comment on my series. Walzer is one of the world's  most distinguished intellectuals.

Whoa.

Walzer took my arguments seriously, in detail. He agreed with some of what I argued, pushed back on other parts, and raised challenges. 

Here I will try to respond to his well reasoned points. Kupfer gave an excellent summary of my series that is worth reading in her Substack.

What I argued

The series made five interconnected claims. Western international law treats war as episodic — a discrete event with a legal trigger, a period of hostilities, and an end. Revolutionary movements, from Lenin through Mao through Islamism, treat war as continuous — a permanent state aimed at total transformation. The imminence doctrine at the heart of international law cannot address threats that are real, building, and existential but not yet "imminent" in any legally recognizable sense. The right diagnostic question before committing to any military response is: if this episodic war is won, does that actually neutralize the threat? The answer determines not just whether to fight, but what victory requires. And the existing international legal framework cannot be reformed from within — any rule flexible enough to address these problems is flexible enough to be claimed by Russia against Ukraine, by Iran against Israel.

The series drew on John Locke's definition of the state of war — declared hostile intent combined with the capacity to act on it, not active hostilities — and argued that this understanding is war as a relationship is what modern international law quietly abandoned in favor of looking at war as an episode. I claim that looking at war as an event has been systematically weaponized by revolutionary actors.

Walzer has a much more comprehensive view of history than I do. He brings up excellent counterarguments to my assertion that revolutionary movements never end until victory or total annihilation; it is a stretch to say the Korean War is still being waged and he notes that the communists won the Vietnam War but now the US has close to normal relations with them which is inconsistent with perpetual war. 

Perhaps I can sharpen the distinction - as he notes, often the revolutionaries become statists when they reach power so the ideology becomes secondary to control. Identifying their own incentives and trajectory is critical in deciding on how to respond to aggression from a self-defined revolutionary state. Walzer argues that China is more statist than revolutionary today, but I think my argument that the US is in a war-relationship with China is still accurate; China is acting in a way consistent with long-term victory over the US, currently using its expertise in surveillance, stealing technology, making other nations dependent on it for infrastructure and using social media to divide Western societies. 

So rather than fixate on Marx and Islamism as revolutionary movements - and Walzer is correct that original Marxism did not support war as the means of revolution - my argument needs to lean more on my idea of war as relationship. Relationships can change over time, as his Vietnam example proves. 

The question is, I think, when an ideology is regarded a more important than statism. My quote of Mao saying that he would gladly sacrifice hundreds of millions of Chinese to win over the West is true but Walzer is also accurate in saying that China is acting more statist than strictly revolutionary. The important thing is whether a nation would change its strategy in response to external events or only its tactics. That is where Western responses to anti-Western states and movements need to concentrate. 

Iran appears to still prioritize ideology over all. Saudi Arabia, also a state that officially follows Islam as its constitution, has shown far more pragmatism in dealing with the West. 

Israel's major error with Hamas was being lulled into thinking that the group was acting pragmatically to help its people and not recognizing that its desire to destroy Israel had not abated - and its pragmatism was a well planned deception. The idea that they would willingly sacrifice tens of thousands of its citizens just to gain public relations points was not seriously considered, let alone that this would be its guiding (and largely successful) military strategy.

Which brings us to the difference between dealing with Islamist ideologies and The Cold War. 

Walzer notes that there were repeated calls for preventive war against the Soviet Union — "strike now before we are struck" — and that it was wise to reject them. The Marshall Plan, NATO, the Voice of America, diplomatic contacts throughout: these ultimately prevailed. If communism ever inspired eternal war against Western capitalism, "the inspiration had a beginning and an end. It was smart to wait it out."

The implication is clear. If it was smart to wait out Soviet communism despite its universalist ambitions and nuclear arsenal, the same patience might apply to Iranian revolutionary Islamism.

I would argue that The Cold War worked because the Soviet Union had a survival interest. Mutual Assured Destruction was a credible deterrent precisely because Soviet leadership — whatever its ideological commitments — valued the survival of the Soviet state and Soviet society. Khrushchev blinked during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Brezhnev pursued détente. The ideological commitment to world revolution consistently yielded to the instinct for national self-preservation. That instinct is what made waiting viable.

Hamas didn't care about its leaders' survival. It cares about Islam's ultimate victory. And so does Iran. 

Khomeini stated explicitly: "We do not worship Iran. We worship Allah. Let this land burn, let it go up in smoke as long as Islam wins in the end." This is the constitutional doctrine of the Islamic Republic, institutionalized in its schools, its Friday prayers, its Revolutionary Guard theology, its proxy network. The regime was founded on the explicit subordination of national survival to revolutionary purpose.

Deterrence requires a rational actor who values survival at a rate sufficient to be deterred. The Soviet deterrence calculation was: launch and be annihilated, or don't launch and survive. Iranian revolutionary doctrine has institutionalized martyrdom as a religious virtue, constructed proxy forces specifically designed to absorb losses while Iran maintains deniability, and for forty years demonstrated consistent willingness to accept enormous costs — including economic devastation from sanctions — rather than abandon the revolutionary project. Shame culture reinforces this at every level — even tiny concessions are read as weakness, and symbolism consistently trumps reality.

There is also a technical asymmetry between Iran and the Cold War. The Cold War "wait it out" strategy was applied to a nuclear-armed adversary — the Soviet Union already had the weapons. The deterrence logic that made waiting viable depended on both sides having the capability and dreading its use. An Iran approaching the nuclear threshold is a categorically different problem. Once that threshold is crossed, the deterrence calculation inverts: instead of waiting being viable, waiting forecloses the option entirely. The Begin Doctrine — applied at Osirak in 1981, at Deir ez-Zor in 2007, against Iran in 2026 — is precisely the recognition that the window for the "wait it out" strategy closes as capability approaches threshold, and that the closing is irreversible. Walzer defended Israel's 1967 preemptive strike on the grounds of imminent threat. The Iranian nuclear program was a threat played out over decades rather than days, without a clear casus belli but where waiting is suicidal. No one can doubt that Iran would deploy a nuclear weapon against Israel and willingly sacrifice a couple of million Palestinians if they thought they could. 

Waiting Iran out might result in a successful popular uprising, or it might result in a nuclear weapon and delivery system. The latter is unfortunately more likely than the former. 

The other major challenge he makes is to my idea that each nation should prioritize their own people over their enemies. 

Walzer defends the position he and Avishai Margalit argued in Haaretz: that innocent men and women on both sides of a conflict have equal value. He reads my framework as relaxing that principle, making it "a little easier to fight against insurgents hiding among civilians" by valuing Israeli civilians at a higher rate than Gazan civilians.

I am not arguing that enemy civilians have less inherent worth as human beings. I'm saying that states have concentric circles of responsibility — to their own citizens first, to enemy civilians second — and that these circles reflect the source of a state's moral and political legitimacy, not a ranking of human worth. A government's primary claim on its citizens' obedience and sacrifice derives from its commitment to protect them. A government that sacrifices its citizens to protect enemy civilians has not demonstrated superior morality. It has inverted the moral basis of its own authority. And current international law supports this: no army is expected to endanger its own soldiers to reduce casualties of the enemy, and the laws of proportionality as adjudicated are far more favorable to the military than the standards applied to Israel. This is not a description of the value of lives but of reality: just as a parent would save her own child over another's, a state must prioritize their own citizens and an army must prioritize its own members. This is the social contract we all live under. 

If armies are expected to weigh all lives equally, that means that Hamas' human shield strategy is impossible to defeat. I would be interested to know how the equal-value principle generates operational guidance in a situation where Hamas has deliberately structured the battlefield to make Israeli restraint a Hamas strategic asset.

I deeply appreciate the discussion. Walzer could have dismissed this series. A pseudonymous blogger arguing that the experts got it wrong, published on Substack, is not an obvious target for serious engagement. He chose to engage seriously, carefully, and generously — identifying where I was right, identifying where he disagrees, and raising the hardest available challenge to my central argument. That is what intellectual discourse is supposed to look like, and it happens far less often than it should.

My theory of war is part of my larger philosophical work. If the framework I have been developing holds up under serious scrutiny from the field's most important living thinker in this domain  — not unscathed, but standing — then it may be worth developing further.

That is what I intend to do.




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This blog may be a labor of love for me, but it takes a lot of effort, time and money. For 20 years and 40,000 articles I have been providing accurate, original news that would have remained unnoticed. I've written hundreds of scoops and sometimes my reporting ends up making a real difference. I appreciate any donations you can give to keep this blog going.

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