The New York Times reported on Israel's killing of Al-Manar correspondent Ali Shoeib in an airstrike near the southern Lebanese town of Jezzine. The strike also killed Fatima Ftouni and her brother Mohammed Ftouni, journalists for the Hezbollah-affiliated Al-Mayadeen channel.
The Times dutifully secured the standard quote:
Legal experts and human rights groups say that expressions of support for an armed group such as Hezbollah do not make someone a legitimate target under the laws of war, unless they actively participate in hostilities.
"Just reporting on the advancement of Israeli troops or engaging in propaganda does not make someone a military target," said Ramzi Kaiss, the Lebanon researcher at Human Rights Watch.
The laws of war say otherwise.
The IDF didn't just call Shoeib a propagandist. According to Ynet, the IDF stated he "operated under the guise of a journalist as a terrorist in the intelligence unit of Hezbollah's Radwan Force." The Radwan Force is Hezbollah's elite commando unit — the force trained specifically for cross-border invasion of Israeli territory.
The IDF's international spokesperson stated that Shoeib was officially recruited into Hezbollah's military wing in 2020, though in practice had been cooperating with the organization since 2013, with his role in the intelligence unit being to film intelligence information and transfer it to the Radwan Force.
This isn't a close call. A confirmed member of a terrorist organization's active military intelligence unit is a combatant. The press credential doesn't change that. As the DoD Law of War Manual states plainly (p. 174): "Although journalism is regarded as a civilian activity, the fact that a person performs such work does not preclude that person from otherwise acquiring a different status under the law of war."
This was not unknown information. The Alma Research Center documented Shoeib's dual role back in 2021, noting that he was "an important mouthpiece in the service of Hezbollah's propaganda and information warfare" and simultaneously "a Hezbollah intelligence and military operative involved in gathering visible intelligence along the Israeli border and an acting conduit for those who wish to collaborate with Hezbollah." Alma noted that as far back as 2006, an Israeli court heard evidence that an informant had been providing IDF strategic details and training programs directly to Shoeib.
But, one might object as the New York Times says, the IDF didn't provide any proof that Shoeib was a Radwan Forces member. So what legal basis is there to target him?
HRW's Ramzi Kaiss's formulation is not just wrong but precisely backwards. He says "reporting on the advancement of Israeli troops" doesn't make someone a target. Again, the e DoD Law of War Manual, quoting international law, says the opposite.
The Manual (p. 240) notes that "providing or relaying information of immediate use in combat operations, such as acting as an artillery spotter or member of a ground observer corps or otherwise relaying information to be used to direct an airstrike, mortar attack, or ambush" is regarded as "taking a direct part in hostilities."
That is a textbook description of what Shoeib was doing. The IDF stated that even during Operation Northern Arrows, Shoeib "continued his activities and reported on the location of IDF forces operating in southern Lebanon." He provided near real-time reports on IDF operations in southern Lebanon — including reporting on strikes against Israeli positions and targeted killings across the region.
Before the war, he went further. He was documented near the border alongside IDF soldiers, sharing footage online showing troops in the Mount Dov area — including identifying a brigade commander by name. Publishing the location and identity of an IDF brigade commander is not journalism. It is targeting intelligence delivered to an enemy actively seeking to kill that commander.
The IDF added that Shoeib "maintained continuous contact with other terrorists in the Radwan Force unit in particular, and within the terror organization in general," including top Hezbollah commanders.
This is what a spotter does. The press badge is the cover; the function is military.
The legal standard under Additional Protocol I (Art. 79) is clear: journalists are protected "provided that they take no action adversely affecting their status as civilians." Systematically relaying enemy troop positions to a military force that can act on them in real time is exactly the kind of action that forfeits that protection.
There is a lot more in this analysis at Lawfare from 2015.
The only legal question remaining is whether killing the other two journalists who were with Shoeib made the attack disproportionate. But historically, spotters have been regarded as essential military targets.
And that is exactly what Ali Shoeib was, even without proving that he was a member of Radwan. And the fact that he was employed by Hezbollah strongly indicates that he had a dual role to help his employer militarily under the cover of journalism.
By any yardstick. Ali Shoeib was a legal combatant. The IDF wouldn't take credit for targeting him unless it was quite certain about the legality of the strike. And everything supports what they are saying.
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Elder of Ziyon








