Friday, December 30, 2022
From Ian:
Caroline Glick: Where the Netanyahu government differs from its predecessor
Caroline Glick: Where the Netanyahu government differs from its predecessor
Over the course of the campaign, and in a steadily escalating fashion as he prepared to return to office, Netanyahu has spoken enthusiastically about the prospect of reaching a peace agreement that will formalize Israel’s relations with Saudi Arabia. Those still sub rosa relations were the foundation of the Abraham Accords.Jonathan Tobin: Can US Jews love the real Israel—or only the fantasy version?
The rationale for a Saudi deal is overwhelming for both countries. Leaving aside the economic potential of such an agreement—which is massive—the strategic implications are a game changer. An Israeli-Saudi normalization agreement, like the agreements Israel concluded with the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan in 2020, is a means to withstand the Biden administration’s realignment away from America’s allies and towards Iran. By strengthening its bilateral ties with the Arab states bordering Iran and other key states in the region, Israel expands its strategic footprint and is capable of developing defensive and offensive capabilities by working in cooperation with likeminded governments. By working with Israel openly, Saudi Arabia sends a clear message to Iran and its people that Saudi Arabia will not be cowed into submission by the regime that is currently brutalizing its youth.
Netanyahu has already made a statement in support of the revolutionaries in Iran. At this point, with most experts assessing that Iran has crossed the nuclear threshold and has enough enriched uranium to produce up to four bombs per month, it is obvious that Biden’s nuclear diplomacy has nothing to do with nuclear non-proliferation.
There are only two ways to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear-armed state—direct action targeting Iran’s nuclear installations and regime change. Netanyahu’s willingness to stand up to the Biden administration and stand with the Iranian people and Israel’s regional partners makes regime change more likely, and direct action against Iran’s nuclear installations more likely to succeed.
Over the two months since the Israeli elections, the opposition and its supporters on the Israeli and American Jewish left have stirred up hysteria by claiming that the most significant distinction between the Lapid-Gantz government and the Netanyahu government centers on social policies related to non-religious Jews. This claim is false, and maliciously so. The Netanyahu government has no intention—and never had any intention—of curtailing the civil rights of non-religious Jews. Their goal is to expand civil and individual rights, by among other things, placing checks and balances on Israel’s hyper-activist Supreme Court and state prosecution.
There are many differences between the previous government and the Netanyahu government. None of them have to do with civil rights. The main distinction is that the Netanyahu government has made securing Israel’s national interests its central goal in foreign and domestic policy. Its predecessors were primarily interested in getting along with the hostile Biden administration, under all conditions. Netanyahu and his ministers will work with the Biden administration enthusiastically, when possible.
For the first decades of Israel’s existence, the above differences with Americans were papered over by the dominance of Labor Zionism, whose universalist rhetoric meshed nicely with liberal sensibilities, even if the security policies it pursued did not. But even in its most idealized form, a particularistic project such as Zionism has been a difficult sell for American Jews, the overwhelming bulk of whom see sectarian concerns not only as antithetical to their well-being, but possibly racist, as well.Ruthie Blum: Israel’s new government and ‘Pauline Kael syndrome’
Having found a home in which they were granted free access to every sector of American society, and in which the non-Jewish majority proved willing to marry them, they unsurprisingly have had difficulty coming to terms with an avowedly ethno-religious state with such a different raison d’être.
Moreover, an American-Jewish population in which the acceptance of assimilation has created a large and fast-growing group the demographers call “Jews of no religion” is bound to take a dim view of a country that specifically defines itself as a Jewish state, no matter how generous its policies toward the Palestinians or the non-Orthodox denominations might be. If many American Jews are no longer certain that their community’s survival matters, how can one possibly expect them to regard the interest of Israeli Jews in preserving their state against dangerous foes with anything but indifference?
Many Jews talk about their willingness to support a nicer, less nationalist and religious Israel than the one that elected Netanyahu and his allies. They support efforts by Democrats to pressure it to make suicidal concessions to Palestinians who, whether Americans are willing to admit it or not, purpose Israel’s elimination. They also want it to be more welcoming to liberal variants of Judaism that Americans practice, and for the Orthodox have less influence.
But even if you think those changes would make Israel better or safer, a majority of Israelis disagree. So, while much of the criticism is framed as a defense of democracy to sync with Democratic Party talking points that smear Republicans, there’s nothing democratic about thwarting the will of a nation’s voters or seeking to impose a mindset they regard as alien to their needs.
The challenge for liberals is not just how to cope with an Israel led by Netanyahu, Smotrich and Ben-Gvir, or to put aside the partisan hyperbole branding it as a fascist or fundamentalist tyranny. It’s accepting the fact that Israel is not a Middle Eastern variant of the blue state enclaves where most American Jews live.
They need to grasp that simple, but still difficult-to-accept concept and forget about the Israel of liberal fantasies. If they can, it should be easy for them to understand that no matter who is running Israel—or how its people think, worship or vote—the sole Jewish state’s continued survival is still a just and worthy cause.
Following the late and former US president Richard Nixon’s landslide re-election in 1972, New Yorker magazine film critic Pauline Kael voiced a mixture of dismay and surprise.
“I live in a rather special world,” she commented. “I only know one person who voted for [him]. Where they are I don’t know. They’re outside my ken. But sometimes when I’m in a theater, I can feel them.”
Her famous acknowledgment of existence in an elitist bubble, insulated from a faceless mass of aliens lurking menacingly in the shadows, may have been irritating, but at least it was honest. It also perfectly described the chasm between the chattering classes and the majority of the voting public.
Though this type of divide in the West tends to be viewed and treated as political – since it’s inevitably expressed at the ballot box – it’s actually more cultural in nature. The response in Israel and abroad to the outcome of the November 1 Knesset election is a case in point. What were the reactions to Netanyahu's coalition?
The initial shock and subsequent hysteria surrounding the emergence of Benjamin “Bibi” Netanyahu’s “full, full right-wing” coalition has been emanating from circles of the Pauline Kael variety. To them, it’s worse than irrelevant that the new government in Jerusalem is the result of the people’s clear choice; they call the rejection of the Left’s increasingly woke post-Zionism “undemocratic” and a sign of societal downfall.
Such baseless charges on the part of the “anybody but Bibi” camp would be funny if they weren’t welcomed so heartily by those in the international community who delegitimize the Jewish state, regardless of its leadership, and by fellow travelers putting Israel on perpetual probation. Take the hundreds of American rabbis (none Orthodox, of course) who signed “A Call to Action for Clergy in Protest of Israeli Government Extremists,” for instance.
