The military attacks destroyed or made inoperative all of Iran’s installed centrifuges—almost 22,000 gas centrifuges—at Iran’s three enrichment sites. They destroyed Iran’s ability to make gas centrifuges, severely degraded its capabilities to research and develop them, and destroyed Iran’s ability to make uranium hexafluoride. In essence, the attacks destroyed Iran’s gas centrifuge enrichment program.With the massive destruction of its gas centrifuge program and installed centrifuge cascades, for the first time in over 15 years, Iran has no identifiable route to produce weapon-grade uranium (WGU) in its centrifuge plants. In addition, the attacks caused immense destruction to Iran’s ability to make the nuclear weapon itself. For the first time in over 15 years, no breakout estimate to WGU is included in the Institute reporting on the IAEA reports, since to do so would require unsubstantiated speculation about the existence and operability of centrifuges that were not destroyed in the war, such as centrifuges already made but not yet deployed, as well as about the availability of enriched uranium stocks, whether near five percent, near 20 percent, or 60 percent enriched uranium.
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