Thursday, April 16, 2015
Elder of Ziyon
The full April 9 Khamenei speech slamming the US as a 'cheater and a liar' has been translated by MEMRI. Here are excerpts:
All the problems [will begin] when the details are discussed, because the opposite side is stubborn, breaks promises, behaves badly, and backstabs. It [i.e. the U.S.] could put our country, our nation, and our negotiating team under siege while the details are under deliberation.Here is the new "factsheet" released by the Iranian parliament's Nuclear Committee on Wednesday for revisions to the Lausanne statement based on Khamenei's demands:
As I have said, no agreement is better than a bad agreement, because there is honor in rejecting an agreement that seeks to trample Iran's national interests and destroy the honor of the nation – as opposed to [accepting] an agreement that humiliates the nation
The reason [for my concerns] is that the other side is a cheater and a liar; it breaks promises and contrary to the straight path. An example of such conduct by the opposite side [the U.S.] came during the recent talks [in Lausanne], when two hours after the talks ended, the White House published a declaration several pages long [i.e. the Fact Sheet] about the negotiations, most of which contradicted reality. Such a declaration cannot be written in two hours – this means that they had engaged in composing this slanderous, erroneous statement that contradicted the content of the negotiations at the very same time as they were negotiating with us.
Negotiations with the Americans revolve solely around the nuclear issue and none other. These talks are a test. If the opposite side [the U.S.] ceases its aberrant behavior, we can continue this experiment with other issues [as well] – but if the other side continues its aberrant behavior, this will reaffirm our past experience regarding distrust of America.
In my personal meetings on the nuclear issue with the [presidential and negotiations] officials, I insist that they perceive our current nuclear achievements as extremely important, and that they do not downplay them. The nuclear industry is vital to the state. Some intellectuals, who ask, 'Why do we need the nuclear industry?' are being deceitful. The state requires an advanced nuclear industry for energy, for producing radiological medicine, for desalinating seawater, and for agriculture. The most important aspect of the state's nuclear industry – that is, achieving this important industry – is the result of the talents of our young Iranians, and this is why we must continue [our] progress in the nuclear industry.
Criminal countries like America, who have already used a nuclear bomb, or France, which conducted dangerous nuclear testing, are accusing us of attempting to manufacture a nuclear bomb, while based on a religious fatwa and a basis of logic, the Islamic regime in Iran has never and will never aspire to a nuclear bomb, and considers it a headache.
Another request I made to the [presidential and negotiations] officials is to not trust the opposite side. Recently, one official explicitly said that we do not trust the opposite side. This is a good position. We cannot swallow the smiling deception of the opposite side, and we must not believe its promises. A good example of this is the position and speech given by the American president following the recent statement [to the media in Lausanne]."
Another of my demands to the [presidential and negotiations] officials is that a complete lifting of the sanctions must be carried out immediately and all at once on the same day the agreement [is reached]. This is very important. If the sanctions are meant to be lifted in a new process, then the basis of the negotiations will be meaningless, because the aim of the negotiations is to get the sanctions removed.
Another request I made to the [presidential and negotiations] officials concerns the oversight [of nuclear facilities]. We absolutely must not allow the pretext of oversight to enable them to penetrate our security and defensive zone. Even the state's military officials do not have the authority to permit foreigners access to this zone, or to halt our defensive advancement under the guise of oversight.
We must establish our defensive capabilities and the nation's iron fist on the military front, and these are indeed growing stronger every day. Furthermore, we must not allow the talks to damage support for our fighting brethren in various places in the region [i.e. resistance organizations such as Hizbullah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Houthis in Yemen, and more].
No form of special oversight which would make Iran a unique country with regard to oversight is acceptable. Oversight should be identical to the routine oversight that exists elsewhere and nothing more. Regarding the necessity of continuing the technical development of the nuclear program – scientific and technical advancement in various forms [i.e. research and development] should continue. The negotiating team might see the need to accept certain restrictions; I have no problem with this, but technical advancement should undoubtedly proceed at full force.
Enrichment Program:The Lausanne statement, as bad as it is, is considered literally meaningless by Iran.
The period for the Join Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) should be limited to five years, in which about 10,000 active centrifuges operating at Natanz and Fordo now will continue nuclear fuel production by enriching uranium below the 5% grade.
The UF6 enriched reserves which are under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should be kept at Fordo nuclear plant and will be turned into nuclear fuel complex based on the existing capabilities.
During the five-year period, the Islamic Republic of Iran will continue to keep the excess centrifuges installed at Natanz and Fordo or will gradually dismantle them, and at the end of the 5-year period, it will replace all the existing centrifuges, including the active or inactive ones, with the new generation of (IR-N) centrifuge machines with the help of the new spaces and infrastructures which will have been already prepared and will use them without any limitation.
Justification:
Based on the Geneva agreement, the period for the final step should merely include a single period which has been considered as to be five years in the present factsheet. But in the Lausanne statement, different periods of 10, 20, 25 years and higher have been considered.
Given the Geneva agreement, the amount of enrichment should be specified based on the country's practical needs and the number of 10,000 centrifuges has also been specified on this basis.
The 5-year period in this factsheet has been has been specified with respect to the date when Iran's nuclear fuel contract with Russia for the Bushehr nuclear power plant will end; hence, the rules and limitations for the components of the enrichment cycle should be set in such a way that the Islamic Republic of Iran will be able to supply the fuel needed for the power plant after the end of the contract with Russia.
Operation of 10,000 centrifuges and developing and having a 10-ton enriched uranium stockpile will enable the Islamic Republic of Iran to supply the fuel needed for the Bushehr power plant in the year when the fuel supply contract with Russia (28-30 tons) ends.
Fordo installations:
Fordo nuclear facility will remain an enrichment and nuclear Research and Development (R&D) center. 4 enrichment cascades with 656 centrifuges will continue operation and production of fuel for purity levels lower than 5% by maintaining the current chain arrangements.
If the country would need 20%-degree (enriched) uranium, the nuclear fuel production line for purity levels lower than 5% will be altered to enrich uranium to the 20%-grade after connecting the centrifuge cascades to each other again.
Justification:
Based on the above, Fordo will remain an actual and active center, and the Islamic Republic of Iran will maintain its capability to reverse its decision and restore the 20%-grade enrichment.
Research and Development (R&D):
In a bid to use R&D findings in the country's industrial-scale enrichment chain, R&D should be planned in a way that the necessary possibilities and infrastructures will be provided for replacing the first generation of centrifuges with the latest generation of centrifuge machines (IR-N) when the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action comes to an end after 5 years.
The R&D program should undergo no limitation before it comes into use for industrial-scale operation.
Justification:
Accordingly, the advanced centrifuges will enter the chain of nuclear fuel production without any restriction at the end of the 5-year deal.
Arak Heavy Water Reactor:
Given the Group 5+1 countries' mere concern about the plutonium existing in the spent nuclear fuel (SNF) of the Arak 40-MW heavy water reactor, the fuel used by the reactor will be sent abroad.
The G5+1 states will be committed to cooperate and take the necessary measures for relevant international licensing and permissions.
Justification:
Given the SNF export abroad, the insistence of the G5+1, specially the US, on redesigning the said reactor is merely a pretext and doesn’t have any scientific rationale.
What is more important than the heavy water nature of Arak reactor is the core of the reactor which is due to be taken out and then be redesigned and renovated. Such a move is irreversible in nature, and thus means crossing the specified redlines.
Supervision and Inspection:
Supervision and inspections of the Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear program should be carried out within the framework of the the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) safeguards agreements.
Justification:
Once done, the principle stated by the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution - that security and military sanctities and boundaries shouldn’t be violated and that the inspections should be carried out at conventional levels similar to all other countries - will be respected and materialized. Given the Islamic Republic of Iran's opposition to the world arrogance, endorsing and implementing the Additional Protocol will provide the world arrogance (a term normally used for the US and its western allies) with legal grounds to stage their preplanned plots against the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Sanctions:
Concurrently with the start of the JCPOA, all the US and EU sanctions will be terminated and Iran will start fulfilling its undertakings based on the verification of the IAEA.
The UN Security Council sanctions resolution against Iran will be annulled and all nuclear-related sanctions will be terminated and the Islamic Republic of Iran's case will be normalized.
The G5+1 countries, the EU and the UNSC will avoid imposition of new nuclear-related sanctions against Iran.
Justification:
By terminating all sanctions in a single step right at the start of the implementation of the final comprehensive agreement, the Supreme Leader's statement that termination of sanctions is part of the agreement and not its result will be materialized.
Based on the Geneva agreement, after the implementation of the JCPOA, all UNSC, US and EU sanctions should be terminated and no new (UNSC) resolution would be needed in this regard; Hence, terminating the UNSC sanctions will close the case and no new resolution which would pave the ground for new plots will be issued.
International cooperation:
The Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear cooperation with the world states, including the G5+1 members, in areas of building nuclear power plants, research reactors, nuclear fuel production, nuclear safety medicine and nuclear agriculture, etc. will be possible and will improve. Based on the JCPOA, Iran will be provided with access to the global market, trade and finance and technical know-how and energy.
Reversibility:
In case of the two sides' non-commitment to their undertakings, there will be a possibility for reversing all measures.
Justification:
Based on the aforementioned proposal, the Islamic Republic of Iran will be provided with reversible measures at the lowest level of damage and, therefore, the G5+1's commitment to its undertakings will be in fair balance (with those of Iran).
Duration of the JCPOA:
After the end of the five-year period and the JCPOA exercise, all restrictions will be lifted and based on the Geneva agreement, the case with the Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear program will be similar to that of the other NPT member states.
(h/t Yoel, Mike Anon)
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