Gaza’s Terrorists Are Finally Isolated and Exposed
During this week’s conflict, Israel has not yet targeted Hamas, Gaza’s governing terrorist organization. But there’s now much speculation about what Hamas will do in response to the flare-up. Islamic Jihad has no governing control of Gaza, but, as the current violence demonstrates, it can easily draw the Strip into conflict. And it is Hamas’s failure to curb Islamic Jihad’s continued provocations against Israel that has led to the present crisis.Jonathan Tobin: Self-defense for everyone but Israel
As Abu al-Ata ramped up his campaign against the Jewish state, Israel warned Hamas that it wasn’t going to take it forever. “Via publications in various media outlets; messages conveyed by Egyptian intelligence; and warnings via international mediators,” writes Avi Issacharoff at the Times of Israel, “Israel repeatedly urged Hamas to take action.” Hamas didn’t act. Israel did.
If Hamas doesn’t now work to get Islamic Jihad in line, the fighting could easily escalate. And, as we’ve seen in the past, Gaza will suffer far more than Israel in any prolonged exchange. But what’s different this time is that Gaza’s endlessly self-inflicted woes don’t inspire the same degree of international sympathy they once did, at least not where it counts.
Sunni Arab kingdoms are now more-or-less allied with Israel against Iran. They’re not interested in upsetting that relationship for the sake of a reckless terrorist group that’s backed by Iran. What’s more, Islamic Jihad’s attack on Sderot broke a commitment that the group made to Egyptian authorities in October about maintaining calm in Gaza. The broken pledge angered Egypt, which had even released some Islamic Jihad prisoners (reportedly with Israel’s consent) as a show of good faith in negotiations. Finally, in the United States, it’s highly unlikely that the Trump administration—a steadfast defender of Israel’s right to self-defense—will stoop to the kind of moral equivalence articulated by Obama administration officials whenever Israel targeted its enemies.
For now, Hamas has formally condemned the assassination of Abu al-Ata. If it stops there and makes Islamic Jihad hold back, then it may spare some Gazans further misery. But Hamas is not known either for restraint or responsive governance.
By treating Israel and its efforts at self-defense as morally equivalent to the actions of Islamic Jihad and the Hamas terrorist regime ruling Gaza, the Jewish state’s critics are not just undermining Jewish security, but dooming Palestinians trapped in the Strip to continued siege and mistreatment at the hands of their terrorist masters.
Lastly, there is the question of Netanyahu’s alleged cynical manipulation of the security situation for his own political benefit.
At this point, there is virtually nothing the prime minister can do that would not be subjected to criticism. When he demonstrates a reluctance to use force, he is accused of being indecisive. When, as is the case now, he acts on the advice of his security chiefs and orders the Israel Defense Forces to eliminate a threat, he is accused not only of inflaming the situation but of doing so merely in order to gain some tactical political advantage.
Yet after more than 13 years of service as Israel’s leader, if there is one thing widely known about Netanyahu, it is that he is extremely cautious about risking the lives of Israel’s soldiers and more interested in deterring war than in risking an escalation to prove a point or demonstrate his toughness. Criticize him all you like for his policies or his personality, but when he has ordered the armed forces to act, it has only happened after every other option has been tried.
Even if this latest bout of violence does not escalate into all-out war and leads to a temporary calm between Israel and Gaza returns, observers should not ignore the two factors that rest at the heart of the problem: Palestinian rejectionism and Iran.
As long as the culture of Palestinian politics rewards the shedding of blood and punishes peacemaking, the Palestinian Authority, PIJ and Hamas will continue to replicate this scenario. The true cycle of violence isn’t one in which Israel is forever being blamed for causing trouble by killing terrorists, but the one in which Palestinians remain locked in a dynamic of endless war they can’t escape.
Secondly, the Middle East continues to pay the price for President Barack Obama’s appeasement, empowerment and enriching of Iran. Tehran’s fingerprints are all over every escalation of fighting between Gaza and Israel, as well as threats to the Jewish state’s northern border. Its ability to fund and promote PIJ gives it leverage over Hamas and ensures that the conflict with Israel stays as hot as possible. The best way to prevent violence between Israel and the Palestinians is to keep the pressure on Iran by stepping up sanctions that limit its ability to cause trouble in the region and fund terrorism.
The discussion about Israel and the Palestinians in the United States continues to be driven by liberal critics of Israel who think that the conflict is driven by Israeli intransigence and Netanyahu’s belligerence. But this week’s violence is one more reminder that the problem has little to do with those factors and everything to do with a toxic Palestinian political culture, prompted by Iran’s malevolent desire to foment violence.
BESA: Gaza Fighting Highlights Differences between Hamas and Islamic Jihad
While Hamas views the use of violence as a means for increasing the volume of trade with Israel and securing the inflow of Qatari money to enhance the welfare of the Gaza population, Islamic Jihad seeks confrontation as part of an Iranian strategy to deflect attention from its Syrian military buildup and regional expansion.
Hamas must take into consideration its popular base, which includes 50,000 men and women whose salaries depend on Hamas' retention of control of Gaza.
Most Gazans live in a society that is almost exclusively Sunni and suspect Islamic Jihad members of being Shiites in disguise. This is why in elections in Gaza universities and trade unions, Islamic Jihad secures a mere 2-3% support.
At Abu Ata's funeral procession just hours after his killing, it was hard to count more than 100 participants. No flags of other Gaza organizations were visible.
Islamic Jihad's paltry popular base means its dependence on Iran is all the greater. Moreover, PIJ can operate purely as a fighting arm without the need to take into account the welfare of the Gaza population.
Hamas leaders are keenly aware who wags Islamic Jihad's tail, the reasons behind its activities, and the ways its strategy contradicts Hamas' current agenda. However, Hamas can only constrain rather than stop Islamic Jihad because it needs Iran as well.