The Economic Case for the US-Israel Partnership
RecommendationsSeth Mandel: Palestine’s Anti-Constitution
Washington should treat the US-Israel partnership as strategic industrial architecture and act accordingly. Below are four concrete steps to do so.
1. Enforce against boycott spillover. Use trade law, financial authorities, and anti-boycott statutes to deter measures that disrupt US-Israel technology integration. European restrictions affecting American firms should be treated as trade barriers and addressed through bilateral leverage and multilateral channels. Indeed, Washington can respond with targeted tariffs, procurement exclusions, export-control adjustments, investment-screening scrutiny, or the suspension of sector-specific cooperation agreements. The point is to raise the cost of discriminatory treatment until reciprocity becomes the rational choice. In parallel, Washington should also offer a structured US-Israel-EU technology framework to align procurement, defense, and digital policies within a coherent allied system.
2. Modernize the free trade framework. The White House should update the 1985 US-Israel Free Trade Agreement to reflect a digital- and services-driven economy. The administration should also incorporate binding provisions on data flows, AI and cybersecurity standards alignment, facilitation of joint ventures in critical technologies, and protections against third-party coercion. Regulatory certainty is a competitive asset in technology ecosystems.
3. Institutionalize coproduction in critical technologies. The US should seek to shift its procurement deals with Israel to structured coproduction in sectors where Israeli capabilities complement US capacity gaps. This effort should seek to embed advanced defense, cyber, and emerging technology systems into American production lines to increase America’s industrial depth.
4. Build a bilateral industrial integration platform. America should establish a federal industrial matching mechanism linking Israeli firms to US manufacturing clusters. The mechanism should tie incentives to physical production, workforce development, and supply chain integration on American soil to bolster shared production capacity.
Collectively, these steps would secure the US-Israel partnership at the level that matters in strategic competition: capital control, production ecosystems, and institutional alignment.
Conclusion
Critics of the US-Israel partnership present it as a legacy arrangement sustained by habit and the idiosyncratic preferences of special interest groups. In fact, it is a prototype of allied codevelopment under conditions of strategic competition. The central challenge facing the United States is constructing an international economic order capable of outperforming authoritarian alternatives over time. The US-Israel relationship demonstrates what that order looks like when it matures: integrated innovation, institutional trust, and resilience verified under stress.
Alliances built on codevelopment and shared industrial capacity generate compounding returns. The United States possesses one that works. Washington now needs to protect it and scale it as part of a broader allied economic architecture for the next generation.
The original Hamas charter, it’s worth noting, was straightforward in its “struggle against the Jews.” The Palestinian Authority’s own proposed constitution doesn’t mention Jews at all. This is the problem when dealing with each of the Palestinian national movement’s leaders in its century-old existence: Jews are either excluded entirely or they are mentioned only as the object of a genocidal raison d’etre. To these Palestinian nationalists, Jews either don’t exist or else they must be made to not exist.
This should take some of the pressure off of Israel. After all, if the Palestinians don’t want self-determination then it shouldn’t be forced on them. This document is an anti-constitution—it is intended to prevent the need for a Palestinian constitution in perpetuity.
No one should be surprised by this: Israel tried to give the Palestinians their own state multiple times, and each time the Palestinians responded with outrage and violence. The world cannot make the Palestinian leadership want a state.
But outside of whether the Palestinians want this state, the world should also ask itself whether it wants this Palestinian state—not some theoretical state that European leaders imagine, but this state that is on offer.
As the Jerusalem Post reports:
“Article XXIV described how the state would ‘work to provide protection and care for the families of martyrs, wounded, and prisoners, and those released from the occupation prisons and the victims of genocide.’
“This article is drafted into the constitution, appearing to formalize the continuation of the PA’s controversial ‘pay-for-slay’ policy, which provides financial stipends to families of convicted terrorists and terror suspects.”
In addition to the grotesque display of bloodlust here, this should also be taken as a slap in the face to the “State of Palestine’s” biggest boosters.
“The ‘pay for slay’ has ended,” crowed French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot in September. When it was reported two months later that the Palestinians had merely hidden such payments, French President Emmanuel Macron was right back at square one, pleading with Mahmoud Abbas to end what Macron had been fooled into believing had already ended.
Macron then offered France’s help in writing the Palestinian constitution. The Palestinians went forward without such input and came up with a constitution that enshrines pay-for-slay. How many times will France allow itself to be humiliated this way?
A few months ago Keir Starmer, who is somehow still the prime minister of the United Kingdom, was reported to “insist that the Palestinian Authority ends its ‘pay to slay’ policy of handing out stipends to the families of ‘martyrs’ killed or detained for attacks on Israelis,” according to the Telegraph. This would be required “before any two-state solution is finalized.”
Isn’t this all getting so very tiresome? Those who want a Palestinian state are either going to have to convince the Palestinians to want one too, or move on with their lives.



























