Seth Mandel: Pick a Side
Again, there are two sides here: The U.S. is on one, and an Iranian proxy waging a hot war against America is on the other. There is no way to describe those who pressured BCG and who engaged in a massive media campaign to discredit GHF other than saying they are objectively pro-Hamas.Col. Richard Kemp: 'GHF is a turning point in the war, critical in removing Hamas'
Though in fairness to the anti-American side of the conflict, the terror coalition is led by Hamas, but there are other groups involved. One of them is the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, an extremely popular terror group among the American left and especially on college campuses. I have written about their seeming ubiquity and their long history of violence against innocents a fair amount over the course of the current conflict because the PFLP continues to set up front groups, forcing the U.S. government to play Whack-a-Mole to stop Americans from funding them.
One such group is Addameer, which the U.S. just sanctioned as a cutout for the PFLP. In response, the UN’s high-profile Mideast rapporteur and virulent anti-Semite Francesca Albanese declared her “full solidarity” with the PFLP-linked organization.
The PFLP has been involved in the post-Oct. 7 terror war against Israeli civilians, has pledged its fealty to Hamas in that war, and has participated in the kidnapping of innocents including, reportedly, the young Bibas children who were subsequently and brutally executed by Palestinians. Just so we’re clear on who and what Francesca Albanese lends her “full solidarity” to.
Again, there are only two sides in this war. The UN has repeatedly chosen to side with Hamas (and the PFLP). Employees of American firms are pressuring their bosses to do the same. All the while, actual Palestinian civilians are murdered in the streets by Hamas but fed by U.S.- and Israel-backed humanitarian coordinators. You can’t be on the side of the UN and Hamas and also be on the side of Gazan civilians and American hostages. So pick one.
Colonel Richard Kemp, the former commander of the British military forces in Afghanistan, spoke to Israel National News - Arutz Sheva about the work of the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) and its impact on the course of the war in Gaza.
"The establishment of the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation is a turning point in the war," Col. Kemp stated. "It is a critical step towards eliminating Hamas from control in Gaza. Their most important means of controlling the population was dominating supply of aid, which was enabled by UNWRA and other humanitarian agencies who could not prevent supplies from being seized by Hamas. Aid was also a vital money-making machine for Hamas which has lost pretty much all other sources of funding to recruit and pay its terrorists. Hamas would take freely supplied aid and sell it to the civilian population at a heavy premium."
"So far, the GHF has delivered a remarkable 19 million meals, including nearly 2.6 million today alone. Some Gazans have commented that this is the first free aid they have received since the war began," he stated. He further noted that the GHF constitutes a "unique and innovative project. It is specifically tailored to deal with the unparalleled challenges that Gaza."
Last night, Hamas terrorists attacked a bus carrying GHF workers, killing eight Gazans who participated in the organization's humanitarian aid efforts. Col. Kemp believes that Hamas decided to attack aid workers because effective humanitarian aid undermines its rule in Gaza. "The effectiveness already of the GHF is demonstrated by Hamas’s threats and attacks against civilians seeking to make use of the system. We also recently saw Hamas murder eight local civilians working for the GHF, and wound and kidnap others. Hamas killing Gaza civilians is nothing new but this is a mark of their desperation. They know just how much the GHF system undermines their control in Gaza. We have seen some limited uprisings against Hamas in recent weeks and there is likely to be more of that as much of the population realises that the terrorists no longer have this stranglehold over them."
Andrew Fox: Aid in Gaza: What is Israel’s New Approach to Humanitarian Aid?
Does this contractor-led aid model have a legal and moral basis? A supportive analysis can indeed find justification, rooted in the same IHL principles discussed earlier. Legally, nothing in the Geneva Conventions mandates that the UN or any specific entity oversee humanitarian relief; what matters is that aid be delivered impartially and effectively to civilians. An occupying power has the right to supervise and control relief efforts for legitimate security reasons, such as searching shipments for weapons or preventing aid from being diverted to enemy fighters.
Israel can argue that excluding UN agencies is a non-arbitrary decision driven by concrete security concerns, namely Hamas’ demonstrated attempts to exploit UN aid. If Hamas has a history of commandeering relief goods, then requiring a new distribution mechanism that excludes Hamas could be seen as a “valid, non-arbitrary reason” to replace the old UNRWA-led system.
The Israeli-US contractor plan rests on the imperative of protecting humanitarian aid from abuse. This considers not only the quantity of aid but also its distribution. By directly provisioning families under close monitoring, Israel aims to cut out the “middleman,” Hamas. In Somalia, only the deployment of US military escorts and later UN peacekeepers ensured that aid could bypass the warlords’ stranglehold. Likewise, in Gaza, a more muscular and controlled delivery system could be seen as the only realistic way to guarantee that food is not weaponised.
UNRWA and others have struggled to prevent corruption or militant interference in Gaza’s aid over the years. From that perspective, it is morally defensible to seek an alternative if the established system is being manipulated. The new model’s emphasis on “rigorous audits” and the involvement of experienced logisticians, including a former World Food Programme director as an advisor, is intended to lend credibility to the assurance that aid will reach its intended recipients.
At the same time, humanitarian organisations warn that “aid operations must remain neutral, independent, and civilian in nature,” and that “treating humanitarian relief as a militarised mission” violates those principles. The new Gaza aid scheme blurs the line between humanitarian and military spheres. Private security firms and Israeli forces securing aid stations directly link relief to one belligerent’s control. This raises legitimate concerns under the humanitarian principles of neutrality and independence. Civilians may perceive aid distribution as an arm of Israeli policy, potentially eroding trust and putting beneficiaries at risk of retribution.
International law does not itself ban an aid mechanism operated by a belligerent, provided that assistance is offered “without any adverse distinction” and not as a reward or coercive tool. Critics are concerned that the contractor model might prioritise aid for civilians who comply with Israeli directives, leaving others out. To genuinely meet IHL’s requirement for impartial aid, Israel and the US must demonstrate that all civilians in need across all of Gaza will receive assistance. If currently only half the population is covered, the plan must urgently expand or risk breaching the principle of impartiality.
So far, the UN has outright refused to participate in the new scheme, with the Secretary-General’s team stating that the proposed model “violates humanitarian principles” and UN agencies will not lend it legitimacy. The lack of established humanitarian actors poses a vulnerability to the plan’s credibility.
Israel’s contractor-driven aid model in Gaza represents a bold recalibration of humanitarian operations in conflict. It challenges the orthodox notion that only UN agencies can deliver aid, positing that when those structures fail, a controlled alternative may be warranted. A conditional, security-conscious aid delivery can save lives without empowering Hamas. Legally, Israel walks a fine line: it must demonstrate that this new mechanism better upholds its obligations to care for Gaza’s civilians under IHL.
Supporting this model does not require a blind endorsement of every aspect; rather, it calls for a nuanced perspective that, in extreme cases, may allow imperfect solutions to outperform dysfunctional ones. The moral litmus test will be whether Gaza’s civilians are better off and more secure in their access to food and medicine under the new scheme.
