Michael Doran: The King’s Foils
The catastrophic failure of Biden’s Iran-centric approach should have discredited Restraintism, but its capacity to wear the ideological colors of every party means it is not fully dislodged from the policy establishment. Its adherents now shelter under Trump’s banner, but his policies show a clearer understanding of the region’s power dynamics.The truth about the elimination of October 7 mastermind Yahya Sinwar
Trump knows that the role of the United States is not to draw up idealistic roadmaps. Will he also see that its role now is to buffer between America’s allies who don’t trust each other? That’s what it did in the Cold War when, for example, it shielded Israel and Saudi Arabia, both indispensable to American power, from each other. It has historically fulfilled the same function between its NATO allies Greece and Turkey. The same logic applies now. Israel and Turkey will clash unless the United States puts distance between them by stabilizing Syria. That country must serve—like Jordan—as a buffer state: neutral, minimally armed, not a platform for escalation. Only the United States can broker such an arrangement.
Doing so requires leverage, which Trump has. Turkey’s economy is not strong, with inflation high, productivity low, and its currency long in decline. Overcentralization has frightened away capital. Meanwhile, Syria is devastated beyond recognition: Large cities are in ruins and millions of people remain displaced. Reconstruction will require outside capital, and none of it will come without a green light from the United States.
Trump has the tools. Reconstruction in Syria cannot begin until the United States lifts sanctions on Damascus, and only Washington can coordinate a reconstruction plan that will mobilize American, European, and Gulf investment to maximum effect. But American leadership in this arena must come with a price: Turkish and Israeli de-escalation. Syria cannot become a Turkish base for threatening Israel.
That is the logic, and it fits Trump’s instincts perfectly. America should not police the region, Trump believes, but he is also unready to surrender it. His style of diplomacy is transactional, built around economic leverage—exactly what this moment requires.
If Trump brokers an understanding between Ankara and Jerusalem, while neutralizing Iran, he will have achieved what the Restraintists always promise but never manage to deliver. He will have shown that the United States can lead without overextending. It can lay the foundation for a regional order that doesn’t collapse under its own contradictions, an order that offers the United States control over oil resources, shipping lanes, investment capital, and intellectual property that are key to the economic future of most of the planet.
The real choice facing Trump is not between intervention and isolation, the false binary that Restraintists present. Rather, it is between strategic engagement that leverages America’s economic power and diplomatic reach, versus the ideological retreat that Restraintists advocate. His zigzag approach—alternating between forceful action and diplomatic outreach, maintaining hawks and Restraintists in tension within his administration—creates the strategic ambiguity and flexibility needed to manage complex regional dynamics without committing to large-scale military deployments.
By continuing this approach while focusing on the Golden Triangle of Israel-Turkey-Iran, Trump can establish a stable regional order that advances American interests without requiring American troops. This is the true “America First” foreign policy—one that recognizes American power and interests while acknowledging the public’s wariness of military entanglements. It represents a genuine alternative to both neoconservative interventionism and Restraintist isolation. It is within reach. If Trump pursues it, he can change the game—and win bigly.
The division’s intelligence personnel worked frantically to narrow these knowledge gaps. Retrospective analysis would later reveal these gaps were substantial. The division was surprised to discover during operations that Hamas leadership had concealed themselves in relatively shallow tunnels approximately 15 metres (49 feet) deep, not the expected 60-70 metres (197-230 feet).Gaza official admits natural deaths listed as war fatalities
Further, they found the tunnels were nearly completely interconnected, enabling continuous movement throughout the underground network – another critical detail largely unknown to Israeli intelligence.
Despite incomplete intelligence and insufficient forces, the 98th Division pressed forward. Previously undisclosed details about the Khan Yunis campaign of December-February 2024 reveal a brilliant, persistent military operation featuring the IDF’s first comprehensive underground pursuit of Hamas’s entire leadership structure.
Hamas operatives typically fled without engaging – abandoning their underground complexes and escaping through connecting tunnels to adjacent sectors. During these retreats, they would detonate explosives to collapse tunnel segments behind them, protected by blast doors. These collapses delayed pursuing forces, allowing the operatives to escape repeatedly.
On one occasion, during the brief window between the IDF ground force’s withdrawal and Goldfuss underground team’s arrival, Sinwar, Deif and Salameh escaped the tunnel disguised as women. Forensic evidence collected later, along with surveillance footage, confirmed that they had indeed been there.
IDF troops discovered the underground complex shortly after the group’s escape and found Hamas leadership’s meal still set out on plates. “The coffee was still hot,” as division commander Goldfus later described to media.
Evidence from the abandoned complex, combined with additional intelligence flowing to command centres, indicated Sinwar was fleeing toward western Khan Yunis.
The Shin Bet accordingly redirected IDF operations in this direction. “This marked the point where Sinwar’s hourglass began running out,” a security source explained. “Until then, he had maintained a static position, minimizing opportunities for mistakes. But once you force him to move, he must improvise, inevitably leading to errors.”
A retrospective intelligence analysis revealed that around May 2024, Sinwar successfully escaped Khan Yunis and moved southward to neighbouring Rafah. At this stage, the IDF had not yet begun operations in Rafah, allowing Sinwar to return to the relative safety of its tunnel network.
Further intelligence indicated Sinwar arrived in Rafah without Deif. After their joint escape from the Khan Yunis house, the two men separated, with Deif remaining in Khan Yunis – possibly due to mobility limitations. Deif and brigade commander Salameh would remain in the city for several more months until their joint elimination by airstrike on July 13.
Intelligence increasingly confirmed Sinwar’s presence in Rafah, eventually narrowing focus to the Tel al-Sultan neighbourhood on the city’s northwestern outskirts.
By August, the IDF leadership had directed the 162nd Armored Division, aka the Steel Formation, to concentrate efforts on Tel al-Sultan’s tunnel network – smaller and less complex than Khan Yunis’s labyrinth.
The 162nd Division employed a fundamentally different approach than the 98th Division’s earlier “cat” and later “octopus” methods in Khan Yunis. The new “elephant method” involved massive force – using bulldozers and explosives to systematically destroy extensive tunnel sections, forcing Hamas operatives above ground.
This strategy gradually denied Hamas nearly all underground movement in Tel al-Sultan, leaving Sinwar and his small security detail no choice but to venture onto the surface.
Footage broadcast on Al Jazeera shows Sinwar during August-September 2024 moving through Tel al-Sultan’s rubble-strewn landscape. These images capture him in civilian clothes, using a walking stick, and wrapped in a camouflage blanket.
Following these developments and the near-complete destruction of Tel al-Sultan’s underground infrastructure, IDF leadership considered the Rafah operation largely complete.
However, Shin Bet officials worried that completely withdrawing from the neighbourhood would allow Sinwar to escape, likely to Khan Yunis. “This prompted the Shin Bet’s insistence on maintaining presence in the area,” a security source explained.
The IDF leadership ultimately decided that the 162nd Division would withdraw from Rafah, but the city wouldn’t be completely evacuated. Instead, forces from the 143rd “Fire Fox” Division, also known as the Gaza Division, would maintain a presence there. Division commander Brig. Gen. Barak Hiram committed to continuing offensive operations, focusing on Tel al-Sultan.
The specific unit deployed to Tel al-Sultan was the 450th Battalion. Its commander R. led three companies: Kfir infantry, paratroopers under Shreibman, and a tank company from the 460th Armored Brigade’s 198th Battalion.
Shreibman’s paratroopers company received orders to secure a building code-named “the Red House,” which offered strategic observation over the area.
At first light on October 17, forces examining the slain combatant’s body discovered that it was Yahya Sinwar. “This marked the first mention of Sinwar’s name throughout the entire operation,” R. noted.
When asked if they received any recognition for killing Sinwar, R. answered plainly: “No. Our persistence produced the result, but we weren’t the only ones. The pursuit of Sinwar was extensive – we simply fired the final bullet.”
Many of those listed as war fatalities in Gaza actually died of natural causes or did not die at all, a Palestinian health official working for Hamas admitted on Saturday, following an analysis that showed massive discrepancies in casualty tallies.
The head of the statistics team at Gaza’s Hamas-controlled health ministry, Zaher al-Wahidi, made the admission to Sky News after an analysis by the HonestReporting nonprofit last week found that some 3,400 individuals listed as war casualties in earlier tallies had been dropped from the ministry’s latest update.
Comparing the October and August tallies to the March one, HonestReporting researcher Salo Aizenberg found “around 3,400 names missing” from the latest one, “including over 1,000 minors,” he told JNS.
“We realized that a lot of people died a natural death,” Wahidi told Sky News regarding the October tally. “Maybe they were near an explosion and they had a heart attack, or houses caused them pneumonia or hypothermia. All these cases we don’t [attribute to] the war,” he said.
According to Sky News, 1,852 people appearing in October’s official list of war fatalities were removed from the March one after it was found that some had died of natural causes or were alive but had been imprisoned. In total, 3,952 names have been removed in several corrections from Gaza’s reported death toll since the war began, according to the outlet.
Whereas the Gaza Health Ministry had previously admitted error that it attributed to reporting mechanism issues, it had not conceded that natural deaths were counted along with war casualties.
The March statistics changed the age distribution of reported fatalities in Gaza: Of all deaths recorded by Hamas between the ages of 13 to 55, which is the general combat age for Hamas fighters, 72% were male, according to the HonestReporting analysis.


























