Seth Mandel: Correcting the ‘Escalation’ Nonsense
Let’s take as an example the New York Times article on Israel’s antiterror raids in the West Bank this week. “It was a significant escalation after months of raids that have unfolded alongside the war in Gaza,” we’re told. We then learn this: “The operation followed months of escalating Israeli raids in the occupied territory.”A step back
Sounds like a lot of escalations! But what does that mean, exactly? Is it an escalation when Israel sends a numerically greater amount of troops than it did in last week’s or last month’s counterterror operation? Is it an escalation if Israel used a piece of equipment, like an unmanned drone, that it didn’t use last time? What about the number of military vehicles—how many jeeps make an escalation?
Much like its equally annoying cousin “disproportionate,” the term “escalation” appears to be a synonym for “Israeli self-defense.”
“Escalation of war has come to mean an increase in scope or violence of a conflict,” the U.S. Naval Institute offers. Thus what happened in the West Bank this week might truly count as an escalation—but if so, it is not Israel that escalated.
More from the Times: “The raid comes as U.S., Israeli and Iranian officials have said that Tehran is operating a clandestine smuggling route across the Middle East to deliver weapons to Palestinians in the Israeli-occupied territory. The goal, as described by three Iranian officials, has been to foment unrest against Israel by flooding the enclave with as many weapons as it can, The New York Times reported in April.”
Ah, a clue. Let’s head on over to what the Times reported in April:
Iran is operating a clandestine smuggling route across the Middle East, employing intelligence operatives, militants and criminal gangs, to deliver weapons to Palestinians in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, according to officials from the United States, Israel and Iran.
The goal, as described by three Iranian officials, is to foment unrest against Israel by flooding the enclave with as many weapons as it can.
The covert operation is now heightening concerns that Tehran is seeking to turn the West Bank into the next flashpoint in the long-simmering shadow war between Israel and Iran.
So what we’ve learned, definitively, is the following: Iran has been escalating the conflict for months, and Israel’s response to this escalation was an attempt to de-escalate—that is, to prevent Iran’s escalation from coming to full fruition. As the Times itself reports, Iran has increased the scope of the conflict, in an attempt to increase the violence of the conflict. If what just happened this week does count as an escalation, it is definitionally Iran’s escalation.
That is also true of Israel’s preemptive strikes on Hezbollah rocket launchers in Lebanon. Using Lebanon as a base of attack on Israel in response to Israel’s counteroffensive in Gaza is quite literally increasing the scope of conflict. Israel’s response has been to take actions that, if further escalation takes place, will limit the damage and destructiveness of that escalation. The other goal of Israel’s actions is to prevent that escalation from happening at all.
Words have meanings. Israel is working to de-escalate conflict while being accused of doing the opposite. That’s the reality, and it isn’t likely to change anytime soon.
Not long ago, I wrote an article titled, “Hostage Talks Won’t Work; Winning the War Will.” A retired American military officer wrote to ask, “What is the definition of winning? What does winning look like?” He wasn’t questioning Israel’s capability; he added, “I am quite sure the IDF can deliver whatever is directed or defined.”Ministers to Netanyahu: No Red Cross visits to Nukhba terrorists without hostage checks first
To be clear, an American military officer knows what winning looks like; he was checking on me. That made me nervous, but I also realized that people are projecting different end games on Israel. The Biden-Harris administration, for example, is pushing for a ceasefire and “de-escalation.” (U.S. President Joe Biden told Israel in mid-April to “pocket the win” after Iran fired 170 drones, 30 cruise missiles and more than 120 ballistic missiles at Israel and succeeded in killing only one person. Odd definition of a win.)
So, I took a shot.
“Winning” is achieving your war objectives. Israel had three clear objectives announced in October.
Secure the border and the people of Israel. Previous ground and rocket attacks by Hamas and Hezbollah resulted in “ceasefires” that left the timing and scope of the next attack up to Israel’s enemies. There was a ceasefire in place on Oct. 6, and Hamas broke it in the most horrific manner. This time, the Israeli government said, “We don’t want another ceasefire, or a better ceasefire, or a longer ceasefire.”
The goal is to secure the border.
The United States settled for a ceasefire in Korea. And when the minuses outweighed the plusses in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, we went home. We put 6,000 or 10,000 miles between us and them. We ignored the mess, the refugees, the killings we left in our wake. For Israel, there is no going home; Israelis are home. If a secure border means a buffer along the Negev and Israeli forces in the Philadelphi Corridor, so be it.
Take away Hamas’s military and governing capabilities. It doesn’t mean “kill them all” or “get a formal surrender.” It means removing the weapons and tunnels already inside Gaza, along with securing the borders so Hamas can’t import more. The tunnels at Rafah tell you that Egypt was a smuggling partner of Hamas. Israel, perhaps naively, assumed Egypt would live up to the agreements it signed in 1982 when Israel withdrew from Sinai and 2005 when Israel withdrew from Gaza. But no, so now Israel has to be in control.
Without military power, Hamas’s governing power wanes. If you believe, as some people do, that the Palestinians aren’t all Hamas themselves or that they don’t support Hamas, but they know Hamas will kill them if they rebel (Hamas has killed many Palestinian civilians since Israel’s invasion, including people trying to get to the “safe zones”), then you have to want the Hamas boot off their necks. The only way to do that for them is by removing the weapons Hamas uses to enforce its will, i.e., to kill them. Or, if you believe, as some people do, that Palestinian civilians do, in fact, support the genocidal program of Hamas, then Israel has to remove as much of the weaponry as possible from the space.
Eleven government ministers joined Minister Orit Strock's call on Thursday not to allow visits by representatives of the Red Cross to the Nukhba terrorists imprisoned in Israel.
The Red Cross would visit the terrorists without having visited the hostages held in Gaza and providing them with medication first.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the political and security cabinet were presented with the call, which they were expected to discuss on Thursday night.
Earlier this week, the High Court of Justice issued a conditional order according to which the state must explain why visits by the Red Cross's representatives to Israeli prisons should be prevented. The ministers demand that this position be the state's answer to the High Court.
Minister Orit Strock led the call and was joined by Amichai Eliyahu, Uriel Busso, Yitzhak Goldknopf, Miki Zohar, Amichai Chikli, Idit Silman, Ya’acov Margi, Ofir Sofer, and May Golan.
Authorized Nukhba visits
Last April, politicians and various organizations strongly criticized the decision of the War Cabinet to authorize visits to Nukhba prisoners.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu proposed approving the visits, which was supported by most cabinet ministers, as opposed to ministers Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich, who opposed it.