Tuesday, January 08, 2008
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Tuesday, January 08, 2008
Tuesday, January 08, 2008
Elder of Ziyon
But Rice on Monday clarified that the US believes that portions of east Jerusalem are considered to be "settlements" and that Israel must stop building there as part of its commitment to implement the first phase of the road map.
The land that Har Homa is on was legally purchased by Jews from Sheikh Shehade al-Faghuri, through an Arab middleman named Ibrahim al-Dajani, in 1944. (source: Army of Shadows)
- Tuesday, January 08, 2008
- Elder of Ziyon
The IslamOnline website published a poem last week, without attribution and without comment, in its "Arts and Culture" section, called "How to Behead.":
Now, IOL is asking readers to write their own poems in response. It still hasn't identified the author or why it decided to print it. IOL itself in the past has published fatwas that were unequivocally against beheading prisoners.
The "poem" itself was written by the self-described "Lyrical Terrorist," a woman who was convicted of a terrorism charge in the UK and received a suspended sentence. She loved downloading beheading videos as well.
Why would Islam Online publish such a poem anonymously, without comment, in its "Arts and Culture" section? If it wanted to editorialize about the justice or perceived injustice of the verdict it should have provided some context. From the furious reaction of readers, it does not appear to reflect IOL's own views at all (although it has published plenty of fatwas supporting suicide bombing in Israel.) As poetry, it is horrendous.
My guess is that this was just poor judgment on the part of the Arts and Culture editor, to try to stir up controversy or to prove that most mainstream Muslims are revolted by beheadings. So far, IOL hasn't explained itself even as it acknowledged the controversy.
Hold himThe reactions from Muslim readers on the site was mostly disgust and anger at Islam Online for publishing it. Some tried to say that the poem was intended to make Muslims think but the vast majority were clearly upset, just as much for the content as much as for the poor image it gives of Muslims altogether.
Tie the arms behind his back
And bandage his legs together
Just by the ankles
Blindfold the punk
So that he won't hesitate as much
For on seeing the sharp pointy knife
He'll begin to shake
And continuously scream like an eedyat
And jiggle like a jelly
Trust me–this will sure get you angry
It’s better to have at least two or three brothers by your side
Who can hold the fool
Because as soon as the warm sharp knife
Touches his naked flesh
He'll come to know what'll happen
It's not as messy or as hard as some may think,
It's all about the flow of the wrist.
No doubt that the punk will twitch and scream
But ignore the donkey's ass
And continue to slice back and forth
You'll feel the knife hit the wind and food pipe
But don't stop
Continue with all your might.
About now you should feel the knife vibrate,
You can feel the warm heat being given off,
But this is due to the friction being caused.
Now, IOL is asking readers to write their own poems in response. It still hasn't identified the author or why it decided to print it. IOL itself in the past has published fatwas that were unequivocally against beheading prisoners.
The "poem" itself was written by the self-described "Lyrical Terrorist," a woman who was convicted of a terrorism charge in the UK and received a suspended sentence. She loved downloading beheading videos as well.
Why would Islam Online publish such a poem anonymously, without comment, in its "Arts and Culture" section? If it wanted to editorialize about the justice or perceived injustice of the verdict it should have provided some context. From the furious reaction of readers, it does not appear to reflect IOL's own views at all (although it has published plenty of fatwas supporting suicide bombing in Israel.) As poetry, it is horrendous.
My guess is that this was just poor judgment on the part of the Arts and Culture editor, to try to stir up controversy or to prove that most mainstream Muslims are revolted by beheadings. So far, IOL hasn't explained itself even as it acknowledged the controversy.
Monday, January 07, 2008
- Monday, January 07, 2008
- Elder of Ziyon
Buried in the weekly UN report on Palestinian Arab civilians from December 25 comes this juicy tidbit:
So the net result is a lot of poorer Gaza farmers, a lot of rotting strawberries, and a lot more reasons to blame Israel rather than themselves for their own self-induced problems.
I wonder if the actual farmers whose incomes are affected by this decision had a vote in this matter or if it was another set of self-righteous and self-appointed "leaders" who pretend to speak on their behalf?
Kerem Shalom crossing was open on six days this week for the entry of commercial and humanitarian goods. On 20, 23, 24 and 25 December, the crossing was open for the export of flowers. Since 18 December, and for the second time this month, the Palestinian strawberries association has blocked all exports of strawberries to protest against the limited amounts Israel has allowed them to export through the crossing (the first strike was between 7 and 11 December).Israel allows the Gazans, supposedly under siege, to export flowers and strawberries to bring in much needed cash. The Gazan strawberry growers, however, are upset that they can't export as much as they want to.
So the net result is a lot of poorer Gaza farmers, a lot of rotting strawberries, and a lot more reasons to blame Israel rather than themselves for their own self-induced problems.
I wonder if the actual farmers whose incomes are affected by this decision had a vote in this matter or if it was another set of self-righteous and self-appointed "leaders" who pretend to speak on their behalf?
- Monday, January 07, 2008
- Elder of Ziyon
In the transcript of the latest Bin Laden audiotape comes this interesting section:
By the way, my posting this is more evidence that the Zionists are actively creating divisions among the otherwise unified Muslims.
After the eloquent speeches on pride, dignity and support for Palestine and having challenged the whole world to impose its will on them, Lebanon accepted the UN Resolution Number 1701. A tool in the hands of America, by accepting this they are accepting the entrance of the crusader armies into the land of Lebanon.Jihad Unspun, who translated this, almost certainly (purposefully or accidentally) mistranslated the last sentence as plural rather than singular - Bin Laden calling infidel countries "traitors" makes no sense, but in context he is clearly calling Nasrallah a traitor.
Do people realize that these armies are the other face of the coin of the Zionist-American coalition? The Secretary General of the Hezbollah party, Hassan Nasrallah deceived the people. He welcomed these armies publicly and promised to make their mission easy despite the fact that he knows very well that those armies are coming to protect the Jews and to close the borders for the faithful Mujahideen. He has perpetrated all these crimes due to the desires of the countries that provide the “good” and “uncorrupt” funds that we mentioned before. So why are they not considered traitors?
By the way, my posting this is more evidence that the Zionists are actively creating divisions among the otherwise unified Muslims.
- Monday, January 07, 2008
- Elder of Ziyon
From Al-Arabiya:
It's interesting that Al-Azhar University's job is censorship for the nation.
Religious scholars in Egypt are outraged by a lesbian scene in a new movie, telling audiences to stay away from the sinful flick and calling for the director and actresses to be prosecuted.Those cunning Zionists!
Preacher and Islamic Studies professor at Cairo University, Dr. Abdel-Sabour Shahin accused the new movie, Hina Maysara (Until Further Notice), of spreading homosexuality and promoting debauchery.
He called on authorities to prosecute the director of the movie and the two actresses, Ghada Abdel-Razeq and Sumaya Al-Khashab, who enacted the lesbian encounter on the big screen.
Shahin claimed the movie is part of "a Zionist and American conspiracy" which uses this sort of movie to destroy the moral fabric of society.
Islamic scholars at Al-Azhar University also expressed their indignation at the movie and supported Shahin's call for a clampdown.
Preacher Youssef Al-Badri told the Kuwaiti paper Al-Ray that the lesbian scene is proof of the moral disintegration of Egyptian cinema. He appealed to Al-Azhar to toughen censorship on art and media outlets, saying "This is its role, and it gave it up."
Professor of Islamic Law at Al-Azhar Elwi Amin said watching sex scenes -- whether gay or heterosexual -- in movies is considered a sin. Amin claimed there is no lesbianism in Egypt and said there would never be.
"Many people in Egypt do not even know what the word 'lesbianism' means. This is the influence of immoral Western culture which controls the media."
It's interesting that Al-Azhar University's job is censorship for the nation.
- Monday, January 07, 2008
- Elder of Ziyon
Multiculturalism breeds intolerance
A British Pakistani bishop ignites a firestorm by stating the obvious.
Montreal Gazette multiculturalism
Critiquing an op-ed that blames "society" for Aqsa Parvez' death
The Arab "Right of Return" to Israel
Rachel Neuwirth explodes myths
I'll try to update throughout the morning....
UPDATE:
Sometimes the middle of the road is just roadkill
Soccer Dad takes on Bradley Burston
A British Pakistani bishop ignites a firestorm by stating the obvious.
Montreal Gazette multiculturalism
Critiquing an op-ed that blames "society" for Aqsa Parvez' death
The Arab "Right of Return" to Israel
Rachel Neuwirth explodes myths
I'll try to update throughout the morning....
UPDATE:
Sometimes the middle of the road is just roadkill
Soccer Dad takes on Bradley Burston
Sunday, January 06, 2008
- Sunday, January 06, 2008
- Elder of Ziyon
book review
When used in wartime, the word "collaborator" is a loaded term. Like the words "traitor" and "treason," "collaborator" is pejorative by its nature, but its negative implication is only in the subjective context of the labeler.
Hillel Cohen, in his fascinating book "Army of Shadows: Palestinian Collaboration with Zionism, 1917-1948," consciously uses these words in the context that Palestinian Arabs use the words today. As a firm member of the post-Zionist historians, perhaps this is not surprising, nor his use of the word "Nakba." But to Cohen's credit, despite his constant use of these terms without scare quotes, he is an honest enough historian to show that the supposedly treasonous behavior done by countless Palestinian Arabs between the Balfour Declaration and the founding of Israel was often anything but.
Reading this book, with Arab appellations being applied to situations where the Arabs end up looking very bad, is an exercise in whiplash. The exact same facts could have been used in a book called "Arab-Zionist Friendship, 1917-1948" but Cohen's use of the pejorative lends a sense of unreality to his terminology.
The book itself is a remarkable historical work, with much use of recently declassified Israeli archives showing the extent of the early Zionist Shai intelligence operations and methods, together with the large numbers of Palestinian Arabs who, to some extent, decided to work with the Jews rather than shun them, often at the cost of their lives.
"Army of Shadows" follows a roughly chronological history of Arabs who willingly sold land to Zionists, who traded with them, who worked for them and who at times employed them, even who married them. It follows the rise of Hajj Amin al-Husseini and elaborates on how his anti-Jewish policies often alienated the silent majority of Arabs and sometimes drove them to become even closer to the Zionists. It shows an overlooked aspect of the messy history of the competing desires of the Husseini-style Arab absolutists, Nashashibi-style pragmatists (who were no less nationalist), the pro-Abdullah camp who wanted a federation with Transjordan, the Arab labor unions, farmers, village elders, land dealers, economic opportunists, criminals, loyal friends to Jews. Yet, again, Cohen's terminology is exclusively the one used by the most extreme Husseini camp, and is now considered normative by Husseini's political heirs of Fatah and Hamas. In some ways, that terminology is almost Orwellian newspeak where it has become forbidden for today's Palestinian Arabs to even think that there could be something positive about cooperating with Israel.
In the 1920s, there were some Arab parties who were explicitly Zionist - the Muslim National Associations and later the Farmers' Parties. Cohen brings some evidence that Zionists were instrumental in helping these parties start and grow, but he implies that there would not have been any pro-Zionist sentiment altogether without this outside influence, a much weaker argument (and one that is slightly demeaning to Arabs, that they could not possibly have been independently anything but anti-Zionist.)
Cohen irritatingly ascribes noble motives to Arabs who want to become and remain friends with Jews, but he almost never gives the Jews the same credit. He consistently emphasizes the Zionist intelligence organization and how it manipulated Arabs but doesn't seem to think that it was possible that Jews could honestly be friends with the Arabs without ulterior motive. The paradox is that Cohen himself grew up friends with neighboring Arabs and those friendships helped him to go into the field of history; his enlightened post-Zionism cannot admit the possibility that early Zionist Jews could possibly have been as open-minded as he himself is.
But for all his faults, Cohen is scrupulously honest - he does not hesitate to tell anecdotes and facts that contradict even his own assumptions and biases. Even as he describes Husseini-style nationalism as being normative he is quick to mention that their opponents also felt they were acting with the best interests of their people in mind, and that they even accused Husseini of being the traitor to their cause.
The 1929 riots ended the explicitly Zionist Arab parties but there remained a significant number who were willing to work more covertly with the Zionist establishment. Some were opportunistic or greedy, some were idealistic, some were simply loyal to their friends. The collaboration included finding land that was for sale, providing intelligence from the Husseini nationalist camp, and quietly championing a more pragmatic relationship with the Zionists who many thought were too powerful to defeat anyway. The Husseini clan was most concerned about land sales, yet they often engaged in such sales themselves.
It was a combination of the Husseinis' intransigence, hypocrisy and their own terror campaign against their political rivals that paradoxically ended up pushing more Palestinian Arabs away from the extremist nationalism of the Husseinis. They didn't become Zionist but they were more willing to accept partition and accommodation. Yet even during the darkest days where the Husseinis were assassinating political rivals and suspected collaborators based only on suspicion, land sales to Jews continued and even increased. Even after the White Paper severely resticted land transfers, the Arabs and Zionists found loopholes to continue to sell land to Jews.
Early in the book, Cohen appears to conflate pan-Arab nationalism with Palestinian Arab nationalism - the former of which was far better established than the latter - and somewhat weakens his case when he claims that most Palestinian Arabs were nationalists. But by the end, when he takes a closer look at Palestinian Arab nationalism and its failure to stop collaboration with the Jews, he gets closer to understanding the truth - that specifically Palestinian Arab nationalism was always a shallow movement that didn't interest Palestinian Arabs themselves enough to fight and die for their own cause. Palestinian Arabs were more loyal towards their clans and villages than towards any sort of national cause, and even the nationalists were split between the absolutists, the ones that favored partition, the pan-Arab Greater Syrians and the Abdullah-oriented "Jordan option" advocates. (The relative ease in which the West Bank Arabs allowed themselves to become annexed to Jordan shows that the purely Palestinian Arab nationalism was weak even in their epicenter.)
Often, the outside Arab armies seemed to be more interested in fighting Zionism than the supposed victims of Zionism themselves. Cohen brings a number of examples where Arab villages fought to keep outside forces away, and many made peace pacts with nearby Jewish settlements. These pacts are part of the reason many Arabs stayed safely in Israel.
Cohen's reasons for the failure of Palestinian Arab nationalism dwells on these divisive factors and the relative success of Zionist intelligence and organization. He is too post-Zionist to entertain the notion that Palestinian Arab nationalism's failure was because it was from the start a negative movement, not a positive one - it was always more to stop Zionism than to build an independent Palestinian state. This is the real reason that it was so shallow and vulnerable to so many divisions - it was not an ideology so much as a violent reaction to a different ideology. No national movement can sustain itself if it is based mostly on the negation of another national movement.
Despite its flaws, this well-researched book is a very important addition to the history of the Palestinian Arabs and of Zionism.
Hillel Cohen, in his fascinating book "Army of Shadows: Palestinian Collaboration with Zionism, 1917-1948," consciously uses these words in the context that Palestinian Arabs use the words today. As a firm member of the post-Zionist historians, perhaps this is not surprising, nor his use of the word "Nakba." But to Cohen's credit, despite his constant use of these terms without scare quotes, he is an honest enough historian to show that the supposedly treasonous behavior done by countless Palestinian Arabs between the Balfour Declaration and the founding of Israel was often anything but.
Reading this book, with Arab appellations being applied to situations where the Arabs end up looking very bad, is an exercise in whiplash. The exact same facts could have been used in a book called "Arab-Zionist Friendship, 1917-1948" but Cohen's use of the pejorative lends a sense of unreality to his terminology.
The book itself is a remarkable historical work, with much use of recently declassified Israeli archives showing the extent of the early Zionist Shai intelligence operations and methods, together with the large numbers of Palestinian Arabs who, to some extent, decided to work with the Jews rather than shun them, often at the cost of their lives.
"Army of Shadows" follows a roughly chronological history of Arabs who willingly sold land to Zionists, who traded with them, who worked for them and who at times employed them, even who married them. It follows the rise of Hajj Amin al-Husseini and elaborates on how his anti-Jewish policies often alienated the silent majority of Arabs and sometimes drove them to become even closer to the Zionists. It shows an overlooked aspect of the messy history of the competing desires of the Husseini-style Arab absolutists, Nashashibi-style pragmatists (who were no less nationalist), the pro-Abdullah camp who wanted a federation with Transjordan, the Arab labor unions, farmers, village elders, land dealers, economic opportunists, criminals, loyal friends to Jews. Yet, again, Cohen's terminology is exclusively the one used by the most extreme Husseini camp, and is now considered normative by Husseini's political heirs of Fatah and Hamas. In some ways, that terminology is almost Orwellian newspeak where it has become forbidden for today's Palestinian Arabs to even think that there could be something positive about cooperating with Israel.
In the 1920s, there were some Arab parties who were explicitly Zionist - the Muslim National Associations and later the Farmers' Parties. Cohen brings some evidence that Zionists were instrumental in helping these parties start and grow, but he implies that there would not have been any pro-Zionist sentiment altogether without this outside influence, a much weaker argument (and one that is slightly demeaning to Arabs, that they could not possibly have been independently anything but anti-Zionist.)
Cohen irritatingly ascribes noble motives to Arabs who want to become and remain friends with Jews, but he almost never gives the Jews the same credit. He consistently emphasizes the Zionist intelligence organization and how it manipulated Arabs but doesn't seem to think that it was possible that Jews could honestly be friends with the Arabs without ulterior motive. The paradox is that Cohen himself grew up friends with neighboring Arabs and those friendships helped him to go into the field of history; his enlightened post-Zionism cannot admit the possibility that early Zionist Jews could possibly have been as open-minded as he himself is.
But for all his faults, Cohen is scrupulously honest - he does not hesitate to tell anecdotes and facts that contradict even his own assumptions and biases. Even as he describes Husseini-style nationalism as being normative he is quick to mention that their opponents also felt they were acting with the best interests of their people in mind, and that they even accused Husseini of being the traitor to their cause.
The 1929 riots ended the explicitly Zionist Arab parties but there remained a significant number who were willing to work more covertly with the Zionist establishment. Some were opportunistic or greedy, some were idealistic, some were simply loyal to their friends. The collaboration included finding land that was for sale, providing intelligence from the Husseini nationalist camp, and quietly championing a more pragmatic relationship with the Zionists who many thought were too powerful to defeat anyway. The Husseini clan was most concerned about land sales, yet they often engaged in such sales themselves.
It was a combination of the Husseinis' intransigence, hypocrisy and their own terror campaign against their political rivals that paradoxically ended up pushing more Palestinian Arabs away from the extremist nationalism of the Husseinis. They didn't become Zionist but they were more willing to accept partition and accommodation. Yet even during the darkest days where the Husseinis were assassinating political rivals and suspected collaborators based only on suspicion, land sales to Jews continued and even increased. Even after the White Paper severely resticted land transfers, the Arabs and Zionists found loopholes to continue to sell land to Jews.
Early in the book, Cohen appears to conflate pan-Arab nationalism with Palestinian Arab nationalism - the former of which was far better established than the latter - and somewhat weakens his case when he claims that most Palestinian Arabs were nationalists. But by the end, when he takes a closer look at Palestinian Arab nationalism and its failure to stop collaboration with the Jews, he gets closer to understanding the truth - that specifically Palestinian Arab nationalism was always a shallow movement that didn't interest Palestinian Arabs themselves enough to fight and die for their own cause. Palestinian Arabs were more loyal towards their clans and villages than towards any sort of national cause, and even the nationalists were split between the absolutists, the ones that favored partition, the pan-Arab Greater Syrians and the Abdullah-oriented "Jordan option" advocates. (The relative ease in which the West Bank Arabs allowed themselves to become annexed to Jordan shows that the purely Palestinian Arab nationalism was weak even in their epicenter.)
Often, the outside Arab armies seemed to be more interested in fighting Zionism than the supposed victims of Zionism themselves. Cohen brings a number of examples where Arab villages fought to keep outside forces away, and many made peace pacts with nearby Jewish settlements. These pacts are part of the reason many Arabs stayed safely in Israel.
Cohen's reasons for the failure of Palestinian Arab nationalism dwells on these divisive factors and the relative success of Zionist intelligence and organization. He is too post-Zionist to entertain the notion that Palestinian Arab nationalism's failure was because it was from the start a negative movement, not a positive one - it was always more to stop Zionism than to build an independent Palestinian state. This is the real reason that it was so shallow and vulnerable to so many divisions - it was not an ideology so much as a violent reaction to a different ideology. No national movement can sustain itself if it is based mostly on the negation of another national movement.
Despite its flaws, this well-researched book is a very important addition to the history of the Palestinian Arabs and of Zionism.
- Sunday, January 06, 2008
- Elder of Ziyon
- self-death
2008 has been relatively quiet since New Year's, but I still keep finding out about 2007 deaths. From Ma'an:
UPDATE: At least it doesn't appear to be an honor killing.
From PalToday (autotranslated):
A corpse found in a landfill in near the West Bank city of Hebron has still not been identified after nine days of investigation, police sources said.So the 2007 total goes to 612.
The body was found in the town of Nuba, west of Hebron.
Hebron Police Chief Majid Hawari said no one has reported a missing person in the area. The police plan to take a DNA sample before burying the body.
UPDATE: At least it doesn't appear to be an honor killing.
From PalToday (autotranslated):
Palestinian medical sources reported that a Palestinian woman was killed by stray bullets during the evening today, Monday, as she and her husband were passing near a quarrel between two families in the path of Saladin leading Central Province [of Gaza.]This makes the 2008 self-death count 4 for 2008.
The sources said that Nagwa Abdel Al, 45 years old, mother of nine children, arrived in the city of Al-Aqsa Martyrs Hospital Deir el-Balah central sector lifeless body after it was hit by two bullets in the chest and neck.
- Sunday, January 06, 2008
- Elder of Ziyon
- media bias
On January 3, Fatah accused Hamas of using arrested Fatah members as "human shields" against Israeli attacks. A Fatah member who fled Gaza during the Hamas takeover was caught by Hamas sneaking back in through Rafah; Hamas arrested him and placed him in an area in Tel Sultan where, with his hands and feet bound, he died in an Israeli attack while the Hamas members fled.
New details in the Palestinian Arab press show that other Fatah prisoners are being held in different locations in Gaza, seemingly for the purpose of increasing the number of casualties in case of Israeli airstrikes against Hamas buildings. (I wouldn't call them human shields; rather human statistic padders. Their purpose isn't to stop Israeli airstrikes but to score propaganda points.)
A Palestinian Arab human-rights organization confirmed Fatah's accusations today, adding that according to Palestinian law the only place in Gaza that prisoners can be held is the Gaza Central Prison.
Yet the only non-Israeli and non-Palestinian Arab reporting of this accusation is in a small UPI story that, as far as I can tell, wasn't picked up by any newspaper. AP, Reuters, AFP, the New York Times, the BBC - all quick to publish similar accusations against Israel - are silent.
New details in the Palestinian Arab press show that other Fatah prisoners are being held in different locations in Gaza, seemingly for the purpose of increasing the number of casualties in case of Israeli airstrikes against Hamas buildings. (I wouldn't call them human shields; rather human statistic padders. Their purpose isn't to stop Israeli airstrikes but to score propaganda points.)
A Palestinian Arab human-rights organization confirmed Fatah's accusations today, adding that according to Palestinian law the only place in Gaza that prisoners can be held is the Gaza Central Prison.
Yet the only non-Israeli and non-Palestinian Arab reporting of this accusation is in a small UPI story that, as far as I can tell, wasn't picked up by any newspaper. AP, Reuters, AFP, the New York Times, the BBC - all quick to publish similar accusations against Israel - are silent.
- Sunday, January 06, 2008
- Elder of Ziyon
A recent book by Matthias Küntzel called "Jihad and Jew-Hatred: Islamism, Nazism and the Roots of 9/11" has caused a minor kerfuffle over at FrontPage Magazine where Andrew Bostom critiqued Küntzel's book, Küntzel responded and Bostom responded back.
The New York Times just reviewed the book as well. (I have not yet read it.)
It appears that Küntzel's thesis is that the virulent brand of anti-semitism that Islam has espoused since after the first World War was the result of Haj Amin al-Husseini's philo-Nazism, and the Nazi bankrolling of Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood. Bostom seems to take exception to the implication that today's Jihad is of a more recent vintage, rather than a continuation of the ancient forms of jihad. Both of them seem to be talking past each other, as the point of Küntzel's book is specifically to discuss the influence of Nazism over current Islamism while Bostom wants to emphasize the continuous historic evolution of jihad.
It sounds to me that, from the specific viewpoint of anti-semitism, Küntzel has a valid point. Traditional Islamic anti-semitism was not nearly as hateful as Christian anti-semitism has traditionally been, and the current Islamist caricatures and accusations against Jews and Zionism are virtually identical to Nazi imagery. The Muslim Brotherhood does represent a newer strain of Islamism than had been prevalent beforehand, and even if they had ancient hadiths to back them up that doesn't mean that those same hadiths were given the same importance in Islamic thinking before the 20th century.
I think, with my tiny amount of research compared to both of Küntzel and Bostom, that the influence of Christian Palestinian Arabs cannot be ignored - they seemed to take the lead in the anti-semitism in early 1900s Palestine, and the Muslim Arabs took some of their ideas before the Brotherhood asserted its influence throughout the Arab world. Similarly, Husseini's Jew-hatred pre-dates Nazism but was no less toxic. In Egypt, though, Küntzel seems to have a valid point.
The NYT excerpts part of Chapter One, and it includes some fascinating tidbits about early Arab-Zionist relations that I hope to write about more in my upcoming review of Army of Shadows. Here is part of it:
The New York Times just reviewed the book as well. (I have not yet read it.)
It appears that Küntzel's thesis is that the virulent brand of anti-semitism that Islam has espoused since after the first World War was the result of Haj Amin al-Husseini's philo-Nazism, and the Nazi bankrolling of Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood. Bostom seems to take exception to the implication that today's Jihad is of a more recent vintage, rather than a continuation of the ancient forms of jihad. Both of them seem to be talking past each other, as the point of Küntzel's book is specifically to discuss the influence of Nazism over current Islamism while Bostom wants to emphasize the continuous historic evolution of jihad.
It sounds to me that, from the specific viewpoint of anti-semitism, Küntzel has a valid point. Traditional Islamic anti-semitism was not nearly as hateful as Christian anti-semitism has traditionally been, and the current Islamist caricatures and accusations against Jews and Zionism are virtually identical to Nazi imagery. The Muslim Brotherhood does represent a newer strain of Islamism than had been prevalent beforehand, and even if they had ancient hadiths to back them up that doesn't mean that those same hadiths were given the same importance in Islamic thinking before the 20th century.
I think, with my tiny amount of research compared to both of Küntzel and Bostom, that the influence of Christian Palestinian Arabs cannot be ignored - they seemed to take the lead in the anti-semitism in early 1900s Palestine, and the Muslim Arabs took some of their ideas before the Brotherhood asserted its influence throughout the Arab world. Similarly, Husseini's Jew-hatred pre-dates Nazism but was no less toxic. In Egypt, though, Küntzel seems to have a valid point.
The NYT excerpts part of Chapter One, and it includes some fascinating tidbits about early Arab-Zionist relations that I hope to write about more in my upcoming review of Army of Shadows. Here is part of it:
It would be a bit simplistic to ascribe the sea change in Arab opinion towards Zionism to the Muslim Brotherhood, as it is a bit dishonest to represent the Arab world's reaction to Zionism, depicted here, as being wholly positive. Nevertheless, it appears that this is an important book in showing how Al Qaeda's antecedents may be just as much Hitlerian as Koranian.On November 2, 1917 the British government, through its Foreign Minister, Lord Balfour, announced its support for the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people. The Balfour Declaration has since then been accepted as the starting point for the Jewish-Arab conflict.
This view, however, overlooks the fact that important representatives of the Arab world of the day supported the Zionist settlement process. They hoped that Jewish immigration would boost economic development thus bringing the Middle East closer to European levels. For example, Ziwar Pasha, later Egyptian Prime Minister, personally took part in the celebrations of the Balfour Declaration in 1917. Five years later Ahmed Zaki, a former Egyptian cabinet minister, congratulated the Zionist Executive in Palestine on its progress: "The victory of the Zionist idea is the turning point for the fulfilment of an ideal which is so dear to me, the revival of the Orient." Two years later the Chairman of the Zionist Executive, Frederick H. Kisch, travelled to Cairo for talks with three high-ranking Egyptian officials on future relations. These officials "were equally emphatic in their pro-Zionist declarations", noted Kisch in his diary. All three "recognized that the progress of Zionism might help to secure the development of a new Eastern civilization." In 1925 the Egyptian Interior Minister Ismail Sidqi took action against a group of Palestinians protesting against the Balfour Declaration in Cairo. He was at the time on his way to Jerusalem to take part in the opening of the first Hebrew university.
Twenty years later scarcely anything remained of this benevolent attitude. In 1945 the worst anti-Jewish pogroms in Egypt's history were perpetrated in Cairo. On November 2, 1945, on the anniversary of the Balfour Declaration, demonstrators "broke into the Jewish quarter, plundered houses and shops, attacked non-Muslims, and devastated the adjacent Ashkenazi synagogue before finally setting it on fire." The event left some 400 people injured and a policeman dead. Meanwhile in Alexandria, at least five people were killed in the course of even more violent riots "which according to a British embassy official were clearly anti-Jewish and, to his relief, not directed against the British." A few weeks later Islamist newspapers "launched a frontal attack against Egypt's Jews as being Zionists, Communists, capitalists, bloodsuckers, traffickers in arms, white slave-traders and, more generally, a 'subversive element' in all states and societies", and called for a boycott of Jewish goods.
In the following sections, we shall look at the reasons why, between 1925 and 1945, a shift in direction was effected in Egypt from a rather neutral or pro-Jewish mood to a rabidly anti-Zionist or anti-Jewish one, a shift which changed the whole Arab world and affects it to this day. The driving force behind this development was the "Society of Muslim Brothers" (Gamiyyat alikhwan al-muslimin), founded in 1928. The significance of this organization goes far beyond Egypt. For today's global Islamist movement the Muslim Brothers are what the Bolsheviks were for the Communist movement of the 1920s: the ideological reference point and organizational core which decisively inspired all the subsequent tendencies and continues to do so to this day.
Saturday, January 05, 2008
- Saturday, January 05, 2008
- Elder of Ziyon
The EU-BAM press and public relations officer has responded to my inquiry:
UPDATE: According to a report in London Al-Quds al-Arabi, Israel has written letters to Washington and the EU requesting taking over Rafah again and giving the EU observers control again over people crossing over.
Dear (Elder, I used a fake name),I wasn't aware that Egypt was not part of the agreement, that this means that Egypt and Hamas can completely go around the EU's and international community's wishes for Rafah. It is interesting that the EU, so keenly interested in a Palestinian Arab state, seems to have nothing to say about this.
Thanks for your interest in EUBAM and to get in touch with us,
As you know and despite the RCP being closed since the 9th of June, the European Union decided to maintain the European Union Border Assistance Mission - Rafah (EUBAM) in the area. Due to the prevailing political and security situation the Mission has been downsizing even if it maintains its full operational capacity. At present moment EUBAM strength is a total of 42 composed by the 34 International staff from 17 different EU states members and 8 locally contracted staff members. In June 2007 the Mission had 96 Mission members in total.
Since the beginning of the Mission in November 2005 we have had our Headquarters in Ashkelon is still in here where the Mission is based and from we continue working. Our task nowadays consists in looked at ways to increase further the EU's support to the Palestinian Authority, and in particular in helping to build up an effective Palestinian civilian and border police force. As you know the EU is playing an important role in training and mentoring the Palestinian police and this is an essential element in developing the structures of a Palestinian state.
About the annual budget I’m afraid that this is not public information, but I can tell you that part of it is paid for each Member State . In this way part of my salary is paid by Spain and in this way it differs from my colleague’s salary.
Concerning the Hajj pilgrims who traveled trough Rafah it is obvious that is not our task to condemn any action in the area. In this regards I would like to remind you that our Mission is an operational one and all policy decisions are made in Brussels . I take the opportunity as well to inform you that we are not an executive Mission and the Rafah Agreement was signed between the EU the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority but not by Egypt .
I hope that this information will be useful for you if not, please feel free to contact me at any time.
About the late response and as you can probably understand most of the Mission member including myself belong to the catholic tradition and we have been celebrating Christmas and New Year with our families. In this respect I take the opportunity to wish you a happy New Year.
With my best regards,
Maria Telleria
Press & Public Information Officer
EU BAM Rafah
Mobile: +972-(0)54/2247250
Fax: +972-(0)8/6845740
E-mail: maria.telleria@eubam-rafah.org
Visiting address: Dan Gardens Ashkelon Hotel, Ashkelon
UPDATE: According to a report in London Al-Quds al-Arabi, Israel has written letters to Washington and the EU requesting taking over Rafah again and giving the EU observers control again over people crossing over.
Friday, January 04, 2008
- Friday, January 04, 2008
- Elder of Ziyon
Palestine Today (Arabic) says that onlookers did a double-take when they saw an Arafat look-alike at a Fatah rally:
Looks like he is already attracting the attention of those handsome young men that the real Arafat liked to spend so much time with.
Looks like he is already attracting the attention of those handsome young men that the real Arafat liked to spend so much time with.
- Friday, January 04, 2008
- Elder of Ziyon
Some of the presumably unemployed academics of Gaza decided to crunch some numbers to see which terror groups has done the most terrorizing between June 15 and November 30th (why they chose those dates will have to remain a mystery.
Here are the numbers, courtesy of Palestine Press Agency (Arabic):
760 armed attacks
30% Al Aqsa Brigades (Fatah)
24% Al Quds Brigades (Islamic Jihad)
18% Salah-Din Brigades (PRC)
11% al-Qassam (Hamas)
9% DFLP
8% PFLP
Number of joint operations: 165
They count: "Engagement with the occupation forces, launching missiles at settlements and military groupings and mechanisms, and blowing up bombs, sniper soldiers and settlers."
Of course, there are no "settlers" near Gaza, so they mean Jewish civilians.
Here are the numbers, courtesy of Palestine Press Agency (Arabic):
760 armed attacks
30% Al Aqsa Brigades (Fatah)
24% Al Quds Brigades (Islamic Jihad)
18% Salah-Din Brigades (PRC)
11% al-Qassam (Hamas)
9% DFLP
8% PFLP
Number of joint operations: 165
They count: "Engagement with the occupation forces, launching missiles at settlements and military groupings and mechanisms, and blowing up bombs, sniper soldiers and settlers."
Of course, there are no "settlers" near Gaza, so they mean Jewish civilians.
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