No, Israel is not hamstrung to only using a "law enforcement" paradigm in Jenin under international law

Call the police!

Last week,  the UN’s High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Turk condemned the Jenin operation, saying that some of the methods and weapons used “are more generally associated with the conduct of hostilities in armed conflict, rather than law enforcement."

“The use of airstrikes is inconsistent with rules applicable to the conduct of law enforcement operations. In a context of occupation, the deaths resulting from such airstrikes may also amount to willful killings,” he said.

What Turk is saying, and what many "human rights" NGOs believe, is that an belligerent occupier must adhere strictly to human rights law which means that any activity done must be police-type law enforcement operations. 

Nations at war, on the other hand, must adhere to international humanitarian law (IHL), which govern wars. The Geneva Conventions are the source for much of IHL.

Turk is wrong. When Israel faces an armed militant group, it not only can but should apply the laws of war. It is absurd to pretend that police actions are adequate to maintain the peace when an armed group has taken over a town. When there are civilians protesting, that calls for law enforcement; when there are heavily armed militants with machine guns and IEDs, that calls for the army and the laws of armed conflict.

The line between the two is not so clear. This was recognized in a 45-page article published in the International Review of the Red Cross in 2012, "Use of force during occupation: law enforcement and conduct of hostilities."

Once it becomes evident that the threat is emanating from a member of an organized armed group or a civilian taking a direct part in hostilities, such as by means of a vehicle-borne IED, then the conduct of hostilities framework would apply at law. In that situation, the use of force is not limited by law enforcement, although such norms would continue to govern the use of force against civilians who are not direct participants in hostilities. ... [T]he force permitted, at law, to counter an IED or suicide bomb by members of organized armed groups or a civilian taking a direct part in hostilities is governed by conduct of hostilities norms. For example, the soldier may be aware from information provided by aerial surveillance, human intelligence, other observation posts and checkpoints, or perhaps even the observation of certain tactics and procedures, that an attack is about to take place. That soldier does not have to wait until the attack is imminent, or the attacker is physically in close proximity and ready to set off explosives, before taking action to remove the threat. In addressing that threat, the soldier can use force governed by conduct of hostilities norms.

In reality, the situation in Jenin is even more tilted towards actual warfare because there is a law enforcement vacuum there. The PA police aren't going into Jenin. If Israel is the legal occupier, then it would be obligated to have forces in Jenin 24/7 - because law enforcement is the responsibility of the occupier!

Obviously, none of the people who insist that Israel is occupying Jenin want to see Israeli police or soldiers opening up police stations there and maintaining order for the civilian citizens. But if Israel is the occupier, that is exactly what Israel is obligated to do!

Which proves that Jenin, and Area A altogether, is not occupied under international law. It is a town with a law enforcement vacuum. By the time Israeli forces must enter, it has turned into a full blown military conflict with armed militias "defending" no one but themselves. 

Even with this, Israel attempts to apply law enforcement paradigms as much as possible when going into towns are trying to arrest militants. This puts Israeli troops and police at extra risk. 

I wrote a satirical thread, somewhat exaggerating the position of "human rights" groups that try to apply a strict law enforcement paradigm to Israel in the territories:

Here is how Amnesty and HRW insist that Israel go after terrorists:

1. Best to not do anything. They are probably innocent and it should be handled by the PA.

2. If absolutely necessary to stop an imminent act of resistance that will definitely kill Israeli civilians,  do not enter the town with force. This scares some children and could damage roads or houses. Just send one policeman to arrest the suspect.

3. Give the suspect, and the entire town, advanced notice that Israel plans to arrest them. That way there are no surprises.

4. In the unlikely event that the suspect or other people decide to shoot or blow up the policeman, only then is he or she allowed to respond with gunfire.

5. When the suspect gives himself up voluntarily, do not frisk or handcuff him. These are painful procedures, and if the suspect is trans, it could be embarrassing, and it is a terrible thing to shame a Palestinian.

6. In the unlikely event that an entire battalion of heavily armed militants respond to the arrest by killing the Israeli policeman and dismembering him or her, send in another and try again.  Use more polite words when requesting his surrender.

7. After several rounds of this with many Israeli policemen dead, then the IDF may enter with a single unarmed Jeep. Soldiers may wear helmets. Try again until successful.

8. Under no circumstances may a bulldozer be used. Under no circumstances may drones be used. Under no circumstances may anything beyond a pistol be used. These are all prohibited as potentially hurting innocent civilians.

9. Under no circumstances may the suspect be injured or killed. He is by definition a civilian since he is not wearing a uniform. Being aggressive is a violation of the Geneva Conventions and a bunch of other international laws that Amnesty has not read.

10. The assumption that a suspect is a civilian also applies to anyone who allegedly attacks Israelis in Israel itself.  They must be peacefully arrested.

I hope this clears up the NGO ruling on how Israelis may defend themselves. In short - they may not.

Luckily, real international law is not as restrictive as the fairy tale versions pushed by Amnesty, HRW and the UN. 

(Made a correction thanks to Irene)

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The irony in a "BDS victory"

According to the Felesteen news site and many other Palestinian sites:

Cyprus International University canceled a lecture that was supposed to be given by a lecturer from the Rubin (or Rabin?) Institute for Studies, in the Israeli occupation entity. 

This came after pressure from students in solidarity with the Palestinian cause, who organized a demonstration on the university campus, in front of the hall in which he was to lecture on the topic of  "Jewish Victims in the Arab-Israeli Conflict." 

The sit-down demanded the university administration to cancel the lecture and expel the Israeli speaker, while the International Academic Campaign Against Occupation and Apartheid and the Campaign for Palestine sent hundreds of letters to the university asking it to cancel the lecture. 

I couldn't confirm this story outside Palestinian media, which says the lecturer's name is Erez Shishani.

But there is a huge irony here.

Cyprus International University is in Turkish-occupied Northern Cyprus. While it has many international students, the Turkish students there are illegal settlers - forced to go there by the Turkish government, as the New York Times reported in 2014:

Students from Turkey are generally placed in Northern Cyprus by the Turkish higher education board, which has integrated the Northern Cypriot colleges into its own roster and assigns students on the basis of a points system that leaves them limited control over where they study.   

This exactly fits the violation in the Geneva Conventions of transferring one's citizens to an occupied territory. The crime that everyone falsely accuses Israel of.

So now Palestinians are celebrating that a university that is part of an illegal occupation. You can't make this up.

One other irony: the university that caves to student pressure to censor lectures has the slogan, "Open for Open Minds."

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The UN Commission of Inquiry's footnotes betray how they lie

It happens again and again. A major institution, whether the UN, Amnesty or HRW, issues a report that asserts what it considers facts, it refers to a footnoted publication, and the footnote proves that they are lying.

Here is an example from the latest UN Commission of Inquiry report. It finds that Israel's "occupation" is unlawful under international law.  It says:

The occupation of territory in wartime is, under international humanitarian law, a temporary situation, which deprives the occupied Power of neither its statehood nor its sovereignty. Occupation as a result of war cannot imply any right whatsoever to dispose of territory.

The footnote to this points to the  International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), commentary of 1958 on article 47 of the Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.

The wording of that commentary makes it clear that Israel is not occupying "Palestinian territory" which is the linchpin of the entire argument.

It says:

This provision of the Hague Regulations is not applicable only to the inhabitants of the occupied territory; it also protects the separate existence of the State, its institutions and its laws. ...As was emphasized in the commentary on Article 4, the occupation of territory in wartime is essentially a temporary, de facto situation, which deprives the occupied Power of neither its statehood nor its sovereignty.

What state is Israel occupying? If there was no state there, there is no occupation. The UN report's own footnote betrays that the assumptions behind the entire report itself is false.

The commentary emphasizes that the purpose of the Convention is to protect the people, not the State. Israel agrees with this and its High Court rulings have always upheld the humanitarian aspects of the Geneva Conventions even without the existence of a Palestinian state in the territories it controls. 

However, the text itself makes it clear that there is no occupation if there is no previously existing State that had legal title to the land - and there wasn't one. It sure isn't Jordan, whose annexation of the West Bank was illegal by virtually every yardstick. It cannot be the "State of Palestine" because we are told - by the UN - that the territories have been occupied since 1967 and no one claims that the "State of Palestine" existed before 1988 at the earliest. 

I have yet to find an international law expert say the exact date that "occupied territories" of 1967 became "occupied Palestinian territories." But the UN retroactively says that the territories that Israel won in a defensive war have been "Palestinian" since 1967 - they even have had a "Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967."

Israel also has the absolute right to protect its own soldiers and citizens from harm that comes from the territories, under the same Geneva Conventions. As always at the UN and with other modern antisemites, a question of competing rights is being treated as if only one side has human rights, and they assume that Jews simply do not have such rights.

The UN's fast and loose definition of "occupation" is made clear in footnote 10:

For the purposes of the present report, “the territories that Israel occupies” and equivalent terms are a reference to East Jerusalem, the Syrian Golan, Gaza and the West Bank outside East Jerusalem. 

Israel doesn't occupy Gaza by any definition of the term that existed in any legal manual or article before Israel's withdrawal from the territory in 2005. Those who claim that Israel occupies Gaza without having a single soldier there have literally made up a new definition of occupation to apply to Israel only. Essentially, the UN is admitting - not for the first time - that it doesn't care about the legal definition of occupation to begin with; it applies the label to Israel without any regard to what it means. 

Which is this entire report in a nutshell. If Israel is not occupying "Palestinian territory" under the legal definition of occupation then there is no "occupation" that can be declared illegal. The UN decided to make the declaration of illegality first, and tried to justify it afterwards, all while pretending to give an impartial legal analysis.

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10/09 Links: Amb. Dore Gold: Why a Two-State Solution Won’t Work; IDF soldier dies of wounds following Jerusalem attack; Annexation and International Law

From Ian:

Amb. Dore Gold: Why a Two-State Solution Won’t Work

There is a school of thought among historians that each of the Arab states, back then, had its own particularistic aims for attacking Israel: Damascus was looking to establish a Greater Syria in the Levant, Amman hoped to reinforce its hold on the holy sites of Jerusalem after the Hashemites lost the holy sites of Islam that they once held in the Hijaz, and Cairo was looking to connect itself with the Mashreq – that portion of the Middle East that was located in West Asia – and by doing so avert becoming isolated in North Africa.

If the considerations of the Palestinian Arabs were paramount for the Arab world, then why wasn’t a Palestinian state established in Judea and Samaria during those years, when the Arab world had the chance because it already held those areas?

True, the Palestinian Arabs tried briefly to set up a mini-state in the Gaza Strip, known as the All-Palestine Government, but it never acquired wider backing through international recognition.

Its association with the Jerusalem mufti, Hajj Amin al-Husseini, the Palestinian leader most visibly connected with Nazi Germany during the war, undermined the chances of the All-Palestine Government succeeding. Gaza remained an area under Egyptian military occupation until the Six-Day War.

Today, Israel needs to design an approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that keeps in mind the true dimensions of the wider conflict. The Arab-Israel conflict has resembled an accordion that can expand or contract according to international circumstances. In 1967, there was an Iraqi expeditionary force that sought to cross into Israel by cutting through Jordan. The conflict had grown.

By 2022, Iraq was no longer the same strategic factor. And it was Iran that was recruiting Shi’ite militias from all over the Middle East and sending them mostly to Syria.

Today there is a risk that if the two-state solution becomes popularized again, without justification, then Israel will come under rising international pressures to adhere to its terms, even if they do not apply. It risks stripping Israel of its right to secure boundaries which is an integral part of Resolution 242.

What recent events have demonstrated is that a very different Middle East has arisen. Diplomacy remains vital in this new period, but it will only yield results if it addresses the vital interests of the parties which engage in it. That is the lesson of the Abraham Accords, which produced four normalization agreements between Israel and Arab states.

But right now, the two-state solution is just a nice-sounding mantra that will lead diplomats off course. This should be the message of the State of Israel the next time an Israeli prime minister addresses the UN General Assembly.

The silence that screams

Sunday, Oct. 9, 2022 is the 40th anniversary of the 1982 Palestinian terror attack on the Great Synagogue of Rome, in which a two-year-old child, Stefano Tache, was killed and 37 others wounded. Stefano’s brother Gadiel, also wounded in the attack, has just published his memoir, The Shouting Silence, in which he deals with the Italian government’s complicity with the terrorists.

The whole of Italy must thank Gadiel for his strength and determination, and for telling the story of his suffering and that of his whole family, especially his courageous mother Daniela and his father Joseph. His story is a personal one of universal value. It teaches us that victims of terrorism face an emotional tsunami from which they can never completely recover. Their psychological and physical pain is unacknowledged and still far from being fully understood, defined and addressed.

In recent months, Israel has faced a wave of terror attacks and attempted attacks. Only the victims know the trauma they must endure, the family heartache, the legacy of physical wounds. During the second intifada, I saw the streets of Jerusalem literally covered in the blood of over 1,000 dead. Yet the aggressors were absolved and even exalted as princes of the world’s oppressed. The victims, however, were erased, and Israel and Jews libeled as oppressors.

Gadiel Tache’s account of his personal experience and the horrific political scandal that allowed the attack sheds light on the true nature of anti-Semitic terrorism and the suffering it causes. In his book, Gadiel makes it clear that anti-Semitic terrorism is simply the latest historical iteration of genocidal anti-Semitic violence, which culminated in the Holocaust. Anti-Semitic terror today uses political viciousness, media defamation, campus and social media hate and outright physical attacks on Jews around the world.

This terror is at its worst in Israel, where anyone, anywhere can fall prey to shooting, knife and car-ramming attacks. There is no family that does not have a relative or friend who has been a victim of terror. But there is also no place in the world that has not known anti-Semitic terrorism, from the 1972 Munich Olympics to Paris, Madrid, London, Toulouse, the Netherlands, New York and many American cities, as well as Mumbai, Kenya and, of course, Rome.

Melanie Phillips: Welcome, Sir Tom. It's been too long My 2020 review of "Leopoldstadt"

The analogy with today could hardly be more obvious. Diaspora Jews will always view their position and prestige in society as proof not only that they have assimilated into the host culture but that the host culture has assimilated them. And on that latter point, they will always be wrong.

Those who think that, with Jeremy Corbyn on his way out, Britain’s antisemitism crisis has passed, have their heads stuck firmly in the sand— even if the “moderate” Keir Starmer becomes Labour leader.

The crisis is far broader and deeper. For some of us, Jew-hatred made Britain unbearable years before Corbyn became party leader. We concluded we’d been living in a fools’ paradise, that after Auschwitz there had been merely a 50-year moratorium on antisemitism which had now ended.

Under the fig-leaf of anti-Zionism and Israel-bashing, it was clear that Jews would only be accepted as fully British on condition that they didn’t identify as a people, and certainly not with Israel’s fate.

For some British Jews, therefore, anything that dwells upon the myopia of that doomed pre-war Jewish community may exacerbate the disquiet they already feel.

It’s important, though, for British people to be made more aware not just of the liquidation of the Jews of Europe but also the nature of the culture that was thus destroyed. Many in the wider society have no idea about the significance to Jews of brit milah, for example, or the Passover seder.

Maybe Stoppard himself now wonders how different his life would have been had he been brought up inside Jewish family life.

Except that the specific culture to which he is drawn here is one that no longer exists.

Among Jews who feel the pull of their Jewish identity after years of having ignored or suppressed it, it’s not uncommon for them to identify not with Jewish religious rites and practices, nor with the State of Israel, but with a Jewish culture that is no more.

Sometimes this is a disreputable impulse, identifying with those murdered in the Shoah in order to cloak themselves falsely in reflected victimhood and moral impunity.

For others, though, it’s a Jewish epiphany no less genuine for being so tenuous.

Often, such stirrings of identity occur through discovering the fate of family members who were murdered. Recreating their culture in literary form creates a line of continuity with a people to which no other link is desired.

Indeed, what other link can there be? Often implacably agnostic or atheist, viewing the world through the Christian or secular prism of the society in which they were raised and educated, and indifferent or even hostile to Zionism and Israel, the only way such people can realistically connect to their Jewishness is through the ghosts of their family’s past.

With Leopldstatdt, Stoppard is saying “hineini” — here I am, Jewish people, I am one of you and I am declaring it to the world. Welcome, Sir Tom; it’s been too long.

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Defending Israel's claim to Judea and Samaria in the House of Lords, 1994

Peter Thomas, known as Baron Thomas of Gwydir, was a British Conservative politician. He was the first Welshman to become Chairman of the Conservative Party, serving from 1970 to 1972, and the first Conservative to serve as Secretary of State for Wales, holding that office from 1970 to 1974

This is the transcript of an address he made at the House of Lords on March 28, 1994:

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, says that the views of the noble Lord, Lord Haskel [that Israeli settlements do not violate Article 49 of the Geneva Conventions], are not widely shared. Listening to the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, it is clear that his views are widely shared by those who have an aversion to the state of Israel. For many years he has demonstrated his views on that matter. I applaud what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Haskel. I thought his contribution important.

However, I am somewhat anxious about the way in which the debate is going. I understand that the Question before the House is: "whether the Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories violate Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention". In anticipation of my noble friend Lord Gilmour giving the reasons why he was asking the Question, I obtained a copy of the Convention for the Protection of War Victims. I assume that my noble friend is referring to the last paragraph of Article 49. It states: The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies". That is the end of the article. It begins by dealing with individual or mass forcible transfers as well as the deportation of protected persons from occupied territories. It was put into the convention at the end of the war as a result of the dreadful activities of the Nazi administration, in particular the mass transfer of population in order to get rid of people regarded as being unacceptable; in name, the Jews. They were taken to be liquidated from one country to another and were moved from one place to another. That is why we have Article 49 in the convention.

I remind the House of Article 2. It states that, "the present convention shall apply to … armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties". The convention applies, to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party. I therefore ask the House to consider this question: which is the high contracting party whose territory is occupied? In other words, which state has sovereign title to the West Bank?

In 1967 Jordan was in occupation. It is generally accepted that after its annexation of the territories, Jordan had no sovereignty in international law. Its presence in Judaea and Samaria was only given de jure recognition by two countries out of the whole international community. Therefore, if one is dealing with points of law, as my noble friend's Question seeks, it seems clear that the West Bank, at present occupied by Israel, does not belong to any other state, and the convention therefore does not apply. The answer to the first and dominant part of my noble friend's Question is therefore no.

I shall raise another matter if I have time. The last legal sovereignty over the territories was that of the League of Nations mandate of 1922. It can be argued that its provisions still hold legal weight. The mandate stipulated that the area was to be part of the Jewish homeland, and that Jewish settlement there was to be encouraged.

I have referred the House to those two matters, namely, the effect of Article 2 and the mandate, to indicate how ridiculous it is even to contemplate that major national and ethnic issues can ever be solved by raising legal points.

That last paragraph seems to me that he is not so much saying that he is making a legal argument as saying that legal arguments are irrelevant since anyone can interpret them as they wish, and the only solution is political.

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Israel is not violating international law in Gaza - part 1: Principle of Distinction

I have described how Hamas is violating at least 19 principles of international law in the current fighting.

Now, is Israel?

The criticism most often given of Israel's actions is that it is violating the "principle of distinction." The Geneva Conventions Additional Protocol 1, article 52, states it this way:

1. Civilian objects shall not be the object of attack or of reprisals. Civilian objects are all objects which are not military objectives as defined in paragraph 2.

2. Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.

3. In case of doubt whether an object which is normally dedicated to civilian purposes, such as a place of worship, a house or other dwelling or a school, is being used to make an effective contribution to military action, it shall be presumed not to be so used.

Many countries, when they ratified this article, clarified it to ensure that collateral damage is not covered by the first sentence of paragraph 2. So, for example, Canada wrote:

It is the understanding of the Government of Canada in relation to Article 52 that ...the first sentence of paragraph 2 of the Article is not intended to, nor does it,deal with the question of incidental or collateral damage resulting from an attack directed against a military objective.

Italy, Australia, the UK, France and New Zealand added similar language (CIHL II para. 83-91)

Logic dictates that it cannot be otherwise. If these caveats aren't in place, then anyone can make any military target immune from attack placing a civilian there, or placing the target in a house or church or hospital that is still used as such. So, for example, Australia's Defence Force Manual states:

The presence of noncombatants in or around a military objective does not change its nature as a military objective. Noncombatants in the vicinity of a military objective must share the danger to which the military objective is exposed.

Note that we are not saying that the existence of civilians at a military target can be ignored; that is part of the Proportionality discussion that will be forthcoming. But clearly international law allows the attack on military targets even if there are some civilians there.

Who determines whether something is a military target or not?

It is not reporters, or eyewitnesses, or residents of nearby houses, or human rights organizations. That decision is given to the military commander, based on the best available information at the time.

So, for example, The Military Manual of the Netherlands says that “the definition of ‘military objectives’ implies that it depends on the circumstances of the moment whether an object is a military objective. The definition leaves the necessary freedom of judgement to the commander on the spot."

Sweden's IHL manual states "it is up to the attacker to decide whether the nature, location, purpose or use of the property can admit of its being classified as a military objective and thus as a permissible object of attack. This formulation undeniably gives the military commander great latitude in deciding, but he must also take account of the unintentional damage that may occur. The proportionality rule must always enter into the assessment even though this is not directly stated in the text of Article 52." (para. 335, 338)

The military commander is not only concerned with the safety of the civilians in the area. The commander is also concerned with the safety of his or her own troops. The US Naval Handbook says "Military advantage may involve a variety of considerations, including the security of the attacking force." (para. 339)

Civilian sites can become valid military objectives. So, for example, Australia’s Defence Force Manual lists among military objectives “objects, normally dedicated to civilian purposes, but which are being used for military purposes, e.g. a school house or home which is being used temporarily as a battalion headquarters”. The manual specifies that "For this purpose, 'use' does not necessarily mean occupation. For example, if enemy soldiers use a school building as shelter from attack by direct fire, then they are clearly gaining a military advantage from the school. This means the school becomes a military objective and can be attacked." (para. 687)

Israel's Manual on the Laws of War goes even further to protect civilians: (para 694)

A situation may arise where the target changes its appearance from civilian to military or vice versa. For instance, if anti-aircraft batteries are stationed on a school roof or a sniper is positioned in a mosque’s minaret, the protection imparted to the facility by its being a civilian object will be removed, and the attacking party will be allowed to hit it . . . A reverse situation may also occur in which an originally military objective becomes a civilian object, as for instance, a large military base that is converted to a collection point for the wounded, and is thus rendered immune to attack.

However, attacks may not be indiscriminate.

It is ultimately up to the commander to determine the nature of the specific, fluid situation. Everything hinges on his or her intent - not on the judgment of other observers and not on finding out better information in hindsight. As stated by Rüdiger Wolfrum and Dieter Fleck in The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law, "The prerequisite for a grave breach (of IHL) is intent; the attack must be intentionally directed at the civilian population or individual civilians, and the intent must embrace physical consequences."

In order to find that the commander has committed a war crime, the bar is set quite high. ICRC commentary on art 85 of the Additional Protocol states:

The accused must have acted consciously and with intent, i.e., with his mind on the act and its consequences, and willing the ("criminal intent" or "malice aforethought"); this encompasses the concepts of "wrongful intent" or "recklessness"....

As long as the IDF did not deliberately attack civilians, and the local commander had a military purpose for each target based on the best information available at the time, there is no violation of the principle of distinction.

Clearly, the observers on the ground and around the world who are looking at the results through the distorted lens of TV cameras cannot possibly know what the intent of the IDF commanders are. They don't know the specific intelligence available, the real-time situation on the ground, the danger to IDF troops or Israeli civilians (in the case of targeting rocket launchers,) the topography of the area (when, for example, the IDF needs to take hgh ground in order to protect its troops) - none of that is available to the armchair analysts who breezily and ignorantly say that IDF actions could amount to war crimes. The bar to determine that is incredibly high, and is not decided by people at Human Rights Watch who change international law at will for their purposes.

The argument that Israel is deliberately attacking civilians has another fatal flaw: if the policy was to attack civilians, then is it difficult to explain how thousands of air strikes and thousands more artillery strikes have killed so few. If the objective is civilian, then there would be tens of thousands of civilian victims. One cannot claim that the IDF is both a uniquely bloodthirsty army using precision weapons to target civilians and at the same time maintain that the IDF is so poor at targeting. Anyone claiming that the IDF is deliberately targeting civilians is either grossly ignorant of how wars are waged, or they are willfully slandering the army.

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Caveat - I am not a lawyer. I am getting much of this from the IDF initial response to the Goldstone Report, and as of yet I have not seen a single scholarly rebuttal to the legal aspects mentioned in that report. If someone has written such a rebuttal, please let me know.

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