Why Iran's reported offer to stop uranium enrichment at 20% is a joke

YNet reports:

Iran is preparing a package which could revitalize long-stalled negotiations over its nuclear program, but which falls short of a complete shutdown of uranium enrichment, the Wall Street Journal reported Wednesday.

According to the report, the Iranian proposals include an offer to stop enriching uranium to levels of 20% purity – a demand which Tehran has rejected in the past.

In return Iran will request that the US and European Union begin scaling back sanctions that have left it largely frozen out of the international financial system and isolated its oil industry.

Would a plan to limit uranium enrichment to 20% be adequate?

No - it would be a joke.

This is not only my opinion or even only Israel's opinion. ISIS, the independent scientific think-tank that has been closely following the Iranian nuclear program for years, explains why enough of a stockpile of 20% enriched uranium is effectively giving Iran the bomb.. Here is what they wrote last March:

We estimate that Iran, on its current trajectory, will by mid-2014 be able to dash to fissile material in one to two weeks unless its production of 20%-enriched uranium is curtailed. If the number or efficiency of Iran’s centrifuges unexpectedly increases, or if Tehran has a secret operational enrichment site, Tehran could reach critical capability before mid-2014. ...

At nuclear talks in Kazakhstan in February, Western negotiators reportedly focused on persuading Iran to curtail its production of 20%-enriched uranium and to export some of its existing stock. These goals are important but insufficient. As Iran increases the quality and quantity of its spinning centrifuges to the point of critical capability, a moratorium on 20%-enriched uranium will matter less and less. It will become easier for Tehran—after using some pretext to renege on a 20% moratorium—to rapidly make up for lost time in accumulating enough 20% enriched uranium that, if further enriched to weapons-grade (or about 90% enriched), would be enough for a bomb. Once Tehran had enough 20% material for a bomb, it could produce enough weapons-grade uranium for that bomb in a week or two.

...Currently, the IAEA inspects two Iranian enrichment facilities on average once a week, and a third facility every two weeks on average. With this rate of inspections, Iran would need to produce 25 kilograms of weapons-grade uranium (enough for one bomb) from its stockpiles of lower enriched uranium in less than one week. The window might be widened to two or three weeks if Tehran blocked one or two inspections on the pretext of an “accident” or a “protest.”

In short, when the amount of time to enrich enough 20% uranium to 25 kg of weapons-grade uranium 90% becomes less than two weeks, under the current inspection regime, then Iran for all intents and purposes can build a bomb whenever they want without fear of being caught.

This is assuming the IAEA is even aware of all Iranian centrifuge facilities. There is evidence that Iran may have started building at least one such secret facility in 2011, and all its other centrifuge facilities were built in secret without informing the IAEA ahead of time. This shrinks the two week window even further.

Even placing IAEA inspectors on site permanently might not be enough, as they could be used as hostages to dissuade any military option to stop enrichment.

In other words, this is the time to keep the pressure on Iran to destroy existing stockpiles of 20% enriched uranium, not to allow it.

But as the WSJ article points out:

By falling short of a complete shutdown of enrichment, the anticipated Iranian offer could divide the U.S. from its closest Middle East allies, particularly Israel, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, who have cautioned the White House against moving too quickly to improve ties with Tehran, according to American and Mideast officials.

And that is the entire point.