The U.S. Should Stop Trying to Solve the Israel-Palestinian Conflict and Focus on Iran
Iran’s nuclear program isn’t just a threat to Israel, but a major concern for the United States, one recognized by the past several presidential administrations. Unless the IDF destroys key nuclear facilities in another attack on the Islamic Republic—which is not an impossibility now that it has taken out Iranian air defenses—it will be a problem the next president will have to reckon with. And regardless of what happens next in the current war, the victor in tomorrow’s election will not be able to ignore the Middle East.Israel May Have Set Back Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions
Michael Mandelbaum, reviewing Steven Cook’s recent book The End of Ambition, has some advice on this score:
The country that now threatens American interests is the Islamic Republic of Iran. It is conducting an active campaign to achieve dominance in the region by unseating governments friendly to the United States and evicting American forces from the Middle East. That campaign has met with considerable success. Iran now exercises substantial, indeed sometimes dominant, influence in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen.
If . . . the Islamic Republic should acquire nuclear weapons, as it is actively seeking to do, its capacity to harm America’s friends and American interests would expand dramatically. The most important task for American Middle East policy is, therefore, to prevent that from happening.
Past American Middle Eastern policy has another implication for the future. For decades, successive American administrations pursued a political settlement between Israel and the Palestinians living in Gaza and on the West Bank of the Jordan River. These efforts all failed, and for the same reasons that American democracy-promotion efforts in the Middle East came to nothing: the political, cultural, and institutional bases for a Palestinian state willing to live peacefully beside Israel have never existed, and the United States cannot create them.
Absent, however, the Palestinians becoming what they have thus far never been—a genuine partner for peace—the American government should waste no more time on what has come, over the years, to be called the peace process. The United States has more urgent Middle Eastern business, business that can, and must, be successfully concluded, with Iran.
After Israel’s most recent attack on Iran, this newsletter noted that IDF jets struck not only ballistic-missile facilities but also a site connected to the nuclear program. J.E. Dyer presents a thorough examination of publicly available information, and concludes that this particular structure, known as Taleghan 2, was what experts call a “critical node” in the Iranian quest for atomic weapons:Snapback sanctions on the table as Iran threatens to go nuclear
A “critical node,” in the analysis of an enterprise like developing a nuclear weapon, is a bottleneck: something that previous paths funnel down to, and something that must be passed through successfully to reach the goal of the enterprise. A critical node cannot be bypassed. It must be successfully negotiated. In the case of this target, the critical node in question is developing a “detonatable” weapon.
Taleghan 2 is . . . not just a component; it’s a unique one. If Israel’s strike took out infrastructure inside the building—and I consider it likely that it did—that’s a setback in getting through the critical node of actually weaponizing fissile material to produce a bomb. The infrastructure, if left in place from the work done before 2004, would be hard to replace. . . .
[I]n a limited strike, Israel thought it worthwhile to hit Taleghan 2. The decision to do that was probably not intended as a mere warning to Iran about Israel’s knowledge of Tehran’s nuclear-weapons program. An isolated warning of that kind would be counterproductive, informing Iran of peril but having no practical impact on the overall situation.
My bet would be on Israel wanting to have a practical impact: setting Iran’s program back by destroying a facility needed to get through the critical node of weaponization successfully. There’s a real probability Israel achieved just that.
Snapback sanctions, the 2015 Iran nuclear deal’s fail-safe mechanism, may be back on the West’s agenda after recent threats and aggression by the Islamic Republic.A Message for America: A Free Lebanon Is the Only Path to Truly Stopping Hezbollah
U.K. Foreign Secretary David Lammy is prepared to trigger snapback sanctions as Iran gets closer to nuclear breakout, The Telegraph reported over the weekend, citing a Foreign Office official who said that London is “committed to preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons using every diplomatic tool available, including the snapback mechanism if necessary.”
The report comes in the immediate aftermath of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s top foreign policy advisor, Kamal Kharrazi, saying that Tehran has “the technical capabilities necessary to produce nuclear weapons” and would do so if facing an existential threat.
In the past year, Iran has twice directly attacked Israel with missiles, in addition to sponsoring Hamas and Hezbollah, which have been at war with Israel for the past year, as well as the Houthis in Yemen, who have sporadically attacked Israel in addition to disrupting global commerce by attacking ships in the Red Sea.
In addition, Iran has sold ballistic missiles and drones to Russia for use in its war against Ukraine, leading the EU and U.K. to impose sanctions last month on Iranian airlines as well as arms procurement and production firms and individuals involved in Iran’s arms industry and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Deployment of the snapback mechanism means that the sanctions regime of the Iran deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), would revert to its original state.
The JCPOA included “sunset clauses,” by which sanctions on Iran would gradually expire; all sanctions would return if snapback is invoked.
Then-Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, who planned to turn his country into a services hub at peace with its neighbors, revolted — along with a coterie of oligarchs. Washington and Paris rushed to their support in 2004, passing UN Security Council Resolution 1559, which demanded that Assad withdraw and Hezbollah disarm.
Despite threats, Hariri stood his ground and was assassinated in February 2005. The crime backfired: It solidified Lebanon’s national consensus, forcing the Syrian dictator to pull out in April.
To deflect Lebanese pressure, Hezbollah triggered a war with Israel in 2006 that ended with UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which not only reaffirmed 1559, but instructed a 10,000-strong UN peacekeeping force, UNIFIL, to help keep Lebanon militia-free south of the Litani River.
But Hezbollah sent “villagers” hurling rocks at peacekeepers, and burned tires to stop the UN force from inspecting suspected Hezbollah arms depots. The villagers even killed some UNIFIL personnel.
Hezbollah built massive fortifications, at times tens of yards away from UNIFIL’s observation towers. Those bunkers were to serve as launchpads for invading northern Israel, like Hamas’s October 7 attack that killed 1,200 people.
The 20-year anniversary of Resolution 1559 has come and gone. Iran spent two decades building up Hezbollah’s capabilities and cemented its control of the Lebanese state, driving Lebanon’s economy into the ground in the process. The US, France, and the UN all failed to change this trajectory.
But something has happened over the last few weeks. In response to a year of non-stop attacks on northern Israel, the Israel Defense Forces decimated Hezbollah’s leadership and degraded its capabilities to such an extent that Lebanon has a window to replicate the consensus that ejected Assad.
The White House is now pushing a framework where Israel would halt its military operations in southern Lebanon, and the Lebanese military would oversee Hezbollah’s withdrawal to north of the Litani River. But if the Lebanese state remains politically controlled by Hezbollah, the agreement will end the same way as Resolutions 1559 and 1701: Non-enforcement and Hezbollah’s resurgence.
If the United States wants to find a viable diplomatic path in Lebanon, it needs to work with willing Lebanese leaders to reclaim Lebanon’s sovereignty from Hezbollah and free Beirut from Tehran’s yoke. That starts with the election of a new anti-Hezbollah Lebanese president.