Andrew Fox Israel Is Succeeding in Gaza
So how does the IDF plan to achieve the aim of defeating Hamas? Through a political solution? Definitely not. No one on the international stage has expressed any interest in helping with governance in Gaza. Nor is there any evidence that these nonexistent partners would do anything other than act as human shields for Hamas, making it impossible for Israel to attack its foes when necessary. The idea that there exists some magic device to convert any sizable number of Gazans to embrace a political alternative to Hamas that would be in any way favorable for Israel can be generously termed a fantasy. According to polling, 2% of Gazans support an Israeli-backed administration. The majority want Hamas back.Caroline Glick: Egypt must pay a price for sponsoring Hamas
Israel’s war cabinet has received significant domestic and international criticism for their lack of a “day after” plan for governance in Gaza, which has been echoed in recent days by Defense Minister Yoav Gallant and war cabinet member Benny Gantz. IDF planners are therefore faced with designing operations to achieve a loosely defined goal, with no clearly articulated strategic end state for the operation from their political leadership—in part perhaps because the “end state” may be unsatisfying to Western ears. So how have they met this challenge?
If you look at what is possible, what the best version of “success” looks like, and what Israel is doing, I contend that in Gaza we are seeing a masterpiece of operational design within severe politically imposed limitations. The IDF is not trying to clear Gaza. With no ability to impose a political arrangement in Gaza, and a Gazan desire for continued Hamas rule, the IDF answer is: Let them have Hamas. But the version of Hamas that Gazans will get is one heavily degraded militarily, and, most importantly, with vast swaths of their tunnels and civilian-embedded infrastructure destroyed. In other words, the IDF aims to replace Hamas 3.0—the version that fought three wars against Israel and then launched the brutal Oct. 7 surprise attacks—with Hamas 1.0, which took over the Gaza Strip from Fatah in June 2007.
To accomplish that end, the IDF has methodically razed what Hamas infrastructure they could find in Gaza City, Khan Yunis, and now Rafah. They have secured the Netzarim corridor to control freedom of movement from south to north. It looks like they are trying to do the same thing along the Philadelphi Corridor and Gaza’s southern border with Egypt, to cut off the inflow of weapons and supplies to Hamas.
Facial recognition software in controlled areas allows the IDF to stop known Hamas commanders moving around. This posture also allows the IDF to strike when concentrations of Hamas are identified, to degrade their manpower, and then withdraw again: And that is what we saw at Shifa hospital and are seeing now in Jabalia.
At the same time, the IDF has methodically destroyed buildings to create a 1-kilometer buffer zone around the Gaza border—a measure that if enforced would indeed prevent a repeat of Oct. 7. If Israel has its way, nobody in Gaza is getting anywhere near the border again. However, whether Washington will come down against this policy remains to be seen, which is why for Israel, the key strategic goal in Gaza is arguably to limit as much as possible the internationalization of the Strip through fantastical plans for “the day after.”
As things stand, the operational end state looks like significant Hamas infrastructure is destroyed, its fighting capability severely degraded, and the border secured, with the IDF retaining the capability to strike into Gaza at will. All of this has occurred while shifting hundreds of thousands of civilians out of harm’s way and minimizing innocent casualties (Hamas’ human shield tactics aside). As John Spencer, chair of urban warfare studies at the Modern War Institute at West Point, has repeatedly pointed out, the efforts the IDF has made to protect civilians is unprecedented in modern urban warfare.
Both the tactical and strategic accomplishments of the IDF campaign in Gaza are entirely real. The operational design that allowed for these accomplishments does, of course, come with disadvantages. First, the destruction of civil infrastructure will require a massive reconstruction effort. While innocent civilian deaths are real and tragic, the almost 1-to-1 combatant-to-civilian death ratio remains very low compared to other conflicts. Second, the Egyptians have been very twitchy about Israeli control of the southern border.
However, we now know why. Since the start of the Rafah operation, the IDF has uncovered some 50 tunnels that run from Gaza into Egypt, suggesting a high and ongoing degree of complicity between the Hamas leadership and the military and political leadership in Cairo.
Militarily, the IDF is hamstrung by international pressure to slow operations, and uncertainty about what comes next in Gaza—a choice that may at least partially lie outside of Israel’s control. For our part, Western critics need to eat humble pie and accept that, on the evidence of the last 20 years, our tactics are not to be recommended. What we are seeing in Gaza is not a failure. It’s a quite brilliant IDF operational design, within the bounds of what is realistically possible.
According to an investigative report in Tablet magazine, in exchange for its “moderating” role in mediating the war between Hamas and Israel, Egypt has received loans and investments from the International Monetary Fund, the European Union and the United Arab Emirates totaling more than $50 billion. While Egypt was on the brink of insolvency on Oct. 6, this inflow of money has now secured Egypt’s financial viability for the next several years.Seth Frantzman: A Hamas lobby emerges in the Middle East
There is no objective reason that el-Sisi’s extortionist pro-Hamas policies should succeed. U.S. leverage over Egypt is considerable. Use of but a fraction of that leverage by the U.S. can induce a significant shift in Egypt’s actions, at least in the immediate term. But rather than use it, the Biden administration to date, has rewarded el-Sisi for siding with Hamas against Israel.
Egypt would not have received its cash infusion from the IMF, the European Union and the UAE without a green light from Washington, which also provides Egypt with $3 billion in military aid per year. Rather than demand that Egypt follow international humanitarian law and permit Gazans to flee the war zone to Egypt, the administration has firmly supported el-Sisi’s refusal to permit them to cross the border. Similarly, Washington has been as critical of Israel’s operation in Rafah as Egypt.
Given the administration’s policy, it is time for American lawmakers who understand the danger Hamas’s survival poses to begin criticizing and Egypt’s nefarious role in facilitating Hamas’s weapons build-up and its success in building its warren of more than 400 miles of underground tunnels across Gaza and into Egypt. Egypt should see its aid tied to an end to its sponsorship of Hamas.
If Hamas survives, its perceived victory over Israel will of course inspire Hezbollah, the Houthis, the Shiite militia in Iraq and Syria and Iran itself to step up their assaults on the Jewish state. But it will also be an adrenalin shot for Islamists in the Western world to expand their terrorist attacks and other forms of political violence against Westerners and home and worldwide.
U.S. elected officials must express their disapproval of Egypt’s policies. They need to take action to undermine el-Sisi’s ability to maintain his pro-Hamas policies and anti-Israel brinkmanship by, among other things, tying U.S. fiscal support and military assistance to Egypt to an end to its cooperative relationship with Hamas; its political warfare against Israel; and threats to abrogate the peace treaty with the Jewish state.
A Hamas lobby that will affect the West
This is also important in the West. There are networks of activists with links to NGOs that are basically fronts for the Brotherhood. As such, Hamas has a lobby that stretches across the West.
A lot of this was known before October 7. Hamas was backed by Iran for years. Hamas leaders lived in Qatar since 2012. Egypt had mediated between Hamas and other Palestinian factions and Israel for years.
Doha had transferred cash to Hamas-run Gaza via Israel for years. Whenever there were tensions in Gaza, such as in May 2021, activists in the West would be galvanized to support the Palestinian cause.
In many cases, this was a thinly veiled form of support for Hamas. In fact, in recent years, there has been a quiet attempt to move Western activism away from backing two states and the Palestinian Authority to back Hamas and “resistance” and one state.
However, there are actors in the current conflict that appear to have remained behind the curtain until now.
Russia surprised Israel with its apparent support for Hamas after October 7. Because of the Ukraine war, Moscow viewed the Hamas attack positively as a way to create trouble for the US and US partners.
China sees the war the same way, and China’s backing of Palestinians has rapidly increased in recent years as Beijing has invested more in Tehran.
Egypt’s role is now in the spotlight. What did Egypt know about smuggling to Hamas? How did Hamas stockpile so many weapons despite supposedly being under blockade?
More difficult questions need to be asked about why Egypt didn’t want Israel operating in Rafah and what was done during the hostage talks that dragged them out and may have misled Israel.
For instance, why was Israel pressured to move to a lower-intensity war in Gaza and pause fighting for Ramadan? Was this really a US request, or was it based on Doha and Cairo asking the US to ask Israel to pause the righting?
This essentially gave Hamas a ceasefire in March and April so that it could recover. Hamas didn’t change its stance at the hostage talks and refused to even hand over a list of living hostages.
Israel doesn’t seem to have pressed for the list, leaving questions about whether the hostages were the top priority for Israel’s leaders as well.
However, the overall picture that emerges is that Israel was played by Doha and Cairo in the talks.
The problem Israel faces is the immense lobby for Hamas behind the scenes. Hamas not only has its official backers and the fact it is hosted in Doha, a Western ally, and backed by Turkey, a NATO member, but Hamas also has partnerships with many NGOs.
It has members who have infiltrated NGOs that work in Gaza. It has also brought their silence through threats or other means.
This means that most NGOs, whether those who deal in food health or other forms of aid, never mention Hamas's role in Gaza.
Hamas infiltrated hospitals and schools, and it is not critiqued by the NGOs. This is all part of a very complex lobby that makes Hamas very strong and hard to remove from Gaza.