Israeli home demolitions deter Palestinian terrorism, study finds
Israeli house demolitions effectively decrease terrorist attacks, according to a new study.Eugene Kontorovich: Resolution 242 Revisited: New Evidence on the Required Scope of Israeli Withdrawal
The study, “Counter-Suicide-Terrorism: Evidence from House Demolitions,” to be published in the January issue of the Journal of Politics, found that Israel’s policy of demolishing the homes of Palestinian terrorists causes “an immediate, significant decrease in the number of suicide attacks.”
The study examines data on punitive house demolitions between 2000 and 2005, and precautionary demolitions — those based on the location of a house but unrelated to the identity of the house’s owner — from 2004 to 2005. The authors found that punitive house demolitions during that time led to “fewer suicide attacks in the month following,” while precautionary demolitions caused “a significant increase in the number of suicide attacks.”
Co-authored by researchers at Northwestern University and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, the study runs contrary to the widely held belief that punitive house demolitions do not dissuade would-be terrorists.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, passed in November 1967, in the wake of the Six Day War, is widely regarded as among the most important ever. But it’s meaning is also the most debated. The resolution famously called for “Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict.” The meaning of this provision – in particular, the extent of the required withdrawal - has been contested ever since.Eugene Kontorovich: The legitimacy of Israel’s nation-state bill (I): comparative constitutionalism
This article presents new evidence on the resolution’s meaning – an issue that has gained new relevance amidst current diplomatic efforts for a Security Council resolution that could effectively supersede 242. The article does not engage all the myriad disputes and questions about the resolution, nor aim at a comprehensive evaluation of it. Rather, it adds two important but previously unappreciated dimensions that bear on how 242 should be read.
First, the article examines the meaning of 242’s withdrawal provision by comparing it to all other such territorial withdrawal demands issued by the Security Council. It finds that the language of 242 differs notably from the other 18 distinct territorial withdrawal demands, all of which explicitly require a complete withdraw from the territory in question. An examination of these resolutions supports the view that 242’s unusual wording was a meaningful and substantive drafting choice.
Second, the article examines contemporaneous understandings in the United Nations about the rules concerning territorial. Discussions in the International Law Commission, involving the leading international law jurists of the post-WWII era, demonstrates that it was generally agreed that the U.N. Charter introduced a new prohibition on territorial changes as a result of war, a principle referred to in the preamble of 242. Yet the same discussions also make clear that this rule was understood to have significant limitations and exceptions. (h/t billposer)
These objections do not hold water. For one, ensuring Israel’s status as a Jewish nation state is a goal expressly endorsed by the same critics, when it comes to pressuring Israel into diplomatic concessions. Second, the law is far from unusual by Western standards: it actually does far less to recognize Jewish nationhood or religion than provisions common in other democratic constitutions. This post will consider the general parameters of the legislation in comparison to constitutional provisions of other Western democracies. Tomorrow, a second post will relate the law to the “two state solution.”
The nation state bills mostly constitutionalize the national anthem, symbols, holidays, and so forth. There is nothing racist, or even unusual, about having national or religious character reflected in constitutional commitments, as research by my colleagues at the Kohelet Policy Forum demonstrates. Seven EU states have constitutional “nationhood” provisions, which typically speak of the state as being the national home and locus of self-determination for the country’s majority ethnic group. This is even the case in places like the Baltics, with large and alienated minority populations.