Ben Shapiro: EXCLUSIVE: Excerpt From Ambassador Nikki Haley’s Upcoming Book, Slamming Media And Obama Administration
On Thursday, The Daily Wire obtained an excerpt from Ambassador Nikki Haley’s upcoming book, With All Due Respect. Haley is widely perceived to be among the leading Republican candidates in 2024 and beyond; her approval numbers as of April 2018 were unprecedentedly high, with a 75/9 split among Republicans, 55/23 split among Democrats, and 63/19 split among independents. The excerpt demonstrates just why Haley was so popular with Americans across the political spectrum: she was extraordinarily willing to speak hard truths to countries with malign practices and intent, and she stood strongly with American allies in her position as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations.
The excerpt opens with Haley explaining that when she first arrived in her new position, she made sure to break with foreign policy tradition by taking her first meetings with the members of the U.N. Security Council. Instead, she writes, “We decided to send a message by going another way. I thought it was important to visit our friends first.” After meeting with the British and French ambassadors, therefore, she next “ditched protocol and met with the ambassador from Israel, Danny Danon.” Haley explains:
Seeing Danny in person gave me an opportunity that I had wanted for some time: to know what the passage of Resolution 2334 had been like from his perspective. Danny said he knew something was going on in those last weeks of the Obama administration, he just didn’t know what. He and his colleagues tried for days to reach out to Ambassador Power and everyone they knew in Washington. No one would take their calls. No one would return their messages. The United States had literally stopped talking to Israel.
The most painful part of our conversation was Danny’s recounting of the vote itself. When a non–Security Council member country, like Israel, is the subject of a Security Council vote, its ambassador sits at the huge C-shaped table with the Security Council members. So when Resolution 2334 was passed, Danny was right there. Disgustingly, all the ambassadors at the table stood up and applauded after the vote was tallied. The audience cheered. And in the middle of it all was the Israeli ambassador, remaining seated while the council applauded his country’s humiliation. As Danny told me about it, all I could think was how that feeling was all too familiar to me. I know what it feels like to be different, humiliated, and ostracized for being who you are.
Greenblatt's Legacy: The Administration's Peace Vision
U.S. Special Representative for International Negotiations Jason D. Greenblatt will leave his post at the end of October.The Balfour Declaration and the Jewish Threat that Made Britain Honor It
Greenblatt repeatedly took the Palestinian Authority to task over its duplicity, such as over its "pay-to-slay" policy of paying Palestinian terrorists and their families.
He asked the UN Security Council, "How is it that we can't find an international consensus that the Palestinian Authority rewarding terrorism and the murder of Israelis using public funds, some donated by countries in this very room, is abhorrent and must be stopped?"
"There is no easy answer as to how to balance the absolute imperative of protecting Israel's security - a principle on which the United States will never compromise - with Palestinian aspirations," he said in June. "Yesterday's peace plans have been unable to create a path to a brighter and more prosperous future while addressing the many challenges to overcome."
One of his legacies is a semantic shift in the vocabulary of U.S. negotiators. Greenblatt has refused to use the word "settlements" for Israeli communities beyond the Green Line, and has instead called them "cities" and "neighborhoods."
Greenblatt told the UN Security Council, "It is true that the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian Authority continue to assert that east Jerusalem must be a capital for the Palestinians. But let's remember: An aspiration is not a right....Aspirations belong at the negotiating table. And only direct negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians can resolve the issue of Jerusalem if it can be resolved."
November 2 marks the 102nd anniversary of the Balfour Declaration, about which I have previously written at length in Mosaic. There, I focused on how the actors who brought the declaration into being assured it would have international legitimacy, and on the tragic failure of Britain and the international community to keep their promise to the Jewish people in the aftermath. Here I want to reflect on an overlooked rationale proposed by the Zionist leader Chaim Weizmann to give the declaration some staying power after the world war would finally end.
Historians have long been preoccupied by this question: why did the war cabinet of Prime Minister David Lloyd George issue the November 2, 1917 declaration in the first place? After all, it seemed so improbable, both at the time and in retrospect. That sense of improbability was well expressed by the Hungarian Jewish writer Arthur Koestler, who called the declaration “an act dangerously outside the cautious routine of diplomacy. The whole thing was unorthodox, unpolitic, freakish.” Given that impression, the document quickly invited obsessive speculation as to the real motives behind it, and initially the speculation ranged very widely.
The guesswork would subside when Britain opened its archives in the 1970s. We now know that, far from being “unpolitic,” the Balfour Declaration was very politic indeed. The bottom line was this: the British war cabinet thought a declaration supporting a Jewish national home in Palestine would make for good propaganda among the Jews of Russia and America, who had been tepid in their support of the Allies in a war that had been dragging on for three long years. The Jews, so the reasoning went, would be fired by the prospect of a Jewish Zion, and would use their influence to keep Russia firmly in the fight and persuade the United States to step up.
The war cabinet also thought that official British sponsorship of Zionism would give England an edge over France in the inevitable postwar wrangle over the disposition of the territories of the Middle East. By assuming the noble burden of helping the Jews, Britain would extricate itself from its promise to share Palestine with France as stipulated in the 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement—a deal that Lloyd George wanted to break for reasons of postwar imperial strategy.
To summarize: the Balfour episode was a matter of realpolitik all along. True, some have argued with surface plausibility that both Lloyd George and foreign minister Arthur Lord Balfour were motivated at least in part by religious sentiment. That they held such sentiments is not in doubt; but no evidence of this shows up in the cabinet papers themselves. Rather, British officials debated Palestine as they debated India or Egypt, that is, as an element in their thinking about how best to preserve and, if possible, expand the presence of the British empire on the world map.
