Elder Of Ziyon - Israel News: pchr

Showing posts with label pchr. Show all posts

Friday, January 22, 2010

More Gaza "civilians" and more PCHR lies

Even though I haven't been spending too much time lately on looking for more dead Gaza "civilians" who were actually terrorists, other people (notably PTWatch) has been diligently digging through Arabic websites and we keep adding to the list.

As of right now, we have identified 358 terrorists who were categorized as "civilians" by the PCHR. Add together the rest of the police and the "militants" that PCHR counted, and we have 667 dead Gazans who were legitimate targets, quickly closing in on half of the dead not being civilians.

Many of the civilians were clearly being used as cover or were unavoidably killed in a legitimate operation. The latest "martyr" PTWatch found is a case in point.

#901, Usama Sa’id Mohammed Lubbad, was a recruiter for Islamic Jihad (who also evidently taught Islamic Jihad tenets to the terrorist equivalent of Cub Scouts in a mosque) and he was killed on January 9th. His obituary mentions that he was killed with a few of his Islamic Jihad friends - mentioned in PCHR as #897, 899, 900 and 909. That's five Islamic Jihad members in one shot, a legitimate target by any measure.

However, during the attack two other people were killed. One was a seven year old boy, the other a 55-year old man. Their deaths were unavoidable by the IDF, and very justified under international law.

Looking back at how PCHR described the attacks at the time, we can see how they purposefully lie to make Israel look like it deliberately attacked civilians. In one section of the report they say

At approximately 09:40 on Thursday, an IOF aircraft fired a missile at three members of the resistance who were near al-Qassam mosque in Beit Lahia, killing all three:

1. Mohammed Nafiz al-Hindi, 25;

2. Anwar Jaber Abu Salim, 24; and

3. 'Abdul Nassar 'Abdul Gaffar 'Ouda, 23.

A couple of paragraphs later they say

At approximately 13:00, medical sources announced the death of Ussama Said Lubbad, 19, of wounds sustained earlier on the same day when IOF warplanes bombed a group of young people in Beit Lahia. Another 3 civilians were immediately killed in the same attack.

These were not two separate attacks, but the same one, as Lubbad's obituary makes clear. PCHR pretends that there were two attacks so that they can claim that the IDF deliberately targeted "a group of young people" - implying that the IDF targeted civilians, one of their memes that has been copied and repeated by HRW, Amnesty and Goldstone.

Out of the group of 7 killed, five were terrorists. PCHR must have known at the time they wrote the report that it was a single attack.

Notice also where the terrorists were - near a mosque.

I'm part of the anti-NGO conspiracy!

The Guardian reports on HRW's whining about being criticized by people like me:

America's leading human rights organisation has accused Israel and its supporters of an "organised campaign" of false allegations and misinformation, including "extremely personal attacks" on its staff, in an attempt to discredit the group over its reports of war crimes in Gaza. Iain Levine, HRW's programme director, said that while the organisation had long attracted criticism, in recent months there had been significant attempts to intimidate and discredit it. "I really hesitate to use words like conspiracy, but there is a feeling that there is an organised campaign, and we're seeing from different places what would appear to be co-ordinated attacks ... from some of the language and arguments used it would seem as if there has been discussion," he said."We are having to spend a lot of time repudiating the lies, the falsehoods, the misinformation."

Isn't it a shame that HRW has to spend time defending its positions rather than being believed uncritically? All together now....Awwww! Although I was tragically not mentioned by name, I am an integral part of the nefarious anti-NGO conspiracy. After all, I was the one who noticed Marc Garlasco's interesting hobby of collecting Nazi memorabilia, information that I shared with other bloggers in an illegal secret Zionist underground information channel known as "email." I didn't have the time to exhaustively research it all, and Omri Ceren of Mere Rhetoric took the story and ran with it (with my full support.) My later contributions to the story included the sock-puppets that HRW sent out to defend themselves and the picture of Garlasco wearing the Iron Cross sweatshirt (which I believe someone else found first and alerted me to.) [And now Omri has a radio show, where such information can be shared with even more people! See how deep our Zio-connections are?] Notably, even then the Guardian quoted HRW implying some sort of blog conspiracy when the story broke. One has to wonder if, say, HRW and Amnesty and the UNHRC and the PCHR and Al Mezan and Al Addameer share information with each other - and whether this is a terrible conspiracy as well? (The answer to the first question is, of course, "yes.") The difference is that the NGOs have multi-million dollar budgets, and will often repeat the claims of other NGOs - even clearly biased ones - without any of their own fact checking. For example, Al Addameer's absurd claim of 750,000 Palestinian Arab prisoners since 1967 has been accepted as fact. Would HRW say that this story is above criticism as well? In interests of full disclosure, a Zio Blog conspiracy member list has been published. You can see us in the About Us page on the Understanding the Goldstone Report site. It includes NGO Monitor, CAMERA and Honest Reporting as well as some well-known writers and bloggers. We share information and build on other posts and articles. We do this precisely because it is more effective and focused. In fact, I'm going to now link to another, far more detailed critique of the Guardian article, from Richard Landes and Augean Stables. See how we all conspire together? Booga booga!

PCHR's Other Lies

We've already demonstrated conclusively that literally hundreds of people that the PCHR called "civilian" casualties of Operation Cast Lead were, in fact, terrorists. (And the incredible team of t34zakat, PTWatch and Suzanne are still finding more.)

The problem is not only that PCHR was unaware of these people's affiliations. PCHR's weekly reports during Cast Lead detail a number of specific incidents that show that the organization knew quite well that the dead were terrorists - and chose to categorize them as "civilian" anyway.

For example:

#1294 in PCHR's casualty list, Naser Yusif Abdul Hadi al-Siefi, was listed in the weekly PCHR report as follows:

At approximately 17:00, the IOF artillery fired at a number of Palestinians, including a resistance activist, in the east of al-Zaytoun neighborhood. As a result, a civilian and a resistance activist were killed:

1. Hashem Rabah al-Hatu, 45, a civilian; and

2. Nasser al-Saifi, 38, a resistance activist.

Not only does this show that it is likely that al-Saifi was engaged in hostilities at the time, it also indicates that the civilian killed was probably unavoidable.

In the same report, PCHR writes:

In the evening, medical crews found the bodies of two activists of the Palestinian resistance in Tal al-Hawa neighborhood in the south of Gaza City. They were killed during the IOF incursion into the area. The two were identified as:

1. Mohammed Nawaf Na'im, 24; and

2. 'Abdullah Nawaf Na'im, 19.

Two known terrorists' bodies were found, no civilians with them.

Keep in mind that the actual number of members of Hamas, Islamic Jihad and other terror groups were about 20,000, in a population of some 1.5 million. That means that one in every 75 Gazans were terrorists. If Israel was shooting at random groups of people, we would expect that only about 1/75 of the dead would be terrorists, or only about 19 of them (rather than the 654 terrorists and police we've identified.)

The odds are extraordinarily low (about one in 5625) that Israel bombed Gaza randomly and killed two people who happened to be terrorists with no other casualties. Yet PCHR, who spent lots of time "researching" the circumstances of the deaths of everyone in their list, referred to both of these people as "civilians" (#1216 and #1317)

Another example:

During IOF ground incursion into Tal al-Hawa neighborhood that continued until 07:00 on Friday, 16 January 2009, ten members of the Palestinian resistance were killed. The dead are: Hamdi Ibrahim al-Banna, 23; Medhat 'Abed Ali Bannar, 24; Na'im Khader Hamada, 20; Mahmoud Khader Abu Salem, 19; 'Ammar Maher Farawana, 18; Farid Hejazi al-Hilu, 23; Mu'taz Abdul Muttaleb Dahman, 21; Hussam Hassan al-'AmaSsi, 35; Rebhi Shuhaibar, 25; and Tamer Faza'a, 20.

For some reason, PCHR called Bannar a "civilian" in their casualty list (#1213) while the rest of them were "militants." Yet Al-Mezan and the Palestinian Ministry of Health also categorized Bannar as a "militant."

Even more curious is this case:

At approximately 17:10, an IOF drone fired a missile at a motorcycle in Bani Suhaila village. Ra'fat Khalil Hamdan Abu al-'Ola, 47, who was riding the motorcycle, was killed. The al-Quds Brigades of Islamic Jihad stated that Abu al-'Ola is one of their members.

And Abu al-'Ola is also listed as a "civilian" on the PCHR casualty list (#1290.)

We are going through all the PCHR reports now and will list all of the people that the PCHR had already previously identified as "resistance activists" who they later called civilian. But these examples are enough to prove that the PCHR not only was being disingenuous by claiming that they had no evidence that these people were militants, but that they were outright lying.

(h/t PTWatch who did most of this research)

PCHR is "astonished" at Hamas terrorists

PCHR made a big deal about the "policemen" killed during Cast Lead, saying that they were "civilians." The fact that a majority of them were also members of terror groups didn't matter to this "human rights" group - to them, a fake police force that is identical to an armed terror group is still worthy of civilian protection.

So there is a little irony at PCHR's report on the unpleasantness that happened last Friday between Hamas and the Jund Ansar Allah group. One of their statements is:

[The PCHR] reiterates its astonishment by the involvement of members of the 'Izziddin al-Qassam Brigades in these incidents, emphasizing that the brigades cannot be a law enforcement body, and its very involvement in the incidents is an encroachment into the powers of law enforcement bodies.

Isn't it astonishing that Hamas doesn't distinguish between its law enforcement and its terror group? Only to PCHR, which clings onto a fiction that would allow it to consider Hamas police to be civilian to begin with, and to consider Hamas to be a normal political leadership of Gaza and not a terror group.

PCHR "civilian" update

Our team has just identified the 300th terrorist that the PCHR identified as a "civilian" victim during the Operation Cast Lead.

We have also identified that 186 out of the 282 policemen killed were also members of terrorist groups, nearly two-third of them.

We have identified 17 children under 18 who were also members of terror groups.

If we add all the police, militants identified by PCHR and "PCHR civilian" militants identified by us together, and if my math is right, we have identified 632 people killed who the IDF considers legitimate military targets, out of the 1410 victims that PCHR identified (subtracting PCHR duplicates.)

Even if we assume that the PCHR is not playing games by counting those who died natural deaths as victims, considering that Israel was fighting against groups who purposefully hid in civilian clothing among innocents, this is hardly "indiscriminate."

Hamas continues to add names of its Al Qassam Brigades "martyrs" to its website, five months later, showing that they were trying to hide the terrorist status of its dead fighters in order to fool the world into believing the idea that Israel was recklessly killing civilians and that Hamas didn't suffer severe losses.

CAMERA picks up on EoZ PCHR research

From CAMERA's blog:

Elder of Ziyon blog's investigation of a list of Palestinian dead during the Israeli military operation in December and January reveals that hundreds who were reported to be civilians were in fact militants. The list of 1417 Palestinian victims was published in March by the Palestinian Center for Human Rights (PCHR), a Gaza-based organization. By cross-checking the names on the list with other Palestinian sources, including Hamas-affiliated web sites, Elder of Ziyon was able to compile the names of 286 militants who PCHR misidentified as civilians.
Media coverage of the Israeli operation in Gaza prominently featured the accusation that Israeli forces engaged in indiscriminate and excessive violence, in some cases intentionally targeting civilians. PCHR's reports of civilian fatalities were frequently cited to substantiate this accusation. As CAMERA pointed out as early as January 21, scrutiny of PCHR's own data cast serious doubts about its accuracy. The CAMERA analysis pointed out over 20 cases of mislabeling militants as civilians and noted that 75 percent of the fatalities were young males of combat age.

The recent analysis by Elder of Ziyon delves further into PCHR's data and debunks PCHR's assertion that most members of Hamas internal security forces (policemen) were civilians. It also reveals that a number of children (aged 17 or under) were Hamas combatants - a point initially suggested in the CAMERA analysis.

While these revelations come too late to impact coverage of the fighting, it can only be hoped that responsible journalists will be less inclined to accept without scrutiny the casualty statistics and claims made by PCHR and other groups that most of the casualties caused by Israeli military action are civilians.

The research has slowed down but it is not finished yet.

Small victories in publicizing PCHR lies

NGO Monitor has linked to our results along with other researchers. The Backspin blog of Honest Reporting had also linked to our research. Someone had posted many of my articles about the PCHR at Cleveland Indymedia. Richard Landes at The Augean Stables republished my Casualties of Truth article. Now I have to find the time to learn a content management system so I can create a nice looking website to show our research....and while I am computer literate, even the simple ones take hours to learn and configure.

Someone else crunching the PCHR numbers

It looks like there are other people besides our team who are debunking the PCHR death count. From The New Republic:

If the IDF's alternate numbers are accurate, they paint a very different picture in terms of the toll on civilian life. How is there such a big disparity between the two sets of numbers? Though the IDF has refused to elaborate in any detail on how it obtained its figures, insight into its methods can be gained in the cluttered basement home office in Toronto of retired Israeli intelligence officer Jonathan Dahoah Halevi. "PCHR's list is inaccurate," he asserts. "I get the impression they intentionally tried to inflate the civilian numbers."
He begins to rattle off indictments. "Why is Said Siyam"—the de facto defense minister of Hamas—"listed as a civilian?" he asks. "Muhammad Dasouki Dasliye. Do you know who he is?" Halevi says that Dasliye was a Palestinian Resistance Committee operative and suspect in the terrorist attack against three American security guards in Gaza in October 2003. "Nizar Rayan," Halevi chuckles. "He's a civilian?" In fact, news reports describe Rayan as a militant cleric who mentored suicide bombers and sent his own son on a suicide mission in 2001, killing two Israelis.
Halevi, a pugnacious father of two, is an insider, a former IDF analyst who works days as a counterterrorism consultant but counts Gaza fatalities in his free time. "It's an intellectual challenge," says the dark-haired, 44-year old, whose parents immigrated to Israel from Yemen. It will take him six months to research all 1,400 of PCHR's names, comparing them to a database of thousands of terrorist operatives he has compiled, as well as whatever he finds on the Internet.
As of last month, Halevi has a list of 171 people the PCHR defines as civilians that he claims he can prove are actually combatants affiliated with Hamas or other terrorist groups. His contention is based on a simple principle: When fighters die, they don't just leave behind a body, a family, and eyewitnesses—they leave a paper trail. Martyrdom posters, photographs of funerals, articles celebrating heroes' exploits, lists of payments to families—these sources help Halevi disprove that a particular fatality was a civilian as opposed to a fighter. Intelligence analysts around the world are following this paper trail, and they don't just work for the Shin Bet or CIA. In fact, in the era of the Internet, vast amounts of intelligence are available to anyone with fluent Arabic, a little training, and a lot of time and patience.
Halevi's macabre hobby began during Israel's 2002 Operation Defensive Shield, the Israeli incursion into six West Bank cities that targeted Hamas and other terrorist cells responsible for a number of recent suicide bombings. Halevi was perplexed. "It made no sense that on the one hand, Palestinians claimed their fighters were performing valiantly, but at the same time they said they were being massacred." So the dogged and methodical Halevi compiled his own list of fatalities in the Jenin refugee camp. "I read everything I could get my hands on—militant web sites, articles, books of fighters' memories. I found that 65 percent of [Palestinians] killed in the Jenin refugee camp were terror operatives, including some children," he says gravely. The Palestinians later independently reduced their fatality number from an estimated 500 to 56.
It was addictive. Soon Halevi found himself spending all his free time cross-checking Palestinian fatality lists. In his opinion, the best and most trusted lists belonged to the Israeli human rights organization B'Tselem and PCHR. "These data banks have an enormous influence," he says. "I found PCHR statistics in UN reports...The UN relies on them." So Halevi published dozens of articles on a popular Hebrew news sites, reporting his findings, always precise, never overstating his claim, but scathing nevertheless. Soon he found himself in a war of words with a B'stelem's spokeswoman, who wrote on Israel's News1 web site, "Halevi is exploiting a Palestinian family's tragedy for political gain" and "he dances on Palestinian blood." For his part, Halevi says both organizations are frequently inaccurate, and attributes their contortions to their political motives: "The former chairperson of the board of B'Tselem said in an interview that the organization's goal is a one-state solution. PCHR has the same goal. They reject Israel's existence as a Jewish state."
Halevi is already knee-deep in PCHR's latest list from Cast Lead. He has produced a spreadsheet with the names of 230 police fatalities cited by both the Gaza police department and PCHR. For 171 of these, he provides the name of the faction they fought for as well as brief biographies, such as "a munitions expert" or "arrested by Israel in 1993 for weapons acquisitions for suicide missions." Most of the 171 moonlighting policemen are listed as operatives in the Qassam Brigades, with others belonging to Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the Palestinian Resistance Committee.
"This information wasn't hard to find," Halevi says. Type one of the names into a Google search and up pops a web site with photos showing the Gaza cop sporting a martyr's headband and M-16. Halevi grants that many of these policemen did actually perform police duties like patrolling streets or directing traffic. "But then they get a call from their friend who says, 'Come on, it's time for a mission,'" Halevi says. "One of the police casualties was even affiliated with al-Qaeda."
Shaheen [of the PCHR] stands by his numbers. "The police force is totally civilian," he insists. While ten of the fighters on PCHR's list are described as policemen, more than 250 of those described as policemen are labeled civilians. Many Gazans enter the police force because they are poor and need the money, he explains. "I can assure you that all these people were working in police traffic or as guards."
Many of the disparities between the PCHR and IDF numbers seem to be definitional. The IDF has repeatedly stated that any member of Hamas security forces—armed or unarmed—is fair game. Shaheen has a much narrower definition of an uninvolved civilian: "According to international humanitarian law, all armed people are classified as militants and all the people who are unarmed [are civilians]," he says. So if the person was armed at the time of death—which he or his fieldworkers determine by investigating the bodies as they arrive at the hospital—he'll count them as a militant. If the person is not armed, his team will check with family members, neighbors, political parties and Palestinian armed factions to determine the deceased's status as a militant or a civilian. He also checks press releases issues by armed factions. "[The IDF] can say whatever they want," he says. "I mean, [these are] facts on the ground."
But even facts can be subjective. For example, Halevi accuses Shaheen's organization of mislabeling Hamas cleric Nizar Rayan as a civilian. Shaheen explains that Rayan was killed in an Israeli airstrike on his home. There are jihadist posters of Rayan all over Gaza, and yet, "I cannot count him as a militant or fighter," Shaheen says. Rayan was unarmed with his wives and children when he was killed, Shaheen explains. "I cannot count this case as a fighter because he didn't participate as a fighter in the offensive. He was a civilian the whole time—going to the mosque, praying, coming back to his house."
Both agree, however, that the war does not end when the fighting stops. "In every war there are two components," says Halevi. "The first is the battle itself, defeating the other side, and the second is presenting the facts of what happened." If a country is not vigilant, he warns, "The other side will rewrite your history."

If anything, the PCHR's researcher is proving himself a liar. If he says that he is only counting militants who were carrying guns at the time, then why does he check websites and interview family members to see if they were militants? And if he did, why wouldn't he count them?

I pointed out as early as January 7 that the PCHR would count people on video who are launching mortars at Israel, in civilian clothing, as "civilians" if the IDF kills them while they are running away, unarmed. The Hamas strategy was specifically to make their people look like civilians, and the PCHR played along dutifully.

Now, how can I get a hold of Halevi?

Preliminary results of PCHR Gaza casualty analysis (updated)

In March, the Palestinian Center for Human Rights widely released a report detailing the people who were killed in Gaza during Operation Cast Lead. This report was a seemingly comprehensive list of the details about every death: the name, gender, age, location, and job of each person is detailed. Most importantly, the PCHR classified all the victims as being either "militants" or "civilians," and their counts indicated that 1180 of 1414 victims were civilians.

Meanwhile, the IDF has claimed that there were 1166 killed in Gaza, of whom 709 were known Hamas or Islamic Jihad militants.

The IDF did not release their list of casualties, so its claims cannot be independently verified at this time. On the other hand, I and other bloggers have been researching the PCHR's claims and have found serious inconsistencies with that organization's methodologies and classifications.

Our team cross-checked the names listed by PCHR with lists of "resisters" compiled by the Al Mezan Center for Human Rights, lists of "martyrs" published by Hamas, the Popular Resistance Committees and other militant groups in Gaza, as well as from the Ma'an News Agency, Palestinian Arabic discussion groups and other sources.

Our preliminary results show that at least 342 of the people killed, that PCHR classifies as "civilians," were, in fact, militants.

PCHR's criteria to determine exactly who is a "militant" is unclear. They seem to claim that they are only counting those whom they had direct evidence were engaging in hostilities at the moment of their deaths, but this is far from clear. At any rate, the term "militant" is not a legal term, and in common usage it refers to anyone who belongs to a military or paramilitary group. The PCHR's statistics are deceptive and slanted towards creating a false impression of IDF brutality.

So far, we have identified members of Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Resistance Committees, the PFLP and the DFLP who are all considered "civilians" by the PCHR. The full list can be seen at http://elderofziyon.blogspot.com/2009/04/more-of-those-civilians-killed-in-gaza.html. These include the links to the original sources where the victims are associated with these various militant groups.

This is far from a comprehensive list. This is only based on the names that we have found. We are not trying to create a full count of civilians and militants; rather we are showing that the statistics given by the PCHR and publicized in the media are knowingly false.

The IDF has categorized most or all of the Hamas police force as "Hamas or Islamic Jihad operatives" and therefore as legal targets. The PCHR takes strong exception to this categorization, and reveals its own definition of "combatants":

PCHR consider the IOF’s classification of police officers as combatants illegal: this classification constitutes a wilful violation of the principle of distinction, a key component of customary international law. Hamas is a multi-faceted organisation, exercising de facto governmental control of the Gaza Strip. As an organisation, it cannot be considered an armed group. Rather, a distinction must be made between Hamas’ armed and political/civil components. The Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades are the military wing of the Hamas organisation, they are an armed group, and are considered as combatants according to IHL. However, Hamas’ political and civil wings are comprised of civilians, who are legally entitled to the protections associated with this status, provided they do not take an active part in hostilities. Civil police, and governmental officials cannot be considered combatants. Attacks intentionally directed against these individuals constitute wilful killing, a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions, and a violation of customary international law.

If we fully accept the PCHR's definitions and interpretations of international humanitarian law (IHL) here, then they are saying that members of armed militias like the Al Qassam Brigades are legal combatants and therefore legitimate targets. By extension, it is clear that the Hamas policemen who were also members of the Al Qassam Brigades were, in fact, legitimate targets from the IDF.

Our research has detailed proof that at least 205 of the policemen listed to have been killed in Operation Cast Lead and classified as "civilian" by the PCHR were, in fact, militants. In addition, the PCHR itself classified 10 policemen as "militants."

(The PCHR has been inconsistent in its own press releases. While they claim that 255 non-combatant policemen were killed in Cast Lead, or that 255 police officers were killed in total, their English list includes some 282 people identified as "policemen," of whom 272 were considered "civilian." Their Arabic list counts some 280 policemen in total.)

By any count, over two thirds of the policemen killed in Operation Cast Lead were members of militant groups, predominantly the al-Qassam Brigades.

Certainly, the PCHR is aware of the affiliations of many of not all of the victims in Gaza. To give one example, the Popular Resistance Committees al-Nasser Salah Addin Brigades published a list of its 18 "martyrs" on January 22, 2009. Yet nine of them - including a "commander" and a "field commander" - were classified as "civilian" by the PCHR nearly two months later. It strains credulity to think that with all the effort the PCHR made in compiling the names and classifying the victims that they were unaware of their affiliations with armed groups.

Why, then, did they classify so many known militants as civilians? One can only conclude that the PCHR is not being consistent with even its own description of who is considered a "militant" - and that the reason is to deceive the readers of its reports and the media who would uncritically report the PCHR's conclusions.

Such a high number of Al Qassam members among the police that were killed indicates that Hamas itself does not distinguish between its so-called civilian and military wings. Effectively, Hamas considers its police force to be the same as its military force. If Hamas does not respect the principle of distinction in its own civilian organization, it forfeits the demand for its opponents to adhere to the principle of distinction, and the entire police force would be considered a legitimate target.

The IDF indeed defined the entire Hamas police force as a legitimate target. If we accept that definition, the total number of militants that we can identify by name using the IDF's criteria would be:

282 total police officers
226 "PCHR militants" (not counting the ten police militants according to PCHR)
148 militants identified as "civilian" by PCHR
---
656 total police and militant victims

This is not far from the 709 militants the IDF has said it is aware of.

The evidence that Hamas doesn't distinguish between its civilian and military wings is overwhelming; for more on that topic see this excerpt from Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad by Matthew Levitt:

Because of the notion that Hamas has independent "wings," its political and charitable fronts are allowed to operate openly in many Western and Middle Eastern capitals. In these cities, Islamic social welfare groups tied to Hamas are often tolerated when their logistical and financial support for Hamas is conducted under the rubric ofcharitable or humanitarian assistance.
While convenient for Hamas and its supporters, this distinction is contradicted by the consistent if scattered findings of investigators, journalists, and analysts. A review ofthe evidence regarding the integration of Hamas' political activism, social services, and terrorism demonstrates the centrality of the group's overt activities to the organization's ability to recruit, indoctrinate, train, fund, and dispatch suicide bombers to attack civilian targets.
The social welfare organizations of Hamas answer to the same political leaders who play hands-on roles in Hamas terrorist attacks. In some cases, the mere existence of these institutions is invoked to classify Hamas as a social welfare rather than a terrorist organization. To debunk these specious assumptions, it is necessary to fully expose what Hamas calls the dawa (its social welfare and proselytization network). This is sometimes difficult because, as one U.S. official explained, "Hamas is loosely structured, with some elements working clandestinely and others working openly through mosques and social service institutions to recruit members, raise money, organize activities, and distribute propaganda."

Yet even without this knowledge, the PCHR is inconsistent in its definitions. Its only consistency, as evidenced by its use of the term "IOF" ("Israel Occupation Forces") instead of IDF, is a desire to make Israel look as bad as possible. This is not the function of a "human rights" organization - it betrays a political agenda rather than a humanitarian one.

The al-Fakhoura UNRWA School

An interesting finding from the PCHR report regards the al-Fakhoura UNRWA school in Jabalya. On January 6th, 2009, the IDF returned fire from nearby the school, and the initial reports from various Gaza organizations charged that between 30 and 50 people were killed there. The PCHR wrote then that the IDF killed "27 civilians instantly" (not counting the Deeb family which was not near the school and indeed appears to have been killed by an errant shell.) The IDF, on the other hand, has claimed that 12 were killed outside the school.

The PCHR report lists exactly 12 victims from near the al-Fakhoura school, although they do not line up with the names and descriptions given by the IDF. Even so, the PCHR does not seem to be interested in publicizing the discrepancy between its initial reports of a massacre and what it later admits.

Child Militants

The PCHR press releases emphasize child victims of the conflict, but they do not mention another fact of which they are aware: that children are being drafted for use by militant groups.

The PCHR list includes 7 militants who were under 18:

#580 ‘Ateya Rushdi Khalil Aal-Khuli (16)
#830 Ahmed Fawzi Hassan Lubbad (17)
#942 Ibrahim Mustafa Sa’id (17)
#1070 Mahmoud Ahmed Fares Juha (16)
#1094 Mohammed Nader Khalil Abu Sha’aban (17)
#1256 Tamer Reyad Ibrahim Faza'a (17)
#1397 Tamer ‘Umar Isma’il al-Louh (17)

We have identified another 8 children who were members of militant groups that PCHR named as civilian:

#280 Ahmed Rasmi Mohammed Abu Jazar "Mujahid" 16 years old
#405 Tareq Yaser Mohammed ‘Afana 16 years old Al Qassam Brigades member
#409 Mahmoud Majed Mahmoud Abu Nahla 16 years old "Shahid Fighter" in ICT list
#415 Ghassan Nizar Abdul Kader Rayan 16 years old (Nizar Rayyan's son) "Al Qassam shahid" (his siblings are not mentioned)
#992 Mohammed Jaber Mohammed ‘Eleyan 16 years old member of PRC/Nasser Brigades
#1156 Hammam Mohammed Hassan al-Khudary 16 years old Islamic Jihad member
#1162 Belal Jamal Isma’il Abu ‘Awwad 17 years old Al Qassam member
#1229 ‘Imad Maher Saleh Ferwana (Ammar Maher Farwana) 17 years old listed as "resister" on Al Mezan list
#1275 Samer Mohammed al-Abed Abu Aser, 17 years old, Islamic Jihad member http://www.saraya.ps/view.php?id=11327 (Saraya site down now, data from ICT)

We have yet to see the PCHR condemn Hamas or Islamic Jihad for their recruitment and use of children as fighters.

Discrepancies in total number killed

The IDF has stated that 1166 people were killed during Cast Lead, and has suggested that the difference in total killed between their count and the counts from PCHR, Palestinian Ministry of Health and Al-Mezan could possibly be because the Gazan organizations counted people who died naturally as being "martyred" by the IDF.

While we have no way to verify that claim, the Palestinian Ministry of Health has a list of all "martyrs" who died, they say, as a result of the "siege" of Gaza (typically cancer and heart disease patients, presumably because of a lack of medical care and the ability to travel to Israel for treatment.). Their monthly totals of such deaths before and after Cast Lead look like this:

November - 10
December - 14
January - 3
February - 13
March - 23

None of the December deaths occured during Cast Lead.

It is curious that the number of deaths from cancer and similar diseases would have plummeted so much during the fighting. While this is hardly proof, it does indicate that the statistics that come out of official institutions in Gaza and the PA are suspect and that there is a possibility that the total number of Cast Lead victims has been exaggerated.

Conclusion

While the results are not complete, there is overwhelming evidence that the PCHR knowingly and maliciously lied in its statistics regarding the numbers of civilians and militants killed during Operation Cast Lead. Knowing its clear biases, the most reasonable conclusion is that the PCHR was not nearly as interested in the truth as it was in demonizing the IDF. The report itself cannot be considered reliable.

Given this information, it is difficult to know whether to believe that organization in other areas.

Update on PCHR fake-civilian publicity

I want to thank everyone who made suggestions to my draft press release as well as other ideas on how to get this information out there.

At the moment, I am talking indirectly to one major media outlet.

I am also in contact with one organization that is "definitely interested" in discussing how we could coordinate our efforts further. I would be much more comfortable finding a partner like that who would be able to verify and expand on what we have found and who already has experience in doing this sort of work. I can't speak for Suzanne or PTWatch but I would prefer that the news gets out widely by any means even if my name is not attached to it.

For now, a press release seems to be a little premature.

Side notes - I did manage to download all of the Al Qassam "martyrs" pages along with pictures. If anyone wants to go through the discussions in the messages as well as the links on the list and save the pages before they go stale or disappear, it would be appreciated.

PCHR lies about "civilians" and agrees with IDF about Jabalya

PCHR finally came out with the English translation of their list of victims of the Gaza operation, and already a number of things merit attention.

PTWatch, in the comments, quickly looked at Hamas' list of "martyrs" from Gaza on its Al Qassam website and immediately found four people who Hamas happily claimed as members of their terrorist group - and who PCHR called "civilians."

#576 Ayman Mohammed Mohammed ‘Afana
PCHR -> civilian
AlQassam -> martyr & fighter

#959 Amir Yousif Mahmoud al-Mansi
PCHR -> civilian
AlQassam -> martyr & fighter

#406 Ali Zuheir Mahmoud al-Houbi
PCHR -> civilian
AlQassam -> martyr & fighter

#133 Mohammed Salah Hassan al-Sawaf
PCHR -> civilian
AlQassam -> martyr & fighter

To this list you can add #257, Ayman Fou’ad Eid al-Nahhal, whom PCHR identifies as a "policeman/civilian."

And Hamas clearly isn't publicizing the names of all of its members. These are just the ones on their website that they admit were killed. Both parties are lying.

There are other terrorists listed as "civilians," such as #864, Tareq Mohammed Nemer Abu ‘Amsha, who CAMERA noted that Ma'an listed as a member of Islamic Jihad al-Quds Brigades.

Intriguingly, some of the terrorists that CAMERA mentioned, who were listed in the weekly PCHR casualty reports, are mysteriously missing from the final report. Is PCHR protecting itself from listing too many dead terrorists? Were they never killed to begin with? It is something that people should be asking PCHR.

One other relevant part of the report: PCHR lists people who were killed "near" and "opposite" the al-Fakhoura School in the Jabalya camp on January 6th. You may recall that the UNRWA told me explicitly that they stood by the casualty figures of 30-50 dead at the school even after the IDF claimed that only 12 were killed. The PCHR itself claimed at the time that 27 civilians were killed instantly at the school.

Well, the PCHR counts of who died near the school are very interesting. Once you do not count the Deeb family - who PCHR says died "opposite" the school, who do appear to have been victims of an errant shell, and who were not counted as casualties from the school by PCHR in January - we are left with 12 dead! The IDF figures are found to be exactly right! The PCHR now says the Deebs were "opposite" the school, whatever that means, while the remaining 12 victims (11 from January 6, 1 from January 7) were "near" the school.

So now we know that not only is the PCHR lying as to who is a "civilian," and not only is Hamas lying as to the number of their own terrorists who were killed, but the UNRWA is also lying in claiming that many dozens were killed at the school - even according to the lying PCHR.

UPDATE: More names of terrorists described as "civilians" by PCHR, and terrorists not listed:

#1314 Ashraf Rebhi al-‘Abed Banar PFLP terrorist described as "Fallen in Battle" by PFLP, civilian by PCHR

# 908 Jamal Ahmed Hussein Nashwan PFLP terrorist "was a leader of the PFLP in the eastern area of Beit Hanoun"

#412 Nizar Abdul Kader Mohammed Rayan prominent Hamas leader

Hamas military leader Abu Zakariyya Al-Jamal not listed

# 468 Mahmoud ‘Adnan Mahmoud Abu Ma’arouf - Hamas member listed as Mahmoud Arif in Ma'an

# 747 Mohammed ‘Ayesh Mansour Abu Naser "affiliated to the Ayman Juda faction, an offshoot of the Al-Aqsa Brigades, the armed wing of Fatah."

#1185 Hamdi Saleh Mohammed Hamada "Al Aqsa fighter"

# 1054 Sa’ad Mohammed Abdullah Hassan "fighter"

# 1047 Ahmed Ibrahim Mohammed Abu Jazar Islamic Jihad "martyr"

The PCHR vs. the IDF on Gaza casualty counts

(This posting has changed from quoting yesterday's Haaretz article to quoting today's Jerusalem Post article which seems more accurate and uses the same numbers as YNet.)

The IDF has released a report on the Arab casualties in Gaza:

The IDF formally released precise figures on Thursday for the first time detailing Palestinian casualties incurred during Operation Cast Lead, and said a large majority of those killed were terrorists.

Of the 1,166 names of Palestinian dead gathered by the IDF's Research Department, 709 have been identified as "Hamas terror operatives," the IDF said, adding that the terrorists hailed from a variety of organizations.

According to the IDF, 162 additional names of men killed during the operation "have not been yet attributed to any organization."

A total of 295 Palestinian non-combatants died during the operation - 89 of them under the age of 16, and 49 of them women, the army added.

The figures were released "following the publication of reports that introduced false information originating from various Palestinian sources," the IDF said.

"In order to remove any doubt regarding the number of Palestinians killed in Operation Cast Lead, the IDF wishes to introduce the accurate figures to the public.

"The figures were gathered following the examination of various intelligence sources and after the names and numbers were thoroughly cross-referenced and examined," it added.

Ha'aretz adds:

The fatality list presented by the Palestinian Health Ministry in Gaza has numerous inaccuracies and contradictions, the IDF says. For example, Tawfiq Ja'abari, the commander of the Hamas police, and Mohammed Shakshak, a personal assistant to the head of Hamas' military wing, Ahmed Ja'abari, are both described as dead children on the Palestinian list.

The PCHR disputes the IDF methodology. Here is their main argument:

PCHR consider the IOF’s classification of police officers as combatants illegal: this classification constitutes a wilful violation of the principle of distinction, a key component of customary international law. Hamas is a multi-faceted organisation, exercising de facto governmental control of the Gaza Strip. As an organisation, it cannot be considered an armed group. Rather, a distinction must be made between Hamas’ armed and political/civil components. The Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades are the military wing of the Hamas organisation, they are an armed group, and are considered as combatants according to IHL. However, Hamas’ political and civil wings are comprised of civilians, who are legally entitled to the protections associated with this status, provided they do not take an active part in hostilities. Civil police, and governmental officials cannot be considered combatants. Attacks intentionally directed against these individuals constitute wilful killing, a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions, and a violation of customary international law.

So the PCHR seems to accept for the most part Israel's contention that 600 of the known casualties are members of Hamas or other armed groups; they argue that only members of Hamas' "military wing" are legal targets.

This is sophistry.

Hamas is a military organization. Its entire purpose is to destroy Israel. All of its "wings" exist for that purpose, and its charitable and civil wings are not independent of its military wing - they are subsidiary to it.

Hamas will use its "charity" components to attract members for its terror wing. It will use the "political" wing as cover to deflect its clandestine use of terror.

Here is an excerpt from a book by Matthew Levitt that is probably the most comprehensive treatise on Hamas, describing the terrorist and political career of the mastermind of the 2002 Netanya Passover massacre:

The mastermind of the attack, Abbas al-Sayyid, served simultaneously as both the overt political Hamas leader in Tulkarm and the covert head of the Qassam Brigades terrorist cell there. Wearing these two hats, al-Sayyid gave public speeches and represented Hamas at public functions even as he secretly recruited military operatives and suicide bombers, received orders and funds from Hamas leaders in Lebanon and Syria, and personally planned and oversaw the cell’s operations. Al-Sayyid openly acknowledged his contacts with Hamas leaders abroad, but maintained these were purely political in nature. In fact, al-Sayyid took active measures to hide the military nature of these contacts. For example, while funds for Hamas political activity—$10,000—$13,000 a month—were overtly transferred from Hamas leaders abroad into al-
Sayyid’s personal bank account, Hamas leaders in Syria transferred funds for Hamas terrorist operations to an account al-Sayyid opened under a fictitious American-sounding name.

At the operational level, almost all the Hamas terrorists involved in the attack rose through the ranks of Hamas through the group’s Islamic Bloc student movement.Al-Sayyid himself began drifting toward Hamas while in high school after hearing the lectures of Sheikh Jamal Mansour, a prominent Hamas political and dawa leader. Three of the operatives, including both intended suicide bombers, were members of a singing troupe called al-Ansar that lauded Hamas and its suicide bombers. Hamas dawa activists and institutions performed a variety of key functions like helping fugitive cell members hide from authorities. In one case female Hamas activists helped a cell member move around Tulkarm disguised as a woman. Covert operatives also used mosques tied to Hamas as meeting places and as dead-drops where messages and matériel—including the suicide bombing vests—were left and retrieved by parties unknown to one another. Long after the attack, the Hamas dawa would use the Park Hotel bombing as a means to radicalize and recruit future operatives by printing posters glorifying the attack and naming community events like a soccer tournament after Abdel Aziz Basset Odeh, the suicide bomber.

Inside the Palestinian territories, the battery of mosques, schools, orphanages, summer camps, and sports leagues sponsored by Hamas are integral parts of an overarching apparatus of terror. These Hamas entities engage in incitement and radicalize society, and undertake recruitment efforts to socialize even the youngest children to aspire to die as martyrs. They provide logistical and operational support for weapons smuggling, reconnaissance, and suicide bombings. They provide day jobs for field commanders and shelter fugitive operatives.

Even after Hamas' takeover of Gaza, Hamas has shown little interest in building an infrastructure to perform daily duties that are a necessary part of governing. When it could, it would keep the existing PA/Fatah infrastructure; only when it felt threatened by them would it replace the leadership - all the while accepting hundreds of millions of dollars from the PA to keep the institutions running. In this way, all the "wings" of Hamas could concentrate on smuggling weapons, building fortified tunnels for bomb storage and to kidnap IDF soldiers, and recruiting more members.

The Hamas police, to take an example of a group that the PCHR considers civilian, is not primarily the law-enforcement organization that PCHR implies. There is no functioning legal infrastructure in Gaza. The Hamas police exist to keep the people under the thumb of Hamas and to stop any competing groups like Fatah to gain strength. Their purpose is just as terrorist as the "military wing."

The PCHR, as always, is doing its best to demonize Israel and as such it has a vested interest in increasing the numbers of "innocent civilians" killed in Gaza. But when you look at the details, you can see that most of those killed were not innocent civilians...and the PCHR knows this quite well.

More intrigue from Jabalya UNRWA school

The Jerusalem Post reports:

The IDF's Gaza Coordination and Liaison Administration (CLA), which earlier this week told The Jerusalem Post that 12 Palestinians were killed in the shelling near a UN school in Jabalya, north of Gaza City - and not 42 as claimed by Palestinian officials at the time - has now given the Post the names of seven of those fatalities.

The incident at the UN school was a key case in point, said the CLA's head, Col. Moshe Levi, since initial reports erroneously stating that the IDF had fired at the school, and putting the death toll at 42, were widely adopted at first by the UN and various NGOs. Earlier this month, the UN corrected its position and confirmed that the shelling and all of the fatalities had taken place outside the school compound.

Within hours of the incident on January 6, the IDF named two Hamas operatives, Immad Abu Askar and Hassan Abu Askar, as being among the dead.

Levi said nine Hamas operatives and three noncombatants died in the incident near the school. The seven names newly released by the CLA were: Ranin Abdullah Sameh, 12, Hadifa Jihad Kahloud, 17, Faris Mahmoud Faraj Allah, 21, Nafed Abu Abid, 22, Abed Muhammad Kadas, 25, Ayman Ahmad el-Khourd, 35, and Basem Abdel Gabin, 40.

The CLA would not specify how it had obtained the names. Officials said these names were being checked and categorized as combatants or noncombatants.

This sentence doesn't make much sense - if they already announced that 9 of them were combatants and three civilian, why don't they know which of the names are in each category?

But the next sentence is more intriguing:

On the day of the incident, officials further said, officers from the CLA contacted the Palestinian Health Ministry and were told that three Palestinian civilians had been killed and that Hamas was hiding the identities of the remaining casualties.

If the Palestinian Health Ministry never claimed the initial count of 42 deaths, then who did? The UN said 30, and PCHR said 27 civilians, so it wasn't either of them. Was this just another case of some reporter or bystander making up a number and having the world believe them without question? And if so, how many other times has this sort of thing happened?

And if the IDF turns out to be correct - and so far, they are the only ones to release names of the victims - then we have solid proof that the UN and PCHR are not reliable. All the other groups need to do to prove the IDF wrong would be to give us their own list of more than 12 victims.

PalArab Self-Death count: A grim milestone

Those wacky Palestinian Arabs just keep killing each other! Here's the result of that nastiness between Hamas and Fatah as each tries to out-terrorize the other:

On Sunday morning, 6 August 2006, unknown gunmen shot Major Mohammed Mousa al-Mousah, 40, from Habalya refugee camp, chief of the Palestinian Military Intelligence in the northern Gaza Strip. He died later from his wound. Tow other persons were also wounded in the same attack.

A nominee for a Darwin Award, that this Palestinian Arab site tries hard to put a good spin on:

On Wednesday, 9 August 2006, a Palestinian was killed in the north of Gaza by an explosion of an artillery shell, and three were injured in the center of the Gaza Strip by mishandled weapons. PCHR's preliminary investigation indicates that at approximately 14:30 on Wednesday, 9 August 2006, Emad Abdallah El-Sharatha (22) was killed by the explosion of an artillery shell fired by the Israeli Occupation Forces (IOF) that did not explode at the time it was fired. At the time of his death, Emad was trying to dismantle the shell in his house, located in the Shusha'a area, east of Jabalia refugee camp. Emad's body was torn to pieces, and extensive damage was inflicted on the house.

Yes, we are all sure that he was trying to dismantle the shell in his house! Here's a nice example of extra-judicial killings that no one cares about because the killers are Arab:

Basem Radi El-Mallah (a 29-year old resident of Faqou'a village east of Jenin) was killed by a Palestinian armed group in Jenin refugee camp. The killing was an extra-judicial execution for suspected collaboration with Israeli security services. PCHR's preliminary investigation indicates that at approximately 13:00 on Sunday, 13 August 2006, an armed group led Basem El-Mallah from his place of residence in the village of Faqou'a to Jenin refugee camp. He was bound and his eyes were covered. They fired at him, killing him instantly with bullets to the upper part of the body.

The "human rights" website this was taken from condemned the killing but still referred to it as an "honor killing"! Finally, we have a few examples of what PCHR refers to as "misusing weapons." The third example doesn't look too accidental to me:

Over the past two days, one Palestinian was killed and two others were injured in Gaza City, including an officer in the General Intelligence Apparatus, in incidents of misusing weapons. PCHR's preliminary investigation reveals that at approximately 08:00 on Sunday, 13 August 2006, the body of Tamer Anwar Hilles, a 19-year old resident of Sheja'eya Quarter in Gaza City, was found in the yard of the Sheja'eya School in the Jabal neighborhood, east of the city. It was learnt later that Hilles was handling a weapon with a friend in the school at approximately 21:00 on Saturday, 12 August 2006. A bullet was accidentally fired, hitting Hilles in the chest. He was killed instantly. At approximately 22:00 on Saturday, 12 August 2006, Dr. Maher Issa Ayyad, a 55-year old resident of Gaza City, was injured by a bullet from an unknown source as he was in El-Diera Hotel on the Gaza City beach front. The bullet hit Dr. Ayyad in the shoulder from above, indicating that it was fired in the air, most probably during a wedding celebration in one of the nearby wedding halls. Dr. Ayyad was taken to Shifa Hospital for treatment, where his injury was listed as light. At approximately 22:00 on Saturday, unknown gunmen in a car fired at an officer in the General Intelligence Apparatus. The officer is Mahmoud El-Ghazzawi (42). The incident took place near El-Shaf'i mosque in Zaitoon Quarter in Gaza City. The officer was hit by several bullets in the feet. He was taken to Shifa Hospital for treatment, where his injury was classified as moderate.

These four deaths puts the PalArab Self-Death count since the start of Israel's incursion at an even 50. No virgins for these guys, though, and no tearful feature stories on the BBC either, because they were unfortunate enough to have been killed by their fellow Arabs who would all live in peace if it wasn't for "occupation." UPDATE: Judeopundit notices a riot at a PalArab wedding, with knives and clubs, when one guest offered a somewhat unpopular opinion. But, no one died, so the count is still at 50. Maybe this was one of those rare weddings that didn't involve machine guns as part of the celebration.