Goldstone report inaccuracies, part 14

One of the most-exaggerated events of the Gaza war was the accusation that Israel had bombed an UNRWA school, killing some 46 people according to some reports.

As time went on, it became clear that the school itself was not hit except from shrapnel, and that the numbers claimed to have been killed were vastly exaggerated.

The Goldstone report, however, claims that 24 were killed near the school - in multiple paragraphs:

41. The Mission examined the mortar shelling of al-Fakhura junction in Jabalya next to a UNRWA school which at the time was used as a shelter housing more than 1,300 people (Chapter X). The Israeli forces launched at least four mortar shells. One landed in the courtyard of a family home, killing eleven people assembled there. Three other shells landed on al-Fakhura Street, killing at least a further 24 people and injuring as many as 40.

687. Three other shells landed on al-Fakhura Street, which was busy at the time, killing at least a further 24 people and injuring as many as 40.

In a few other paragraphs it refers to at least 35 people killed both near the Fakhoura school and the al-Deeb family (which indeed appears to have been a tragic accident.)

The question is, how did Goldstone get the idea that 24 were killed on al-Fakhoura Street?

The answer is here:

661. The three other shells that the Mission could identify as having landed at different places on al-Fakhura Street killed at least 24 people. The witnesses estimate that up to another 40 were injured by the blasts. The Mission has not been able to verify those figures, but having inspected the site and viewed the footage, it does not consider these numbers to be exaggerated.

In other words, the Goldstone Commission did not even attempt to enumerate the people allegedly killed on al-Fakhoura street, taking Palestinian Arab witnesses at their word!

How could the esteemed Commission have verified these numbers? Well, for one thing, they could have simply looked at the PCHR report of those killed in Gaza and counted the number of people said to have been killed near the al-Fakoura school.

PCHR uses two different characterizations of those killed in the area. The al-Deeb family is invariably described as living "Opposite to al-Fakhoura School/ Jabalia Refugee Camp/ Northern Gaza" and of being killed simply in "Jabalia Refugee Camp/ Northern
Gaza." The others seem to always be described as either having lived or having been killed "Near al-Fakhoura School/ Jabalia Refugee Camp/Northern Gaza."

There are only 12 people who are described that way.

They include:

#783 Belal Hamza Ali ‘Ubeid (17 years old) Member of al-Qassam Brigades
#771 ‘Ateya Hassan Mustafa al-Madhoun DFLP National Resistance Brigades
#773 Zeyad ‘Ateya Hassan al-Madhoun DFLP National Resistance Brigades

It is possible that PCHR was not consistent in its definitions, but this maps with the number of victims that the IDF claimed to have been killed outside the school.

The IDF and the JCPA list different victims for the school than PCHR does, and it is possible that there were more victims. However, it seems to be unlikely to be too many more. The Goldstone Commission claims that there were three mortars in the area, and generally mortars do not kill that many people.

JCPA says that other terrorist victims include:

Khaled Mohammed Fuoad Abu Askar (Abu al-‘Izz), an Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades operative, was born on December 12, 1989, in Jabaliya. At the age of 15 he joined the Muslim Brotherhood and was active in the Hamas student organization, which serves as a recruiting agency for the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades. In 2006 he was accepted into fighting groups posted in front-line positions. He underwent an advanced military training course and was posted to a special unit of the north Gaza battalion where he participated in dozens of ambushes and fought against IDF forces. He served as a military instructor in the Imad Aqel battalion and supervised the ambush and suicide unit.

Raafat Abu Askar, a military-terrorist operative in the security services with the rank of warrant officer, killed in the attack near the Al-Fakhura school.

Osama Jemal Obeid, an Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades operative, killed in the attack near the Al-Fakhura school.¹⁷

Iyad Jaber Aman, an Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades operative, killed in the attack near the Al-Fakhura school.¹⁸

Abd Muhammad Abd Qudas, a Fatah operative active in Palestinian Military Intelligence, killed in the attack near the Al-Fakhura school.¹⁹

Atia Hassan al-Madhoun and his son, Ziyad al-Madhoun, operatives in the Brigades of National Resistance, the military-terrorist wing of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Atia was regional commander for Jabaliya. The two were the father and brother of Hassan al-Madhoun, one of the senior commanders of Fatah's Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, who was lynched by Hamas in the summer of 2006. The two were killed in the attack near the Al-Fakhura school.²⁰

If we accept the PCHR placement of victims, then 3 out of 12 victims were terrorists. If we accept JCPA's list, then some 10 terrorists out of (let's use Goldstone's) 24 people were killed. Either way, the number of terrorists killed is not consistent with the characterization that Goldstone gives; in fact Goldstone does not admit that any terrorists were killed in the incident at all.

Goldstone admits that there were some reports that there was mortar firing from Gaza militants, bringing two news reports from AP and British Channel 4 in footnotes (391), and also mentions that nine witnesses deny any firing from the area (para. 672.) Goldstone does not use this inconsistency to indicate that witnesses may be unreliable; instead the report says "the Mission accepts, for the purposes of this report, that some firing may have occurred that gave rise to the Israeli armed forces’ response."

Godlstone spends a bit of time pointing out inconsistencies between the initial Israeli reaction to the attack and subsequent reports. In fact, Goldstone uses these inconsistencies as proof that the Israeli version of events is not reliable. There indeed were inconsistencies between israel's initial reaction to the flawed reports of up to 50 victims in the school and the final report issued months later. However, there were also inconsistencies between how the UN initially characterized the attacks (saying over 40 were killed and that the school itself was attacked) and how it changed its tune afterwards, yet Goldstone does not question the UN witnesses' veracity in the face of these inconsistencies.

Even worse, one of the witnesses that Goldstone relies on heavily is Muhammed Fouad Abu Askar, whom it admits is a Hamas member in the footnotes (para 652) and whose son was a member of the al-Qassam Brigades (PCHR #782.)

Another relevant fact that Goldstone ignores was mentioned in the IDF report, footnote 263:

The IDF internal investigation provided important context for this incident. It revealed that Hamas often used 120mm mortars to attack Israeli towns and villages near the border of Gaza. Hamas terrorists had acquired significant expertise with these weapons and improved the accuracy of their technique; this tactic was central to Hamas‘ method of fighting the IDF in urban areas. Hamas‘ use of 120mm mortars posed a serious threat to IDF ground forces. Only a day before the incident in question, Hamas mortar fire had injured 30 IDF soldiers.

Goldstone describes the legal issues this way:

42. In drawing its legal conclusions on the attack against al-Fakhura junction, the Mission recognizes that for all armies proportionality decisions, weighing the military advantage to be gained against the risk of killing civilians, will present very genuine dilemmas in certain cases. The Mission does not consider this to be such a case. The firing of at least four mortar shells to attempt to kill a small number of specified individuals in a setting where large numbers of civilians were going about their daily business and 1,368 people were sheltering nearby cannot meet the test of what a reasonable commander would have determined to be an acceptable loss of civilian life for the military advantage sought. The Mission considers thus the attack to have been indiscriminate in violation of international law, and to have violated the right to life of the Palestinian civilians killed in these incidents.

In either of the two possible scenarios I mention, where either 3 out of 12 or 10 out of 24 killed were terrorists, it is far from clear that Goldstone's analysis holds water.

Given the facts that al-Qassam and DFLP terrorists were in the area, that mortar fire was coming from that area (according to reporters who interviewed witnesses), that the IDF responded without hitting the school itself, and that IDF return fire did indeed kill a number of terrorists far out of proportion to the report's characterization of a busy street with 150 civilians randomly scattered about (para. 698, using the Hamas witness again as their primary source,) it seems that Goldstone's legal analysis as to the military advantage of IDF returning fire is incorrect.

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Goldstone report inaccuracies, part 13

In two separate but virtually identical paragraphs, the Goldstone Commission report says:

1582. Insofar that movement and access restrictions, the settlements and their infrastructure, demographic policies with regards to Jerusalem and Area C, and the separation of Gaza from the West Bank prevent a viable, contiguous and sovereign Palestinian State from being created, they are in violation of the jus cogens right to self-determination.

1744. Insofar as movement and access restrictions, the settlements and their infrastructure, demographic policies vis-à-vis Jerusalem and Area C of the West bank, as well as the separation of Gaza from the West Bank, prevent a viable, contiguous and sovereign Palestinian state from arising, they are in violation of the ius cogens [sic] right to self-determination.

(Jus cogens means a "higher law" that must be followed by all countries.)

I am not a lawyer and have no legal training. Even so, I believe that this is an astonishing statement from a number of legal perspectives.

First of all, the right of self-determination is defined by the UN in this way:

The two important United Nations studies on the right to self-determination set out factors of a people that give rise to possession of right to self-determination: a history of independence or self-rule in an identifiable territory, a distinct culture, and a will and capability to regain self-governance.

The first factor simply does not exist for Palestinian Arabs. The second is arguable; I believe that a distinct Palestinian Arab culture is a relatively new phenomenon that coincides with (at the earliest) 1948, and that the cultural differences between Palestinian Arabs and other Arabs is no different in scope than the cultural differences that exist within any country. And the third factor is specious, given the history of Palestinian Arab politics from the 1920s up until today. Even if you argue points 2 and 3, point 1 is demonstrably false and therefore the entire idea is wrong.

Even though the UN seems to have redefined "self-determination" in order to accommodate its pet Palestinian project, this does not make these factors automatically disappear.

Secondly, if you accept that there is a people called "Palestinians," the concept of "self-determination" does not automatically mean "the right to a state." The ICJ seems to define this as the right of a people to govern their own affairs free from outside interference - emphatically not statehood, a right that the world community would never accept for fear of every minority suddenly demanding the right of independence.

Thirdly, and most importantly, the UN Charter forbids nations from interfering with the territorial integrity of other nations. The idea that a Gaza and West Bank Palestine must be contiguous necessarily means that Israel's territory would be divided. (A bridge between the two could hardly be considered creating a "contiguous Palestinian state.")

Goldstone is not trying to give legal sanction to a Palestinian Arab state with free passage between two territories; he is not trying to innovate by saying that virtual contiguity via video and computer networks could be an alternative to physical contiguity. He is advocating that Israel cut itself in two and he is trying to say that the rights of Palestinian Arabs trump those of Israelis.

It may be politically incorrect to question Palestinian Arab peoplehood or to muse whether a state is the necessary means to achieve their self-determination. This does not make that opinion factually incorrect. Goldstone's sacrifice of legal definitions to the altar of political correctness is saddening, but not surprising.

However, the idea that somehow Palestinian Arab nationhood can rightfully impact Israeli national rights, as enshrined in the UN itself, is past sloppy interpretation of the law - it is illegal itself.

UPDATE: An email correspondent with real legal credentials told me that the idea that "self determination" falls under jus cogens is laughable.

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Goldstone report inaccuracies, part 12 (updated)

The Goldstone report talks about the bombing of the al-Maqadmah mosque on January 3rd:

820. The al-Maqadmah mosque is situated near the north-west outskirts of Jabaliyah camp, close to Beit Lahia. It is located less than 100 metres from the Kamal Idwan hospital, in the al-Alami housing project. At least 15 people were killed and around 40 injured – many seriously – when the Israeli armed forces struck the entrance of the mosque with a missile.

The report goes into some detail that the mosque was indeed bombed by Israel, and the IDF responses to the charges seem to be very inadequate:

829. The Israeli armed forces’ response to the allegations states:
...relating to a strike against the “Maqadme” mosque in Beit-Lahiya on January 3rd, 2009, it was discovered that as opposed to the claims, the mosque was not attacked at all. Furthermore, it was found that the supposed uninvolved civilians who were the casualties of the attack were in fact Hamas operatives killed while fighting against the IDF.

830. Apart from the apparent contradictions it contains, the Mission notes that the statement does not indicate in any way the nature of the inquiry, the source of its information or the reliability and credibility of such sources.

831. In July 2009 the Israeli Government repeated the same position.463

I have no indication that the mosque was not hit by IDF forces, and I have no reason to doubt Goldstone concerning the matter; they appear to have found forensic evidence that indicates it was an Israeli strike rather than a Hamas bomb.

There are a couple of inconsistencies, however. The claim that at least 15 were killed seems to have come from the initial PCHR report of the incident, which lists 12 people killed and claims that three more died in the following days. However, PCHR only lists 11 to have died in the Jabalya refugee camp on January 3rd; and additional 3 died in Beit Lahiya on that date (one of whom was listed in the initial PCHR report), and I found one who died later, so it is possible that 15 were killed if all of the Beit Lahiya victims were in the mosque as well, but the PCHR report indicated that three of them died at a later date and that is not reflected in the final list.

More importantly, Goldstone doesn't bother to point out that 6 of the dead were actually terrorists: (numbers are PCHR list numbers)

458 ‘Umar Abdul Hafez Mousa al-Silawi Al Qassam Brigades
459 Ra’ed Abdul Rahman Mohammed al-Msamha (pictured, unclear of affiliation)
462 Sa’id Salah Sa’id Battah Al Qassam Brigades
478 Muhannad Ibrahim ‘Ata al-Tannani Al Quds Brigades member
484 Ibrahim Mousa Issa al-Silawi Al Qassam Brigades
987 Ahmed Hamed Hassan Abu ‘Eita Al Qassam Brigades

It seems to be very unlikely that 6 of the 15 known dead in a mosque crowded with hundreds of civilians would be terrorists. Either the mosque itself had a hundred terrorists or so, or something else is going on. (Jonathan D. Halevi counts 7 dead terrorists).

Could there have been an attack from the area of the mosque? Could an informant have given the IDF information of the whereabouts of known terrorists? I don't know, and unfortunately the IDF isn't giving out any verifiable information about the incident, but this does not seem to be the "slam-dunk" that Goldstone represents it as.

And where exactly did the blast hit? Apparently, it hit outside the mosque, not inside as Goldstone implies. So it seems more likely that the IDF hit a gathering of terrorists outside the mosque rather than a few hundred worshipers. (h/t Suzanne)

At the very least, these avenues should have been pursued, using any means that Goldstone had at their disposal - the same means I and my team has had to verify the militant status of many civilians. Unfortunately, fairness does not seem to have been a part of the Goldstone mandate, and when the evidence supports the commissions preconceived notions of the truth, they have had little incentive to look beyond the biased testimonies they eagerly accepted.

Testimony from people like the sheikh of the mosque - who happens to share the same last name as two of the Al Qassam Brigades members listed above.

(UPDATE: Added one more I missed. And added about the blast hitting outside the mosque.)

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Goldstone report inaccuracies, part 11

While we have already looked at some of Goldstone's inaccuracies concerning the civilian status of Gaza police, the report makes more specific mention of the police killed at the areas they visited in Gaza, mainly the Arafat police compound and the Al-Abbas police station.

435. From the facts available to it, the Mission finds that the deliberate killing of 99 members of the police at the police headquarters and three police stations during the first minutes of the military operations, while they were engaged in civilian tasks inside civilian police facilities, constitutes an attack which failed to strike an acceptable balance between the direct military advantage anticipated (i.e. the killing of those policemen who may have been members of Palestinian armed groups) and the loss of civilian life (i.e. the other policemen killed and members of the public who would inevitably have been present or in the vicinity). The attacks on the Arafat City police headquarters and the Abbas Street police station, al-Tuffah police station and the Deir al-Balah investigative police station constituted disproportionate attacks in violation of customary international humanitarian law.

436. From the facts available to it, the Mission further believes that there has been a violation of the inherent right to life of those members of the police killed in the attacks of 27 December 2007 who were not members of armed groups by depriving them arbitrarily of their life in violation of article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

From the analysis here, Goldstone takes the facts that it was aware of, where the commission believed the Palestinian Arab NGOs as to which policemen were members of terror groups and discounting Israeli sources, and says that given that information, the direct military advantage of killing members of armed groups is not great enough to justify attacking the police stations knowing that many people who were not members of such groups would be killed.

Goldstone is more explicit in the conclusion:

1720. The Mission also concludes that Israel, by deliberately attacking police stations and killing large numbers of policemen (99 in the incidents investigated by the Mission) during the first minutes of the military operations, failed to respect the principle of proportionality between the military advantage anticipated by killing some policemen who might have been members of Palestinian armed groups and the loss of civilian life (the majority of policemen and members of the public present in the police stations or nearby during the attack). Therefore, these were
disproportionate attacks in violation of customary international law. The Mission finds a violation of the right to life (Article 6 ICCPR) of the policemen killed in these attacks who were not members of Palestinian armed groups.

The implication is that if the majority of the 99 policemen killed in these specific attacks were members of armed groups, then Israel may have been justified in those attacks.

Well, guess what? The majority of the policemen they refer to were members of terror groups.

I'm not 100% sure where the number 99 came from, but according to PCHR there were 91 police killed at Arafat Police City and 9 killed at the al-Abbas police station on December 27th. Based on those 100 people, we have evidence that 65 of them were militants, or 65% - nearly two-thirds. Goldstone's flat-out statement that a majority were not members of armed groups is not true.

Beyond that, Goldstone implies that many non-police civilians would have been in the area at the times of attack and therefore Israel should have not attacked for fear of hitting them. It gives no numbers of civilian casualties in those police stations, however. At Arafat Police City, 90 out of the 91 killed were police, and one was a "driver" who was also a member of the al-Qasaam Brigades. So 100% of those killed at that police station were, according to Goldstone's criteria, legitimate targets, as well over half were members of armed groups.

At the al-Abbas police station, 7 of the 9 killed were policemen, and 7 of the 9 killed were members of terror groups. (One "jobless" civilian was a member, one policeman we found no evidence of being a member.)

It is ridiculous to say that group of terrorists who outnumber civilians by nearly 2-1 would be immune from legitimate attack under international law. While Goldstone's earlier analysis was more concerning the roles that the police were playing at the time of the attack, his conclusion seems to imply that if they were known to be members of terror groups then the attack would be legitimate.

Which is exactly the case.

It is worthwhile to mention that the Goldstone report chooses deliberately to concentrate only of specific events that would demonize Israel. Instead of looking at the total numbers of killed and the circumstances, the Commission cherry-picked specific events and looked in more detail at those events. Therefore, they chose the initial Israeli attacks on police stations on December 27th because those attacks appeared to be the most egregious attacks on civilians (in their minds.) Yet even in this case, they are wrong.

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Goldstone report inaccuracies part 10 (updated)

723. The Mission considers, however, that the testimonies of the witnesses strongly suggest

that already before daybreak on 4 January 2009 the Israeli armed forces were in full control of

the al-Samouni neighbourhood. The Israeli soldiers had taken up position on the roofs of the

houses in the area. According to several witnesses, the soldiers on the street spoke to residents

who had ventured out of their houses.410 In some cases (for instance, at the house of Saleh al-

Samouni and at the house Iyad al-Samouni was in, see below), they entered the houses nonviolently

after knocking on the door. According to Saleh al-Samouni, the prolonged

identification of all the persons present in his house (his father identifying each family member

in Hebrew for the soldiers) took place outside. The soldiers appear to have been confident that

they were not at immediate risk of being attacked.

724. The Mission also reviewed the submission it received from an Israeli researcher, arguing

generally that statements from Palestinian residents claiming that no fighting took place in their

neighbourhood are disproved by the accounts Palestinian armed groups give of the armed

operations. The Mission notes that, as far as the al-Samouni neighbourhood is concerned, this

report would appear to support the statements of the witnesses that there was no combat.411

Note 411: “The hidden dimension of Palestinian war casualties…”. Only 4 of the more than 100 entries in the submission refer to combat action in Zeytoun, the much larger part of Gaza City of which al-Samouni neighbourhood is a part. The incidents in Zeytoun that are mentioned reportedly occurred on 6, 7, 11 and 13 January 2009, and consist of Palestinian combatants opening fire against Israeli troops with rocket-propelled grenades, a mortar (in one case) and detonating an explosive device.

It is difficult for me to say that there was or was not military activity in the Samounis' neighborhood on January 4th. However, Goldstone takes the absence of any mention of incidents in the Al Zaytoun neighborhood (in which the Samounis lived) in an Israeli report as evidence that there was no significant fighting there on January 4th. Goldstone's other evidence is indeed Palestinian Arab witnesses.

I do not know how big Al Zaytoun is either. However, it seems pretty clear that there was still fighting in Al Zaytoun on January 4th. PCHR names:

495 Mustafa Zuhdi Mustafa Erhayem

498 Mohammed Fou’ad Mahmoud al-He

515 Mohammed Bassam Mohammed ‘Anan

530 Hassan ‘Isam Hassan al-Jammasi

580 ‘Ateya Rushdi Khalil Aal-Khuli (16 years old!)

all as militants, actively fighting Israeli forces as they were killed in Al-Zaytoun on January 4th.

In addition, (576) Ayman Mohammed Mohammed ‘Afana (policeman) was an Al Qassam Brigades member killed in that neighborhood on that day.

And the fighting continued in Al-Zaytoun on January 5th:.

639 Mohammed Mohammed Nabih al-Ghazali (PCHR)

641 Rashad Helmi Mahmoud al-Samouni (see below) (PCHR)

681 Ahmed Hassan Abdul Karim Abu Zour listed as "resister" on PMoH site (#226)

Again, this doesn't mean that Goldstone is incorrect concerning the immediate area of the Samouni house, but it does indicate that the commission ignored easily-available data that could indicate that their implication that no fighting was taking place in Al-Zaytoun is wrong.

In para. 713 and footnote 404, they list the names of every member of the al-Samouni extended family that was killed. One of them is Rashad Helmi al Samouni (male, aged 42), whom the PCHR lists as being killed a militant. (Not only that, but another al-Samouni is listed as having been killed on January 5th: Mohammed Ibrahim Helmi al-Samouni, listed in PCHR as a civilian but who was a member of Islamic Jihad.)

So one of the civlians Goldstone lists as being killed was in fact a terrorist.

At the very least, a small amount of fact checking would have uncovered these inconsistencies. Yet Goldstone says without reservation:

721. The Mission found the foregoing witnesses to be credible and reliable. It has no reason to doubt their testimony.

I think there is more than enough reason to doubt their testimony.

(UPDATE: I misread Goldstone and thought that the commission was saying that the al-Samouni deaths were on Jan. 4th. One person with that name was killed on Jan. 4 in al-Zaytoun, but as far as I can tell he was a civilian. I corrected the post above.)

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Must read: Richard Landes fisking Goldstone's NYT piece

Professor Richard Landes does a superlative job fisking Judge Richard Goldstone's op-ed in the New York Times today. And while I have been spending what time I have on the minutae of the large Goldstone Report, Landes' post goes to the very heart of the topic, and shows exactly what is problematic about the entire enterprise. It casts great doubt on Goldstone's honesty, at least with regards to this topic.

It is a must-read, as are the links Landes uses to support his arguments.

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Goldstone report inaccuracies part 9: Gaza Police

The Goldstone report spends a lot of space (paragraphs 414-421) trying to justify its contention that the Hamas police force was a civilian force, and that Israel was not justified in attacking it. I believe that this analysis is flawed and that the conflicting evidence is weighted with a clear bias towards declaring the policemen to be civilian.

410. In order to shed some light on where the truth might lie between these two conflicting descriptions of the police, the Mission finds it necessary to examine the development of the security forces linked to Hamas after its election victory in January 2006. When Mr. Said Seyam, a senior Hamas representative,269 took office as the Palestinian Authority’s Minister of Interior in April 2006, he found that he had little or no control over the Palestinian Authority’s security forces, which were put under the control of the President of the Palestinian Authority and of officials loyal to him.270 On 20 April 2006, he announced the formation of a new security force
reporting directly to him. This was the Security Forces Support Unit, also known as the Executive Force (al-Quwwa al-Tanfiziyya). The new security force appears to have had a double function as both a law-enforcement agency and, at least potentially, a military force. It was officially charged with enforcing public security and protecting property. At the same time, he appointed Mr. Jamal Abu Samhadana, commander of the Popular Resistance Committees, as the head of the Executive Force271 and announced that it would be composed of 3,000 new recruits from various Palestinian armed groups, including al-Qassam Brigades.272 The newly appointed commander reportedly declared: “[The Executive Force] will be the nucleus of the future Palestinian army. The resistance must continue. We have only one enemy. … I will continue to carry the rifle and pull the trigger whenever required to defend my people. We are also a force against corruption. We are against thieves, corrupt officials and law breakers.” 273

This paragraph seems to set the tone that, at least originally, Hamas did not distinguish between civil and military functions for its Executive Force.

411. In August 2007, following the June 2007 Hamas seizure of full control over Gaza, the current Director of the Gaza authorities’ civil police, then head of the Executive Force, Gen. Abu Obeidah, described the planned reorganization of the security services in Gaza. Executive Force members were to be integrated into the civil police. He reportedly stated that Hamas was “working hard to retrain Executive Force members to perform police duties” and that the “Force will be in charge of chasing drug dealers and lawless residents”. At the same time, he stated that
“members of the Force are religious, and are resistance fighters.”274

At this point, when Hamas took over Gaza, it was obvious to all that Hamas would need to take over the police duties. Fatah clearly was not going to be tolerated in that role. The question is, did Hamas intend that the police would be a purely civil police force, or simply that they had to fulfill that role in order to maintain law and order but they would still be considered resistance fighters (and moonlight as such)? At this point, as of 2007, the answer seems to be the latter, according to Goldstone's evidence.

412. In October 2007, the security services operating in Gaza were reorganized. The previous Palestinian Authority’s police agencies in Gaza were merged with the Executive Force.275 The security forces under the control of the Ministry of Interior emerging from this reorganization comprise the Civil Police, the Civil Defence, the Internal Security (an intelligence agency) and the National Security. Their mandates, according to the Gaza authorities’ Ministry of Interior’s website,276 are differentiated.

413. The National Security force is given specific military tasks, such as “the protection of the State from any foreign aggression” and “responsibility for the defence of the Palestinian homeland in the face of external and internal threats”. It is thus plainly a military force whose members are, under international humanitarian law, combatants.277 The functions of the police have been outlined above.

The website shows that there are six security services under the Interior Ministry: Police, Civil Defense, Security and Protection, Homeland Security, National Security Forces and Military Medical Services. Keep in mind that they all report to the same ministry, meaning that they are much closer related than traditional military and police duties are in most nations.

I maintain that there is essentially no distinction between these groups.

To give an example, the "Security and Protection" group lists 12 "martyrs" from the Gaza war on its website. It is not the police division; it seems to be mostly serving a function of bodyguards. However, of the 12 killed, PCHR listed 2 of them as "militants" and 9 of them as "police." (One I could not find.) Of the 9 "police," 6 of them were listed as Al Qassam Brigades members on the Al Qassam website itself, and two were listed as Al Qassam Brigades members in other sources.

414. On 1 January 2009, during the Israeli military operations in Gaza, the police
spokesperson, Mr. Islam Shahwan, informed the media that the police commanders had managed to hold three meetings at secret locations since the beginning of the armed operations. He added that “an action plan has been put forward, and we have conducted an assessment of the situation and a general alert has been declared by the police and among the security forces in case of any emergency or a ground invasion. Police officers received clear orders from the leadership to face the enemy, if the Gaza Strip were to be invaded.”278 Confirming to the Mission that he had been correctly quoted, Mr. Shahwan stated that the instructions given at that meeting were to the effect that in the event of a ground invasion, and particularly if the Israeli armed forces were to enter urban settlements in Gaza, the police was to continue its work of ensuring that basic food stuffs reached the population, of directing the population to safe places, and of upholding public order in the face of the invasion. Mr. Shahwan further stated that not a single policeman had been killed in combat during the armed operations, proving that the instructions had been strictly obeyed by the policemen.

This is a critical paragraph, and it highlights Goldstone's credulity. There is a clear statement from the police spokesman saying that the police were instructed to face the enemy, which is not a very ambiguous statement. Months later, when he is reached by commission members to explain this problematic statement, he seizes the opportunity to "clarify" that he only meant that they should be doing normal police duties.

And Goldstone believes him.

Not only that, his "proof" is an absurd statement that no policemen were killed in combat (presumably during the ground invasion.) This is a lie. According to PCHR and my research, 16 policemen were killed from January 4th and on, 34 policemen were killed, and my research indicates that at least 16 of them were members of terror organizations.

Here is a most obvious case where Goldstone's members are willing to believe what they are told by Hamas without any followup.

415. The Mission notes that there are no allegations that the police as an organized force took
part in combat during the armed operations. On the basis of the information provided by the
Gaza authorities and of the above-mentioned study of the Orient Research Group Ltd., it would
appear that 75 per cent of its members killed in the course of the military operations died as a
result of the air strikes carried out during the first minutes of the Israeli attack. These men had
not engaged in combat with the Israeli armed forces.279

If one assumes that the commission is accurate in defining the police as a separate, purely civil institution, this would seem to be the case. If one believes that it is a facade to make human rights organizations happy, then it is a bit less clear.

416. The Mission also notes that while the then commander of the Executive Forces and now
Director of Police did reportedly say in August 2007 that members of the Executive Force were
“resistance fighters”, he stressed in the same interview the authorities’ intention to develop it into
a law enforcement force. The Mission notes that a situation in which a recently constituted
civilian police force integrates former members of armed groups would not be unique to Gaza.
That prior membership in itself would not be sufficient to establish that the police in Gaza is a
part of al-Qassam Brigades or other armed groups.

Nor does it disprove it. However, other evidence might cause one to tilt that way. For example, if the vast majority of Gaza's police force were also members of terror organizations, wouldn't that indicate that Hamas is quite happy with freely mixing the civil and militant duties of its members?

417. Except for the statements of the police spokesperson, the Israel Government has
presented no other basis on which a presumption can be made against the overall civilian nature
of the police in Gaza. It is true that the police and the security forces created by Hamas in Gaza
may have their origins in the Executive Force. However, while the Mission would not rule out
the possibility that there might be individuals in the police force who retain their links to the
armed groups, it believes that the assertion on the part of the Government of Israel that “an
overwhelming majority of the police forces were also members of the Hamas military wing or
activists of Hamas or other terrorist organizations”,280 appears to be an overstatement that has
led to prejudicial presumptions against the nature of the police force that may not be justified.

While we have established that Goldstone believes, without reservation, the assertions of the Hamas police spokesman, it gives no such credit to the IDF. Where does it gain its skepticism from? Skipping a little...

420. The Mission further notes that the study conducted by the Orient Research Group Ltd.
names policemen killed during the attack, whom it identifies as members of Hamas, al-Qassam
Brigades, other armed Palestinian groups or “terror operatives” whose affiliation is not known.
In 78 out of 178 cases the policemen are alleged to be members of al-Qassam Brigades on the
sole basis that they were allegedly Hamas members.

I do not know the methodology of the Halevi report referenced here, but my research (using similar methods) has determined that at least 206 of the 242 policemen killed in Gaza were members of terrorist organizations or "military" groups. That is about 74%.

At least 83 of them were explicitly listed as members on the official Al Qassam Brigades website. Many others were listed as "militants" by Al Mezan, in Al Qassam Brigades forums, and in PFLP and Islamic Jihad websites. And ten of them were recognized as militants by the PCHR.

(About 15 of my count came from ICT and I have not corroborated yet on any militant website. Even so, it still leaves a vast majority of Palestinian Arab police as being actively affiliated with terror groups.

This is the key fact: a police force that (at the very least) tolerates its members as also being terrorists loses its status as being worthy of protection. Perhaps not according to a strict interpretation of international law, but for all practical purposes the fact that the police also did traffic duties does not make them any less militant, any more than an army doing police duties would be immune from attack.

Goldstone however copies an argument against this logic from the Al Mezan Center:

421. Furthermore, it appears from the response to the Mission from the Orient Research Group
Ltd. describing its methodology that its information on police members’ alleged affiliation with
armed groups was based to a large extent on the websites of the armed groups. In this respect,
the Mission is mindful of a recent report by a Palestinian human rights NGO drawing attention to
the “issue of the ‘adoption’ of killed persons by resistance groups; i.e. declaration by a political
or armed group that the person killed was one of their members. Often, when persons, including
children, are killed by actions of the Israeli armed forces , political and/or armed groups ‘adopt’
them as ‘martyrs’ placing their photographs on their websites and commending their contribution
to resisting occupation. This does not mean that those persons killed were involved in resistance
activities in any way. The families accept this ‘adoption’ of deceased family members for
various reasons including the willingness of resistance groups to provide financial support to the
families and pay for funeral costs of the persons killed.” As the NGO concludes, “these cases
require in-depth investigation on a case-by-case basis in order to determine every person’s status
according to his actual affiliation”.283

It is true that some websites use the word "martyrs" when referring to women and children. However, my group's original research was careful to ignore any sources that did this practice. I did not see a single women or child (less than 16 years old) being mentioned as a member of any armed group. Moreover, we were careful not to count people listed only as "shahids" and made sure that those we counted were called "mujahid" or similar terms, if not explicitly members of specific brigades.

In other words, Goldstone accepted the poor argument of Al Mezan without checking it against the specific entries mentioned. It also ignored my email to the Commission that listed my data and methodology. Its logic of throwing out any evidence that proved the police to be a sham front for terrorists, and accepting any evidence that claimed otherwise, is problematic indeed.

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Goldstone Commission problems, part 8

This is not an inaccuracy per se, but it is more than troubling.

One of the major sources that the Goldstone Commission heavily relied on in testimonies was TAWTHEQ. TAWTHEQ is quoted in the context of the Gaza war more often than HRW and seems to be mentioned in the report body about as often as PCHR (although PCHR is mentioned more in footnotes.) In other words, it seems that Goldstone put a lot of emphasis on TAWTHEQ's direct testimony to the Commission.

Who is TAWTHEQ? It is not an NGO - it is Hamas!

The organization is an Arabic acronym for the "Central Commission for Documentation and Pursuit of Israeli War Criminals." The possible objectivity of such an organization seems remote. Its webpage describes it as

TAWTHEQ " The Central Commission for documentation and pursuit of Israeli war criminals" is an independent governmental organization dedicated to monitoring and documenting the Israeli aggression crimes that targeted individuals, buildings, private and public property by the Israeli occupation forces, and particularly crimes that occurred during the last aggression on the Gaza Strip on 27 / 12/2008 until 19/1/2009 and pursuit war criminals and follow-up submitting lawsuits against them via the national and the international courts without any political affiliation to any party.

TWATHEQ [sic] is considered the only official commission to deal with the files of documenting aggressions and criminal acts of the Israeli aggression on Gaza, and follow-up submitting lawsuits against the Israeli officials.

It was established by the Gaza Ministry of Justice, which is Hamas.

While there are serious problems with relying on biased NGOs like PCHR (who refuses to call the Israeli army the IDF, instead using the term IOF consistently,) TAWTHEQ is single-mindedly created by Hamas not to be objective at all. Its mandate isn't to determine the existence of war crimes - it is to maximize the number of such "crimes."

So, for example, Goldstone quotes TAWTHEQ as saying that "341 of those killed were children. " It also quotes the PCHR and B'Tselem (314 and 320, respectively.) It is probable that TAWTHEQ (as well as DCI) is including children who were combatants in their list of victims.

The entire purpose of TAWTHEQ is to accuse Israel of war crimes and provide "evidence" to credulous NGOs. The fact that Goldstone gave it as much weight as it did seems to be a reflection of Goldstone's general bias towards those who testified in person, something that appears to be consistent throughout the report. As in the case of Addameer, Goldstone seems far less likely to question Gazan facts and figures than Israel's, even when the Arab organizations themselves have an explicitly anti-Israel mandate.

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Goldstone report inaccuracies part 7

493. The reports received by the Mission suggest that it is likely that the Palestinian armed
groups did not at all times adequately distinguish themselves from the civilian population among
whom the hostilities were being conducted. Their failure to distinguish themselves from the
civilian population by distinctive signs is not a violation of international law in itself, but would
have denied them some of the legal privileges afforded to combatants. What international law
demands, however, is that those engaged in combat take all feasible precautions to protect
civilians in the conduct of their hostilities. The Mission found no evidence that members of
Palestinian armed groups engaged in combat in civilian dress. It can, therefore, not find a
violation of the obligation not to endanger the civilian population in this respect.

I already dealt with some of the claim that they found no evidence of Hamas and PIJ masquerading as civilians, and there is more where that came from. But it is curious that Goldstone says that disguising themselves as civilians is not a violation of international law.

Geneva protocol I article 37 paragraph 1 states:

1. It is prohibited to kill, injure or capture an adversary by resort to perfidy. Acts inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection under the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, with intent to betray that confidence, shall constitute perfidy. The following acts are examples of perfidy: (a) the feigning of an intent to negotiate under a flag of truce or of a surrender; (b) the feigning of an incapacitation by wounds or sickness; (c) the feigning of civilian, non-combatant status; and (d) the feigning of protected status by the use of signs, emblems or uniforms of the United Nations or of neutral or other States not Parties to the conflict.

Unless I'm misreading it, it sounds like the very act of a combatant pretending to be a civilian is prohibited under international law.

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Goldstone report inaccuracies part 6

495. Although the situations investigated by the Mission did not establish the use of mosques
for military purposes or to shield military activities, the Mission cannot exclude that this might
have occurred in other cases. As far as hospitals and United Nations facilities are concerned, the
Mission found that it could not exclude that Palestinian armed groups engaged in combat
activities in the vicinity of these protected sites. The Mission wishes to emphasize that the
launching of attacks from or in the vicinity of civilian buildings and protected areas are serious
violations of the obligation on the armed groups to take constant care to protect civilians from
the inherent dangers created by military operations.

496. The Mission asked the Gaza authorities to provide information on the sites from where
the Palestinian armed groups had launched attacks against Israel and against the Israeli armed
forces in Gaza. The Mission similarly asked whether, to their knowledge, civilian buildings and
mosques had been used to store weapons. In their response, the Gaza authorities stated that they
had no information on the activities of the Palestinian armed groups or about the storage of
weapons in mosques and civilian buildings. The Mission does not find this response to be
entirely plausible. The Mission notes, more importantly, that, whether the answer reflects the
reality or not, the Gaza authorities are obliged under international law to control the activities of
armed groups operating on the territory under their control.346 If they failed to take the necessary
measures to prevent the Palestinian armed groups from endangering the civilian population by
conducting hostilities in a manner incompatible with international humanitarian law, they would
bear responsibility for the damage done to the civilians living in Gaza.

The basic assumption that somehow the Gaza "authorities" are not exactly the same as the "armed groups" is bizarre. It is almost like the UN needs to hold onto the fiction that Hamas is somehow a respected civilian authority in order to jam their ideas of human rights into a neat category and ignore the reality.

At any rate, the idea that Goldstone could find no "proof" that mosques were used for weapons is ridiculous. This seems like proof to me:



And so does this, unless Korans have particularly flammable qualities:

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Goldstone report inaccuracies part 5

493. The reports received by the Mission suggest that it is likely that the Palestinian armed
groups did not at all times adequately distinguish themselves from the civilian population among
whom the hostilities were being conducted. Their failure to distinguish themselves from the
civilian population by distinctive signs is not a violation of international law in itself, but would
have denied them some of the legal privileges afforded to combatants. What international law
demands, however, is that those engaged in combat take all feasible precautions to protect
civilians in the conduct of their hostilities. The Mission found no evidence that members of
Palestinian armed groups engaged in combat in civilian dress. It can, therefore, not find a
violation of the obligation not to endanger the civilian population in this respect.

This video, showing Palestinian Arab militants disguised as civilians shooting a 120mm mortar from a street in Jabalya, shows otherwise. it is astonishing to think that the Commission couldn't find it.

Beyond that, Islamic Jihad bragged about its hiding among civilians:

There is no visibility of the men of the resistance in the streets of the [Gaza] strip. No one sees their means of transportation, and even light weapons can no longer be seen with people publicly in the Gaza Strip. The resistance completely disappeared. Anti-aircraft artillery fires on the aircraft without them knowing the location. The whereabouts of rockets launched from the heart of the strip cannot be seen or known.

According to medical sources, the number of martyrs and wounded of the elements of the Palestinian resistance are few in comparison to the number of civilian martyrs who were killed since the start of the Israeli war on Gaza, except for the large number of Palestinian policemen who were martyred on the first day of the war in Gaza.

Abu Mohammed - one of the field commanders in the Jerusalem Brigades, the military wing of Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine - said: "The goal is to take the "energy of concealment," to mislead the occupation aircraft and its agents [collaborators.]

And here's a link to a video from German TV that clearly shows Palestinian Arabs hiding weapons under civilian clothing in a crowded Gaza street.

How could the Goldstone Commission not have known about these?

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Goldstone report inaccuracies part 4

273. The legal framework applicable to situations of occupation includes provisions contained
in the Hague Regulations (especially articles 42–56), the Fourth Geneva Convention (especially
articles 47–78) and Additional Protocol I, and customary international law. The successive steps
in the development of that legal framework represent attempts by the international community to
protect human beings better from the effects of war while giving due account to military
necessity.

274. Article 42 of the Hague Regulations, regarded as customary international law,158
prescribes that “territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of
the hostile army”. The occupying authority so established shall take all measures in its power “to
restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety” in the occupied area (art. 43).
These provisions call for an examination of whether there was exercise of authority by Israel in
the Gaza Strip during the period under investigation.

276. Israel has without doubt at all times relevant to the mandate of the Mission exercised
effective control over the Gaza Strip. The Mission is of the view that the circumstances of this
control establish that the Gaza Strip remains occupied by Israel. The provisions of the Fourth
Geneva Convention therefore apply at all relevant times with regard to the obligations of Israel
towards the population of the Gaza Strip.

277. Despite Israel’s declared intention to relinquish its position as an occupying Power by
evacuating troops and settlers from the Gaza Strip during its 2005 “disengagement”,162 the
international community continues to regard it as the occupying Power.163

278. Given the specific geopolitical configuration of the Gaza Strip, the powers that Israel
exercises from the borders enable it to determine the conditions of life within the Gaza Strip.
Israel controls the border crossings (including to a significant degree the Rafah crossing to
Egypt, under the terms of the Agreement on Movement and Access164) and decides what and
who gets in or out of the Gaza Strip....

279. The ultimate authority over the Occupied Palestinian Territory still lies with Israel. Under
the law and practice of occupation, the establishment by the occupying Power of a temporary
administration over an occupied territory is not an essential requirement for occupation, although
it could be one element among others that indicates the existence of such occupation.165 In fact,
as shown in the case of Denmark during the Second World War, the occupier can leave in place
an existing local administration or allow a new one to be installed for as long as it preserves for
itself the ultimate authority.

Goldstone spends a bit of time trying to justify Gaza's status as being legally occupied. The report doesn't address the many arguments that show otherwise, and uses an expansive definition of "occupation" that goes beyond any other. The Denmark precedent is a perfect example: during World War II, the Danish government cooperated with Germany and allowed Nazi troops in its territory, and while most citizens weren't thrilled with it, they accepted it, which made this occupation much easier. When the situation became untenable and the Danes more restless, Germany dissolved the Danish government - a move that proves that Germany did have effective authority of Denmark, far beyond what Israel has with Gaza.

As we have seen in the past, the UN's legal justification for calling Gaza "occupied" is a stretch at best, a lie at worst. Goldstone does not address the main legal issues that many respected law experts have as to whether Gaza is occupied, even though they are readily available. For example:

there is no legal basis for maintaining that Gaza is occupied territory. The Fourth Geneva Convention refers to territory as occupied where the territory is of another "High Contracting Party" (i.e., a state party to the convention) and the occupier "exercises the functions of government" in the occupied territory. The Gaza Strip is not territory of another state party to the convention and Israel does not exercise the functions of government-or, indeed, any significant functions-in the territory. It is clear to all that the elected Hamas government is the de facto sovereign of the Gaza Strip and does not take direction from Israel, or from any other state.

Some have argued that states can be considered occupiers even of areas where they do not declare themselves in control so long as the putative occupiers have effective control. For instance, in 2005, the International Court of Justice opined that Uganda could be considered the occupier of Congolese territory over which it had "substituted [its] own authority for that of the Congolese Government" even in the absence of a formal military administration. Some have argued that this shows that occupation may occur even in the absence of a full-scale military presence and claimed that this renders Israel an occupier under the Fourth Geneva Convention. However, these claims are clearly without merit. First, Israel does not otherwise fulfill the conditions of being an occupier; in particular, Israel does not exercise the functions of government in Gaza, and it has not substituted its authority for the de facto Hamas government. Second, Israel cannot project effective control in Gaza. Indeed, Israelis and Palestinians well know that projecting such control would require an extensive military operation amounting to the armed conquest of Gaza. Military superiority over a neighbor, and the ability to conquer a neighbor in an extensive military operation, does not itself constitute occupation. If it did, the United States would have to be considered the occupier of Mexico, Egypt the occupier of Libya and Gaza, and China the occupier of North Korea.

Moreover, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that foes of Israel claiming that Israel has legal duties as the "occupier" of Gaza are insincere in their legal analysis. If Israel were indeed properly considered an occupier, under Article 43 of the regulations attached to the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907, it would be required to take "all the measures in [its] power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety." Thus, those who contend that Israel is in legal occupation of Gaza must also support and even demand Israeli military operations in order to disarm Palestinian terror groups and militias. Additionally, claims of occupation necessarily rely upon a belief that the occupying power is not the true sovereign of the occupied territory. For that reason, those who claim that Israel occupies Gaza must believe that the border between Israel and Gaza is an international border between separate sovereignties. Yet, many of those claiming that Gaza is occupied, like John Dugard, also simultaneously and inconsistently claim that Israel is legally obliged to open the borders between Israel and Gaza. No state is required to leave its international borders open.

The Goldstone Commission is making a flawed legal argument, and in fact extending the definition of "occupied" way beyond the Hague and Geneva definitions, in ways that are a mockery of law. It appears that Goldstone, along with the previous ICJ ruling it also relies on, has a "gut feeling" that Gaza is occupied and will find whatever flimsy legal justifications they can find to support it after the fact.

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Goldstone report inaccuracies part 3

264. On 22 December 2008, a 24-hour ceasefire was declared at Egypt’s request. Three rockets and one mortar were launched from Gaza that day. Israel opened the border to allow a limited amount of humanitarian aid to enter Gaza.149 

265. By 23 December 2008, rocket and mortar fire was again increasing significantly; 30 rockets and 30 mortars were fired into Israel on 24 December 2008. 150 The Israeli armed forces continued to conduct air strikes on positions inside Gaza and the crossings into Israel remained closed. On 26 December 2008, a rocket launched from Gaza fell short and hit a house in northern Gaza killing two girls, aged 5 and 12.151 

266. The intensified closure regime on the Gaza crossings which began in November continued in December, with imports restricted to very basic food items and limited amounts of fuel, animal feed and medical supplies. According to OCHA, many basic food items were no longer available and negligible amounts of fuel were allowed to enter Gaza. This resulted in the health sector in Gaza deteriorating further into a critical condition, with hospitals continuing to face problems as a result of power cuts, low stocks of fuel to operate back-up generators, lack of spare parts for medical equipment and shortages of consumables and medical supplies.152 On 18 December 2008, UNRWA once again suspended its food distribution programme for the rest of the month, owing to shortages.153 

267. On 27 December 2008, Israel started its military operations in Gaza.154 

 The report goes into great detail on everything that happened between the beginning of the truce and Israel's response, but it skips an important fact: that the Hamas al-Qassam Brigades declared "Operation Oil Stain" on December 24th concurrent with their huge increase of rocket attacks. The Brigades continued to boast about this operation until well after Israel's response. In a very real sense, they declared the war. Also, Goldstone spends much space on the humanitarian situation in Gaza at that time. From reading the report one would get the impression that Gazans were to the point of starvation. Yet as this video shows, they didn't seem to be in such bad shape: Although my version is satirical, the video is real, and was taken during this exact time period of December 2008. It isn't a place one might choose to live but it is a far cry from many places - including much poorer areas of Egypt right across the border.

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Goldstone report inaccuracies part 2

227. The first incident relevant to the ceasefire reportedly took place on 23 June 2008, when a 67-year-old Palestinian civilian was injured when the Israeli military stationed at the border north-west of Beit Lahia opened fire on a group of Palestinians trying to collect fire wood near the border. Also on 23 June, two mortar shells were reportedly fired from central Gaza. One landed near the Nahal Oz crossing and the other in the Negev desert; no injuries were reported. YNet reports a mortar shot "early Monday morning" while Ma'an reports that the Palestinian Arab man was injured on Monday afternoon. So which was the first incident? Apparently, the Goldstone Commission can't figure that out. Interestingly, when Islamic Jihad shot three rockets to Israel on June 24th, they didn't claim it was in reaction to any Israeli actions in Gaza, rather for something the IDF did in Nablus. So it is entirely possible that the report of the 67-year old man is less than accurate.

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Goldstone report inaccuracies part 1

The Goldstone Report on Gaza just came out. I will be listing inaccuracies as I find them; it is a huge report and I am skipping around to areas I am interested in. 209. Since 1967, about 750,000 Palestinians have been detained at some point by the Government of Israel, according to Palestinian human rights organizations. As I demonstrated here, these numbers are completely made up by a Palestinian Arab group called Addameer. The figures are absurd and are based on no real figures. Moreover, Addameer has increased these numbers by 100,000 since 2004 or so, and we have accurate statistics on Israeli arrests in the past couple of years - they are off by orders of magnitude. In other words, Addameer lies with impunity, testifies before the Goldstone commission, and Goldstone believes them.

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