Wednesday, April 01, 2026
From Ian:
Lessons from the Iran War
Lessons from the Iran War
The centers of gravity on both sides of the Iran war are holding up under military pressure: Iran's command and control, its domination of a still-cowed population, ability to block shipments out of the Gulf, and its missile and drone stocks; the U.S., Israel, and Arab states' internal cohesion, weapons stocks, and despite considerable oil and gas price increases.John Spencer: What Are Iran’s Centers of Gravity and How Are They Being Attacked?
Neither side is displaying a decisive collapse of will, with Gulf Arab states so far demonstrating both resilience and defiance of Iran. There will not be a collapse of will by the Israeli government and population. For Israel, this conflict, correctly, is existential and the costs so far are easily bearable. Under such conditions, the conflict likely will shift to negotiations with or without a ceasefire.
Iran is a cause more than a state, although it presents as both. Its attacks on civilian targets in neighboring states seeking to remain neutral, and targeting of international oil supplies, have revealed the regime's nature. The region will never be really at peace unless either the very nature of the regime changes into that of a normal state, or it is stripped of all capability, in perpetuity, to project power through nuclear weapons, drones and missiles, terrorists and proxies.
Iran is able to prioritize its ideological mission of regional domination and religious orthodoxy over its own population, economy, and even military losses in a way most normal modern states cannot. It's hard to break the iron will of ideological states at almost any pain level.
Israel's extraordinary military success both offensive and defensive, the Israeli people's resilience, and its intelligence capabilities in this conflict give it dramatic dominance in the region, building on its previous success with the help of others decimating the Iranian proxy network. But it does not have the strategically mobile ground forces to decisively defeat Iran or other distant foes.
Iran's current strategy is simply to keep shooting with whatever is left of its not inexhaustible but very large weapons stocks until the pain on Gulf states and the American public, diminishing American and regional partners' own weapons stocks, and events elsewhere force the U.S. and Israel to end operations, with or without a face-saving formal understanding with Iran.
The United States and Israel are not simply working through a list of targets in an effort to destroy Iran’s military piece by piece. They are applying pressure across multiple parts of the same system at once. Production, command, naval capability, sensing networks, infrastructure, and support networks are all being hit in ways that reinforce each other.IRGC Opposes Negotiations with U.S.
That is what a center of gravity approach looks like in practice. Not a single decisive strike, but a series of actions that collectively make it harder for the system to function, adapt, and recover.
Clausewitz’s warning about dispersion still applies. Effort should be concentrated. But concentration does not always mean a single point. It can mean sustained pressure against the elements that give the enemy its strength.
There is also a dimension of modern war that Clausewitz could not have fully imagined. The ability to strike not just the system, but the individuals who animate it, at scale and with precision. Today, the United States and Israel are not only degrading infrastructure and capabilities. They are systematically targeting the leadership that commands them. Political leaders, military commanders, and those responsible for missile forces, naval operations, nuclear development, and proxy networks. This is not incidental. It follows the same logic. If the center of gravity is the regime’s integrated ability to generate and sustain coercive power, then removing the leadership that directs and coordinates that system directly attacks its function and its will. It introduces paralysis, disrupts continuity, and signals that no part of the system is protected.
And even then, the outcome is not automatic. War is a contest of will. Striking a center of gravity is not about destruction alone. It is about compelling the enemy to do your will through the use, or threat of use, of force, including military action, sanctions, and the removal of critical capabilities the regime sees as vital to its survival.
If the campaign is successful, Iran’s critical capabilities are degraded or destroyed, and there is a real possibility the effects of the war will be visible in decisions, not just damage. That could include Iran handing over its nuclear material, accepting intrusive inspections, ending the program in a way that cannot be easily reversed, halting missile development at scale, reducing or ending support to proxy forces, and abandoning the use of the Strait of Hormuz as a tool of coercion.
Those outcomes are the measure. Anything short of that may represent significant damage. It may even look decisive in the short term. But Clausewitz would caution against confusing damage with success.
Contacts between Iran and the U.S. are intensifying, Israel Hayom has learned.
In Washington, officials believe that Iran's economic and military distress will push Tehran to accept the 15-point American proposal within a matter of weeks.
Negotiations are currently being conducted by a handful of senior Iranian leaders still in place, alongside President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi.
The main obstacle remains the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The U.S. has demanded guarantees that the entire leadership, including the Guards, accept the terms.
At this stage, the Iranians have been unable to provide such guarantees because of the fierce opposition of Mohammad Vahidi, the Guards' current commander, to the very existence of negotiations. In the United Arab Emirates, Iranian financial assets have been frozen, with the intention of using them as compensation for the damage caused by Iranian attacks.
