In his 1986 capsule review of Raphael Patai's book,
The Seed of Abraham: Jews and Arabs in Contact and Conflict,
John C. Campbell concludes:
The author draws some personal conclusions of his own that seem
unduly optimistic, such as that the Israeli Arabs are moving through
evolving cultural values to a status of equal partners in the democratic and
liberal state of Israel. [emphasis added]
Is Campbell right?
In his book, Patai writes that Arabs living under foreign rule is not
something new. Until World War I, most Arab countries were ruled by the
non-Arab Turks, followed afterward by control under the forces of Great
Britain, France and Italy in the region.
But in those cases, the Arabs were the majority population.
In Israel, in 1948, the Arabs almost overnight became a minority in a
country in which for many centuries they had been the overwhelming majority
even though they did not enjoy self-rule. [p. 322]
With the reestablishment of the State of Israel, not only did the Arabs become
a minority -- for the first time, Arabs were exposed to the kind of non-Arab
influences which few Arabs had ever experienced before.
Patai describes the compulsory education, exposure to Hebrew and integration
into the Israeli workforce, as the Arabs commuted to nearby Jewish cities,
towns and villages. All this brought improvements to the Arab standard of
living -- and also gave the Arabs increased exposure to Israeli society and
culture.
In brief, although in no segment of Israeli Arab society had things reached
a stage even in the 1980s where one could speak of the onset of Arab
deculturation that is, a decline of their national Arab culture, it soon
became clear that what was happening was that the Israeli Arabs were rapidly
becoming bicultural...At the time of this writing (1985), this process is
still in full swing. [p.323]
To get an idea of how the Israeli-Arabs themselves viewed this, Patai quotes
from research done by Mark A. Tessler in 1974, published as "The Identity of
Religious Minorities in Non-Secular States." Tessler examines Jews in Tunisia
and Morocco -- and Arabs in Israel. As a result of his research, Tessler finds
Israeli Arabs to be a "non-assimilating" minority with an "unnarrowed cultural
distance" between Arabs and Jews in Israel.
Tessler's evaluation is supported by these responses from the 348 Israli Arabs
he interviewed:
23% said they feel more comfortable in Israel than they would in an
Arab or Palestinian state
30% said it made no difference
55% considered Israel's creation in 1948 to have been illegal
But on the other hand:
53% stated the term "Israeli" described them "very well" or fairly well"
40% said they felt closer to Jews in Israel than to Arabs in distant
lands such as Algeria or Morocco
As a measure of the extent of bicultural acculturation:
50% rejected the statement that it was unacceptable for
a married woman to go out socially in public without he husband
Most listened to Hebrew radio and television programs as often as
Arabic ones.
55% felt it was important for their children to study the history of
Judaism
65% felt it was important to study the history of Zionism
78% said they would not object to their children attending a
Jewish high school
Tessler writes that "the rejection by many Israeli Arabs of some aspects of
traditional Arab culture is unmistakable, suggesting that the distance between
Jews and Arabs in Israel is reduced in some areas" -- but then goes on to
conclude that "no plausible outcome of the struggle among [the] cultural and
religious facts would bring about a situation in which non-Jews can share
fully the mission of the state."
But based on the positive side to some of Tessler's results, Patai interjects:
The data presented do not seem to justify this conclusion.
According to Patai, the tension between Arab and Jew is aggravated by 3
things:
o The Arab religion, tradition and history have conditioned
them to have a disparaging view of Jews as dhimmis
o Never before in Arab history have they lived under Jewish
rule
o An Arab's knowledge of the Koran and Islam has
taught them that for a Jew to rule over Arabs is against the will of Allah and
intolerable
Based on this, we might expect matters to be worse.
Why aren't they?
Arabs are also pragmatists, and, if not in thought and word, certainly in
action, have always recognized and accepted the limitations of the possible.
[p. 328]
Because of that Arab pragmatism, Patai still cautions that in the event of
renewed hostilities, Israeli Arabs would side with their fellow Arabs if given
the opportunity, seeing as at the time of the writing of his book, Arabs have
still not reconciled themselves to life under Israeli rule. And material
improvements to the lives of Israeli Arabs will not necessarily improve
matters.
Then what will?
Israeli Arabs will have to absorb enough of the Israeli-Hebrew culture and
values to erase from their psyche that age-old Arab contempt for the Jewish
dhimmis...It can come about only gradually as a result of the de facto
symbiosis of Arabs and Jews. [p.328]
Patai sees the contact of Israeli Arabs with Palestinian Arabs as a major
factor preventing "Israelization." This is the second consequence of Israel's
victory in the Six Day War, that the presence of these Palestinian Arabs and
the challenges of Gaza and the "West Bank" since 1967 serves to radicalize
Israeli Arabs. The other problem, which Patai mentions earlier in the book is
that while Gaza and the West Bank were under the control of Egypt and Jordan,
there were no expressions of independence or of establishing a Palestinian
state, knowing that neither Nasser nor King Hussein would take kindly to the
idea. The miraculous victory also removed that inhibition on calls for a
Palestinian Arab state.
Similarly, as Patai writes in his preface to the 1976 edition of
The Arab Mind (p. xxiv-xxv), the fact that Egypt was able to hold its
own in the beginning of the 1973 October War, not only gave Sadat the
self-confidence to pursue a peace treaty with Israel with honor -- instead of
being merely a defeated foe -- but as Patai adds here, it helped create a new
generation of Palestinian Arabs who actively supported the PLO.
On that score, evidence that this ominous radicalization of Israeli Arabs that
Patai saw may be counterbalanced by surveys of Israeli Arabs in recent years
which indicate a decrease in the identification Israeli Arabs feel as
Palestinians, as noted in an earlier post,
More evidence that fewer Arab Israelis identify as "Palestinian":
Survey |
as Israeli |
as Israeli-
Arab
|
as Israeli-
Palestinian
|
as Arab-
Palestinian
|
as Arab |
as Palestinian |
as Religious
(Muslim,
Christian,
Druze)
|
Smooha I
(2012)
|
--- |
40% |
40% |
20% |
--- |
--- |
--- |
Smooha II
(2014)
|
--- |
32% |
45% |
22% |
--- |
--- |
--- |
Shaharit
(2017)
|
20.5% |
--- |
--- |
--- |
28.4% |
14.6% |
35.8 |
+972 Magazine
(2019)
|
--- |
46% |
19% |
--- |
22% |
14% |
--- |
JPPI
(2020)
|
23% |
51% |
--- |
--- |
15% |
7% |
--- |
An apparent problem with this chart is that it does not jive with Tessler's
survey that back in 1974 53% of Israeli Arabs stated the term "Israeli" described them "very
well" or fairly well
-- unless you include in the above chart those who see themselves as
Israeli-Arab/Israeli Palestinian as well.
Patai sees the situation of Israeli Arabs as not merely a problem that needs
to be solved. After all, he is a cultural anthropologist, not an old-school
Orientalist.
The Israeli Arabs by acquiring modern Hebrew Israeli culture, are thereby
transforming themselves before our very eyes into a radically new coinage in
the Arab world: into an Arab people whose cultural physiognomy will have two
sides, an Arab and a Hebrew. [p. 329]
Going a step further, he sees a "reversal" of classical Arab history itself.
The Koran duality reflects Muhammad's original respect for Jews, whom he hoped
to convert -- as well as his later contempt for them when they refused.
But now:
The present-day Israeli Arabs' attitude to contemporary Israel has no choice
but proceeds in the opposeite direction, from the tradional Arab contempt
for the Jewish dhimmis to a respect for the people of Israel which will
inevitably develop as a by-product of the growing Arab familiarity with and
understanding of the nonmaterial aspects of Israeli-Hebrew culture. One
hardly maintains a contemptuous attitude to a people whose culture one has
absorbed and values internalized. [p. 329]
The importance of Patai's analysis is that he provides a view not only of
the enormity of what Israeli Arabs are experiencing, but also of the slowly
progressing success of their integration into Israeli society, even with the
bumps in the road along the way.
These days, we are witnessing this acceptance of Israel on a larger scale that
Patai may not have foreseen, with the Abraham Accords and Israel's
normalization with the UAE in particular, which we can see goes beyond being a
joint defensive pact against Iran.
It is a rocky road, after all -- this is the Middle East after all, and
nothing is easy or can be taken for granted.
But the Abraham Accords is leading to a growing relationship that itself is
also affecting Israeli Arabs, demonstrating the potential for accepting
Israel, not only as a neighbor in the Middle East, but as another home for
Arabs in it.