Monday, March 17, 2025
From Ian:
Seth Mandel: Two Questions for Abbas and the Palestinian Leadership
Seth Mandel: Two Questions for Abbas and the Palestinian Leadership
A possible successor to Mahmud Abbas is warning that Abbas’s successors will abandon peace negotiations with Israel entirely. Which is less a warning than a direct threat.John Spencer: The Battle for Legitimacy in Urban Warfare
But a threat of what, exactly? That is, what would change, in a practical sense, under this new regime?
The official is Jibril Rajoub, and he gave a rare, on the record interview to the Times of Israel. Rajoub’s words are carefully chosen; he uses the interview to appear to praise Abbas to the heavens while, in reality, undermining Abbas’s standing among the Palestinian public and promoting himself as a palatable alternative.
But set his motives aside for now and let’s deal with his words. Abbas, he says, “is the last founding pillar of the Palestinian national movement who believes in two things: making historic reconciliation [with Israel] based on the two-state solution [and] that blood-shedding should not be a choice to achieve [that goal].”
The “blood-shedding” part is obviously false: Abbas pays terrorists and their families for attacks against Israeli civilians. But regarding Abbas’s purported support for a two-state solution, I have two questions. The first question is: What would the map of an acceptable two-state solution look like? Please answer in the form of a detailed map to which you would say “yes,” thus ending the conflict. Israel has produced such maps in the past, and they have been based on negotiations with Palestinian leaders who had been invited to make their demands and to respond to Israeli demands.
The last time this happened was in 2008. Here is the map. Abbas’s response to this map was to end negotiations without a counteroffer. So: What, specifically, about this map is unacceptable to the Palestinian leadership, and how would Abbas change it in order to make the entire map satisfactory?
The map is not a secret, nor is the process that led to it. All Palestinian demands are met by this plan—unless there has been some misunderstanding, which Abbas is free to clear up right now on the record.
Of course, I cannot guarantee that after Abbas’s rejection, this exact deal is still on the table. But considering the events of the past 15 years, Abbas would be crazy not to find out for sure. Making an offer would also force Israel to respond.
If Abbas has any desire to achieve full Palestinian self-determination, he would answer my first question. My second question is closely related, and it is also based on Rajoub’s implication that the Palestinian nationalist movement is only getting more radical, and stands on the precipice of ditching even the pretense of a two-state solution: What is Abbas willing to do to convince his supporters of the need and value of a two-state solution?
Despite this significant change in strategic imperatives, an interactive report by The New York Times report, “Israel Loosened Its Rules to Bomb Hamas Fighters, Killing Many More Civilians,” failed on two levels. First, the article did not clearly explain the difference between altering the civilian casualty threshold and the ultimate proportionality decision required within that threshold. Second, the article failed to acknowledge how a radical shift in operational context justified this change.Andrew Fox: Lessons for Western Militaries from the Gaza War
The shift from a counterterrorism paradigm to a large-scale ground campaign fundamentally alters the way the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) targeting framework is implemented, especially at the tactical level. This is not because the law itself changes, but because the conditions for its implementation do. In counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations, especially those heavily reliant on air power, engagements are often deliberate, with targets identified through prolonged intelligence collection, surveillance, and precision strikes conducted with the luxury of time. This includes the opportunity to carefully model anticipated civilian harm. This allows for ‘tactical patience’, enhancing civilian harm mitigation.
However, combined arms maneuver warfare—such as the ground campaign Israel launched in Gaza—demands a fundamentally different approach to LOAC implementation. Close combat against a well-armed, entrenched enemy, particularly one that embeds itself within civilian infrastructure, often compels maneuver commanders and subordinate leaders to make split-second use-of-force decisions in the midst of battle. Unlike an air-centric counterterrorism approach where commanders often have the luxury of time and extensive attack resources to achieve their desired attack effects, ground forces in LSCO operate under a mission imperative to “close with and destroy the enemy by fire and maneuver.” This means synchronizing a range of combat power in real time, often while under fire, in an environment where the ability to conduct detailed proportionality assessments is drastically limited.
Crucially, the LOAC principles of distinction, precautions, and proportionality remain unchanged, but how those principles are implemented must adapt to the realities of high-intensity warfare. In LSCO, a commander may not have the luxury of waiting for a higher echelon to conduct an extensive collateral damage estimate before engaging the enemy. The very nature of combat in dense urban terrain—where enemy forces use tunnels, fortified positions, and civilian structures for military purposes—means that expectations for how LOAC should be applied in a counterterrorism context cannot simply be transposed to combined arms maneuver operations. To do so is to ignore the operational realities that fundamentally shape battlefield decision-making.
Expecting the same level of civilian harm mitigation in a major ground campaign as in an air-dominant counterterrorism operation is therefore not just unrealistic—it is operationally illogical. This does not mean the law is ignored or circumvented. Rather, it means that commanders must make attack-legality determinations based on the circumstances of LSCO, where the need for rapid decision-making and immediate force synchronization demands a different application of the same legal principles. Misunderstanding this distinction leads to unrealistic expectations that can delegitimize even lawful military actions and distort public perception of what compliance with the LOAC truly requires in the context of large-scale urban warfare.
Exacerbating the misleading nature of the NYT article was the way it addressed modifications of other IDF precautionary measures, such as protocols for observing potential enemy targets and warning tactics such as roof knocks: dropping low-yield explosive on top of buildings as warning shots that give civilians time to flee an imminent attack. But again, it failed to explain why extensive strike precautions taken by Israel in pre-October 7th counterterrorism campaign logically be ill-suited to a high-intensity war against Hamas where military requirements might preclude such measures. By not distinguishing between the operational adjustments to civilian risk mitigation procedures, the New York Times report contributed to a distorted understanding of how context impacts LOAC implementation. This oversight underscores the vital importance of nuanced reporting that distinguishes between temporary policy adaptations and enduring legal principles.
In today’s information age, public perception plays a pivotal role in the legitimacy of military operations. When media outlets and advocacy groups conflate changes in tactical and operational procedures with indifference towards international legal standards, they risk undermining the credibility of even well-founded military decisions. Clear communication is essential—not only to explain the inherent differences between the legal obligations and the policies adopted to implement these obligations, but also to contextualize why these distinctions matter in varying operational scenarios.
The long-term negative consequence of such reporting and the overbroad condemnations it contributes to are profound. At a time when U.S. armed forces must once again contemplate LSCO, and some advocate a retreat from the legal and moral high ground, we cannot afford reinforcing unrealistic expectations of what the LOAC demands. Doing so will only provide greater momentum for those who unfortunately fail to recognize the moral and strategic value of the continuing commitment by U.S. armed forces to the rules of international law especially in war, and even when the enemy does not reciprocate such commitment. By recognizing the vital role operational context plays in assessing both actual and perceived legitimacy will ensure that the pursuit of strategic objectives does not come at the cost of eroding the very legitimacy upon which the moral and legal authority of military operations depends.
In sum, the military-intelligence community should cultivate the same agility and breadth of vision that Israel was forced to adopt: expect hybrid and “asymmetric” warfare tactics, respond with creativity and speed, and actively shape the information sphere so that truth defeats falsehood.
The role of cyber operations in Israel’s campaign was unprecedented, blurring the line between digital and kinetic warfare. The IDF launched offensive cyber measures to disrupt enemy command-and-control and communications networks. For instance, as it began ground operations in late October, Israel carried out strikes on Gaza’s telecom infrastructure that plunged the territory into an internet and phone blackout. This combined cyber/kinetic action hampered Hamas’s ability to coordinate forces or broadcast propaganda videos during critical battles.
On the defensive side, Israeli cyber units worked feverishly to harden their own networks after 7 October, when Hamas cyber attacks and Iran-backed hackers sought to exploit vulnerabilities. Throughout the conflict, Israel also leveraged cyber-based intelligence for strategic effect: the military routinely published intercepted communications and hacked surveillance footage to expose Hamas’s tactics and human-rights abuses.
By releasing these materials (with minimal delay) on social media and in press briefings, the IDF effectively countered enemy propaganda in real time. One notable example was the intercepted Hamas call about the Al-Ahli hospital blast, which Israel shared online to undermine Hamas’s false narrative. In essence, cyber intelligence and info-war capabilities became a force multiplier—the IDF not only physically hit Hamas’s networks, but also fought in the information space, debunking the militants’ claims and highlighting the truth of the conflict. Israel’s use of hackers and analysts alongside soldiers shows how modern wars are fought on servers and social platforms as much as in the streets.
Moving forward, the West should fully integrate cyber and information warfare into its military-intelligence doctrine. Any confrontation with a peer opponent will feature a significant cyber dimension—likely far more intense than what Israel faced with Hamas. A Russian campaign, for example, could begin with waves of cyberattacks to knock out European communications, scramble logistics, and spread confusion.
The IDF’s experience demonstrates the value of offensive cyber actions to throw the enemy off balance. Whether that means hacking enemy comms, jamming their signals, or even confiscating illicit funds (as Israel did by seizing millions in cryptocurrency from Iran-backed groups) to sap their finances, cyber tools can erode an adversary’s capacity to wage war.
At the same time, we must be prepared to counter enemy propaganda and disinformation on a massive scale. Moscow has long shown proficiency in information warfare—from deepfake videos to troll farms—aiming to skew perceptions. The lesson from Israel is to proactively put out factual intelligence to challenge lies. This could mean quickly declassifying satellite images or intercepts if Russia tries to fabricate an atrocity or justify aggression, much as the IDF did to set the record straight on Gaza.
Importantly, the cyber defence of military and critical infrastructure needs to be rock-solid. Even Israel, a “Start-Up Nation,” found that its cyber defences had gaps: over fifteen Iran-linked hacker groups launched attacks on Israel after 7 October, hitting targets like hospitals and leaking sensitive data. In one chilling scenario, hackers obtained Israeli soldiers’ medical records and could have altered blood type data, potentially putting wounded troops at risk of mistreatment.
For the West, this is a warning to invest heavily in cybersecurity and inter-agency coordination before a crisis. Drills that simulate communications outages, malware infections, or social-media misinformation cascades are as important as live-fire military exercises. By fortifying networks and educating personnel (and the public) on recognising disinformation, we can blunt the effectiveness of enemy cyber strikes.
Ultimately, the IDF showed that success in cyber and information warfare comes from offence and defence: disrupt the enemy’s systems and lies, while securing your own. Our intelligence community, learning from Gaza and Lebanon, should ensure that, in any future conflict, its “digital frontline” is as robust and agile as its traditional forces—if not more so.
Conclusion
No two conflicts are identical. The IDF fought in Gaza under circumstances unique to Israel’s security situation—against an irregular foe, in a small coastal strip, with both home turf advantages and challenges. Troops operating in Eastern Europe would face a far more conventional enemy operating in expansive terrain. Yet the past months have revealed some commonalities of urban warfare in the 21st century. Drones will swarm. Communications will falter. Tanks will continue to rumble down shattered streets, requiring clever tactics to survive. Civilians will be in the line of fire, testing the ethics and discipline of every soldier. Elite units may find themselves fighting hand-in-hand with grunts. Air power will deliver sledgehammer blows, successful intelligence fusion will decide the outcome of battles, and the court of global opinion will render its own verdict.
Israel’s campaign in Gaza since 7 October 2023 has been a crucible of adaptation. The West is running out of time to absorb these lessons before a future conflict necessitates similar adaptation in the heat of battle. The overarching lesson is balance: integrate the IDF’s tactical innovations with a clear understanding of how engagements would differ against a near-peer adversary. By doing so, our militaries can honour the IDF’s sacrifices by ensuring that if armed forces are ever thrust into a brutal urban fight—whether defending our allies or safeguarding our own national interests—they will be as prepared, lethal, and restrained as necessary. The fog of war will always be thick, but the experiences of Gaza can illuminate the path to better strategy on the streets of any city where our soldiers may one day have to fight.
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