Benny Morris: Iranian Escalation May Work to Israel’s Benefit, but Its Strategic Dilemma Remains
Examining the effects of Iran’s decision to launch nearly 200 ballistic missiles at Israel on October 1, Benny Morris takes stock of the Jewish state’s strategic situation:Seth Mandel: What’s With Biden’s Schizophrenia on Lebanon?
The massive Iranian attack has turned what began as a local war in and around the Gaza Strip and then expanded into a Hamas–Hizballah–Houthi–Israeli war [into] a regional war with wide and possibly calamitous international repercussions.
Before the Iranians launched their attack, Washington warned Tehran to desist (“don’t,” in President Biden’s phrase), and Israel itself had reportedly cautioned the Iranians secretly that such an attack would trigger a devastating Israeli counterstrike. But a much-humiliated Iran went ahead, nonetheless.
For Israel, the way forward seems to lie in an expansion of the war—in the north or south or both—until the country attains some sort of victory, or a diplomatic settlement is reached. A “victory” would mean forcing Hizballah to cease fire in exchange, say, for a cessation of the IDF bombing campaign and withdrawal to the international border, or forcing Iran, after suffering real pain from IDF attacks, to cease its attacks and rein in its proxies: Hizballah, Hamas, and the Houthis.
At the same time, writes Morris, a victory along such lines would still have its limits:
An IDF withdrawal from southern Lebanon and a cessation of Israeli air-force bombing would result in Hizballah’s resurgence and its re-investment of southern Lebanon down to the border. Neither the Americans nor the French nor the UN nor the Lebanese army—many of whose troops are Shiites who support Hizballah—would fight them.
President Biden was committed to Hamas’s defeat at the beginning of the war a year ago. Halfway through, his efforts became singularly focused on ending the hostilities in any way possible, leaving Yahya Sinwar untouched and consigning at least some of the hostages to permanent captivity.Ruthie Blum: 50 shades of ‘Don’t’
The original plan was to rebuild Gaza after removing Hamas from the strip. That required putting together a regional coalition willing to stick its neck out and plunk down ungodly amounts of money while taking at least some responsibility for management of Gaza during a dangerous and chaotic transition period. The flaking-out of the Biden administration didn’t just give Sinwar a new lease on life; it put our Sunni allies out on a limb and then cut that limb down.
The amount of commitment it would take to “fix” Lebanon would dwarf Gaza reconstruction. This is the second problem with the administration’s new grand idea. In four weeks, America will elect Biden’s successor. That person, whether Kamala Harris or Donald Trump, will replace the Cabinet with their own. Harris’s national-security team is dominated by those who want the U.S. less, not more, entangled in the politics of the Middle East. Which is to say, Joe Biden’s chosen successor would shred Biden’s plan on her first day in office.
Without a commitment from the U.S., there won’t be a commitment from anyone else. Our allies have already been burned by Biden’s about-face on Gaza.
All of this reveals the wasted potential of U.S. policy in the Mideast. The Obama-Biden administration’s coddling of Iran enabled the Gaza and Lebanon crises to reach this point. Four years later, Donald Trump handed Biden and Harris the Abraham Accords and an ongoing set of negotiations with Saudi Arabia, which they promptly shoved in a drawer so they could try to revive a policy that privileged Iran. When that went nowhere, the fickle crew went back to Saudi Arabia, too late to secure an agreement.
Now they want an Iranian proxy to remain in Gaza but an international coalition to push out an Iranian proxy in Lebanon?
Their hearts are in the right place—for now. But they have mortgaged the American credibility that would be needed to follow this path. Such are the wages of indecision and strategic caprice. The legacy of this administration will be chaos and missed opportunities.
This was evident from Biden’s urging in April, after Iran launched hundreds of missiles and drones at Israel, that Netanyahu “take the win” and move on. The “win” to which he was referring was the successful interception of the projectiles. In other words, dodging a bullet is preferable to targeting and taking out a shooter.
Following Iran’s ballistic barrage last week, Biden’s main concern focused on Israeli retaliation. He went as far as to say that he opposes an Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities and oil fields. He then added the usual mantra about Israel’s right to respond, as long as civilians aren’t killed.
Which brings us back to the 50-minute phone call that was the first communication between Biden and Bibi in some 50 days. Apparently, the White House defines “having Israel’s back” as turning its back on the Jewish state—when not stabbing it in the back by withholding crucial weaponry and constantly calling for ceasefires, that is. You know, the kind of “peace deals” that benefit the very mass murderers engaged in the ongoing seven-front assault against America’s key ally in the Middle East.
Given the length of the chat, it’s obvious that much was omitted from the White House summation of it. But reading between the already despicable lines is sufficient to glean what must have been a far worse exchange.
The following excerpt is illustrative: “On Lebanon, the president emphasized the need for a diplomatic arrangement to safely return both Lebanese and Israeli civilians to their homes on both sides of the Blue Line. The president affirmed Israel’s right to protect its citizens from Hezbollah, which has fired thousands of missiles and rockets into Israel over the past year alone, while emphasizing the need to minimize harm to civilians, in particular in the densely populated areas of Beirut. On Gaza, the leaders discussed the urgent need to renew diplomacy to release the hostages held by Hamas. The president also discussed the humanitarian situation in Gaza and the imperative to restore access to the north, including by reinvigorating the corridor from Jordan immediately.”
The sole mention of Iran preceded the above passage; it was a short condemnation of the Oct. 1 ballistic-missile attack on Israel. No acknowledgement of Tehran’s being the head of the terrorist octopus. Not a word about nukes or Israeli plans for some major “October surprise.”
It’s not clear whether Netanyahu informed Biden of what Israel has in store for the ayatollahs. He probably didn’t reveal his whole hand, so as to avoid receiving a raspy presidential “Don’t.” But he certainly was right to save Gallant a flight.