Israel is winning
So, to review: just as the Israelis think they’re on the cusp of victory, the Americans are scrambling to reach a deal that would preserve Hamas, end Iran’s attacks on U.S. assets, and wrap up the war in time for the progressive wing of the Democratic Party to forget that Joe Biden sponsored an alleged “genocide.” The rest of today’s Big Story, on the U.S. play and how Israel is thwarting it, is lifted from an email from The Scroll’s geopolitical analyst, who asks to remain anonymous to preserve zir mystique:Seth Mandel: Israel Is Nobody’s Proxy Army
“I think the assumption by U.S. planners was that Gaza would turn out to be a tar baby for Netanyahu. The strategic assumptions were therefore that after a few months Bibi would punch himself out, the Israeli offensive would grind to a halt. The United States would then take advantage of the resulting stalemate—which would also hopefully result in the collapse of Bibi’s coalition government and its replacement by a more pliant government led by the likes of Benny Gantz, Gadi Eisenkot, and possibly Yair Lapid—to pivot to establishing a Palestinian state, using the prospect of a hostage deal plus recognition by the Saudis as the carrots, and the threat of cutting off necessary U.S. munitions and U.S. diplomatic support as the sticks. The result would be a weaker, more pliant Israel surrounded by local Iranian clients, with Iran elevated to the status of America’s primary regional partner.
“All of these initial assumptions struck me as sound enough. Furthermore, the United States was no doubt encouraged by its interlocutors within the Israeli security and political elite and by its previous successes working with those interlocutors to bring the coalition’s judicial reform bill to a crashing halt. Just to make sure, the United States quickly imposed its own constraints on Israel’s war effort in exchange for diplomatic and military support—like mandating the resupply of food, medicine, and other necessities to Hamas, publicly engaging with Qatar to free hostages, making Israel responsible for civilian casualties while refusing to relocate Gazans outside of the Strip, and other measures whose effect was to limit Israel’s advantages and strengthen Hamas’ resolve. By tilting the playing field against Israel, the United States was essentially working to produce a stalemate, which it could then exploit for its own preferred ends.
“Initially, I saw plenty of evidence that the U.S. strategy was succeeding, from Yoav Gallant’s public statements about Israel’s need for U.S. resupply and the slow pace of Israel’s initial advances, to Israel’s seeming deference to U.S. wishes to not mention Iran or attack Hezbollah, to the relatively low Hamas casualty numbers relative to the size of their fighting force. By shaping the boundaries and nature of the fight, the United States was clearly gaining control over the likely nature of the result.
“Lately, however, the evidence I am seeing points in the opposite direction. I am seeing increasing Israeli success in killing more Hamas fighters and grinding down their ability to maneuver and launch rockets with diminishing Israeli losses. Even worse, from the U.S. perspective, is that it seems that Israel appears to have successfully innovated its way around U.S.-imposed constraints to arrive at more potent war-fighting strategies. The paradoxical result of U.S. constraints, which were meant to pen Israel into a cul-de-sac, is that they have led to the reduction of Israel’s dependency on the United States and therefore of U.S. leverage over Israel’s choices.
“That Gantz and Eisenkot are now attacking Bibi from the right, for letting too many supplies into Gaza, and that voices in Washington that were previously exulting in “Bibi’s failures” have fallen silent seem like clear indicators of which way the wind is blowing. Another indicator here is the publicly purported willingness of the Saudis to accept increasingly vague promises of a future Palestinian state in exchange for recognition of Israel in the present. The price is going down—not up.
The Iranian strategy appears to be based on Tehran’s previous ability to run U.S. troops out of the region, most infamously after the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marines barracks in Beirut, which killed 241 Americans. But the differences between the two situations are more important than their similarities, and one hopes the Biden administration is aware of them.John R. Bolton: Is the U.S. Misreading the Middle East?
President Reagan deployed U.S. troops to Lebanon in 1982 as part of a multinational peacekeeping force in the wake of the Israeli military campaign to push the PLO out of Lebanon. In September of that year, Lebanon’s newly elected pro-Israel President Bachir Gemayel was assassinated by Syria. Reagan informed Congress he was contributing 1,200 U.S. troops, at Lebanon’s request, and joining French and Italian peacekeepers, “to assure the safety of persons in the area and bring to an end the violence which has tragically recurred.” Chaos persisted, as did the U.S. troop presence, until the barracks bombing. Crucially, the administration removed the troops without hitting back at the Iranians’ chosen vessel for the slaughter, Hezbollah. “It is beneath our dignity to retaliate against the terrorists who blew up the Marine barracks,” claimed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Vessey, one of the most absurdly foolish statements ever given by a high-ranking U.S. security official.
But that strategic timidity was gone by the end of the Reagan presidency, which refashioned its approach to terrorism in a much more serious way once the president’s inner circle was fully rounded out with people who understood the importance of the state sponsorship that was fueling global terrorism.
Biden’s responses so far to the attack in Jordan may be insufficient, but the doctrine of nonresponse itself is fully discredited. The president is under pressure from members of his own party to restore deterrence. Further, while the Iranians may be encouraged by Biden’s catastrophic pullout from Afghanistan (as would be any enemy of the West), they appear to be guilty of projection: Israel is not America’s proxy militia, and it will not end this war simply because the secretary of state wants the war to end.
Nor will Israel shy away from war with Hezbollah if that is what is required to allow its citizens to live safely in the north. “War would not be good for Hezbollah—they know they will pay a heavy price,” Defense Minister Yoav Gallant told Jewish Insider. “But we mean to return our civilians to their homes either with a treaty or with force.”
The Iranians have learned the wrong lesson from 1983, and their best hope is that the Biden administration has done the same. But either way, Israel has agency here, and it intends to use it.
The idea of raising the Palestinian Authority from its ashes on the West Bank to govern Gaza leaves Israelis across the political spectrum speechless. The Washington Post's Ishaan Tharoor recently described the Palestinian Authority as "weak and increasingly unpopular" and a "sclerotic institution, riven with corruption" and its leader, Mahmoud Abbas, as presiding "over his rump of a fiefdom like other Arab autocrats in the region, stifling civil society and repeatedly dodging calls for fresh elections." It defies common sense that such an entity should be entrusted with responsibility on the West Bank, let alone post-conflict Gaza.
With regard to the objective of full diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel, before Oct. 7, Riyadh and Jerusalem were progressing toward mutual recognition, motivated by their shared view of Iran's threat, amplified by the palpable economic and political benefits likely after recognition. The current Gaza conflict has not altered those realities. Rather, Iran's "ring of fire" strategy against Israel has emphasized, not reduced, the congruence of Israel's and Saudi Arabia's national security priorities. The issue of Palestinian statehood will not be a dealbreaker for Riyadh.
Recognizing a Palestinian state before peace is agreed on with Israel only compounds the error. Such suggestions mirror Yasser Arafat's campaign in UN agencies to make "Palestine" a state just by saying so. They contradict years of U.S. policy, as well as the Oslo Accords, and will cause Israel to stiffen its resistance. This is no way to treat an ally gravely threatened by Tehran.
As for concerns about a "wider war," the U.S. and Israel have been in a wider war since Oct. 7. The real cause is unmistakably Iran. Until Iran stops interfering beyond its borders - stops arming, equipping, training and financing terrorist groups and stops seeking nuclear weapons - there will be no lasting Middle East peace and security. Iran does not and will not fear U.S. power until it pays heavily for what its barbaric surrogate Hamas unleashed four months ago, now joined in violence by Hizbullah, the Houthis and Shiite militias.