Target Development
Target development is concerned with identifying what to attack.
The central feature of the process is the “Target Bank,” a master list
of pre-planned targets developed by IDF commanders to achieve
desired operational effects it anticipates needing. Like any other
advanced military, the IDF is constantly engaged in developing war
plans for a variety of future contingencies, even during peacetime. When hostilities break out, additional pre-planned targets are
developed in an expedited fashion and added to the Target Bank.
The target development process begins with a review of a target
in light of the mission objectives. In this phase, planners identify the
desired effect they need to achieve. For instance, must the target be
destroyed or merely degraded to achieve the desired effect? Or,
must a line of communication such as a road or airfield be rendered
permanently unusable or only taken out of use for a specific period
of time? This process also determines the “uncertainty”
surrounding the target. How specific is the intelligence in terms of
geographic and temporal certainty? What intelligence gaps remain
and how may the intelligence taskings be refined to resolve doubt?
IDF lawyers figure heavily in this process. Once planners
identify and propose targets based on anticipated or actual missions
and operational goals, lawyers from the International Law
Department review each. When hostilities
break out, the ILD is augmented by a group of additional LOAC
experts, including both active duty and reserve officers; this
combined entity is known as the Operational Law Apparatus (OLA)
and is commanded by the head of the Department. With sensitivity
to policy and operational considerations, members of the OLA first
determine whether the proposed target qualifies as a “military
objective,” a term defined below. It is during this review, and
especially for fixed targets such as command and control nodes,
critical lines of communication, arms caches, or fixed military
facilities, that possible proportionality concerns (also discussed
below) are highlighted.
MAG officers utilize a detailed checklist to perform the legal
review of the proposed strike (Appendix I). Based on this initial
assessment, each target is designated as “Approved,”
“Conditional,” or “Not Approved.”...
Target Assessment
Whereas target development is concerned with determining
what to attack, target assessment focuses on how and when to attack.
The target assessment phase begins when a target enters the Target
Bank and continues through the post-strike phase as Battle Damage
Assessments (BDA) and debriefings are conducted. Many of the
activities described in this phase may have already occurred once,
in at least a rudimentary way, during Target Development. In
Target Assessment, these steps are re-addressed in a refined way.
Therefore, Target Assessment is less a “step” or “phase” in the
targeting process than a component in a continuous loop of
intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination.
During Target Assessment, planners again identify any specially
protected persons or objects under the LOAC, like medical facilities,
that are in the target area and assess the likelihood of collateral
damage to civilian persons or objects that may result. They also designate “dead-space” near the target that is relatively free of
civilians and important civilian property, such as an abandoned
building or an open area in a depression. The dead spaces are noted
for possible use during execution of the strike as a location towards
which a steerable weapon such as a laser-guided missile may be
diverted to limit unanticipated collateral damage. IDF lawyers in
the OLA provide around-the-clock advice to planners and
commanders as they refine target intelligence to ensure compliance
with the LOAC.
This situational understanding informs the weaponeering
process, which in the IDF is elaborate and sophisticated. Broadly
speaking, “weaponeering” is the selection of the means (weapon)
and method (tactic) that will be employed to attack a particular
target. Effective weaponeering is as much a military art as it is a
military science.
During weaponeering, expert planners adjust the munition, the
delivery platform, the angle of attack, and other physical variables
in order to best achieve the desired military effect while complying
with the LOAC requirement to minimize or eliminate collateral
damage to protected persons and property. For instance, the IDF
often employs specially configured smaller warheads with reduced
explosive material against targets in urban areas to limit collateral
damage. Other warheads have been re-engineered to generate
lighter fragments upon detonation so that the fragments travel
shorter distances from the point of impact. Additionally, pilots and
operational planners with training in physics and aerodynamics
determine the appropriate angle of attack – the vector upon which
munitions will be released from attack platforms—in order to direct
the blast away from nearby civilian persons or objects while
achieving the desired effect. Of particular note is the fact that,
whenever feasible, the IDF uses engineers alongside munitions
experts and pilots to better understand the impact of an attack on
structures. ...
Pre-Strike Controls
Targets that have been developed and assessed remain in the
Target Bank until the decision is made to strike a target. At that
point, additional pre-strike controls are implemented. The target is
re-verified – appropriate intelligence assets and other observation
platforms confirm the location of the target and that it remains a
valid military objective susceptible to attack. Pre-strike controls
include reassessment of the initial proportionality review conducted
during target development, since changes in the military situation
may decrease the military advantage anticipated or the previously
unidentified presence of protected persons or objects in the target
area might increase expected collateral damage. Proportionality is
monitored, to the extent feasible, until the moment of weapons
release. If significant new intelligence surfaces, a reassessment all
relevant officers involved in the targeting process, including the
legal advisor, is required.
Whenever feasible, the IDF employs various precautions aimed
at avoiding, or at least minimizing, the collateral damage expected
from the attack. These precautions may include, for example, visual observation by an RPA. This enables movable targets to be tracked
and facilitates the identification of civilians and civilian objects that
may have come into the target area unexpectedly in order to cancel,
divert, or modify a strike if necessary based on legal or rules of
engagement concerns.
When civilians may be affected by an attack and it is militarily
feasible to do so, the IDF undertakes extensive measures to warn
them....
Strike Operations
Target development, target assessment, and pre-strike controls
continue until the moment of attack. The final decision to strike is
generally made at a high level in the Air Force Headquarters, where
a robust operations center monitors each target through strike
execution. Pilots retain the discretion to abort a mission if their own
observation of the target indicates that the unanticipated presence
of civilians or civilian objects in the target area requires the attack to
be cancelled on the basis of a change in proportionality. The IDF
stresses this responsibility, and the responsibility to take feasible
precautions in attack, to pilots in their training.
The ultimate measure of control for air operations lies in the
senior decision-makers in the air operations center. While the IDF
did not consent to public identification of the individuals who
exercise this authority, it can be described as a cadre of very senior
decision-makers with extensive experience, training, and robust
support from intelligence analysts, weaponeering experts and legal
advisors. During the Authors’ interviews of senior IDF leaders, it
became clear that they are acutely aware of the scrutiny their attacks
receive and of their legal obligations. Indeed, in many cases they
disapprove of what are clearly lawful strikes on the basis that the
advantage likely to be gained is outweighed by potential negative
repercussions in the public information and strategic
communications arena (the so-called “CNN effect”), or based on
broader policy concerns that factor heavily in their decisions.
Immediately following an attack, the pilot, as well as ground
observers and other intelligence sources, conduct an assessment of
the strike’s effects, both in terms of Battle Damage Assessment and
collateral damage. This assessment feeds a “lessons learned”
process in which tactics, munitions, and the effectiveness of various
intelligence sources are analyzed and, when necessary, adjusted to
facilitate greater precision and better effects, as well as decreased
collateral damage, in subsequent attacks.