Saudi media silent on Wikileaks revelations

In the wake of the Wikileaks revelations about Saudi princes partying, Saudi desire to destroy Hezbollah and how much the Saudi monarchy hates Iran, I was wondering how the Saudi media are reporting these news items.

The answer? They aren't.

The English-language Saudi Gazette and Arab News have both limited their Wikileaks stories to very general issues and have not delved into any of the revelations, especially none that mention the kingdom. (Al-Arabiya, partly owned by the Saudi MBC network but based in Dubai, did a minimal report on one of the cables.)

It is easy to forget, when reading English-language Arab media, that there is a wide gulf (pun partially intended) between Western ideas of freedom of expression and those practiced in most of the Arab world. Even though one can find articles in Arab and Arabic media that would not be out of place in any Western publication, it takes a little more effort to realize what is not being covered.

There is a glimmer of good news here, though. Since we can see that the Saudi monarchy does not allow any articles to be published that they disapprove of, that means that they specifically allow many recent articles about increasing women's rights in the Kingdom as well as articles that implicitly denigrate the Muttawa, Saudi Arabia's religious police.

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Saudi princes know how to par-ty!

The latest Wikileaks cable from Jeddah is a fun read:

Behind the facade of Wahabi conservatism in the streets, the underground nightlife for Jeddah’s elite youth is thriving and throbbing. The full range of worldly temptations and vices are available -- alcohol, drugs, sex -- but strictly behind closed doors. This freedom to indulge carnal pursuits is possible merely because the religious police keep their distance when parties include the presence or patronage of a Saudi royal and his circle of loyal attendants, such as a Halloween event attended by ConGenOffs on. [DETAIL REMOVED] Over the past few years, the increased conservatism of Saudi Arabia’s external society has pushed the nightlife and party scene in Jeddah even further underground. End summary.

Elite party like the rest of the world,
---------------------------------------

just underground
-----------------

Along with over 150 young Saudis (men and women mostly in their 20’s and early 30’s), ConGenOffs [officials of the US consulate - EoZ] accepted invitations to an underground Halloween party at PrinceXXXXXXXXXXXX residence in Jeddah on XXXXXXXXXXXX. Inside the gates, past the XXXXXXXXXXXX security guards and after the abaya coat-check, the scene resembled a nightclub anywhere outside the Kingdom: plentiful alcohol, young couples dancing, a DJ at the turntables, and everyone in costume. Funding for the party came from a corporate sponsor, XXXXXXa U.S.-based energy-drink company as well as from the princely host himself.

Royalty, attended by “khawi,” keep religious police at bay
--------------------------------------------- -------------

Religious police/CPVPV (Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice) were nowhere to be seen and while admission was controlled through a strictly-enforced guest list, the partygoers were otherwise not shy about publicizing the affair. According to a young Saudi from a prominent Jeddah merchant family, the Saudis try to throw parties at princes’ houses or with princes in attendance, which serves as sufficient deterrent to interference by the CPVPV. There are over 10,000 princes in the Kingdom, albeit at various levels and gradations -- “Royal Highnesses” (“Saheb Al Sumou Al Maliki”) signified by direct descent from King Abdulaziz, and mere “Highnesses” (“Saheb Al Sumou”) from less direct branches of the Al Saud ruling family. Our host that evening,xxxxxx (protect), traces his roots to Thunayan, a brother of Mohammad, Amir of Diriyyah and Nejd (1725-65), King Abdullah’s direct ancestor, six generations back. Although PrinceXXXXXXXXXXXX is XXXXXXXXXXXX not in line for the throne, he still enjoys the perks of a mansion, luxury car, lifetime stipend, and security entourage. (Note: Most of the prince XXXXXXXXXXXX’s security forces were young XXXXXXXXXXXX men. It is common practice for Saudi princes to grow up with hired bodyguards from Nigeria or other African nations who are of similar age and who remain with the prince well into adulthood. They are called “khawi,” derived from the Arabic word “akh,” meaning “brother.” The lifetime spent together creates an intense bond of loyalty. End note.)

Availability of black market alcohol, prostitutes, and drugs
--------------------------------------------- ---------------

Alcohol, though strictly prohibited by Saudi law and custom, was plentiful at the party’s well-stocked bar, well-patronized by Halloween revellers. The hired Filipino bartenders served a cocktail punch using “sadiqi,” a locally-made “moonshine.” While top-shelf liquor bottles were on display throughout the bar area, the original contents were reportedly already consumed and replaced by sadiqi. On the black market, a bottle of Smirnoff can cost 1,500 riyals when available, compared to 100 riyals for the locally-made vodka. It was also learned through word-of-mouth that a number of the guests were in fact “working girls,” not uncommon for such parties.

Additionally, though not witnessed directly at this event, cocaine and hashish use is common in these social circles and has been seen on other occasions.

Comment: Saudi youth get to enjoy relative social freedom and indulge fleshly pursuits, but only behind closed doors -- and only the rich. Parties of this nature and scale are believed to be a relatively recent phenomenon in Jeddah. One contact, a young Saudi male, explained that up to a few years ago, the only weekend activity was “dating” inside the homes of the affluent in small groups. It is not uncommon in Jeddah for the more lavish private residences to include elaborate basement bars, discos, entertainment centers and clubs. As one high society Saudi remarked, “The increased conservatism of our society over these past years has only moved social interaction to the inside of people’s homes.”

It will be very interesting to see if and how the Saudi media reacts to this.

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Wikileaks is only starting

Only 1,060 of 251,287 documents - 0.42% - have been released so far, according to the Wikileaks Cablegate website (one mirrored here.)

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Wikileaks: Saudis wanted Arab/NATO alliance to destroy Hezbollah

From The Guardian:

Saudi Arabia proposed creating an Arab force backed by US and Nato air and sea power to intervene in Lebanon two years ago and destroy Iranian-backed Hezbollah, according to a US diplomatic cable released by WikiLeaks.

The plan would have sparked a proxy battle between the US and its allies against Iran, fought in one of the most volatile regions of the world.

The Saudi plan was never enacted but reflects the anxiety of Saudi Arabia – as well as the US – about growing Iranian influence in Lebanon and elsewhere in the Middle East.

The proposal was made by the veteran Saudi foreign minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal, to the US special adviser to Iraq, David Satterfield. The US responded by expressing scepticism about the military feasibility of the plan.

Here is what the cable said:
Opening a discussion with S/I Satterfield focused largely on Iraq, Saud first turned to Lebanon and stated that the effort by "Hizballah and Iran" to take over Beirut was the first step in a process that would lead to the overthrow of the Siniora government and an "Iranian takeover of all Lebanon." Such a victory, combined with Iranian actions in Iraq and on the Palestinian front, would be a disaster for the US and the entire region. Saud argued that the present situation in Beirut was "entirely military" and that the solution must be military as well. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) were too fragile to bear more pressure; they needed urgent backing to secure Beirut from Hizballah's assault. What was needed was an "Arab force" drawn from Arab "periphery" states to deploy to Beirut under the "cover of the UN" and with a significant presence drawn from UNIFIL in south Lebanon "which is sitting doing nothing." The US and NATO would be asked to provide equipment for such a force as well as logistics, movement support, and "naval and air cover."

This happened during Hezbollah's siege of Beirut in 2008.

I guess, in the parlance of that part of the world, Saudi Arabia must be considered Zionist...

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Wikileaks: Concern about IHH in December 2009

In a recently released cable dated December 4th, 2009 it is mentioned that the Treasury Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes raised concerns about IHH, the Turkish Humanitarian Relief Foundation. The same organization which purchased the Mavi Marmara and joined a flotilla of ships going to Gaza in May 2010.

The cable states that the IHH is "a large NGO providing material assistance to Hamas". [NAME REMOVED] surprisingly said to the Assistant Secretary that he was not familiar with the NGO but would look into the matter.

The same person whose name is removed from the cable states that Turkey and private Turks "sympathize with the needs of people in Gaza" and will send money directly to the people and work to "convince our Israeli friends to send help also".

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Wikileaks: PalArab/Jordanian rioting cancels soccer game

From the latest batch of Wikileaks, an indication of how much Jordanians dislike their Palestinian Arab brethren:

Summary: Anti-Palestinian hooliganism and slogans denigrating the Palestinian origins of both the Queen and the Crown Prince led to the cancellation of a July 17 soccer game between the rival Faisali and Wahdat clubs, who traditionally represent the East Banker and Palestinian communities, respectively. Matches between the two teams have a long history of violence, but the specific digs at the royal family marked a new low. The clubs have been fined and their fans publicly chastised, yet official media reporting and commentary has been noticeably thin. The game exposed the growing rift between East Bankers and Palestinians in Jordan. The King’s silence on the event is noteworthy, as is a reluctance among our contacts to discuss the issue. End Summary.

Jordanian police intervened to stop fan violence and the chanting of anti-regime slogans during a July 17 [2009] match between Amman soccer clubs Faisali and Wahdat in the industrial town of Zarqa. The unrest began when Faisali fans started to chant slogans against Palestinian-origin Jordanians, including Queen Rania. Some Faisali fans threw bottles at Wahdat players and their fans. The coaches of both teams ordered their players off of the field in the middle of the game for their own safety, and the remainder of the match was canceled. (Note: It ended in a scoreless draw. End Note.)

---------

¶5. (S) Faisali-Wahdat games have a long history of hooliganism and politically motivated violence. Past matches have been shut down by the police following riots spurred by offensive slogans shouted by both sides. Those slogans have over time become a popular barometer of tensions between East Bankers and Palestinians. The slogans and cheers on the Faisali side during the July 17 match were particularly divisive and controversial, as they were directed at members of the royal family for the first time. Faisali supporters chanted about the Palestinian origins of Queen Rania with the cheer, “divorce her you father of Hussein, and we’ll marry you to two of ours.” The newly appointed Crown Prince did not escape comment either, as he is half Palestinian (and one quarter British) himself.

Official Fallout
----------------

¶6. (SBU) Official reaction to the match was surprisingly pro-forma. Prince Ali, half-brother to the King and chairman of the Jordanian Football Union (JFU), issued a statement calling the behavior of Faisali fans “unacceptable” and “a red line.” In addition to a relatively meager 5000 JD (USD 7000) fine on Faisali, the JFU indicated that larger security restrictions would be placed on future games. Members of parliament also sent a missive to the press denouncing the chants of Faisali supporters as “contrary to Jordanian values.” The statement was read by MP and Wahdat president Tareq Khoury on the floor of parliament. The Faisali club issued a press release of its own, promising to identify the “outcasts” among its fans and deal with them accordingly.

Media Silence, Internet Cacophony

¶7. (C) Despite all of the official condemnations of Faisali and its supporters, none of Jordan’s self-censoring media featured descriptive news stories about the game and why it was called off. Columnists and commentators, even those who are usually used to advance pro-government views, were noticeably silent. The heads of the Faisali and Wahdat fan clubs were allegedly invited to appear on Al-Jazeera, but refused in recognition of the sensitivities surrounding criticism of the royal family.

¶8. (SBU) Internet news sites, however, were full of commentary on the game and its implications. Many defended the Faisali supporters as “real” Jordanians fighting against undue Palestinian influence. Some commentators believe that Prince Ali failed to remain neutral in the conflict by only chastising Faisali supporters, and called for Wahdat to receive similar opprobrium.

Comment
-------

¶9. (S) There is broad recognition throughout Jordan that the Faisali-Wahdat incident exposed the uncomfortable gap between East Bankers and Palestinian-origin Jordanians -- one that most would rather keep well-hidden for the sake of political stability. The connection between this rift and the Hashemite monarchy, including the newly-appointed Crown Prince, makes the incident even more unsettling. Even our most forthcoming contacts are reluctant to talk with us about the issue, recognizing that it strikes at the core of Jordanian identity politics. One contact reluctantly admitted that the game brought out the “ugly side of Jordanian ultranationalism” and said that it would be difficult to contain now that it was publicly expressed. Another pointed to the “increasingly explicit and provocative” Faisali slogans as proof that status quo-oriented East Bankers are uncomfortable with the increasing pressures for reform that will inevitably lessen their near-monopoly on political and social power.

¶10. (S) The King’s silence on the game and its political implications is deafening. High level government contacts and members of the diplomatic community are puzzled by the King’s failure to respond to a verbal attack on his family that also dips in to Jordanian identity politics. While he is on “internal vacation” in the southern part of Jordan, the King’s public exposure has been limited to meetings with scattered foreign officials. While perhaps unintentional, the King’s silence has effectively empowered the pro-status quo establishment.

I knew there was friction in Jordan between the communities, but this is much bigger than I thought.

I need not mention that if any Israelis had shouted anti-Palestinian Arab slogans in a soccer game, it would be broadcast all over the world to prove Israeli racism. Jordanian bigotry against their own Arab brothers, on the other hand, is not going to get reported.

(After I found this, I saw that JPost had already covered it.)

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How did the Wikileaks get leaked?

A compelling article in Pajamas Media by Charlie Martin:

As someone who has been involved with intelligence for more than 30 years and with computer security for 25, the professionally interesting point is: “How did it happen?”

Let’s start by recalling some of the basics of the whole arcane mechanism of classification. The classification system in the U.S. grows out of two basic axioms: first, you work hardest to protect the material that can cause the most damage; and second, the one way to be certain someone can’t reveal a secret is to make sure they don’t know it.

...The whole system of classification depends on two things: making it hard to get sensitive information, and making sure as few people as possible do know a particular piece of classified information by using “need to know” rules and their formalization in compartments.

According to the press coverage, the only suspect is one Pfc. Bradley Manning. Manning had been an intelligence analyst supporting the 10th Mountain Division. Manning bragged about having passed information to WikiLeaks to Adrian Lamo, previously famous for having cracking into the New York Times‘ internal systems. Lamo turned him in.

The story, as reported by the Guardian, is that Manning gathered the information on SIPRnet — a U.S. government sharing network for data at SECRET and below — then loaded it on writable CD-ROMs that he brought into his work area saying they contained Lady GaGa music.

The problem here: this explanation raises many more questions than it answers.

First is the “need to know” question. Manning had been a E-4 Specialist (same pay grade as a corporal) analyst — he was busted to PFC for unrelated reasons — and would have had access to intelligence in theatre. It seems inconceivable that he would have access to worldwide diplomatic cable traffic. The Guardian story’s answer is that these cables were being dumped into SIPRnet as part of a 9/11-inspired attempt to make information available, and thus avoid the problem of people not “connecting the dots.”

Perhaps. But the other side of that argument is what’s known as the “aggregation problem” in computer security: the more information you collect together, the more you can learn. As we’re seeing in these leaks, you can infer some very sensitive stuff from a lot of relatively low-level information. Are we really giving any random person with a SECRET clearance access to this much information, including video of Baghdad firefights and Special Forces operation reports?

Second, there’s the way Manning is said to have gotten the information out of his secure area. According to the Guardian, Manning brought in some rewritable CD-ROMs with music, erased the music, copied the data to the CD-ROMs, and walked back out with them.

If so, there is an ex-officer from his unit who is now counting socks in Thule, Greenland, or should be. Secure areas have a very straightforward rule on such things: media may come in, but it can’t go back out. (In fact, when I worked in a secured area, we even had to lock up our typewriter ribbons and platens.)

But this seems unlikely, because the DoD had forbidden people to even bring CDs and thumb drives in to secure areas in 2008.
...
This explanation isn’t completely implausible. Not completely. If it’s true, it appears that it means general breakdowns in the methods by which the U.S. has protected classified information since the First World War, as well as violating explicit policies and procedures.

Of course, there’s another explanation: someone at a higher level of trust than Pfc. Manning is the real source, and Manning is just a convenient fall guy.

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Wikileaks: Hezbollah's fiber optics network, courtesy of Iran

From JPost:

In yet another WikiLeaks release of leaked US State Department cables on Sunday, it was revealed that Hizbullah established a complete fiber optic communications network throughout Lebanon, independent of the country's communications system, which he said Iran fully financed.

Lebanese Telecommunications Minister Marwan Hamadeh decried the establishment of the separate communications network, calling it "a strategic victory for Iran." Hamdeh said that setting up the fiber optics network was "the final step in creating a nation-state, and that "Hizbullah now has an army and weapons; a television station; an education system; hospitals; a financial system; and a telecommunications system."

Discussing the options of the Lebanese government in countering the independent communications network, Hamadeh said that the Hariri government had two choices: to seek a UN Security Council resolution, or to cut the fiber optic lines. However, the telecommunications minister said he was told by a Hizbullah official that "any move against the FiOS [fiber optics system] would be taken as 'an Israeli attack' and dealt with accordingly."

In statements to US Charge d'Affaires Michele Sison in Beirut, Hamadeh expressed fear for his and other government officials' physical safety for exposing and challenging the Hizbullah communications network. He said that the anti-Syrian, anti-Hizbullah March 14 movement, led by now-Lebanese President Sa'ad Hariri was relaying details of the network to a handful of friendly countries, both in the West and throughout the Arab world.

Hamadeh accused the "Iranian Fund for the Reconstruction of Lebanon" of funding the fiber optics project. He said the same group has been building roads and bridges since the 2006 Second Lebanon War and was using the roads projects as a cover to install the communications lines. Describing the wide reach of the newly installed network, he said the lines run "from Beirut, around both sides of the airport, into the south below the Litani [River] and back up through the Bekaa Valley to the far north." He said it goes through Palestinian refugee camps, Hizbullah training camps, and through Christian areas.

This is not exactly news, but the Western media has been all but ignoring the ugly fact that Iran, through Hezbollah, has already destroyed Lebanon from within. All that is left is a shell of a country that cannot act independently - and that gets threatened if it acts as if it is sovereign.

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A couple of new Wikileaks

From Ha'aretz:

The Irish government has acted to limit transfers of American weapons to Israel and Iraq through Shannon Airport in the wake of public outrage after the Second Lebanon War, an American diplomatic cable published by WikiLeaks reveals.

After the Second Lebanon War, the Israel Defense Forces needed to restore its depleted ammunition stocks, but the ambassador's cable indicates that the Irish government has been making it increasingly difficult for American weapons shipments to Israel to pass through its airport.

The cable, sent from the Dublin embassy in September 2006, says that "although supportive of continued U.S. military transits at Shannon Airport, the Irish Government has informally begun to place constraints on U.S. operations at the facility, mainly in response to public sensitivities over U.S. actions in the Middle East."

According to the ambassador, "Segments of the Irish public ... see the airport as a symbol of Irish complicity in perceived U.S. wrongdoing in the Gulf/Middle East." He said the Irish government "has recently introduced more cumbersome notification requirements for equipment-related transits in the wake of the Lebanon conflict."

And from WSJ:

Leaked U.S. diplomatic cables provide new details on the U.S. assessment of how Iran's Revolutionary Guards Corps has promoted Tehran's influence in Iraq since the 2003 U.S.-led invasion.

The demise of archenemy Saddam Hussein, with whom Tehran fought an eight-year war in the 1980s, presented the Iranians with an unprecedented opportunity, and they appear to have exploited it from Day One.

The leadership of the Qods Force—the Guards' paramilitary and espionage arm—"took advantage of the vacuum" in the aftermath of the fall of Mr. Hussein's regime to begin sending operatives into Iraq when "little attention was focused on Iran," according to an April 2009 dispatch from the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad. The cable was part of a trove of classified U.S. diplomatic communications made public this week by WikiLeaks.

(h/t Joel)

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Wikileaks: Hezbollah's presence in Brazil

It's generally known that Hezbollah is active in Latin-America. Basically it's not new what Wikileaks reveals, but still it's worth it to mention.

This is what Wikileaks has released so far:

"While the majority of Brazil’s Muslims are moderate in orientation and the overwhelming majority is moderate in deed and action, genuine radical elements do exist here, some in the Tri-Border area of Foz de Iguacu and others among Sao Paulo’s estimated 20,000-strong, Hezbollah-oriented Shia population. Muslims at the moderate, Sunni-oriented Future Institute charge that Shia immigrants sometimes come to Brazil with Hezbollah support (allegedly USD 50,000 is a typical sum) to found businesses to support Hezbollah in Lebanon." [Nov 2009]

and:

"Sao Paulo's Muslim moderates worry about the rise of fundamentalism and Hezbollah influence among more recent waves of largely Shia Lebanese immigrants, as they promote a broadly tolerant vision of "modern Islam". Their own community remains quite traditional, with women's and youth organizations limited. Even so, the traditional leadership's eagerness to engage, acute awareness of the dangers of radicalism, and their solid achievements in integrating Muslim and Brazilian identities make them an excellent example of how a unique MMC (Muslim Minority Community) has, by and large, carved out a positive space within a diverse Latin American country. ...
As [XXXX], a Lebanese Brazilian banker and Maronite Christian, told SMRC Pandith, "Hezbollah is gaining [adherents]," particularly with more recent Shia Lebanese immigrants. Consequently, the moderates want to "push back against the radicals" by promoting popular interfaith activities. " [December 2009]

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Paranoia is funny:"Wikileaks is Israeli plot against Turkey"

The depths of crazy, courtesy of Turkey's Hurriyet Daily News:

Israel could have engineered the release of hundreds of thousands of confidential documents on WikiLeaks as a plot to corner Turkey on both domestic and foreign policy, according to a senior ruling party official.

“One has to look at which countries are pleased with these. Israel is very pleased. Israel has been making statements for days, even before the release of these documents,” Hüseyin Çelik, deputy leader of the Justice and Development Party, or AKP, and the party’s spokesperson, told reporters at a press conference Wednesday.

Following initial reaction to the leaked U.S. Embassy cables, which have revealed diplomatic secrets about Turkey, Azerbaijan, its Middle Eastern neighbors, Turkish officials have started to suspect that “the main cause of these leaks was to weaken the Turkish government.”

WikiLeaks has released approximately 250,000 documents of confidential U.S. diplomatic correspondence to newspapers around the world. Around 8,000 of those documents are from the U.S. Embassy to Ankara.

That a whopping 3%.

Yasin Doğan, a columnist for the pro-government Yeni Şafak newspaper, also named the Israeli lobby in the U.S. as the source of the cable leaks.

According to observers, government officials believe the cables leaked through WikiLeaks were selected as part of a comprehensive plan to corner Turkey both in terms of domestic and international politics.

On foreign policy, the release of cables indicating that many Arab countries were in fact in favor of a military attack on Iran to scuttle Tehran’s ambitions to develop nuclear weapons were seen as moves to show that Turkey was alone in defending Iran in the region.

“This situation posits Turkey as the only advocate of Iran not only in Europe but also in the Middle East,” Murat Yetkin, Ankara representative of the daily Radikal, wrote in his column Wednesday.

Yetkin added his observation that Ankara has evaluated the cables as a psychological campaign to push Turkey to take a cooler stance on Iran.

Furthermore, the release of remarks by Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev on Turkey and other remarks that Balkan countries were extremely uncomfortable with Davutoğlu’s frequently heard rhetoric on neo-Ottonamism were also evaluated as moves to weaken Turkish influence in its near abroad.

One problem with megalomaniacs is that they think that everything revolves around them.

(h/t Vandoren)

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Wikileaks: Egypt recruiting spies in Iraq and Syria against Iran

An interesting cable about a meeting between Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen and Egyptian General Intelligence Service Chief Omar Soliman, April 2009. In it, we learn that Egypt is recruiting spies in Syria and Iraq to infiltrate Iran, that Egypt is just as upset at Iran as any other Arab state - and not just because of the nuclear issue; that Iran was smuggling arms and $25 million of cash into Gaza a month; that Gaza puts moderate Arab regimes in a corner (presumably because they don't support Hamas radicalism but their people do), that Soliman does not distinguish between Hezbollah and Iran at all. Excerpts:

Soliman said radicalism was the "backbone" of regional security threats, adding that radicalism in Gaza posed a particularly serious threat to Egyptian national security. Soliman said Egypt must "confront" Iranian attempts to smuggle arms to Gaza and stop arms smuggling through Egyptian territory.

We do not want incidents like Gaza to inflame public anger," Soliman said, adding that the Gaza conflict put "moderate (Arab) regimes" in a corner. To prevent another outbreak of violence, Egypt is focusing on Palestinian reconciliation and a durable cease-fire between Hamas and Israel. On reconciliation, Soliman explained, the ultimate goal was to return the Palestinian Authority to Gaza, as "Gaza in the hands of radicals will never be calm."

Iran is "very active in Egypt," Soliman said. Iranian financial support to Hamas amounted to $25 million a month, but he said Egypt was "succeeding" in preventing financial support from entering Gaza through Egypt. Iran has tried several times to pay the salaries for the al-Qassam Battalions, but Egypt had succeeded in preventing the money from reaching Gaza. Soliman said the Egyptian government had arrested a "big Hezbollah cell," which was Hezbollah's first attempt to stand up a cell within Egypt. Iran was also trying to recruit support from the Sinai Bedouins, he claimed, in order to facilitate arms smuggling to Gaza.

Egypt has "started a confrontation with Hezbollah and Iran," Soliman stressed, and "we will not allow Iran to operate in Egypt." Soliman said Egypt had sent a clear message to Iran that if they interfere in Egypt, Egypt will interfere in Iran, adding that EGIS had already begun recruiting agents in Iraq and Syria. Soliman hoped the U.S. would "not walk the same track as the Europeans" in regards to negotiating with Iran and warned against only focusing on one issue at time, like Iran's nuclear weapons program. Iran must "pay the price" for its actions and not be allowed to interfere in regional affairs. "If you want Egypt to cooperate with you on Iran, we will," Soliman added, "it would take a big burden off our shoulders."

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Wikileaks: How to negotiate with Iranians (1979)

Here's a notable cable, from 1979 - in the wake of the Islamic revolution in Iran - on how Iranians think, and what precautions diplomats need to take in negotiating with Iranians.

INTRODUCTION: RECENT NEGOTIATIONS IN WHICH THE EMBASSY HAS BEEN INVOLVED HERE, RANGING FROM COMPOUND SECURITY TO VISA OPERATIONS TO GTE TO THE SHERRY CASE, HIGHLIGHT SEVERAL SPECIAL FEATURES OF CONDUCTING BUSINESS IN THE PERSIAN ENVIRONMENT. IN SOME INSTANCES THE DIFFICULTIES WE HAVE ENCOUNTERED ARE A PARTIAL REFLECTION ON THE EFFECTS OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION, BUT WE BELIEVE THE UNDERLYING CULTURAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL QUALITIES THAT ACCOUNT FOR THE NATURE OF THESE DIFFICULTIES ARE AND WILL REMAIN RELATIVELY CONSTANT. THEREFORE, WE SUGGEST THAT THE FOLLOWING ANALYSIS BE USED TO BRIEF BOTH USG PERSONNEL AND PRIVATE SECTOR REPRESENTATIVES WHO ARE REQUIRED TO DO BUSINESS WITH AND IN THIS COUNTRY. END INTRODUCTION.

¶3. PERHAPS THE SINGLE DOMINANT ASPECT OF THE PERSIAN PSYCHE IS AN OVERRIDING EGOISM. ITS ANTECEDENTS LIE IN THE LONG IRANIAN HISTORY OF INSTABILITY AND INSECURITY WHICH PUT A PREMIUM ON SELF-PRESERVATION. THE PRACTICAL EFFECT OF IT IS AN ALMOST TOTAL PERSIAN PREOCCUPATION WITH SELF AND LEAVES LITTLE ROOM FOR UNDERSTANDING POINTS OF VIEW OTHER THAN ONE'S OWN. ...

¶4. THE REVERSE OF THIS PARTICULAR PSYCHOLOGICAL COIN, AND HAVING THE SAME HISTORICAL ROOTS AS PERSIAN EGOISM, IS A PERVASIVE UNEASE ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE WORLD IN WHICH ONE LIVES. THE PERSIAN EXPERIENCE HAS BEEN THAT NOTHING IS PERMANENT AND IT IS COMMONLY PERCEIVED THAT HOSTILE FORCES ABOUND. IN SUCH AN ENVIRONMENT EACH INDIVIDUAL MUST BE CONSTANTLY ALERT FOR OPPORTUNITIES TO PROTECT HIMSELF AGAINST THE MALEVOLENT FORCES THAT WOULD OTHERWISE BE HIS UNDOING. HE IS OBVIOUSLY JUSTIFIED IN USING ALMOST ANY MEANS AVAILABLE TO EXPLOIT SUCH OPPORTUNITIES. THIS APPROACH UNDERLIES THE SOCALLED "BAZAAR MENTALITY" SO COMMON AMONG PERSIANS, A MIND-SET THAT OFTEN IGNORES LONGER TERM INTERESTS IN FAVOR OF IMMEDIATELY OBTAINABLE ADVANTAGES AND COUNTENANCES PRACTICES THAT ARE REGARDED AS UNETHICAL BY OTHER NORMS.

¶5. COUPLED WITH THESE PSYCHOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS IS A GENERAL INCOMPREHENSION OF CASUALITY. ISLAM, WITH ITS EMPHASIS ON THE OMNIPOTENCE OF GOD, APPEARS TO ACCOUNT AT LEAST IN MAJOR PART FOR THIS PHENOMENON. SOMEWHAT SURPRISINGLY, EVEN THOSE IRANIANS EDUCATED IN THE WESTERN STYLE AND PERHAPS WITH LONG EXPERIENCE OUTSIDE IRAN ITSELF FREQUENTLY HAVE DIFFICULTY GRASPING THE INTER-RELATIONSHIP OF EVENTS. WITNESS A YAZDI RESISTING THE IDEA THAT IRANIAN BEHAVIOR HAS CONSEQUENCES ON THE PERCEPTION OF IRAN IN THE U.S. OR THAT THIS PERCEPTION IS SOMEHOW RELATED TO AMERICAN POLICIES REGARDING IRAN. THIS SAME QUALITY ALSO HELPS EXPLAIN PERSIAN AVERSION TO ACCEPTING RESPONSIBILITY FOR ONE'S OWN ACTIONS. THE DEUS EX MACHINA IS ALWAYS AT WORK.

¶6. THE PERSIAN PROCLIVITY FOR ASSUMING THAT TO SAY SOMETHING IS TO DO IT FURTHER COMPLICATES MATTERS. ...

¶6. FINALLY, THERE ARE THE PERSIAN CONCEPTS OF INFLUENCE AND OBLIGATION. EVERYONE PAYS OBEISANCE TO THE FORMER AND THE LATTER IS USUALLY HONORED IN THE BREACH. PERSIANS ARE CONSUMED WITH DEVELOPING PARTI BAZI--THE INFLUENCE THAT WILL HELP GET THINGS DONE--WHILE FAVORS ARE ONLY GRUDGINGLY BESTOWED AND THEN JUST TO THE EXTENT THAT A TANGIBLE QUID PRO QUO IS IMMEDIATELY PRECEPTIBLE. FORGET ABOUT ASSISTANCE PROFERRED LAST YEAR OR EVEN LAST WEEK; WHAT CAN BE OFFERED TODAY?

¶7. THERE ARE SEVERAL LESSONS FOR THOSE WHO WOULD NEGOTIATE WITH PERSIANS IN ALL THIS:

- --FIRST, ONE SHOULD NEVER ASSUME THAT HIS SIDE OF THE ISSUE WILL BE RECOGNIZED, LET ALONE THAT IT WILL BE CONCEDED TO HAVE MERITS. PERSIAN PREOCCUPATION WITH SELF PRECLUDES THIS. A NEGOTIATOR MUST FORCE RECOGNITION OF HIS POSITION UPON HIS PERSIAN OPPOSITE NUMBER.

- --SECOND, ONE SHOULD NOT EXPECT AN IRANIAN READILY TO PERCEIVE THE ADVANTAGES OF A LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIP BASED ON TRUST. HE WILL ASSUME THAT HIS OPPOSITE NUMBER IS ESSENTIALLY AN ADVERSARY. IN DEALING WITH HIM HE WILL ATTEMPT TO MAXIMIZE THE BENEFITS TO HIMSELF THAT ARE IMMEDIATELY OBTAINABLE. HE WILL BE PREPARED TO GO TO GREAT LENGTHS TO ACHIEVE THIS GOAL, INCLUDING RUNNING THE RISK OF SO ALIENATING WHOEVER HE IS DEALING WITH THAT FUTURE BUSINESS WOULD BE UNTHINKABLE, AT LEAST TO THE LATTER.

- --THIRD, INTERLOCKING RELATIONSHIPS OF ALL ASPECTS OF AN ISSUE MUST BE PAINSTAKINGLY, FORECEFULLY AND REPEATEDLY DEVELOPED. LINKAGES WILL BE NEITHER READILY COMPREHENDED NOR ACCEPTED BY PERSIAN NEGOTIATORS.

- --FOURTH, ONE SHOULD INSIST ON PERFORMANCE AS THE SINE QUA NON AT ESH STAGE OF NEGOTIATIONS. STATEMENTS OF INTENTION COUNT FOR ALMOST NOTHING.

- --FIFTH, CULTIVATION OF GOODWILL FOR GOODWILL'S SAKE IS A WASTE OF EFFORT. THE OVERRIDING OBJECTIVE AT ALL TIMES SHOULD BE IMPRESSING UPON THE PERSIAN ACROSS THE TABLE THE MUTUALITY OF THE PROPOSED UNDERTAKINGS, HE MUST BE MADE TO KNOW THAT A QUID PRO QUO IS INVOLVED ON BOTH SIDES.

- --FINALLY, ONE SHOULD BE PREPARED FOR THE THREAT OF BREAKDOWN IN NEGOTIATIONS AT ANY GIVEN MOMENT AND NOT BE COWED BY THE POSSIBLITY. GIVEN THE PERSIAN NEGOTIATOR'S CULTURAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS, HE IS GOING TO RESIST THE VERY CONCEPT OF A RATIONAL (FROM THE WESTERN POINT OF VIEW) NEGOTIATING PROCESS.

I would guess that things are a little different now, only because the Iranian leadership is committed to a policy of lying about and hiding its nuclear program as a state-level function, not merely on the personal plane that this cable is speaking about. But it is still illuminating, and probably not far off from the truth.

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"We're tapping phone lines - I know that that ain't allowed"

From Ha'aretz:

The United States broke an Israeli code and tapped the secure phone line in the Israeli Embassy in Washington without Jerusalem's knowledge.

That revelation about Israeli-American relations did not come from WikiLeaks, but rather from former ambassador to Washington Itamar Rabinovich, in a radio interview yesterday.

Rabinovich did not say exactly when the code was broken and when Israel found out about it, but it was understood from his remarks that the tap started after his 1993-1996 tenure in the U.S. capital and was discovered only years later.

The former envoy said that every staffer at the Israeli Embassy in Washington is warned about possible leaks of conversations held in the building and on ordinary phone lines, but also on the secure phone line.

After the Americans broke the code, Israel's deepest policy secrets were apparently exposed.

"Every 'juicy' telegram was in danger of being leaked," Rabinovich told Army Radio's Razi Barkai. "We sent very few of them. Sometimes I came to Israel to deliver reports orally. The Americans were certainly tapping the regular phone lines, and it became clear that in later years they were also listening to the secure line."

Imagine the outcry that would be sweeping the world now if it was Israel caught tapping US diplomatic phone lines.

It is no secret that allies spy on each other, and when such activities are caught, they are usually handled discreetly. But shouldn't Israel make a stink, just once, in order to get Jonathan Pollard finally released?

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Wikileaks: Netanyahu's critique of the Lebanon war, and more

An interesting memo from a meeting between Representative Gary Ackerman and Binyomin Netanyahu while he was opposition leader in April, 2007:

Netanyahu commented that Shimon Peres had admitted to
him that the Oslo process had been based on a mistaken
economic premise, and as a result European and U.S.
assistance to the Palestinians had gone to create a bloated
bureaucracy, with PA employees looking to the international
community to meet their payroll. Netanyahu predicted that
Palestinians would vote for Abbas if they believe that he can
deliver the money. He suggested putting in place an
"economic squeeze with an address," so that Hamas would
receive the popular blame. Asked if Fatah knew how to
conduct an election campaign, Netanyahu said the Palestinian
patronage system should be forced to collapse, which would
have an immediate impact since the entire Palestinian economy
was based on graft and patronage. Instead, he asserted, the
opposite was happening. Hamas was also handling the prisoner
release issue well since they had created the impression that
Hamas was in control of the process and "sticking it to the
Israelis."

Turning to the Second Lebanon War, Netanyahu said the
problem was not the war's goals but rather the disconnect
between goals and methods. If the IDF had used a flanking
move by a superior ground force, it could have won easily.
Instead, Israel "dripped troops into their gunsights," an
approach he termed "stupid." The top leadership had lacked a
sense of military maneuver. In addition, they had been
afraid to take military casualties, but instead got many
civilian casualties. If Olmert had mobilized the reserves in
ten days, seized ground, destroyed Hizballah in southern
Lebanon, and then withdrawn, he would be a hero today.

Netanyahu asserted there was a growing sense in the
public that he had been right in the last election.
Unilateral "retreats" (i.e. such as the withdrawals from Gaza
and southern Lebanon) were the wrong way to go. Israel had
allowed an Iranian enclave to establish itself in Gaza.
Syria was arming itself for the first time in 20 years,
Hizballah had rearmed since the war, and Gaza was being
turned into a bunker. Egypt was not doing on a twelve mile
front along the Gaza border what Jordan was doing on a
150-mile front. The way out was to stop Iran, thereby
dealing with the octopus, not just its tentacles.

Netanyahu stated that a return to the 1967 borders
and dividing Jerusalem was not a solution since further
withdrawals would only whet the appetite of radical Islam.
Ackerman asked if the Palestinians would accept peace based
on the 1967 lines. Netanyahu said he would not agree to such
a withdrawal since the 1967 lines were indefensible, but he
added that the "right of return" was the real acid test of
Arab intentions. Instead of Israel making more step-by-step
concessions, Israel should insist that further concessions be
linked to reciprocal steps toward peace. The Palestinians
must drop the right of return and accept Israel's right to
exist. The Arab initiative did not meet this standard since
it keeps the right of return open. Israel will only have a
peace partner when the Palestinians drop the right of return.
Asked whether Israel could accept case by case exceptions,
Netanyahu insisted not one refugee could ever return. Israel,
after all, was not asking for the right of Jews to return to
Baghdad or Cairo.

Netanyahu said UNSCR 242 was not a bad formula since
it did not specify precisely from which territories Israel
would withdraw. After the withdrawals from Gaza and Lebanon,
there was deep disillusionment among Israelis about the
principle of land for peace. Even the noted Israeli leftist
writer AB Yehoshua had said in a recent interview that he
despaired about peace because the Arabs wanted all of Israel.
From 1948 to 1967, the conflict had not been about occupied
territories, but that point had been obscured by "effective
propaganda." The root of the conflict was an Arab desire to
destroy Israel, which had now become part of the larger
ambitions of radical Islam.

The 1967 borders were not the solution since Israel
was the only force blocking radical Islam's agenda of
overrunning Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Netanyahu proposed that
Israel offer to work with the Saudis against Iran. If Iran
was not stopped, there would be no agreement with the
Palestinians, and the peace treaties with Jordan and Egypt
would come under tremendous pressure. There could be no
deterrence against "crazies" such as Ahmadinejad.

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Wikileaks: The Gulf fear of Iran and the demolition of "linkage"

From the perspective of Israel, the Wikileaks revelations have vindicated Israel's prioritizing the Iranian nuclear issue above all else. The news that Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and other Gulf countries have consistently communicated their fear of - and sometimes recommended military strikes against - Iran prove, definitively, that the "Palestinian issue" is not the driving force behind peace in the Middle East.

While the New York Times credits the Obama administration with pushing more far-reaching sanctions against Iran than the previous Republican White House, it doesn't mention that this same administration has been using the Iran issue as bait to pressure Israel to do what it wants. Whether this is a reflection of the importance Obama gives the "peace process" or whether it is an indication that he deep down believes that somehow a peace agreement would truly defuse other Middle East problems is unknown, but the end result is the same - the administration has been using "linkage" as a strategy to push Israel into doing its bidding.

Which is a very dangerous game to play if the real priority is Iran.

What is very clear, though, is that the so-called "experts" and "realists" like Stephen Walt and Marc Lynch who support the "linkage" claim are completely wrong. As Omri at Mere Rhetoric notes:

Either Walt, Mearsheimer, Lynch, Chas Freeman, and their ilk don’t know much about the Middle East, or they’re ignoring what they do know in order to push their own foreign policy wishful thinking as objective analysis.

 Read Omri's entertaining analysis  for more.

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Dozens of "aid" planes filled with missiles to Hezbollah?

In the wake of the Wikileaks revelation that Iranian Red Crescent planes sent to Hezbollah during the Lebanon war were "half filled" with missiles, one may wonder how many planes are we talking about?

One hint: The war lasted from July 12 to August 14. Here is a report from Radio Free Europe from August 1:

The fifth consignment of Iranian aid destined for Lebanon arrived in Damascus on July 23, IRNA reported. The two aircraft carrying medicine and medical equipment from the Red Crescent Society came on the heels of four other aid shipments, Iranian Charge d'Affaires in Syria Ghazanfar Roknabadi said.

If there were two planeloads in each consignment, and the fifth one was on July 23rd, that averages out to roughly a planeload a day.

If half of the cargo were indeed missiles and other weapons, that means that Iran may have smuggled 16 cargo planes worth of missiles during the war via the Iranian Red Crescent - and possibly dozens more in the months following.

I don't know, but Geneva might consider this a war crime. Perhaps protocol 1, article 38?

It is prohibited to make improper use of the distinctive emblem of the red cross, red crescent or red lion and sun or of other emblems, signs or signals provided for by the Conventions or by this Protocol. It is also prohibited to misuse deliberately in an armed conflict other internationally recognized protective emblems, signs or signals, including the flag of truce, and the protective emblem of cultural property.

Can't wait for HRW and Amnesty and the UN to jump on these revelations and strongly censure Iran for this crime. Any hour now.

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Wikileaks: Iran and Syria lied to IAEA about nuke plants

From The Guardian:

Iranian officials withheld from international atomic energy inspectors the original design documents for a secret nuclear reactor suspected of being part of Tehran's plan to build an atomic bomb, a US embassy cable reveals.

The secretariat of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was denied the blueprints when in October 2009 its inspection team visited the part-built facility in a mountainside at Fordow near Qom. It was instead provided with designs that showed only what was already built.

Providing a picture of Iranian obstruction to the visit, Herman Nackaerts, the IAEA's deputy director general who led the inspection, revealed that Iranian officials were "steered by unseen observers who send notes to the Iranian interlocutors during meetings" and insisted on tape recording the meetings but refused to allow the IAEA to do the same.

According to the secret cable back to Washington the inspectors were "not impressed" by the Iranians' continued refusal to elaborate on their denials of evidence pointing to the nuclear programme's military intent.

"The secretariat was still trying to understand ... why Iran would build this facility, scaled as it was for 3,000 centrifuges in contrast to the much larger Natanz facility," Nackaerts told Richard Kessler and David Fite, senior staff members of the US house of representatives foreign affairs committee, in a 90-minute meeting in Vienna.

The IAEA believed there was "a high-level decision not to co-operate" with the inspection, Nackaerts said, and Iran's denials had left the agency at "an absolute stalemate" with Tehran over the military application of its nuclear programme.

Iran insists the facility is for purely civilian purposes. It told IAEA inspectors during the four-day visit that documentary evidence its nuclear scientists had obtained "green salt", an intermediate product in uranium enrichment for nuclear reactor or bomb material, was forged. It said a document about uranium metal describing the process of machining hemispheres of the kind used in nuclear warheads was "mistakenly" included in a packet of information Iran received from the network of Abdul Qadeer Khan, a Pakistani nuclear scientist believed by the US to be a serious proliferation risk because of his previous trading in nuclear weapons technology.

Nackaerts challenged the Iranians to prove the evidence was bogus. He "asked that, if some of the documentation were 'doctored', Iranian officials should show the [IAEA] secretariat 'where the truth ends.' "

In the very same leaked cable, we see details on how Syria stonewalled the IAEA investigation on the nuclear plant that Israel bombed in Dair Alzour in 2008:

9. (SBU) The Syria case, Nackaerts said, was starting to look like Iran in that the government provided "good cooperation" on some areas but presented a "stalemate" on others. The Secretariat challenged Syria's proposed explanation for the presence of uranium at Dair Alzour/Al Kibar (i.e., that Israeli depleted uranium munitions could be the source), but the inquiry was at a roadblock. Syrian officials had been told their first explanation for anthropogenic uranium at the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR) was not credible, and the Agency had inquired what nuclear material Syria could have had that was not previously declared. Overall, the IAEA still "did not understand" (meaning, it could not yet present the solid case for) how Dair Alzour fit in as part of a Syrian nuclear program "or part of someone else's program."

Syria was taking a page out of Iran's playbook, and apparently it is as successful in stonewalling the IAEA without much fear for significant sanctions.

(h/t Emet)

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Wikileaks: Iran used Red Crescent to send agents and weapons to Hezbollah

A heavily redacted memo in Wikileaks as presented by The Guardian shows that Iran has cynically used its Red Crescent to smuggle weapons -including missiles - and agents into Lebanon during the 2006 war as well as elsewhere.

8. (S) Per the IRC's regulations, following his election in 2005, President Ahmadi-Nejad was able to appoint four members (out of 16) of the IRC management group. These four [NAMES REMOVED] were opposed to the IRC's leadership and eventually requested its president, Dr. Ahmad Ali Noorbala, to resign. [DETAILS REMOVED] He did so in January 2006 [DETAILS REMOVED] Most of the incoming managers were members of the IRGC or the MOIS [Iranian Intelligence Agency]. [NAME REMOVED] said that pre-existing members now considered the IRC an agent of the IRGC. [Iranian Republican Guard]

9. (S) [NAME REMOVED] further elaborated on the presence of MOIS officials in the IRC and other government agencies. All government agencies include an MOIS representative [DETAILS REMOVED] [NAME REMOVED] Prior to Ahmadi-Nejad, the IRC official in this position was the sole MOIS representative; afterwards, [NAME REMOVED] said 40 officers at headquarters and 100 officers at the provincial officers came from the MOIS.

10. (S) [DETAILS REMOVED] in line with Ahmadinejad's government-wide directive, that all employees pass a counterintelligence course. [NAME REMOVED] indicated that such a course violated the principles of the IRC because Red Cross/Red Crescent organizations are supposed to be independent from the state.

11. (S) In addition to the personnel moves, [DETAILS REMOVED] The IRC under Dr. Noorbala had resisted the IRGC's request to take responsibility for relief and rescue operations. [DETAILS REMOVED] the IRGC's Basij forces to assume responsibility for relief and rescue. [DETAILS REMOVED]

12.(S) In 2007, the IRC's budget was granted an additional $200 million to acquire helicopters. The IRC, [DETAILS REMOVED] ordered 20 Russian MI-17 helicopters. Five of these were delivered to the IRC, the remaining 15 went to the IRGC. A similar helicopter order was planned for 2008. (Note: [NAME REMOVED] indicated that [NAME REMOVED] is the only Iranian entity allowed to import helicopters and that it is owned by the IRGC and MOIS.)

13.(S) [NAME REMOVED] has invested in three Iranian companies backed by the IRGC and Defense Ministry. The first, owned by the Defense Ministry, produces chemical weapons protective equipment; it had been defunct prior to the infusion of IRC funds. The second, owned by the IRGC, produces pre-fabricated military commands and mobile hospitals. The third, owned by the Defense Ministry, produces armored personnel carriers.

14.(C) Finally, the IRC [DETAILS REMOVED] began building health clinics in Karbala, Najaf, Hilla, Kazemayn, and Basra and awarded the construction contracts to IRGC companies, despite the IRC's own staff of qualified engineers. [NAME REMOVED] said the clinics would be used for treatment but also as warehouses for military equipment or military bases if needed. He noted that the Iraqi Red Crescent and Iraqi Ministry of Health were not happy with this activity.

Facilitating IRGC Support to Hezbollah

--------------------------------------

15. (S) The IRC again facilitated the entry of Qods force officers to Lebanon during the Israel-Hezbollah war in summer 2006. Although [NAME REMOVED] did not travel to Lebanon during the conflict, he reiterated that the only true IRC officers dispatched to Lebanon were [DETAILS REMOVED] all others were IRGC and MOIS officials. [NAME REMOVED] further said that the IRC shipments of medical supplies served also to facilitate weapons shipments. He said that IRC [DETAILS REMOVED] had seen missiles in the planes destined for Lebanon when delivering medical supplies to the plane. The plane was allegedly "half full" prior to the arrival of any medical supplies.

16. (S) [NAME REMOVED] also allowed the transfer of an IRC hospital in southern Lebanon to Hezbollah. [NAME REMOVED] said that Hassan Nasrallah had asked Supreme Leader Khamenei to allow Hezbollah to run the hospital during Dr. Noorbala's tenure as IRC president. Although Khamenei acquiesced, Dr. Noorbala prevented the transfer until his own departure. The hospitaL [DETAILS REMOVED] is under Hezbollah control. [NAME REMOVED] is allegedly close to Nasrallah and is also trying to create a network of medical clinics in Lebanon.

17. (S) Comment: [NAMES REMOVED] are examples of figures nominally within the Iranian government establishment who have taken courageous stands against IRGC and MOIS incursions into Iranian governance. Such figures are key to our ability to understanding and countering the malign activities of these organizations regionally...

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Wikileaks: Mossad's advice to the US

The Guardian has trove of the Wikileaks documents. Here are excerpts of an interesting 2007 description of Undersecretary Burns' meeting with Mossad chief Meir Dagan. The problem is that little of his prescient advice is being followed by the US.

In an August 17 meeting, Israeli Mossad Chief Meir Dagan thanked Under Secretary Burns for America's support of Israel as evidenced by the previous day's signing of an MOU that provides Israel with USD 30 billion in security assistance from 2008-2018. Dagan provided his assessment of the Middle East region, Pakistan and Turkey, stressing Israel's (a) concern for President Musharraf's well-being, (b) view that Iran can be forced to change its behavior, and (c) sense that Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon are unstable with unclear futures ahead of them.

Assessing the region, Dagan said Israel sees itself in the middle of a rapidly changing environment, in which the fate of one Middle Eastern country is connected to another. Dagan then said he was concerned about how long Pakistani President Musharraf would survive: "He is facing a serious problem with the militants. Pakistan's nuclear capability could end up in the hands of an Islamic regime." Turning to Iran, Dagan observed that it is in a transition period. There is debate among the leadership between Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad and their respective supporters. Instability in Iran is driven by inflation and tension among ethnic minorities. This, Dagan said, presents unique opportunities, and Israelis and Americans might see a change in Iran in their lifetimes.

Dagan said that Jordan has successfully faced down threats from the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, and that Egypt is struggling with the question of who will replace President Mubarak. He said he sees no hope for the Palestinians, and that Israel looks at Syria and Lebanon, and sees only instability. Further afield, it looks at Turkey and sees Islamists gaining momentum there. The question, he asked, is how long Turkey's military -- viewing itself as the defender of Turkey's secular identity -- will remain quiet.

7. (S) If Israel's neighborhood were not unstable enough, Dagan observed, it did not help that Russia is playing a "very negative role" in the region. He observed that all of these challenges have to be addressed globally -- they could not be dealt with individually. Returning to Jordan as an example, he noted that the more than one million Iraqi refugees in Jordan were changing Jordanian society, and forcing it into a new relationship with Saudi Arabia. This is evidenced by Saudi King Abdullah's recent visit to Jordan, which implies greater understanding between the Jordanians and the Saudis.

10. (S) Dagan led discussion on Iran by pointing out that the U.S. and Israel have different timetables concerning when Iran is likely to acquire a nuclear capability. He clarified that the Israel Atomic Energy Commission's (IAEC) timetable is purely technical in nature, while the Mossad's considers other factors, including the regime's determination to succeed. While Dagan acknowledged that there is still time to "resolve" the Iran nuclear crisis, he stressed that Iran is making a great effort to achieve a nuclear capability: "The threat is obvious, even if we have a different timetable. If we want to postpone their acquisition of a nuclear capability, then we have to invest time and effort ourselves."

11. (S) Dagan described how the Israeli strategy consists of five pillars:

A) Political Approach: Dagan praised efforts to bring Iran before the UNSC, and signaled his agreement with the pursuit of a third sanctions resolution. He acknowledged that pressure on Iran is building up, but said this approach alone will not resolve the crisis. He stressed that the timetable for political action is different than the nuclear project's timetable.

B) Covert Measures: Dagan and the Under Secretary agreed not to discuss this approach in the larger group setting.

C) Counterproliferation: Dagan underscored the need to prevent know-how and technology from making their way to Iran, and said that more can be done in this area.

D) Sanctions: Dagan said that the biggest successes had so far been in this area. Three Iranian banks are on the verge of collapse. The financial sanctions are having a nationwide impact. Iran's regime can no longer just deal with the bankers themselves.

E) Force Regime Change: Dagan said that more should be done to foment regime change in Iran, possibly with the support of student democracy movements, and ethnic groups (e.g., Azeris, Kurds, Baluchs) opposed to the ruling regime.

12. (S) Dagan clarified that the U.S., Israel and like-minded countries must push on all five pillars at the same time. Some are bearing fruit now; others would bear fruit in due time, especially if more attention were placed on them. Dagan urged more attention on regime change, asserting that more could be done to develop the identities of ethnic minorities in Iran. He said he was sure that Israel and the U.S. could "change the ruling regime in Iran, and its attitude towards backing terror regimes." He added, "We could also get them to delay their nuclear project. Iran could become a normal state.

16. (S) On Pakistan, Dagan said that President Musharraf is losing control, and that some of his coalition partners could threaten him in the future. The key question, Dagan said, is whether Musharraf retains his commander-in-chief role in addition to his role as president. If not, he will have problems. Dagan observed that there has been an increase in the number of attempts on Musharraf's life, and wondered whether he will survive the next few years.

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