Three Journalist Mistakes We Can Expect To Continue Unchallenged During The Biden Administration (Daled Amos)

Last Friday, during the White House Briefing led by Press Secretary Jen Psaki, we were treated to the following exchange:

Q Thank you, Jen. Two quick foreign and one domestic, if that’s okay. Can you confirm officially that Robert Malley has been appointed Special Envoy for Iran? Is that —

MS. PSAKI: I can. I believe it was announced this morning. Yes? Or I guess I can confirm it here too for you.

Q That would be great. And then the — as you know, settlements have been a major obstacle to getting the Palestinians back to the negotiating table. Would President Biden consider it — does he believes settlements are — should be halted in the West Bank so that the Palestinians will come back?

MS. PSAKI: I don’t have any new comments from President Biden on this or the current circumstance. He’s obviously spoken to this particular issue in the past and conveyed that he doesn’t believe security assistance should be tied. But I don’t have anything more for you on the path forward toward a two-state solution. [emphasis added]

The journalist's question contains 3 mistaken assumptions -- assumptions that at this point have also been accepted without question by the media as fact.

Assumption #1: Settlements are an obstacle to the Palestinian Authority coming to the negotiating table.

Just last month we noted that historically this claim is simply not true. Jackson Diehl -- the deputy editorial page editor for The Washington Post -- made the point in 2010 that Abbas admitted that he demanded a settlement freeze before coming to the table because Obama did:

When Obama came to power, he is the one who announced that settlement activity must be stopped. If America says it and Europe says it and the whole world says it, you want me not to say it?

Going a step further, the settlements are part of the negotiations as per Oslo, not a sweetener to encourage the Palestinian Arabs to first come to the table:

Settlements are only one of the six issues to be negotiated by Israel and the Palestinians according to the original Oslo Accords from 1993. To single out the issue of settlements ahead of any negotiations while ignoring other bilateral issues constitutes a fundamental distortion of these signed agreements.

Yet this distortion has taken hold, including in the minds of the journalists who are supposed to be in command of the facts.

Assumption #2: Israel should make unilateral concessions

Why should the assumption be, as this journalist clearly believes, that unilateral concessions by Israel owes it to the Palestinian Arabs -- and the peace process itself -- to make immediate sacrifices?

Why does nobody suggest a freeze on Abbas's pay-to-slay policy that encourages terrorism and the murder of Israelis?

In fact, we have already seen Israel commit to a freeze in the settlements in 2009, in a sign of good faith that Abbas would come to the negotiating table.

Did it work?

To the contrary, when Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu implemented a 10-month security freeze in order to coax the Palestinians to the negotiating table, Abbas essentially responded with a 9-month negotiating freeze. And after the moratorium on Israeli building expired, he again refused to talk peace.

Those unilateral concessions to the Palestinian Arabs do not work.

Assumption #3: Settlements are being built

The building of Israeli settlements is supposed to be a a major obstacle -- and that is a claim that was made over and over by the Obama administration:

Back in 2014, in an interview with Jeffrey Goldberg about his Middle East policy, Obama claimed:

we have seen more aggressive settlement construction over the last couple years than we've seen in a very long time.

Obama's deputy national security advisor Ben Rhodes claimed, on December 23, 2016, that "thousands of new settlements are being constructed...you saw tens of thousands of settlements being constructed"

On December 28, 2016, following the US abstention that allowed the passing of UN Resolution 2334, then-Secretary of State Kerry claimed, "We’ve made countless public and private exhortations to the Israelis to stop the march of settlements."

In a speech Biden gave before J Street in April 2016, he copied that heated rhetoric, condemning "the actions that Israel’s government has taken over the past several years – the steady and systematic expansion of settlements..."

In January 2017, I wrote a post debunking the claim of settlement expansion in detail -- and showed how even then the media parroted these fabrications. 

In point of fact:

o  There were 228 settlements -- not tens of thousands

o  What Kerry calls a march of settlements in 2016 is 3 settlements in 2012 -- with none from 1990 till then and none from the end of 2012 to 2016 when Kerry made his claim

o  If you look at what is actually going on, you see the issue is not the building of an expanding number of settlements, but of homes inside those settlements.

Even taking into account that the issue is the houses being built, according to Haaretz in 2015 -- the number of houses constructed was down under Netanyahu:

According to data from the Housing and Construction Ministry, an average of 1,554 houses a year were built in the settlements from 2009 to 2014 — fewer than under any of his recent predecessors.

By comparison, the annual average was 1,881 under Ariel Sharon and 1,774 under Ehud Olmert. As for Ehud Barak, during his single full year as prime minister, in 2000, he built a whopping 5,000 homes in the settlements.

So:

o  Israeli settlements are not the obstacle to negotiations, they are one of the issues to be discussed at the negotiations

o  There is no justification for Israel to concede on a negotiating point, while Abbas merely pockets those concessions

o  Settlements are not expanding. Houses within the settlements are being built to meet the need.

There was a time when journalists asked the kinds of questions that kept the administration on its toes --  attacking the points, not the people presenting them.

Of course, that would require a certain level of knowledge as well as a willingness to challenge the common perception.

My favorite example is a daily press briefing held on November 17, 2009, when the following exchange took place between the State Department Spokesperson Ian Kelly and Matt Lee, reporter for the Associated Press. The topic was what the Obama administration had accomplished till then in advancing peace between Israel and the Palestinian Arabs:

MR. KELLY: Well, I would say that we’ve gotten both sides to commit to this goal. They have – we have – we’ve had a intensive round or rounds of negotiations, the President brought the two leaders together in New York. Look --

QUESTION: But wait, hold on. You haven’t had any intense --

MR. KELLY: Obviously --

QUESTION: There haven’t been any negotiations.

MR. KELLY: Obviously, we’re not even in the red zone yet, okay.

QUESTION: Thank you.

MR. KELLY: I mean, we’re not – but it’s – we are less than a year into this Administration, and I think we’ve accomplished more over the last year than the previous administration [under President George Bush] did in eight years. [emphasis added]

QUESTION: Well, I – really, because the previous administration actually had them sitting down talking to each other. You guys can’t even get that far.

MR. KELLY: All right.

QUESTION: I’ll drop it.

The question is, who in the media is both willing and able to keep the Biden administration honest about its Middle East policy now.

Hat tip: IM

---

---

Read More

Time To Read The Tea Leaves: Where Is Biden Headed In The Middle East? (Daled Amos)

Now that Biden is president, Israel and the Jewish community look on as the various pieces of his new administration fall into place, waiting to see what this means for both the Jewish community and for Israel.

Everything becomes part of the cup of tea leaves that Jews are trying to read.

One of the things that got this process going in earnest was the change made to the Twitter account of the US Ambassador to Israel. 

Last Wednesday, the account suddenly read:

The question was: why change it to US Ambassador to Israel, the West Bank and Gaza?

Legal Insurrection quotes from the original article in the Washington Free Beacon which sounded the alarm:

The change in title marks a significant shift in policy toward Israel. The United States has for decades declined to take a policy position on the West Bank and Gaza territories, maintaining the Israelis and the Palestinians must decide in negotiations how the areas will be split up for a future Palestinian state. By including Gaza and the West Bank in the ambassador’s portfolio, the Biden administration appears to be determining that neither area is part of Israel—a move that is certain to rile Israeli leaders. [emphasis added]

In the end, it apparently turned out to be a false alarm, as the page was quietly changed back to "US Ambassador to Israel" and WFB updated their article accordingly. No one knows if it was the work of an overeager staffer or whether Twitter accidentally refreshed the old page.

But this is a good example of the eagerness to jump at the most trivial indication of Biden's new Middle East policy, especially in terms of what policy changes we should expect, especially when it comes to Iran.

Attention dutifully went back to following the procession of Biden nominees for various positions within his administration.

Biden's new National Security Adviser is Jake Sullivan.

Last May, Sullivan co-wrote an article in Foreign Affairs about America’s Opportunity in the Middle East, which advocated

a phased approach that delivers nuclear progress up front and creates space to address regional challenges over time. Under such an approach, the United States would immediately reestablish nuclear diplomacy with Iran and salvage what it can from the 2015 nuclear deal, which has been fraying since the Trump administration abandoned it in 2018. The United States would then work with the P5+1 and Iran to negotiate a follow-on agreement. In parallel, the United States and its partners would support a regional track.

It is to be expected that Sullivan supports some kind of return to the Iran deal, albeit cautiously.

On the other hand, Sullivan also praised the Abraham Accords back in September, saying it was a "positive accomplishment" that was "good for the region, it’s good for Israel, it’s good for peace" while balancing that with "we should praise this deal for what it is but not for more than what it is...It’s been a long time coming. This is not a bolt out of the blue."

But over the weekend, when Sullivan spoke by phone with Israeli National Security Advisor Meir Ben Shabbat, the White House released an oddly phrased statement that

They discussed opportunities to enhance the partnership over the coming months, including by building on the success of Israel’s normalization arrangements with UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco.

Lahav Harkov, the Jerusalem Post's diplomatic correspondent, noted on Twitter

She also pointed out that while in Israel it was reported that

The two agreed to discuss soon the many topics on the agenda including Iran, regional issues and advancing the Abraham Accords.

in the White House statement, there was no mention of Iran at all.

There are those tea leaves again.

And then there is Tony Blinken.

During his confirmation hearings last week, Tony Blinken -- Biden's choice for Secretary of State -- was asked about Biden's Middle East policy.

The Biden administration would consult with Israel and Arab allies before taking any action regarding returning to the Iran deal, though he admitted that he "believes that if Iran comes back into compliance, we would too"

But Blinken went on to say, on the issue of compliance:

But we would use that as a platform with our allies and partners, who would once again be on the same side as us, to seek a longer and stronger agreement, and also as you and the chairman have rightly pointed out, to capture these other issues, particularly with regard to missiles and Iran’s destabilizing activities. That would be the objective.

Having said that, I think we are a long way from there. We would have to see once the president-elect is in office what steps Iran actually takes and is prepared to take. We would then have to evaluate whether they were making good—if they say they are coming back into compliance—[on] their obligations, and then we would take it from there. But in the first instance, yes, we absolutely will consult with you, and not only with you, I think as the chairman suggested, it’s also vitally important that we engage on the takeoff, not the landing, with our allies and with our partners in the region, to include Israel and to include the Gulf countries. [emphasis added]

First of all, Blinken seems to be taking an awful lot for granted about getting Israel and the Gulf Arab states on board negotiations with the leading state sponsor of terrorism in the Middle East.

Secondly, his metaphor about engaging US allies "on the takeoff, not the landing" implies a willingness to push those US allies off the plane -- if not under the bus.

And Blinken is nothing if not a party man, who claimed during his confirmation hearing:

In my judgment, the JCPOA, for whatever its limitations, was succeeding on its own terms in blocking Iran’s pathways to producing fissile material for a nuclear weapon on short order. [emphasis added]

But overall, the general consensus does seem to be that Biden's picks for his staff have been reassuring on the issue of Iran.

Except for one.

There are indications that Biden could pick Robert Malley as his special envoy to Iran, which Eli Lake describes as a reason to believe that Biden’s First Foreign Policy Blunder Could Be on Iran. The problem is that Malley favors talks with Iran as the only way to get any results, and claims that pressure does not work.

Lake demurs:

More important, the notion that Iran’s regime does not respond to pressure is a talking point of the Iranian regime, especially Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif. It also happens to be false. Obama’s maximum pressure campaign between 2011 and 2013 ultimately coerced the regime to enter open nuclear negotiations with the U.S., China, Russia, France, Germany and the U.K. [emphasis added]

More to the point, appointing Malley would directly contradict statements that Biden made just last year while on the campaign trail:

Biden himself during the campaign has said he would support targeted sanctions to punish Iran for human rights abuses, developing ballistic missiles and support for terrorism. And Blinken and Sullivan have committed to working with regional allies to press Iran to change its ways. What message would it send if the administration’s envoy to Iran believes no Iranian leader could ever agree to stop making war on its neighbors?

Part of Biden's problem is that he is beholden to the progressive wing of the Democratic Party, one that favors the Iran Deal and supports for a Palestinian Arab state on the one hand and is antagonistic to Israel and Saudi Arabia on the other, and is not impressed by the Abraham Accords either.

So it's no small thing that while praising the Abraham Accords, Blinken made a point to leave this window open:

However, he said the Biden administration would “take a hard look at” some of the “commitments” that were made in tandem with those accords.

Is Biden going to try to thread this needle -- both in terms of his Middle East policy abroad but also in terms of satisfying his progressive base that expects to be rewarded handsomely for their support?

And if he does make this attempt, will he succeed?

Or are we already seeing signs of it beginning to unravel?

---

---

Read More

B'tselem's Struggle For Relevance Continues To End In Failure (Daled Amos)

B'tselem's accusation of Israeli Apartheid has been a long time coming, after cynical comment made by their then-CEO Jessica Montell in a 2003 interview:

I think the word apartheid is useful for mobilizing people because of its emotional power

She noted approvingly how Palestinian Arabs called Israel's security barrier the 'Apartheid Wall'.

Such cynicism appears widespread within B'tselem --

1.)  In 2019, B'tselem hired Simone Zimmerman to be their US director. Zimmerman is one of the founders of IfNotNow, a group that avoids addressing the right of Israel to even exist:

We do not take a unified stance on BDS, Zionism or the question of statehood.

In 2016, Zimmerman was let go from her position as Jewish outreach director for Bernie Sanders' presidential campaign for a curse-laden attack on Netanyahu that she posted on Facebook.

B'tselem apparently thought that made her a good fit with their other employees --

2.)  B'tselem's International Advocacy Officer, Sarit Michaeli responded to an article in Ha’aretz about a Palestinian psychologist who said that more than a third of the children in a Gazan refugee camp had been sexually abused -- tweeting that it was Israel's fault:

3.)  In 2014, journalist Tuvia Tenenbom published his popular book, “Catch the Jew.” In it, he writes about a conversation with B’Tselem researcher Atef Abu Rub, who was serving as a guide to his group at Yad Vashem and told Tenenbom that the Holocaust was a "lie, I do not believe it."

B'tselem originally defended Abu Rub, who claimed the comment was made by a third party. In the end, however, B'tselem fired Abu Rub.

4.)  In 2011, a B'tselem photographer, Nariman al-Tamimi providing video supposedly showing Israeli police arresting an 11-year-old Palestinian boy for stone-throwing, and deliberately putting him into a police car without his mother.

In fact, Nariman al-Tamimi staged the scene:

Yet, a careful viewing of the clip (with Hebrew and Arabic dialogue) reveals that the exact opposite was the case; the policemen invited the mother to accompany her child. At 2:07 minutes into the video, one of the policemen says to the mother, “Come, come, get in.” The cop then asks one of the people standing nearby, “Is that his mother?” When the bystander answers in the affirmative, the policeman repeats, “Get in with him” (the boy). The door is opened for her and she is about to get into the vehicle, as the policemen are saying “get into the car,” but then (2:27) the mother is pulled away from the car by the Palestinian man wearing a black jacket. After the policemen closes the van’s door, a woman wearing a pink shirt pushes the mother towards the vehicle, and then the mother bangs on the door, a heartrending scene.

5.)  In April 2010, B'tselem staff member Lizi Sagie resigned under pressure for statements she made on her personal blog -- including: “The IDF Memorial Day is a pornographic circus of glorifying grief and silencing voices,” “Israel is committing Humanity’s worst atrocities…Israel is proving its devotion to Nazi values…Israel exploits the Holocaust to reap international benefits.”

6.)  On January 8, 2016, the Israeli investigative news program “Uvda” (Fact) reported that B’Tselem employee Nasser Nawaja conspired with Ezra Nawi, a radical activist from the NGO “Ta’ayush,” to entrap a Palestinian man who was interested in selling land to Jews in the West Bank. They did this knowing that the sale was illegal according to Palestinian law and was punishable by death, not to mention the torture that would be likely to precede it.

B'tselem's response?

Responding to the piece with a statement on its Facebook page, B’Tselem said that while it opposed tortures and executions, reporting Palestinians interested in selling land to Israelis to the PA was “the only legitimate course of action.”

When they defended Nasser Nawaja on their Facebook page, B'tselem added a picture describing Uvdah as "Uvdah For Hire"

That is an interesting accusation, considering that B'tselem gets most of its funding from outside of Israel.

NGO Monitor reports that for the years 2012-2019, B'tselem donors include: European Union, Sweden, Switzerland, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, France, the United Kingdom, Ireland, the US, and Germany -- and according to annual reports, donations from foreign countries amounted to 64.7% of total donations from 2012-2016.

And there is a reason that most of B'tselem's funding comes from outside Israel.

Writing in 2016, Shmuel Rosner writes in the context of the above-mentioned Uvda report about the B'tselem employee who helped entrap a Palestinian Arab, noting that "B’Tselem is an organization that many Israelis dislike, and they have reasons to dislike it." 

Rosner explains:

Why do human rights activists turn to such immoral methods? Many of them do it because of anger and because of fear. They are angry at a country that refuses to accept their political recipe for Israel. They fear that their activity of many years will be in vain as the country moves in a direction they disagree with.

The angrier they become, the more apprehensive they become – the more they lose their inhibitions. Thus they turn to immoral methods, they turn to other countries to look for the support they cannot get among Israelis, and they turn to language that makes Israel a caricature – a fascist state, an apartheid state, a villain among nations. They say that they act out of love of Israel – and some of them certainly do – but with time and frustration some are made hateful. And hate makes them lose the ability to separate right from wrong, acceptable from unacceptable, useful from not-useful.

Speaking of the name-calling by human rights activists -- and by B'tselem in particular -- B'tselem recently came out with a report fulfilling Montell's admiration for the usefulness of the word Apartheid "for mobilizing people because of its emotional power."

The media jumped at the opportunity to spread the word about the report, with some describing B'tselem as a "leading human rights organization" -- just the shot in the arm B'tselem needed.

But CAMERA's Tamar Sternhal asks the nagging question: Is B'Tselem Israel's 'leading human rights organization'?

Progress in improving human r.ights in Israel and the West Bank is a legal battle waged in the Knesset and the courts, and in recent years B’Tselem has zero presence, activity and accomplishments in these areas. Tellingly, B’Tselem’s 2019 Activity Report mentions no action taken in the Knesset or courts...On the international level of advancing human rights, the battle is waged at the United Nations Council on Human Rights in Geneva, and B’Tselem is absent from that key venue as well.

What's left?

Social media.

That will certainly keep B'tselem in the news -- but those foreign governments may not necessarily feel they are getting their money's worth.

If those foreign governments are really interested in change, they might be better served supporting the Association for Civil Rights in Israel and Worker's Hotline. Sternthal lists their activities -- and accomplishments.

The reason for their success might have something to do with the fact that they actually have lawyers among their staff.

B'tselem does not.

The media may have noticed the incongruity of non-lawyers weighing in on the legal definition of Apartheid.

The Seventh Eye reported that while the Israeli media did have stories on the recent B'tselem report, it was covered in English -- not in the Hebrew papers.

It quoted B'tselem's Roy Yellin, who asked Haaretz why they covered B'tselem's Apartheid report in English, but not in Hebrew:

Apparently, B'tselem's attempt to have a any impact inside Israel continues to end in failure.

Will their foreign investors notice?

---

---

Read More

When It Comes To Media Attacks On Israel, Timing Is Everything (Daled Amos)

In 2010, Jackson Diehl -- the deputy editorial page editor for The Washington Post -- suggested 

How Obama sabotaged Middle East peace talks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The conventional wisdom at the time was that Netanyahu was responsible for the impasse.

Diehl disagreed:

For 15 years and more, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas conducted peace talks with Israel in the absence of a freeze on Jewish settlement construction in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Now, it appears as likely as not that his newborn negotiations with Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu -- and their goal of agreement on a Palestinian state within a year -- will die because of Abbas's refusal to continue without such a freeze.

...So why does Abbas stubbornly persist in his self-defeating position? In an interview with Israeli television Sunday night, he offered a remarkably candid explanation: "When Obama came to power, he is the one who announced that settlement activity must be stopped," he said. "If America says it and Europe says it and the whole world says it, you want me not to say it?"

The statement confirmed something that many Mideast watchers have suspected for a long time: that the settlement impasse originated not with Netanyahu or Abbas, but with Obama -- who by insisting on an Israeli freeze has created a near-insuperable obstacle to the peace process he is trying to promote. [emphasis added]

Whether Obama deliberately pressed for the freezing of settlements in the hope of pressuring Israel into a concession or blundered into creating a deadlock -- either way, Obama's interference changed the Palestinian story, turning a freeze of settlements into a new demand.

Now we see something similar happening with the coronavirus.

One of those leading the way, on January 3rd, in accusing Israel of deliberately withholding the vaccine from the Palestinian Arabs was The Guardian:

This was followed by the usual gang, such as Haaretz on January 10th

And Al Jazeera on January 13th:

Among many other media outlets.

But that was not what the Palestinians themselves were saying.

Palestinian Media Watch reports that at first, the PA consistently said they were determined to acquire the vaccine on their own without any help from Israel:

Nov. 21, 2020:‎
PA meets with WHO, UNICEF, UNRWA “to ensure that Palestine is provided ‎with adequate Coronavirus vaccines” (Israel not invited)‎

Dec. 12, 2020:‎
PA orders “four million doses of the Russian vaccine… expected in Palestine by ‎the end of this year” (Israel's help not requested)‎

Jan. 9, 2021:‎
PA announces: “Four vaccine producer companies [will deliver for] 70% of the ‎Palestinian people… the WHO will provide for 20%” (Israel's help not needed)‎

Jan. 9, 2021:
PA announces: “Two million doses were ordered [from AstraZeneca]… we ‎received an official response from the company… [Also] the Russian company ‎Sputnik, and a vaccine was ordered… We are not just waiting… we are ‎working…” (Israel's help not needed)‎

But with the media helpfully getting the story wrong and ganging up on Israel, the PA just couldn't resist:

Jan. 10, 2021:‎
PA Foreign Ministry demands that Israel “supply the Palestinian people with ‎Coronavirus vaccines… [Israel is] racially discriminating against the ‎Palestinian people, and negating its right to health [services]… an apartheid ‎against the Palestinian people in the field of health”

You can almost hear Abbas now, "If American media says it and European media says it and the whole world says it, you want me not to say it?"

Going a step further, the vaccine accusation is beginning to get traction in Congress too:

According to the article, the new Congresswoman, a member of the "progressive" wing of the Democrats 'shared' her copy of the Guardian article.

And now with this story still making the rounds, the "human rights" organization B'Tselem has come out with their report accusing Israel of apartheid.

B'tselem and their friends are posting and reposting this all over the internet to get maximum exposure, tossing around the claim that Israel is guilty of "Jewish supremacy."

Of course, the Palestinian Authority is already accusing Israel of apartheid, so this report won't have any effect on Palestinian propaganda.

Instead, the timing of the report and the massive distribution over social media may indicate a campaign to influence more than a Congressperson or two.

This could be one component of an orchestrated campaign to influence the incoming Biden administration. The lingering accusation of Israel withholding the vaccine could be part of this too.

If so, it is going to be a long 4 years.

---

---

 

Read More

Years Before Trump's Abraham Accord We Almost Had Obama's 'Ishmael' Accord (Daled Amos)

Before the Trump administration changed the rules for what peace in the Middle East could look like, Obama also tried his hand at opening ties with problematic countries based on the invitation he made in his 2009 inaugural address that "we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist.” This led to improving relations with Myanmar in 2012 and Cuba in 2014. 

 

Unlike the Abraham Accord, there was not a lot of excitement and fanfare, and not much in the way of a ripple effect. But Obama did consider something more substantial in the Middle East during his last year in office.

 

In April 2016, he tried to play broker, but not between Israel and the Arab world. Instead, Obama tried to negotiate peace between Saudi Arabia and Iran:

The White House is pinning its hopes for a more stable Middle East in years to come on the uncertain prospect that it can encourage a working relationship—what Mr. Obama has called a “cold peace”—between Saudi Arabia and Iran

...“You need a different kind of relationship between the Gulf countries and Iran—one that’s less prone to proxy conflicts—and that’s something that would be good for the region as a whole,” the official said. “Promoting that kind of dialogue is something the president will want to speak to the leaders about.”

...But the strategy requires at least some buy-in from highly skeptical Saudi leaders and other Persian Gulf states

All you need do is substitute Israel for Iran and you have the basic outline for the Abraham Accords, based on the goal of a "warm peace" between Israel and those same Gulf states -- and other Arab states as well. But by focusing on Iran instead, not even a cold peace was achieved.

 

Obama's failure to bring Iran and the Saudi's is not surprising.

After all:

The Saudis are Sunni, Iran is Shia.

The Saudis are Arabs, Iran is Persian.

(The fact that Iran is a global sponsor of terrorism and working on making a nuclear bomb didn't help.)

 

Don't underestimate the rift between Sunnis and Shiites.

 

In his book, The Closed Circle, David Pryce-Jones writes about the turmoil following the death of Mohammad, whose only family heir was his daughter, Fatima. There was no agreement on how Mohammad's successor was to be chosen:

Leadership of the community might pass through her and her descent, or through the Prophet's companions who were best qualified. A majority, known as Sunni, preferred election. A minority, known as Shia, preferred the principle of heredity, devolving through Ali, the cousin and husband of the Prophet's daughter, and those descendants of his specifically designated for the succession by their own immediate predecessor. Disputed authority made for the fragmentation of Islam. Three of Muhammad's four immediate successors [including Mohammad's son-in-law, Ali], known as caliphs, were murdered. Turning upon legitimacy, the quarrel between Sunni and Shia became irreconcilable. [emphasis added; p. 28]

This fighting among Muslims has never stopped. The situation in Syria is just one example of many of how divided the Arab/Muslim world is against itself.

 

But in addition to the Sunni-Shiite rift, how does the Arab-Persian rift play out?

 

Back in June 2019, Mordechai Kedar -- who served for 25 years in IDF military intelligence -- gave a talk to
EMET, the Endowment for Middle East Truth on the Middle East.

 

 

One of the topics Kedar touched upon was the roots behind the hatred between the Saudis and the Iranians (starts at 36:05).

He traces this tension back to the 7th century, when the Arabs were spreading Islam from the area that is today Saudi Arabia -- starting with Syria, Lebanon and what is today Israel, spreading out to the east (to Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan) and to the West (Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria Morocco and Northern  Africa) and then up north (Spain).

In the year 636CE, the Arabs defeated the Persia army, despite the larger Persian army. Their forces were worn down both by wars with Byzantine as well as by moral and political corruption within.

 

But the differences between the two armies was more than a matter of size. Kedar points out the erudition of the Persians, many of whom were adept at mathematics, chemistry, physics and astronomy, having made great contributions in these areas -- but because of their corruption, they ended up being defeated by the Arabs, who in those days were illiterate.

Following their defeat, many of the Persians were sold into slavery, a degrading and humiliating procedure --
all the more so for academics being sold into slavery.

 

The Persian slaves freely converted to Islam, knowing this would get them out of slavery -- only to find that the Arabs put taxes on them, taxes they could not pay so that they were forced instead to work for the Arabs.

 

And so they were cheated a second time.

 

As Kedar puts it:

Till this very day, the Persians have not forgotten and did not forgive what the Arabs did to them. And this underlies the enmity between the Persians and the Saudis.

The Saudis are the descendants of those who did this to the Persians.

 

Mordechai Kedar also spoke about this in Hebrew at BESA in March of that same year, starting at about 15:45 (video will automatically start there.)



Jews are not the only ones with long memories.

 

Considering the nature of such enmity, it is no wonder that Obama's attempt to bring the Iranians and the Saudis together failed.

 

But by the same token, this hatred casts doubt on the wisdom of Obama's Iran Deal as a whole, on the direction it was taking prior to Trump taking office and on Biden's declared intention to resurrect the deal.

 

If anything, this background verifies the need for a Middle East coalition against Iran.

Read More

Is The New Middle East Peace Contagious Enough To Spread To Arab Israelis? (Daled Amos)

By Daled Amos

Over the past few months, we have watched as the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco have made peace with Israel. With the Biden administration ready to take over in a matter of weeks, we have come to the end of this historic chapter in Middle East peace.

 

But while for now, the momentum for peace has taken us as far as it can between the Arab states and Israel, there may still be a potential for the Arabs living within Israel itself.

Prof. Daniel Pipes writes that Arabs and Muslims increasingly accept Israel even as the global Left rejects it. He notes that till now, when Arab Israelis have voted in the Israeli elections, they have voted for the radical, anti-Zionist Arab parties that reject the idea of Israel as a Jewish state.

But Pipes believes that may be about to change.

Enter Mansour Abbas, 46, the head of an Islamist party, the United Arab List (also known as Ra’am), which holds four of the Knesset’s 120 seats. He hails from the Galilee town of Maghar and has a dentistry degree from the Hebrew University in Jerusalem; currently, he is studying for a Ph.D. in politics at Haifa University. Married with three children, he practices dentistry in Maghar.

 

Mr. Abbas (not to be confused with Mahmoud Abbas, 85, head of the Palestinian Authority) has recently emerged as a deal-making politician ready to act pragmatically on behalf of Israel’s Arabs. At a time of electoral turbulence, with new elections scheduled for March 2021, he has become an instant powerbroker due to his readiness to cooperate with Benjamin Netanyahu and perhaps even to save Mr. Netanyahu’s prime ministry. [emphasis added]

Mansour Abbas. Youtube screencap

 

By 'pragmatic', Pipes is referring to Abbas's willingness to cooperate with Netanyahu based on what the Israeli government can do for the Arab community. Abbas wants Netanyahu to ease legal restrictions on construction in Arab towns and to approve the necessary funds to address the problem of crime in Arab communities. Getting Netanyahu to make the necessary resources available would enable Abbas to win more seats in the next election.

 

This idea of an Arab MK working together with Netanyahu and the right-wing Likud is novel, unprecedented -- and seems to have won the approval of Arab Israelis. Pipes quotes Yousef Makladeh of the consulting company StatNet who reports that "over 60 percent of the [Israeli] Arab population supports MK Mansour Abbas’ approach, that they can work with the [Jewish] right.” 

 

If, in fact, a majority of Arab Israelis are willing to support working with the right-wing in general and with Likud and Netanyahu in particular, this obviously has implications not only for Israel, but also for Netanyahu's chances in the March election.

 

This is the same kind of pragmatism that lies behind Makladeh's finding that “a majority of the Arab public favors the peace agreements with the Gulf States."

 

According to Makladeh, it's all about economic opportunity:

“The public wants peace, it does not matter with whom, because it will bring them economic advantages,” he said. More trade with the UAE, more UAE investors coming to Israel, and Israeli companies going to the UAE, will mean more opportunities for Arab-Israelis, who will be seen as the logical middlemen. [emphasis added]

Makladeh's findings are being taken seriously because he successfully predicted both the Arab turnout and the votes for the Arab Joint List in the last election. 

 

Abbas and his party, United Arab List, are part of the Joint List, which has been opposing both the Abraham Accords--despite the fact that its own constituency approves of it--and opposing the idea of working together with Netanyahu and Likud, another idea that a majority of Arab Israelis appear to accept.

 

In addition to appearing to be on the wrong side of the Abraham Accords and working with Likud, the Joint List also focuses on the Palestinian issue in their opposition to the Abraham Accords. 

 

According to Makladeh's research, Arab Israelis are not as invested in the Palestinian issue as they once were:

“It is not that they don’t love and support them – a big part define themselves as Palestinian – but they say: ‘This is too big for us. We can’t deal with the Palestinian issue. That should be for the US, Russia and France to work out. It can’t all be on our back.’”

As a matter of fact, Abbas actually joined the Joint List in voting against the Abraham Accords with the UAE and Bahrain -- yet he explains that vote in such a way that he does not alienate Arab supporters of working with Israel:

We only voted against the deals to protest that there is no peace deal with the Palestinians. If there will be a real agreement with the Palestinians, there will be real agreements with 55 Muslim countries. But what truly matters is that we are Israelis, and our actions are not supposed to be influenced by whether there is peace with Bahrain. We are a part of Israeli society, and we want to be partners. [emphasis added]

Just try and find another member of the Joint List who talks like that.

 

It is no surprise that there is growing tension between Mansour Abbas and the other members of the Joint List, both because he is taking positions diametrically opposed to theirs and because Abbas is making a name for himself, in part at their expense. 

 

Mansour Abbas is becoming identified with the perceived potential change in the relations between Israel and the Arabs inside the Jewish state.

 

As Haviv Rettig Gur of Times of Israel puts it, "a tectonic shift, a “normalization” process more visceral and vital to Israel’s future, is already well underway closer to home."

 

He points to a post that Mansour Abbas made to his Facebook page back in October, where he wrote:

I'm not afraid to say that I'm introducing a pragmatic new political style, balancing constancy and the ability to influence! I truly believe that if we are to bring real, concrete change to our society, we have to be influential in decision making--which does not mean we need to give up our fortitude, whether patriotic or religious; we just have to find a point where balance is right, to know properly our relationship with the Knesset and how we operate, and that our participation in it is not just to record positions.

Gur noted at the time that the post had over 4,300 likes and that most of the over 700 comments were positive.

 

Abbas took a further step in a TV interview with Arab Israeli journalist Lucy Aharish on the online television channel DemocratTV:

Aharish: “Let’s be specific. [Would you say:] ‘If we get a good enough offer, to be heads of committees, cabinet posts, if Netanyahu turns to us, we are capable of sitting in a government with Netanyahu.’”

Abbas: If I was a regular Arab MK who’s used to a certain discourse, I’d tell you, ‘There’s no such thing. We’d never agree to sit in Netanyahu’s government.’ But I say different. Instead of giving that answer, and then the other side can say, ‘Look, the Arabs don’t want to integrate, don’t want to participate, don’t want to have a say,’ I say, ‘Sure.’ If the prime minister or the head of another party who’s a candidate for prime minister has this attitude [i.e., is willing to have Arab parties as coalition partners], let’s have them say they’re interested in the Joint List, that they want [us] in the circle of decision-makers, and then I’ll have the opportunity to say yes or no.

Why say no before we get an offer? Why? Anyone who has the right to form a government, let him turn to us, we’ll sit, we’ll discuss, and then we’ll decide.

Gur notes, "That Mansour Abbas took great care not to rule out a coalition role for his party is as clear a signal as one could issue that he is asking to be invited in. And the possibility that it may be Netanyahu doing the inviting doesn’t faze him one bit."

His analysis of Abbas and of Arab Israelis is cautiously optimistic, based on developments both around the Middle East and in Israel as well:

As the Palestinian cause fades throughout the Arab world, it fades among Israeli Arabs as well..And the demand to integrate, to gain acceptance, to be heard in the media and in politics, to have a say in the affairs of a country they have come to accept as their own — even if they feel it has yet to accept them as its own — has overwhelmed the old ideologies.

...If Mansour Abbas’s new pragmatism is any indication, it could signal that Israel’s Arabs are increasingly thinking of themselves not in a narrowly Arab context but in a broader Israeli one, as one community among many vying for resources and attention in the broader political landscape.

Leaders sometimes strike out boldly in a new direction, hoping their flock will follow. Mansour Abbas doesn’t seem to believe that’s what’s happening. He seems to think — and despite the vituperation of some this week, he seems to be right — that the Arab Israeli community is already there, already eager for integration and influence. It’s time, he is arguing, for Israel’s Arab leaders to follow.

How this will all work out in the next election is anybody's guess, but there is an additional wrinkle that Gil Hoffman points out that there is a rule in Abbas's United Arab List that will prevent him from running for re-election:

The rule is that MKs can serve no more than three terms, and it does not matter whether that term is four years or four months. Abbas is in his third term, even though he was first elected only 19 months ago.

Come March, Abbas may very well have a new party, one that will openly oppose some of the positions of the Joint List -- which according to polls is already down from 15 to 11 seats.

 

If there really is the potential for normalization within Israel, we are likely to find out in March.

Read More

More Than Just Peace -- It's Normal (Daled Amos)

 

Seth Frantzman presents an interesting thesis in his op-ed in Newsweek this week. He argues that Israel's Peace Deals Show How Abnormal Israel's Treatment Has Been, based on his recent visit to Dubai -- along with 50,000 other Israelis since November 26.

 

Noting how normal his experience there felt, and how normal in fact it should feel, Frantzman writes that Israel's isolation within the Arab world is an artificial situation:

However, a concerted campaign over the decades attempted to make it seem acceptable that not only would Israel lack relations with dozens of mostly Muslim countries, but Jewish religious displays themselves would be considered taboo or "controversial" in those places. 

 

...Acceptance of the isolation of Israel and erasure of Jewish history in the Middle East has been an open wound afflicting the whole region. It should never have happened. Israel and some Arab countries fought a war in 1948, and there are legitimate reasons that Palestinians and their supporters opposed Israel's policies. But similar terrible wars, such as that between India and Pakistan in 1948, didn't result in dozens of countries not recognizing India or pretending that Hindus don't exist. Normalization and the presence of diplomatic relations are the most basic geopolitical norms throughout the world. Yet so many politicians, like former U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, who pushed for engagement with Iran, blindly accepted the fact that so many countries did not normalize ties with Israel. [emphasis added]

Frantzman sees the "anti-Israel crusade" of the past 70 years as the result of antisemitism.

 

The comparison of Israel with India is an interesting one.

 

On the one hand, one can argue that unlike India, Israel -- as a Jewish state -- provokes the long-standing animus in the Arab/Muslim world against Jews that is practically hard-wired into Islam. That tension has been evident throughout the Arab world since its beginnings.

 

Normalization is a Western concept and the goal towards which states work when they resolve conflicts with each other. It is not necessarily an Arab approach -- where hudnah, or truce, is used: a temporary solution, awaiting an auspicious change in the status quo with the enemy.

 

That is what makes the Abraham Accords so striking -- that it is not the way things are normally done in the Middle East, as opposed to the peace treaties Israel has with Egypt and Jordan, where there is a 'cold' peace and anti-Israel rhetoric there is common. In the Abraham Accords, there are Arab countries that have turned the corner and do not see Israel as the enemy; Egypt and Jordan have not yet been able to do this.

 

The similarity between India and Israel is in their active pursuit of improving ties, both globally and with the Muslim world in particular.

 

The Wikipedia article on Foreign relations of India has a list of the countries with which India has forged ties. In the section describing India's ties with the Palestinian Arabs, it says

In the light of a religious partition between India and Pakistan, the impetus to boost ties with Muslim states around the world was a further tie to India's support for the Palestinian cause. [emphasis added]

This claim that India's conflict with Pakistan is a motivator for better relations with Muslim countries is echoed in the descriptions of India's ties with some Muslim countries: 

Afghanistan: "The new democratically elected Afghan government strengthened its ties with India in wake of persisting tensions and problems with Pakistan, which is continuing to shelter and support the Taliban"

Bangladesh: "At the outset India's relations with Bangladesh could not have been stronger because of India's unalloyed support for independence and opposition against Pakistan in 1971."

Iran: "After the Iranian Revolution of 1979, Iran withdrew from CENTO and dissociated itself from US-friendly countries, including Pakistan, which automatically meant improved relationship with the Republic of India."

Tajikistan: "India's role in fighting the Taliban and Al-Qaeda and its strategic rivalry with both China and Pakistan have made its ties with Tajikistan important to its strategic and security policies"

And on the flip side:

Saudi Arabia: "India's strategic relations with Saudi Arabia have been affected by the latter's close ties with Pakistan. Saudi Arabia supported Pakistan's stance on the Kashmir conflict and during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 at the expense of its relations with India."

Turkey: "Due to controversial issues such as Turkey's close relationship with Pakistan, relations between the two countries have often been blistered at certain times, but better at others."

In other words, Pakistan has served as an impetus for certain Muslim countries to improve their ties with India, similar to the way Iran has motivated certain Muslim countries to improve their relations with Israel.

 

While one might argue with Frantzman's contention about how artificial the enmity towards Israel is in the Arab world, it is clear that prior to Trump, US administrations "blindly accepted the fact that so many countries did not normalize ties with Israel." The Trump administration didn't, and orchestrated not just the end of hostilities, but normalized relations between Israel and 4 Muslim states.

 

In a recent article, Jonathan Tobin describes How Trump Transformed ‘Quid Pro Quo’ From Democratic Slur to Diplomatic Triumph. He notes the opposition, including among Republicans:

That Latin phrase has become a term of abuse among Democrats, ever since it became the totemic phrase used to justify their failed Trump impeachment attempt. But the string of normalization deals showcases a triumphant side of the quid pro quo approach.

Far from indicating a shallow, cynical attitude to governance, these deals show quid pro quo is a swifter, smarter, saner strategy than the very different ideas and tactics pursued by previous administrations.

Tobin describes this quid pro quo approach as transactional diplomacy -- but good luck defining how it is any different from normal diplomacy.

 

Wikipedia traces transactional diplomacy back to former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who focused specifically on regional solutions and working with countries to build up their infrastructure and reducing their reliance on the US. The Christian Science Monitor sees transactional diplomacy as values free and compares it with the US agreeing to reduce its relations with Taiwan in order to improve relations with China or Obama trading sanctions relief in exchange for Iran's agreeing to a nuclear deal.

 

Tobin's view of transactional diplomacy is pragmatic and is about tossing ideas that don't work:

The point about Trump’s transactional strategy is that it worked. Instead of focusing on maintaining policies that could never achieve any results — such as the unrealistic hope the Palestinians would ever seriously negotiate, and the equally hopeless stalemate in the Western Sahara — Trump seized opportunities to make deals that did advance U.S. interests, rather than allowing himself to be bogged down by diplomatic traditions.

Maybe the Trump administration really is onto something here. No act of diplomacy could have created the kind of warmth and friendship we are seeing between Israel and the UAE. 

 

Maybe that quid pro quo did not so much create peace as remove the roadblocks to it.

 

And that brings us back to Frantzman's claim that normal relations for Israel, even within the Arab world, may not be such a strange or abnormal idea after all.

Read More

Why Didn't The Abraham Accords Happen 25 Years Ago? (Daled Amos)

By Daled Amos

The announcement earlier this month that Israel and Morocco have agreed to establish full diplomatic relations and normalize ties was not a complete surprise. After all, it is no secret that the two countries have had friendly relations with each other for decades.

 

If anything, the question is what took so long.

 

But it is not just that Israel and Morocco have been friendly for so long. More than that, the ingredients that made normalization possible under the Abraham Accords were there 25 years ago too, if not longer.

 

The circumstances that made the Abraham Accords possible now and enabled Trump to do something that previous administrations could not do, and in fact claimed was just not possible -- those circumstances are not really new.

 

In 1996, historian Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, Senior Fellow at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University, wrote a paper for The Maghreb Review entitled Israel and Morocco: A Special Relationship. In it, he not only gives the background that led to the establishment of low-level liaison offices in Rabat and Tel Aviv. He also underscores elements that years later would make normalization possible in 2020.

 

For example, today a major impetus for the Arab normalization of ties with Israel is the threat of Iran, both because of its status as a state sponsor of terrorism and its efforts towards nuclear weapons.

 

But back in 1996, Iran was not the threat it is today. So what common interests drew Israel and Morocco together?

 

Maddy-Weitzman writes:

From the outset of Moroccan independence in 1956 and through subsequent decades, Israel and Morocco identified a number of vital interests common to both sides: their perception of a common threat posed by radical pan-Arabism, epitomized by Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir [Nasser] in Egypt, the Ba'th in Syria and Iraq, and the FLN in Algeria. (p. 36-7)

These radical elements were a threat to the stability of Morocco's monarchy and were antagonistic towards Israel as well.

 

From Morocco's perspective, it made sense to turn to the West for the economic and military help it needed in order to deal with the challenges to its stability, both in the region and at home. It was in Morocco's interest to turn to the US  and "like so many other countries, Morocco concluded that one important road to Washington passed via Jerusalem."

And of course back then too it was in Morocco's interest to get US support on the issue of the Western Sahara.

The goal was more than the cold peace we associate with Egypt and Jordan. According to Weitzman, Morocco's King Hassan II had "a particular vision of renewed Semitic brotherhood, based on an idyllic Jewish-Arab past in Morocco and Muslim Spain, which could contribute to an economic and human renaissance in the contemporary Middle East."

 

And on the less idyllic and more practical side, then -- like now -- there was the financial boon that could potentially accrue to Morocco as a result of a peace agreement:

The Israeli Export Institute estimated in October 1994 that Israel's export potential to Morocco during the coming three years amounted to $220 million dollars annually, in areas such as agricultural products, irrigation equipment, the building trades, hi-tech electronics, processed foods, and professional services for infrastructure development. In addition, the potential for Morocco serving as a centre for the re-export of Israeli goods to other North African countries was estimated in the tens of millions of dollars. Estimates of the value of Israeli goods reaching to Morocco via third parties and subsidiary companies ranged from $30-100 million annually. (p.45)

Not bad.

 

Also, in another foreshadowing of what UAE has to gain from a peace agreement, Yedi'ot Aharonot quoted US sources in 1996 that Morocco was looking into Israeli help in upgrading 20 of its F-5 combat jets.

 

Before Israel signed peace treaties with Egypt (1979) and Jordan (1994), Morocco made clear what kind of relations it wanted with Israel. Weitzman lists the kinds of statements made by Morocco during the years 1976 to 1977:

a. the historical affinity between Arabs and Jews as 'sons of Abraham' and 'grandsons of Ishmael and Isaac,' an affinity which could form the basis for the tapping of both sides' capabilities in order to modernize and develop the Middle East;

b. Israel's capabiility for contributing to the modernization and development of the Arab world;

c. the dangers to the Arab world inherent in prolonged conflict;

d. the need for coexistence and integration, which required Israel's withdrawal to the June 1967 boundaries, creation of a Palestinian state, and full peace, recognition and integration between Israel and the Arab states; and

e. the need for dialogue to solve all problems, including dialogue between the PLO and Israel. (p. 41)

One could easily imagine the UAE making these statements -- including its continued commitment to the Palestinian Arabs, but these statements about peace that seem novel even now were being made over 40 years ago.

But no groundbreaking peace treaty between Morocco and Israel happened.

Official trade between the 2 countries amounted to just $2 million.

Why?

 

One reason might be that Nasser and the other potential threats to Morocco's stability posed a different kind of danger than what Iran does today. Iran is a Muslim state, but not an Arab one. Its brand of Islam fanaticism is very different from the pan-Arabism Nasser advocated as the leader of Egypt. And Iran takes the spread of its influence very seriously.

 

But more than that, King Hassan II of Morocco saw himself as a facilitator, hosting summits, conferences and Israeli prime ministers -- while at the same time maintaining his image as a leading Arab statesman. In 1967, Morocco sent armed forces to Egypt, although they only got as far as Libya. In 1973, Moroccan forces in Syria participated in the Yom Kippur War. The following year, he hosted the conference that conferred recognition of the PLO.

 

King Hassan II in 1983. Public domain

 

He was in no hurry to sign a peace treaty with Israel, preferring a gradual approach.

His son, King Muhammad VI, may be a different story.

The question now is no longer when peace will start, but rather how far will it go.

Read More

Maybe The Potential For The Abraham Accords Was There All Along (Daled Amos)

By Daled Amos

Typical of the Palestinian Arab claim to the land is the statement Abbas made in front of the UN Security Council in 2018:

We are the descendants of the Canaanites who lived in the land of Palestine 5,000 years ago, and continuously remained there to this day. Our great people remains rooted in its land. The Palestinian people built their own cities and homeland, and made contributions to humanity and civilization. [emphasis added]

Two years earlier, in 2016, Abbas expanded on this. On official PA TV Abbas said

They [the Jews] are thieves who stole the land, and who want to steal the history, but history cannot change and cannot be falsified. The facts bear witness to it. We have been here for the last 5,000 years, and have not left this land. We have not left this land. Our forefathers are the monotheist Canaanites and Jebusites. They are the ones who built Jerusalem, before Abraham was even here. [emphasis added]

What drives the Palestinian Arabs in general -- and Abbas in particular -- to such obvious fabrications?

On the one hand, there is the Palestinian Arab goal to usurp the strong indigenous Jewish connection to Israel.

But there is another element.

There is the attempt to establish a basis for Palestinian nationalism.

In his book The Seed of Abraham, Rafael Patai discusses the development of Arab nationalism in general --and why Palestinian nationalism by definition pales in comparison.

Many of the Arab countries in the Middle East are newly created as a result of British, French and Italian machinations. The straight borders of many of those Arab countries testify to the arbitrariness of both the borders and the states themselves.

Writing in 1986, Patai notes

It is remarkable how rapidly the population of each of the newly created Arab states developed a national consciousness and patriotic feelings of its own. This process was facilitated in the major Arab states by historical memories that the leadership soon learned how to utilize. Sentiments in French mandatory, and later independent, Syria were thus related back to the great days when Syria, with Damascus as its splendid capital, was the center of the great Umayyad caliphate, while the newly reestablished Iraq saw herself as heir to the Abbasid empire whose center was the Iraqi capital of Baghdad. However, no other Arab country had as solid a basis for priding itself of its glorious past as Egypt, which, although its greatest age lay far back in the millennia of the jahiliyya [Arabia before the advent of Islam], nevertheless came to view that early Pharaonic period as part of its national history.

Some Arab countries could create a national consciousness based on their place in Arab history. Other Arab countries, lacking that tie, could instead boast of their ancient history -- even if that history belonged to a land they had conquered and was not actually their own.

Where did that leave the Palestinian Arabs? 

Up the creek.

In Palestine, such attempts at establishing a great Arab national past ran into a vexing problem. Since Palestine had never been an independent Arab country, its period of pride had to be sought in the biblical Israelite age. As we have seen in an earlier chapter, the Arabs considered themselves heirs of Abraham the hanif [maintained pure monotheism], and claimed that Abraham, with his son Ishmael, was the founder of the sanctuary at Mecca. One writer even claimed that Abraham himself was an “Arabian.” Thus the more general claim could be made, even though it retained tenuous at best, that Palestine was the scene of part of Arab prehistory. [emphasis added]

That is where Jewish history got in the way.

The difficulty arose in connection with the long period between Abraham (whose Arab progeny settled in Arabia) and the end of the Hebrew monarchy, during which there was no Arab presence in Palestine, while the Banu Isra’il (“Children of Israel”) were undeniably masters of the land. Hence, in contrast to Egypt, the Arabs could not claim that they had also in Palestine a national history going back to the long millennia of the jahiliyya. (p.309; emphasis added)

But according to Patai, a sense of Palestinian nationalism did develop, and Patai describes it as a slow process that started with Arab differences with the Jews of the Second Aliyah who -- unlike the First Aliyah -- insisted that only Jews be employed as workers to work the land. 

That nationalism continued after the reforms of the Young Turks led to the modernization of the Ottoman Empire and Arab representation in the new Turkish Parliament.

And this reaction against the Ottoman Empire led to the possibility of an unlikely (from today’s vantage point) alliance:

At the same time Arab nationalist leaders recognized that their cause could benefit from Jewish help. In June 1913 was held in Paris the first conference of Arab nationalists which was an overt anti-Turkish demonstration, and in preparation for which Arab approaches were made to the Jews with a view to setting up an Arab-Jewish alliance. In the course of these contacts it appeared that most Arab leaders in Cairo and Beirut took a positive view of Zionism were basically in favor of Jewish immigration to Syria and Palestine, and expressed their understanding of “the valuable assistance that the capital, the diligence, and the intelligence of the Jews can provide to the accelerated development of the [Arab] areas of Turkey.” (p.312; emphasis added)

Patai quotes Ahmad Mukhtar Bayham, an Arab leader from Beirut at that conference who declared, “The entry of Jews--yes! But the entry of Turks--no!”

The president at that conference, Abd al-Hamid Zahrawi made a statement:

Because they [the Jews] are our brothers in race, and we regard them as Syrians who were forced to leave the country at one time but whose hearts always beat together with ours, we are certain that our Jewish brothers the world over will know how to help us so that our common interest may succeed and our common country will develop both materially and morally (p. 313)

It sounded promising, but in the end, no agreement was reached on Zionist issues such as Jewish immigration and land purchases.

But it is in this context of the potential alliance between Arabs and Jews that we can appreciate how it is that Chaim Weizmann and Emir Faisal were able to come to an agreement that recognized Zionist goals in then-Palestine.

Today, the Abraham Accords are not necessarily a bolt out of the blue. Perhaps the potential for Jewish-Arab cooperation existed all along.

At one time, they faced a common enemy: the Ottoman Empire.

Today, that common enemy is Iran.

---

---

We have lots of ideas, but we need more resources to be even more effective. Please donate today to help get the message out and to help defend Israel.

Read More

The Kobayahshi Maru, The Blackmailer's Paradox and Trump (Daled Amos)

Two men are offered $100,000.00 -- All they have to do to earn it is to come to an agreement on how they will split the money among themselves.

No problem.

Except that one of the men refuses to split the money evenly. Instead, he demands 90% of the cash or he will leave and neither of them will get anything -- and he insists on receiving that 90% regardless of the other man's arguments. Sure enough, realizing that the 'blackmailer' is not going to budge, the other man realizes he has no choices other than to agree to accept 10% of the money, or leave empty-handed.

So he takes the $10,000.

And the blackmailer pockets the other $90,000.

Welcome to the pre-Trump Middle East.

Nobel Prize winner Robert Aumann described this in 2010 as "The Blackmailer's Paradox," and explains how Israel's desire for peace with the Arabs suffers from the same problems.

Namely:

1. There is an underlying assumption that agreements must be reached with the Arabs at any price -- and the failure to reach an agreement is unacceptable.

2. Just like the man who accepts the $10,000 -- who sees the situation as a one-time game -- Israel focuses on the short, immediate term instead of seeing the immediate situation as part of the long term, and as an opportunity to establish precedents and initiatives for another, different opportunity at some point down the road. In the paradox above, instead of accepting the $10,000 -- the man could have stood his ground and refused to give in, thereby setting the groundwork for a potential opportunity that might come up later.

Lee Smith fleshes out this point in an interview with Aumann:

Aumann believes that the problem isn’t that the Israelis and Arabs don’t want peace, but rather that the Israelis and their U.S. patron believe they are playing a one-time game whereas the Arabs see themselves as playing a repeated game. Jerusalem and Washington are in a hurry to conclude negotiations immediately, whereas the Arabs are willing to wait it out and keep playing the same game. The result is that Israel’s concessions, or the desire to have peace now, have brought no peace.

...“For repetition to engender co-operation, the players must not be too eager for immediate results,” Aumann said in his lecture. “The present, the now, must not be important. If you want peace now, you may well never get peace. But if you have time—if you can wait—that changes the whole picture; then you may get peace now.”

3. Like the blackmailer, the Arabs have complete and total faith in their position, which empowers them to demand preconditions and even concessions up front. This confidence also convinces the other side, and the West in general, of the rightness of the Arab cause.

In his blog First One Through, Paul Gherkin has a post,  Nikki Haley Channels Robert Aumann at the UN Security Council, where he runs down how Israel failed on all 3 of the above points during the Obama administration:

Meanwhile, Israel collapsed under Obama on all three points. It was compelled to publicly state its support for a two state solution which may-or-may-not be the best outcome for an enduring peace. It was repeatedly pushed for “good will gestures” that showed that Israel would take immediate action and would not walk away from the table. And far-left wing organizations such as J Street and the New Israel Fund actively undermined the faith and conviction that Jews have a basic human right to live in homes that they legally purchase. [emphasis added]

The peace process was left in shambles.

And what would the alternative look like?

Jonathan Mark, the associate editor of The New York Jewish Week, describes the alternative to the "good will gesture" approach, à la Aumann's approach, this way:

The idea isn’t convincing the other guys to like you, or to even be civil to you. The idea is to convince them that you’re prepared to walk; that you’re thinking long-term, not just Obama’s term; that you convince yourself that you’re playing for keeps, that you have the winning hand, that you’re the meanest dog in the junk yard — showing your teeth, even as you smile — and in the process you convince your opponent, too.

And that is what the Trump administration did, by taking the step which the Obama administration never contemplated: recognizing and supporting some of Israel's claims, while at the same time holding back on support of the Palestinian Arabs.

In response, the Arabs did what they consistently do. They played the long game as opposed to the one-time game -- and waited out the Trump administration.

What Trump did was change the way the game was played.

Kind of like the Kobayashi Maru.

In the second Star Trek movie, the Kobayashi Maru is a training exercise designed to test the character of Starfleet cadets in a no-win scenario. The cadet is assigned in a simulation to rescue the disabled civilian vessel Kobayashi Maru, located in the Klingon Neutral Zone, knowing that any Starfleet ship entering the zone will cause an interstellar border incident. The cadet crew must choose whether to attempt a rescue of the Kobayashi Maru crew – endangering their own ship and lives – or abandon the Kobayashi Maru to certain destruction. If the cadet chooses to attempt a rescue, the simulation is deliberately designed to guarantee that the cadet's ship is destroyed with the loss of all crew members.

In the movie, Captain Kirk is the only one to ever successfully complete the mission, rescue the Kobayashi Maru, and escape the Klingons unscathed.

How?

Kirk secretly reprogrammed the computer to allow for the possibility of rescue -- because he does not believe in "no-win" scenarios.

In going contrary to accepted wisdom, both in pursuing Middle East peace with other Arab countries while bypassing the Palestinian Arabs and in applying pressure on the Palestinian Arabs instead of on Israel, Trump rewrote the accepted, calcified way of pursuing peace -- Trump basically pursued a strategy worthy of Captain Kirk.

Source: YouTube screencap

Well, maybe not exactly.

But the degree to which Trump exploded the accepted myths by reprogramming how Middle East peace can be accomplished can be seen in the reactions that followed.

According to Wikipedia, while the movie itself does not discuss the consequences of rejecting the rescue mission, it is discussed in Star Trek novels and video games that followed -- with consequences that include the mutiny of the crew.

So while Trump has been nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize (similar to Kirk receiving a commendation for "original thinking"), there has also been a backlash.

Øyvind Tønnesson, a former adviser and editor for the Nobel Institute's Peace Prize section, told Newsweek:

In principle, then, I would not rule out either Netanyahu nor Trump as theoretically possible NPP [Nobel Peace Prize] candidates. My personal opinion, however, is that their policies and personal records stand, for the most part, in stark contrast to the main trajectories in international peace politics that the NPP has followed since 1901.

To which Aumann offered the counterargument:

The Peace Prize is for peace, not for being a nice guy. It's true that it was given to Mother Teresa and later to Obama, but neither one brought peace. Netanyahu brought peace, and is bringing more of the same.

And it is interesting to imagine if Trump might have brought more of the same as well.

---

---

We have lots of ideas, but we need more resources to be even more effective. Please donate today to help get the message out and to help defend Israel.

Read More