Gadi Taub: The Peace Process Failed, but Its Bad Assumptions Live On
IV. Homo EconomicusSeth Mandel: Palestinian Nationalism Uber Alles
But misunderstanding runs deeper. It is not only that we imagined the Palestinian national movement in the image of ours. We also projected our own misconceptions of human nature onto the Palestinians. We misunderstood them, in other words, in the same way that we misunderstand ourselves.
Contemporary Western elites mostly assume as a matter of course that we all want, above all, a decent job, food on the table, and a safe environment to raise our children. But when we conceive of all life in these materialistic terms, we lose the ability to imagine the human capacity for the sublime and the evil alike. And, encouraged by fuzzy-headed liberal and socialist assumptions from America, Europe, and the global NGO industry, Israelis failed to believe in their neighbors’ sinister intentions.
When, one after the other, IDF intelligence chiefs reassured us that the Palestinians are deterred because it was not in their interest to risk the economic gains we helped them achieve, it is because they project our ideas of human motivation onto them. So self-evident do their presuppositions seem that they become invisible to those who hold them.
These presuppositions serve as filters by which any contradictory information is labeled as pessimism, fear-mongering, fantasy, absurdity, or deception—and so never enters intelligence calculations. The same projections and misunderstandings predominate departments of Middle East studies throughout the West.
It was on the basis of these Western conceptions of human nature that we assumed our technology would be intimidating enough; it was this view that informed our belief that, once freed from Israeli occupation, Gazans would naturally devote their efforts to nation-building and economic betterment; it is on the basis of this outlook that we also convinced ourselves that they’ll see that perpetual peace was better than perpetual war.
And this is why we did not take seriously their theology of hate, their deep-seated racism, and the depth of their barbaric sadism.
We did not take ourselves seriously either, and so we did not understand the forces within ourselves that were now awakened.
In his masterful essay “Churchill in 1940,” Isaiah Berlin wrote that Winston Churchill did not create the fortitude that the British people displayed in their determination to fight the evil of Nazism. He only awakened something that was already in them, but that they themselves had forgotten. In a less poetic way, but with no less ferocity, Benjamin Netanyahu tapped a force within the hearts of Israeli Jews that most of us no longer remember we possessed. He did it simply and straightforwardly: he insisted on total victory from day one, and has never wavered since.
Unlike Churchill who commandeered the whole of British society, Netanyahu has had to manage the war despite opposition from much of the state and military bureaucracy, fickle coalition partners, a hostile press, and an elite that loathes him. That elite includes much of the top brass of the IDF and Shin Bet, who have more than once tried to undermine him. Instead of the unwavering support Britain received from the Roosevelt administration even before Pearl Harbor, the current U.S. government has repeatedly tried to bring about the end of Netanyahu’s term as well as an end to the war without Israeli victory. It is also undermining Israel’s long-term security with its strategy of appeasing Tehran. Notwithstanding all this, Netanyahu has persisted on the path to the victory and now Israel seems close to achieving it, perhaps even to removing the Iranian nuclear threat. That’s a breathtaking feat of statesmanship by any standard—one that most of us, myself included, did not believe was possible at all.
All the same, October 7 did happen on Netanyahu’s watch. The question of his responsibility awaits inquiry when this war is over. What he did and did not do before that day will have to be weighed against what he did since.
But the truth is that Israelis care very little about that now, which is why the attempts to pin responsibility for the disaster on the prime minister have failed to gain traction. After a string of extraordinary operational successes in the conduct of the war, and after resisting external pressure to buckle in the face of Israel’s enemies, Netanyahu is steadily rising in the polls. That’s because a solid majority in Israel understands the existential danger we are in, and so does not dream of replacing the one man who has never wavered on “total victory.”
Fatah’s control of the PLO at this time was so consequential because it was created as an umbrella coalition of Palestinian resistance groups. The last major holdout, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, had joined the prior year. Arafat took over at the perfect moment to mold the entire Palestinian national movement according to his methods. Though there would be disagreement and discord, the main point of uniting the disparate factions of the Palestinian “resistance” was to threaten the stability of Arab states that didn’t back total war with Israel.We’re All Colonialists Now
Fight Club’s first rule was “you don’t talk about Fight Club.” The PLO’s first rule was “you only talk about destroying Israel.” Everything else gets checked at the door.
What Qaddumi’s comments meant was not that supporters of the Palestinian cause should temporarily set aside their devotion to, say, gay rights or feminism. It meant that supporters must permanently set aside their devotion to gay rights and feminism and anything else they believed. Because the true state of a leftist movement, in the Palestinian rendering, is revolution in perpetuity.
This is the danger of the primacy of Palestinian nationalism on campus and among other, mostly but not entirely progressive, activist institutions. Nothing else matters but the destruction of the power structures wherever they are. Permanent revolution means there can be no peace, no compromise. If yet another generation of activists is reared on this one rule, it will apply to everything, not just Israel or Zionism.
Finally, how to reconcile the declared Marxist and socialist bona fides of the Palestinian national movement with its issue ban, which would seem to rule out much that animates the class war? Here Qaddumi shows the cleverness of the movement. The class war exists, but the Palestinians have… invented a new class:
“Because of the evacuation of the Palestinians, Al-Fateh represents the refugees. It is the only revolutionary movement which has transcended the Arab movements, Arab parties and the Palestinian regional movements, and it has done this because it has depended on the refugee class. The bourgeois concept, on the other hand, is one of attributes.”
In other words, in the permanence of the “refugee class” is where the movement finds its greatest strength.
The “pro-Palestinian” activists in the West are not unaware of all this—or at least those who speak for them and lead them aren’t unaware. The point of all this conflict is its permanence and its wide applicability. There are, of course, people who support the establishment of a Palestinian state but who do not support open-ended violent revolution. But of the two groups, the Western activist class tends to elevate and legitimize only the more extreme one, which makes no excuses for its hypocrisies and which cannot be placated by peace and compromise.
Kirsch notes that the massacre of Jews in Israel—instantly transmitted around the world via bodycam footage taken by Hamas fighters—had the effect of reversing “the usual terms” of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. For two decades, the pattern of the conflict saw Hamas casually rocket Israeli towns near the Gaza border with little effect while Israel retaliated with lethal artillery barrages and air strikes. The asymmetry of firepower combined with a similar asymmetry in the protection of civilians left Israel largely unscathed while Palestinians bore the brunt of the Israeli response. These uneven death tolls provoked fierce criticism of Israel around the world. One might have expected, then, that a gruesome and intimate butchery of many hundreds of Israeli civilians would elicit widespread horror and condemnation. In fact, just the opposite happened. The most murderous attack against Jews since the Holocaust inspired “a larger and louder pro-Palestinian response than any previous conflict.”
How to explain this wretched state of affairs? Kirsch admits that some of the indignation toward Israel flows from traditional humanitarian concerns in response to Israel’s retaliatory invasion of Gaza, which resulted in a great many civilian casualties. But in truth, this was an afterthought. The protests against Israel erupted more or less concomitantly with the news of Jewish bloodshed, well before any Israeli military response. Over the years, it had been common to witness excitement and enthusiasm over Hamas’s exploits in Palestinian culture, or even in the political slums of Cairo and Damascus; what made this time different, Kirsch observes, is that now “it was coming from Ivy League campuses, the Democratic Socialists of America, and Black Lives Matter.”
And the forces of jihad returned the compliment to the boutique left, adopting the language of an academic seminar. Three months after its barbaric attack in the Gaza Envelope, Hamas published a memorandum in defense of the war it initiated. “The events of October 7 must be put in their broader context,” it said. That broader context, Hamas explained, is “all cases of struggle against colonialism.” Formerly committed to shedding Jewish blood on explicitly theological grounds, Hamas now fine-tuned its position to opposing Zionism as a “colonial project,” an “illegal entity.”
But the insistence that Israel is part of the same historical process that brought European settlers to various lands wrenched from indigenous peoples belies the historical record. Modern Zionist settlement in what is now Israel took off in the 1880s when Palestine was a province of the Ottoman Empire. Jewish emigration continued after World War I when the land was ruled by the British under a mandate from the League of Nations. Eventually, the Jewish state was established in a manner that displaced Arab inhabitants of Palestine but did not erase them.
Notwithstanding the post-1967 settlements on the West Bank, the State of Israel remains a speck on the regional map surrounded by a vast swath of Arab countries stretching from Morocco to Iraq. Some empire. And since 1948, the Arab population of historic Palestine has swelled from about 1.3 million to about 7.5 million. Some genocide.
Anyone with a tinge of sympathy for Zionism ought to recoil from an ideology that is a fount of historical falsehood and monstrous fantasy at the expense of the Jews. But Kirsch wisely instructs readers how the settler-colonial prism also provides low returns for Palestinians. In short, the rise of this framework generates terrible confusion about that insoluble conflict. By fashioning a radical argument against Israel’s entire existence, the settler-colonial paradigm obviates any legitimate discussion of land swaps and proposed national borders. Given the durable imbalance of power, the implications for Palestinians of remaining locked in rejectionism will be grim. Hence the beginning of wisdom for advocates of Palestinian interests is to recognize that Israel, with no “mother country” to speak of, is staying put.
Ultimately, it is not only the concept of colonialism that people fail to grasp in the modern age but the concept of war. In a century of recurrent conflict between Jews and Arabs, it is long past time for Palestinians to adjust to the reality of Jewish sovereignty. Without that, their aspirations for a better life will remain bound up in an impossible, anti-historical scheme. On Settler Colonialism is a lucid and humane warning against precisely that fate.