Something unusual is happening in Yemen. The Houthis — a movement whose official slogan includes "Death to America, Death to Israel, Damn the Jews" — are watching Iran take its heaviest blows in history and doing essentially nothing about it.
Why not?
At first I thought it was self-preservation. But Hezbollah, which has the same instinct, went all in, no doubt at Iran's behest.
The Houthis are saying that they are waiting for the right moment. On March 9th, speaking during his Ramadan lectures, Abdul Malik al-Houthi explained, "Regarding military escalation and action, our fingers are on the trigger, ready to respond at any moment should developments warrant it."
What is the right moment? For that, we need to understand a basic fact: for Iran, survival is victory.
Iran's strategic objective right now is not to defeat the United States militarily. It is to survive the campaign with enough institutional continuity, territorial control, and proxy infrastructure to reconstitute its threat posture over time — and to create enough economic and political pressure on the coalition to force a ceasefire before that threat posture is fully dismantled.
The oil weapon is central to that strategy.
The Strait of Hormuz closure has removed approximately 20 million barrels per day from global markets, roughly one-fifth of global oil consumption. There are partial mitigations available to make up some of this shortfall. Saudi Arabia's East-West Pipeline to Yanbu and the UAE's Habshan-Fujairah pipeline to the Gulf of Oman can together bypass the strait for perhaps 6-9 million bpd under optimal conditions, though drone strikes have already targeted Fujairah infrastructure and a Saudi oil field has been hit. Global spare production capacity outside the Gulf adds perhaps 1.5-3 million bpd. Strategic petroleum reserve draws from the U.S. and IEA members provide perhaps 2-4 million bpd of cushion measured in weeks, not months. U.S.-led naval escorts could restore another 0.5-2 million bpd through carefully batched convoys, but commercial operators won't return at scale until the route is genuinely safe, not merely escorted, and insurers remain unwilling to write policies. Venezuela can only add about half a million bpd.
Add all of it up generously, and the world can cover perhaps 10-14 million bpd of the shortfall. The remaining 6-10 million bpd, sustained over weeks and months, will do what oil shocks have always done: drive inflation, strain supply chains, and create political pressure on governments whose populations feel it at the pump. Asia absorbs over 80% of Hormuz oil flows. South Korea, Japan, and India are not parties to this conflict. Their governments will not remain silent indefinitely. And in the United States, Brent crude at $90-100 per barrel will eventually be measured in polling numbers.
This is Iran's path to survival: economic attrition with the world pressuring the US to end the war as soon as possible.
Yet even the partial mitigation from the Saudi pipeline depends almost entirely on one assumption: that the Red Sea bypass route stays open.
The Houthis control the Bab-el-Mandeb strait at the southern entrance to the Red Sea. They have already demonstrated, over two years of operations, that they can make that corridor effectively impassable to commercial shipping through a sustained campaign of ballistic missiles, anti-ship cruise missiles, and one-way attack drones. During their previous campaign, the Houthis attacked 178 vessels, sinking four ships and killing nine sailors, forcing hundreds of commercial vessels to reroute around South Africa.
Right now, ships going across the Red Sea to the Suez Canal are still unimpeded. The Saudi pipeline is safe for now. But the Houthis can make the entire Red Sea too dangerous for shipping; insurers would bail as soon as there is one ballistic missile aimed at the Yanbu port that the Saudis use.
This is Iran's ace in the hole. Closing both the Straits of Hormuz and Bab-el-Mandeb, and harassing the ships already in the Red Sea, is an oil shock that the world cannot absorb now.
If the Houthis enter now, they do so at the moment of maximum U.S. military attention and maximum carrier strike group presence. They would be struck hard, potentially decisively, while the political and military infrastructure to do so is fully in place. That is a bad trade, not just for the Houthis, but for Iran, which needs them intact for exactly the scenario described above.
The Houthis, kept intact and in reserve, are the instrument designed to execute the most important part of Iran's survival strategy at the critical moment.
The only question is timing. And here is where strategy must be considered more importantly than a literal interpretation of international law. Because there is no reason to wage the war in Iran's timetable.
The Houthi threat should be addressed now, while the carriers are in place, while the military and political infrastructure to address it is mobilized. Waiting until they shoot their first missile or drone is exactly what Iran wants the US to do - because Iran controls the timing to stay in power.
Airstrikes against Houthi military infrastructure — launch sites, missile and drone storage, command and control — conducted now, as part of the broader campaign posture, carry a fraction of the political and operational cost they would carry in four or six weeks, when justifying renewed escalation becomes exponentially harder. The targeting intelligence accumulated during Operation Prosperity Guardian and the August 2025 strikes is there. The assets are in the region. The narrative logic — these are Iran's proxies, this is a single integrated threat network — is defensible and accurate.
The Houthis have already demonstrated their willingness to act against global shipping when Iran requests it. That is not a theoretical future threat — it is an established behavioral pattern with a two-year track record. The question is not whether they will do it, but when Iran decides the moment is optimal.
The Houthis are not acting out of self preservation. Like Hezbollah, they are doing exactly what their Iranian masters tell them to do. Iran needed Hezbollah to open up a second front to Israel at the outset of the war, but they need the Houthis to be wait and maintain their full capabilities.
Waiting for that moment give Iran control of the most important single variable in the war's political sustainability: the oil price, and with it, the patience of every government in Asia and every voter in America watching their energy bills.
The Houthis are not standing down out of principle. They are being held in reserve as a weapon. The time to address a weapon is before it is fired, not after.
We know they would use it on request. They already did.
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Elder of Ziyon


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