The European Union sanctioned four individuals and three organizations under its Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime, calling them "extremist Israeli settlers and organisations which support them" and declaring that they "are responsible for serious and systematic human rights abuses against Palestinians in the West Bank." I cannot vouch for every name on the list. I do know one of them well. Regavim is an Israeli legal-advocacy NGO that takes pains to operate within international and local law, and documents its research and litigation in the open. So I read the EU's statement of reasons to learn what serious and systematic human rights abuse Regavim had committed.
The EU says that Regavim "institutes legal proceedings and lobbies for the demolition of Palestinian property." It is "responsible for multiple court proceedings." It "lobbied for the demolition of a Palestinian primary school." The human rights abuse the EU condemns, in the EU's own words, is using Israel's court system and lobbying its government. The regulation then performs its sleight of hand, asserting that "through its activities" Regavim "plays an instrumental role in facilitating and encouraging coercive acts that aim to destroy Palestinian property." Regavim files petitions; a court decides; the state enforces. The "coercive acts" are court rulings and demolition orders issued by the State of Israel. The EU sanctions the petitioner for the verdict. If the EU is stating that Israel's respected High Court is really an extremist settler organization, it should sanction it.
The "extremist" label deserves the same scrutiny as the charges, because I have watched Regavim work in a different context. In 2013 the organization took me through the Negev, where it documents the same illegal-construction problem among Bedouin communities, and I filmed what they showed me. What I heard from them was not bigotry. Regavim acknowledged that the Bedouin had been treated badly by Israel in the decades after 1948, insisted that any solution had to give them a fair alternative, and argued that the state would have to spend serious money to provide it. Regavim's actual position is that the law should apply evenly and that the people affected by it deserve a just result. This is not how an extremist settler group would act. The EU is painting them as anti-Arab fanatics; the truth is quite the opposite.
The regulation singles out one case. Regavim petitioned over an EU-funded school at Jubbet adh-Dhib, near Bethlehem. An Israeli court found the structure had been built without a permit and posed a safety hazard to the children inside it, and COGAT imposed a deadline to vacate following the court's order. Regavim's role began and ended with the petition. The party that built without a permit was the European Union, and the party that ruled the construction unlawful was an Israeli court applying Israeli planning law. The EU has sanctioned the organization that brought the violation to the court's attention, while describing its own unpermitted construction as the injured party. Regavim's spokeswoman Naomi Linder Kahn put it precisely: the group's crime "involves petitioning to the courts against a dangerous, illegal, EU-funded school built on Israeli state land in a national historic site."
Strip out the rhetoric, and the only problem the EU has with Regavim is that it disagrees with its political opinions and legal advocacy. The EU has apparently forgotten its own Charter of Fundamental Rights, which guarantees everyone "freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority." Sanctions are interference by public authority, and the EU has imposed them on an organization for its opinions and its lawful actions. If anyone is violating fundamental rights in this case, it is the EU, which has frozen a group's assets and barred its director from travel because it disagrees with the group's politics. The list of charges contains nothing illegal, because there is nothing illegal to charge. Regavim holds the position that Jews have a right to their ancestral land and that the law should be upheld to that end, and it has defended existing Israeli law in Israeli courts.
And guess where that law came from?
The entire international case against Israeli construction in Area C rests on a single foundation: that Israel is the belligerent occupier in the West Bank. Israel considers the territory disputed, but it agrees to adhere to the human rights portions of the laws of occupation in its administration of Area C. The law of occupation in the Hague Regulations Article 43 obligates the occupant to respect "the laws in force in the country" unless absolutely prevented. The occupier administers the territory under the legal order it inherited. In Area C, that order is the planning regime the EU's own allies describe in detail: under the 1966 Jordanian Planning Law, still in force in the West Bank, virtually any construction requires a permit issued in line with an approved scheme, and that scheme descends from Regional Outline Plans the British Mandate approved in the 1940s. When Israel took the territory in 1967, it took over the planning powers that the Jordanian law already conferred. Enforcing a permit requirement that predates the occupation by decades is the occupier doing exactly what Article 43 commands. This is international law.
The EU knows this regime applies to its own projects, because the UN says so plainly. Any Area C construction — and OCHA's enumeration names "a private home, an animal shelter or a donor-funded infrastructure project" — still requires approval from the Israeli Civil Administration, because the planning transfer to the Palestinian Authority that the Interim Agreement envisioned was never carried out. The EU builds anyway, without the permits the law in force requires, and then declares the result legal. A structure erected without a permit is unlawful under the precise legal order that occupation status keeps alive. The EU cannot invoke "this is occupied territory" to delegitimize one population's building and then fund the other population's building in open defiance of the planning law that occupation status itself preserves.
There is room for honest argument about how Israel applies the law, hardly ever approving Arab construction in Area C. But that is a problem with the application of the law, not the law itself. The permit requirement itself is inherited law, not Israeli invention, and a building put up without a permit is illegal by the standard the EU insists governs the land. The EU's quarrel is not that Israel enforces a foreign legal order; it is that Israel enforces it against construction the EU paid for.
The low approval rate also reflects what Area C was built to be. Oslo II sorted the dense Palestinian population into Areas A and B, the urban and village zones where roughly 95 percent of West Bank Palestinians live, and left Area C as the strategic remainder: the settlements, the main roads, the Jordan Valley, the open land whose disposition the parties deferred to final-status talks. A zone defined in 1995 as the sparsely populated reserve, explicitly not the place where the Palestinian population was settled, will naturally generate a high rejection rate when permits are sought to build into it. Both sides understand the stakes. PASSIA states openly that Israel's aim in Area C is to push Palestinians toward A and B, and INSS records that Palestinians have run an organized legal campaign that has won authorization for 113 previously unauthorized villages — a build-first, litigate-later strategy rather than scattered individual need. Area C is contested strategic space whose population balance is being fought over before any negotiation, which is precisely the contest the EU funds on one side and sanctions on the other. The burden is not Palestinian alone: Jewish residents face their own thicket of permitting and legal review for construction and expansion, which is what one would expect of a planning regime applied across a disputed zone rather than one rigged in their favor.
The hypocrisy is stark. Regavim, Amana, and Nachala are accused, in the EU regulation's own language, of building or facilitating outposts "to create facts on the ground," of working to alter the territorial and demographic reality before any final-status agreement, of making it harder for the rival population to remain. This is exactly what the EU is doing on the other side! I took a tour with Regavim a decade ago and saw the EU's own program with my own eyes: clusters of structures thrown up across Area C without permits, flying the EU flag and bearing the words "Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection," positioned in deliberate lines across valleys to block Jewish communities from forming, like stones in a game of Go. Residents were brought in from Areas A and B to populate villages where none had stood. I saw hoses running off to steal water from neighboring Israeli towns. That was ten years ago, and the trajectory was already unmistakable; the structures have only multiplied since, because the program is continuous and the EU has never hidden it. Brussels funds the building, brands it, and describes its purpose in the same terms the regulation now treats as a human rights crime when the builders are Jewish.
The conduct the EU finances and the conduct the EU condemns are the same conduct: unpermitted construction in Area C, undertaken to win the territorial contest before negotiations, by moving a population in. The EU has drafted a definition of the offense that indicts its own program word for word. The only variable that decides whether Brussels calls it "humanitarian aid" or "serious human rights abuse" is which population holds the trowel. A standard that condemns one party while the accuser performs the identical act is not a legal standard; it is a pervasion of the entire concept of equal standing under the law.
The EU's fallback is that this construction qualifies as humanitarian assistance that an occupied population may receive regardless of domestic permit law. The argument fails on the EU's own evidence. Humanitarian assistance under international humanitarian law is relief for a population in need, not permanent construction engineered to alter territorial control. The EU's description of the Israeli mirror-conduct — facts on the ground, contiguity, frustrating the other side's claims — is an admission that the purpose of such building is political and territorial rather than humanitarian. Brussels has characterized the activity accurately when Jews do it and mislabeled the same activity when it does it.
Return now to the principle the EU claims to live by, because the contradiction is not abstract. The EU describes human rights defenders — and its own list of them names "members of human rights NGOs, academics, lawyers" — as "natural and indispensable allies," and its Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders commit EU missions worldwide to oppose exactly the tools the EU has now reached for: "administrative and judicial harassment," "smear campaigns, travel bans, criminalisation, stigmatisation." When a foreign government freezes the assets of a research-and-litigation NGO and bans its director from travel because it dislikes the NGO's cause, the EU calls that repression and sends a démarche. When the EU does it to an Israeli NGO, it calls it a human rights sanction. The behavior the EU condemns abroad is the behavior it has adopted here, against an organization whose work — researching land use, publishing findings, filing petitions in a democratic state's courts — is the textbook profile of the defenders the EU vows to protect everywhere else.
Underneath the legal packaging lies a claim with no source in law: that Area C is already Palestinian sovereign territory, so that Israel's permit regime is a foreign imposition and EU construction needs no one's permission. The status of Area C is the question the Oslo framework deferred to final-status negotiations, and no treaty, ruling, or resolution has settled it. There is no moment in history where control of Area C was legally (or otherwise) transferred to the Palestinian Authority. The EU has decided the question by assertion, and then by funding the facts and punishing the litigants who challenged them in court.
A European Union that built its identity on the promise that lawful opinion is beyond the reach of state punishment has now demonstrated, in a binding legal act, the precise conditions under which it will break that promise: when the opinion is inconvenient and the person holding it is Israeli.
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Elder of Ziyon

















