After all, his website happily publishes screeds from the Neturei Karta, and who is more Jewish-looking than they are?

The one uncontroversial fact about the Middle East is that the Arab-Israeli conflict is inextricably linked to every other problem in the region. Known as “linkage,” this is the one idea that has won the support of a broad consensus of U.S. congressmen, senators, diplomats, former presidents, and their foreign-policy advisers, seconded by journalists, Washington policy analysts, almost every American who has ever watched a Sunday morning news roundtable, and the Obama Administration, from National Security Adviser James Jones to the president himself: “If we can solve the Israeli-Palestinian process,” candidate Obama said on Meet the Press in the spring of 2008, “then that will make it easier for Arab states and the Gulf states to support us when it comes to issues like Iraq and Afghanistan. It will also weaken Iran, which has been using Hamas and Hezbollah as a way to stir up mischief in the region.”
...Having written a book that describes the Middle East in terms of a clash of Arab civilizations, I give no credence to the notion that the Arab-Israeli arena is the region’s defining issue. Rather, it is one among many conflicts that plague this conflict-prone area, and so I see the Arabic-speaking regions in terms of intra-Arab clashes, or an Arab cold war, where regional actors—not just nation states, but also regimes and their domestic rivals, in addition to competing sectarian groups—are warring with each other at varying levels of intensity. There is the Palestinian civil war between Hamas and Fatah that has cooled for the time being; in Lebanon, Hezbollah has routed the pro-democracy March 14 forces; the Houthi rebellion taking place on the Saudi-Yemen border is effectively a proxy war between the Saudis and the Iranians; in Syria, the ruling Alawite minority simultaneously fears the country’s Sunni majority even as it uses Sunni militants to advance its interests in Iraq, Lebanon, Israel, and the Palestinian territories; and in Iraq, Sunnis and Shia seem to be poised for a continuation of the civil war that will ensue after the U.S. withdrawal. That’s the real Middle East, where the Arabs’ fight for power among themselves takes priority over whether or not Washington negotiators have the percentages right in proffered land swaps between Israel and the Palestinians.
Nonetheless, I can hardly help but recognize the central role that U.S. Middle East policy has given to the belief that, from the Persian Gulf all the way to Western North Africa, a region encompassing many thousands of tribes and clans, dozens of languages and dialects, ethnicities and religious confessions, the Arab-Israeli issue is the key factor in determining the happiness of over 300 million Arabs and an additional 1.3 billion Muslims outside of the Arabic-speaking regions. Where does such an extraordinary idea come from? The answer is the Arabs—who might be expected, in the U.S. view of the world, to give us an honest account of what is bothering them. However, this would ignore the fact that interested parties do not always disclose the entire truth of their situation, especially when they have a stake in doing otherwise.
...
Nor apparently can the Americans admit that linkage was just a strategic instrument that leveraged the Arab narrative to the advantage of the United States. The further U.S. policymaking gets from the origins of the myth, the more magical and enticing it has become. The myth of linkage has grown to such legendary proportions at this point that it is the extent of the current White House’s Middle East policy. We have no other strategy to stop the Iranian nuclear program but linkage. Movement on the peace process, the Obama Administration believes, will get the Arab regimes to help us with Iran. The problem is that the Arabs will not help us with Iran. They want us to deal with Iran ourselves, but if we keep forcing the issue of linkage they have no choice but to go along with the ruse that everything is linked to the Arab-Israeli crisis. After all, it’s their narrative, and they can’t disown it now.
In reality, the reason the Obama Administration, Gates, and Petraeus are pushing linkage into overdrive is that there is no Iran strategy, and nothing—not even linkage—is going to stop the Iranians. They are telling the Arabs that they are going to do what they can about the Palestinian question, because they are not going to do anything about Iran. That’s the Arabs’ consolation prize for being an American ally. What a cruel joke fate has played at the expense of Arabs, who have been talking out of both sides of their mouth about the Palestinians and linkage for almost a century, a myth that came to link the fate of the Americans to that of the Arabs, and theirs to ours. Since we have no other policy than a magic trick, the Arabs have no choice but to pretend to believe it’s real.
(h/t EBoZ)
First, let there be no doubt: President Obama and all of us in his Administration are determined to reach a comprehensive peace in the Middle East—central to which is a two-state solution. President Obama has defined this goal as a vital U.S. interest. Now, none of us need to be reminded that this is very tough work. But we believe that through good-faith negotiations, the parties can mutually agree to an outcome that ends the conflict and reconciles the Palestinian goal of an independent and viable state based on the 1967 lines, with agreed swaps, and Israel’s goal of a Jewish state with secure and recognized borders that reflect subsequent developments and meet Israel’s security requirements.Contrast this with the next paragraph:
Israelis and Palestinians, as well as all those interested in peace, need to confront a basic reality: the status quo has neither produced long-term security nor served their interests. All parties must accept their share of responsibility for reaching a comprehensive peace that will benefit the entire region and the world. Our efforts must be driven from both above and below. That’s why the United States is focused on two mutually reinforcing tracks: resuming negotiations between the parties, and helping develop the institutions of a future Palestinian state. We strongly endorse the Palestinian Authority’s two-year state-building plan and are doing all we can to support it.
It is also important that the parties fulfill their Roadmap obligations. Unilateral actions taken by either party cannot be allowed to prejudge the outcome of negotiations and will not be recognized by the international community. Our position remains clear: we do not accept the legitimacy of continued Israeli settlement activity. Israel should also halt evictions and demolitions of Palestinian homes. At the same time, the Palestinian Authority should continue to make every effort to ensure security, to reform its institutions of governance, and to take strong, consistent action to end all forms of incitement.The only unilateral action that she decries are those that are done by Israel.
The Palestinian Authority is working in full swing to make sure no laborers will be working in Israeli settlements by the end of 2011, PA Minster of National Economy Hasan Abu Libda said Tuesday.This is going to be very interesting.
“There are currently 25,000 Palestinians who make their living from working in Israeli settlements. They should stop as they aren’t any different from 200,000 other unemployed workers,” Abu Libda said in an interview with Ma'an.
“Even though Palestinian law prohibits work in Israeli settlements, we know that a large number of people left their jobs and have gone to work in settlements,” he said, urging laborers to “work out another solution.”
Asked what alternatives those 25,000 workers could expect to find, the minister said there were 200,000 others out of work and that in seven months, the PA would take action to protect national interests by completely stopping all economic relations with settlements.
“In no country in the world is the unemployment rate zero, and so long as Israel continues to discourage the Palestinian national economy, the only alternative is to get citizens to consume national products,” Abu Libda explained. Only 18 percent of consumption in Palestine is national products, he explained, and if the PA can raise this rate to 40 percent, that will provide 50-60,000 jobs.
With regard to quality and competitiveness of national products, “Work is ongoing with the private sector to provide budgets to improve the quality of products and in a couple of weeks or months, there will be a noticeable improvement in quality of Palestinian national products, he said. “Once they improve, consumers will trust national products, and they will eventually be able to compete with Israeli products.”
For his part, PA Minister of Labor Ahmad Majdalani asserted that nothing in Palestinian law prohibited work in settlements. However, workers should stop on their own free will for moral and political reasons, Majdalani told Ma'an. In any case, Palestinian law prohibits only the import of settlement products, he said.Which means that a PA minister doesn't even know the law of his quasi-country.
The preferred policy (or more precisely, the lesser of the evils) is thatHow closely the IDF follows the advice (or how often it independently arrives at the same ideas) is an open question. It is still interesting to see that the Arabs are closely following Israeli military thinking.
of a relatively extensive military campaign once every few years. The
scope of the campaign and its frequency are dictated by the intensity
of the threat posed by the elements of resistance, the nature of the
battlefield, and the regional and international circumstances prevailing
at the time. However, in every scenario it is crucial that Israel’s military
response be disproportionate, so as to demonstrate to the enemy the
heavy cost inherent in every attempt to undermine the security of Israel’s
regional sphere. Such a step must not last long, but must focus on causing
extensive damage to the leaderships of the resistance organizations (both
at the military and the political echelons) and the various infrastructures
under their auspices (including civilian). Such a step may well be
accompanied by extensive damage to the Israeli home front, and also
by extensive damage – unintentional, of course – to the enemy’s civilian
sphere. Therefore, Israel’s leadership must conduct a public diplomacy
campaign on two fronts: one at home, where it will have to clarify the cost
Israel’s citizens must pay for confrontations with resistance elements
and stress that one must not expect a quick victory or decision by the IDF;
and the other for international audiences, where it will be necessary to
explain the complexity of tackling resistance elements and describe the
constraints the enemy imposes on Israel, first and foremost the necessity
to fight in the densely populated civilian sphere.
None of the steps described is likely to cause the complete surrender
of resistance elements or convince them to enter into direct talks with
Israel or recognize its existence (at least not in the foreseeable future).
However, military moves, particularly extensive ones accompanied by
serious damage to the resistance elements, are likely to create long term
deterrence with regard to undertaking violent operations against Israel.
Indeed, resistance elements developing sovereign or semi-sovereign
status have also developed a sensitivity and vulnerability they lacked
in the past. The assets of a governing entity, such as those of Hamas
in the Gaza Strip, give Israel more targets to damage and spell out loss
considerations to the resistance organizations, especially at a time when
governmental stability hangs in the balance.
[T]he 1967 lines are coming back as a common reference point when many officials and commentators talk about a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is increasingly assumed that there was a recognized international border between the West Bank and Israel in 1967 and what is necessary now is to restore it. Yet this entire discussion is based on a completely distorted understanding of the 1967 line, given the fact that in the West Bank it was not an international border at all.Read the whole thing.In fact, Article II of the Armistice with the Jordanians explicitly specified that the agreement did not compromise any future territorial claims of the parties, since it had been "dictated by exclusively by military considerations." In other words, the old Armistice Line was not a recognized international border. It had no finality. As a result, the Jordanians reserved the right after 1949 to demand territories inside Israel, for the Arab side. It was noteworthy that on May 31, 1967, the Jordanian ambassador to the UN made this very point to the UN Security Council just days before the Six-Day War, by stressing that the old armistice agreement "did not fix boundaries."
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