PMW: Abbas’ advisor repeats PA antisemitic narrative
According to this narrative, Jews were unwanted in Europe - an European plot created a homeland for them in Palestine.Jared Kushner’s Peace Proposal Would End the Palestinian Refugee Problem
According to the Palestinian Authority’s historical revision, Jews have no connection to the Land of Israel. The reason there are any Jews in “Palestine” is because of a European plot to get rid of the unwanted Jews. This antisemitic part of the Palestinian narrative was repeated last week by PA Chairman Abbas’ advisor on Foreign Relations, Nabil Shaath, at a symposium in Iraq:
“Shaath presented the plotting role that the US has played throughout history in order to erase the Palestinian identity and right, beginning with the Balfour [Declaration] that would not have been issued without American support, and the European plot to settle the Jews who were unwanted in Europe in order to get rid of them, so that they created a homeland for them that would absorb them in Palestine.” [Al-Ayyam, June 26, 2019]
Palestinian Media Watch has exposed the antisemitic element of the PA narrative numerous times. Another of Abbas’ advisors, Mahmoud Al-Habbash, for example, has stated that Europe supported Zionism to get rid of the Jews:
Mahmoud Al-Habbash, Abbas' Advisor on Religious and Islamic Affairs: "After World War II ended, the colonialist states wanted to get rid of the presence of the Jews of Europe, who had a monopoly over the economy and capital. Therefore, they supported these claims and helped them establish their state on the land of Palestine at the expense of the Palestinian people, who are still suffering from this crime."
[Official PA daily Al-Hayat Al-Jadida, April 24, 2018]
The U.S. “Peace to Prosperity” plan, unveiled at the Bahrain conference last week, calls for putting $50 billion toward improving the economic situation of the Palestinians; of this, over half is to be disbursed in Gaza and the West Bank, while the remainder would be divided among Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt—to be spent on descendants of Palestinian refugees living in the first two countries, and Gazans resettled in the last. From this part of the plan, Raphael Bouchnik-Chen sees an attempt to integrate these Palestinians into the countries where they live, and end their anomalous status as permanent “refugees”:
The Trump administration is pursuing the goal of changing the Palestinian experience from that of a society of miserable “refugees” into that of a prosperous society. . . . Kushner’s concept has a historical precedent. On June 15, 1959, the UN secretary-general Dag Hammarskjold presented a resettlement initiative. Hammarskjold assumed there were means available for the absorption of the refugees into the economy of the Arab region, and asserted that the refugees would be beneficial to their host countries by providing the manpower necessary to those countries’ development. He proposed that the program be financed by oil revenues and international funds up to $2 billion.
In 1959, [the Arab League] claimed that acceptance of the UN secretary general’s plan, with no guarantees, would have been tantamount to giving up [Palestinians’] economic and political rights. The Arabs accused Hammarskjold of exceeding his legal limits, and faulted him for ignoring the fact that the economic issues were the result of the political conflict. Addressing the economic question also separated the refugee problem from the conflict as a whole, which, so it was argued, was one of nationhood.
Why a U.S.-Israel Alliance is a Terrible Idea
Beyond the political imperatives on both sides, the decisive question regarding a US-Israel defense treaty can be cast in terms of cost-benefit analysis. The various costs have been outlined above. As to the benefits, a formal alliance would not necessarily add to the key components vital to Israel's national security.
US military assistance, which indeed provides the IDF with key components of its build-up and maintenance, clearly constitutes an element in Israel's deterrence equation. But this rests upon the existing long-term (ten year) commitments of the Administration and upon annual congressional allocations – not upon any treaty. The weight and size of the assistance package is a function of US determination to help an ally, and not predicated upon the existence of a formal treaty document. Nor would such a document change hostile perceptions of Israel's immense base of support in the US as it is today.
A US-Israel defense treaty would also pose some diplomatic difficulties. A degree of formal distance between Jerusalem and Washington is useful in Israel's diplomatic interactions with many of the Third World countries that are suspicious of a superpower. In addition, under a defense treaty, Israel will be even less free to compete with the US military industries than it is today. As a formal ally, Jerusalem would be less likely to conduct effective diplomacy with Moscow, let alone host a tripartite US-Russia-Israel summit of national security advisors.
Thus, a defense treaty between Israel and the US would reflect noble sentiment; but beyond the statement of friendship, it is neither desirable nor practical. The treaty may be a lofty idea, but one that works well only if it remains theoretical.