Does Israel want peace?
While Israel never lost the hope of peace, it understood that it would not come about merely through slogans, chants, campfires, or peace symbols.Nadav Eyal: Exclusive: The Warning Netanyahu Got Before the War
Among Israel’s neighbours, rallies all too often called for the murder of Jews and the destruction of the Jewish state. Survivors of Nazism, jihadism, and communism knew such words could become reality. They had seen it before.
Israelis, therefore, had no appetite for the catastrophic illusions that led Neville Chamberlain, the British prime minister, to declare after Munich in 1938: “I believe it is peace for our time…” Genuine peace partners
Nor were Israelis ready to risk being sacrificed on the altar of geopolitical expediency, otherwise known as appeasement, as happened so shamefully to Czechoslovakia.
Israelis needed no sanctimonious lectures from afar about the virtues of peace. They understood those virtues better than most. What they needed were genuine peace partners.
Anwar Sadat had once been a bitter foe of Israel and had sympathies for Nazi Germany during the Second World War. Yet he came to understand that Egypt’s future prosperity depended on making peace rather than pursuing Israel’s destruction.
It worked. Paired with Menachem Begin, Israel’s first Right-of-centre prime minister, and with the help of the United States, they achieved the seemingly impossible in 1979 – peace.
To get there, Begin agreed to a full withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula, three times the size of Israel itself, and from the strategic depth it represented.
It worked again in 1994, this time with Jordan, while Yitzhak Rabin was Israel’s leader. As with Sadat, King Hussein convinced Israel he was sincere about peace, understood Israel’s security concerns in a country the size of Wales, and grieved for the loss of innocent lives – Arab and Israeli alike. Another peace treaty, more Israeli concessions, and no Israeli second thoughts.
A third breakthrough came in 2020, when Israel had to choose between partial annexation of disputed West Bank territory and a normalisation agreement with the United Arab Emirates. The Right-of-centre Israeli government chose the latter.
The decision has paid dividends ever since. In addition, there was the unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Gaza in 2005, which could have led to peaceful coexistence, but instead was seized by Hamas to create a new launching pad for its war to the death with the Jewish state.
Anyone visiting Israel and speaking with people going about their daily lives would be hard-pressed to find an Israeli who welcomes decades of army reserve duty, rejoices as their children enter life-and-death military service, looks forward to 3am dashes to bomb shelters while carrying toddlers or helping elderly relatives, or relaxes on a bus while wondering whether a nearby package contains groceries or nail bombs.
Of course, the big question is whether peace with the Palestinians is possible. Hopefully, one day it will be. It requires, though, not just a territorial negotiation, but something bigger.
Can the Palestinians convincingly accept that Israel, whatever its final borders, is there to stay, that Jews are indigenous to the region, and that living alongside Israel, not replacing it, must be the outcome?
Neither the late Yasser Arafat nor Mahmoud Abbas, by their actions, has shown the courage and sincerity of Anwar Sadat or King Hussein. Will the next Palestinian leader? Only time will tell.
Meanwhile, Israel continues to pray fervently for peace, while never forgetting that it lives in a part of the world where, as Shimon Peres, the late Israeli president and Nobel laureate, liked to remind visitors: “In the Middle East, either you’re at the dinner table or you’re on the dinner menu.”
An in-depth look at Roaring Lion — the war aim Israel never made public, the intelligence assessment that failure could push Iran toward the bomb, and what the Mossad told the KurdsAndrew Fox: Hamas’s ‘disarmament’ deal is not what it seems
It is impossible to think about Israel’s plan to bring down the Islamic Republic without first thinking about its sheer presumption. Grinding a regime down over years — sanctions, influence operations, the slow seeding of fear and confusion — is one thing. Recruiting Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the former Iranian president and Holocaust denier, as an asset and installing him in power is another. So is launching a full-scale Kurdish invasion. This is the kind of project superpowers fail at. Israel tried it, and poured an enormous effort into the attempt.
Over the past weeks, The New York Times and Haaretz have published a great deal about that effort. What follows adds to the record on the most ambitious regional objective Israel has ever pursued: regime change in a country of roughly 100 million people, a regional power — attempted in wartime, and in coordination with the only superpower, the United States.
In the presentation the Mossad gave the Israeli cabinet on the eve of the operation, regime change was projected to take “one to three years.” That was a reasonable hedge; the Islamic Revolution did not happen in a day either. The ministers heard a different tune. “We understood,” one of them told me, “that we were going for regime change in a fast, sweeping move — killing the current leader, a Kurdish invasion, Ahmadinejad as our agent, protesters in the streets.”
Begin with a distinction
Again and again this has been described as “a Mossad operation.” The Mossad — Israel’s foreign intelligence service — was without question the animating force, the planner, the one pushing. But this was an operation of the State of Israel, ordered by its cabinet. It grew out of a conviction that had taken root at the political level and was then imposed on the security establishment: there would be no solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis, and no end to the friction with Iran, without a change of regime in Tehran. The 12-day war of June 2025 had created an opening, and Donald Trump was in the White House. Israel had to try, because the window might close. The cost of inaction, even weighed against the risk of failure, was higher than the cost of action.
Those words were said explicitly by Benjamin Netanyahu to the American president. The doctrine is his.
None of this is interpretation. The war aims of Operation Roaring Lion were never officially published. After conversations with a double-digit number of sources, military and political, the central objective can be reconstructed:
To deeply degrade or remove the threats Iran poses to Israel by creating the military conditions for a change of regime in Iran. Those may not be the exact words. But “creating the conditions for regime change” was the bottom line.
The phrasing was a compromise, negotiated in part with the IDF. From the first moment, the army said it did not know how to produce regime change on its own. For the General Staff, the main effort was strategic damage to Iran — the erosion of capability over time. Support for the Mossad was, as the army understood it, a secondary effort.
Why “creating the conditions” rather than “toppling the regime”? One defense official offered me a guess: the IDF knew this was a complicated objective, possibly an impossible one. It did not want to be dragged into a war with an aim so absolute that it could run forever — far past the number of interceptors in Israel’s magazines.
And yet the cabinet voted for an objective that was, in practice, an attempt at regime change. An objective that large — Megalomanic, some would say — dictates the allocation of resources and carries severe regional consequences. Put another way: the nuclear program and the ballistic missiles mattered, but they were not the holy grail, and they were not the message of the new war that followed. Where Rising Lion, the June 2025 campaign, prioritized the nuclear project — and did in fact halt enrichment — Roaring Lion was meant to be the war that ended all wars. With Iran, at least.
Western powers continue to misunderstand Hamas. They treat it as a stack of rifles with a political office attached. But it’s far more than an armed force. It ruled Gaza for almost two decades and infested its civil machinery. It shaped schooling through the education bureaucracy. The health sector operated under its government, while Hamas-run courts enforced its authority. Municipal employees and emergency committees kept its presence visible when formal ministries broke down. Collecting the weapons of Hamas and other factions removes an immediate threat of armed force, but it leaves Hamas’s human infrastructure in place.Lee Smith: The President of PEACE
The proposed handover to the National Committee exposes the danger. Hamas has sought to carry over 40,000 civil servants and security personnel into the new technocratic order. Roughly 10,000 belong to the Hamas-run police. A new nameplate on a ministry changes little if the same officials control salaries and local permits, with loyal policemen on the streets. Hamas can surrender the administrative title while retaining its governance networks.
Hamas’s behaviour during the ‘ceasefire’ does not bode well for the Board of Peace plan. Hamas gunmen reappeared as Israeli forces withdrew last year, crushing local rivals. The movement then resumed enforcing order with extreme brutality. Its remaining bureaucracy collected revenue and paid loyalists. Israel now says Hamas continues to recruit and rebuild. Every month of quiet exposes the superficial appearance of calm, even as renewed Hamas coercion demands another violent confrontation.
Verification of Hamas’s surrendering of weapons is going to be nigh-on impossible. No audited inventory exists for an arsenal dispersed across ruins and private buildings. Inspectors must prove the absence of hidden rifles and explosives across a dense urban landscape designed to frustrate surveillance. Hamas can hand over expendable weapons and reveal tunnels Israel already knows about, while continuing to conceal those Israel is unaware of. The commanders who remember how to rebuild can remain underground or melt into civilian employment. A weapons store controlled by a fragile administration remains a future armoury.
Hamas’s leaders are unusually candid about their objectives. Political bureau member Bassem Naim said the agreement preserved ‘our strategic project’. He praised the ‘Al-Aqsa Flood’, Hamas’s codename for the 7 October pogrom, and called for other arenas to advance the ‘liberation’ project.
The Board of Peace’s roadmap therefore offers Hamas an opportunity. Surrender enough metal to secure Israeli withdrawal, then protect the organisation embedded within Gaza’s new administration. Rearmament can wait until scrutiny fades. The weapons left inside Gaza will be waiting, too.
So, if Trump can’t win the war, or won’t, he can win a peace by pocketing Hamas’ nonconcessions to pad his résumé as a dealmaker—indeed, a “PRESIDENT OF PEACE,” as U.N. Ambassador Mike Waltz described the commander in chief now determined, like the loser presidents who preceded him, to waste American time, prestige, and money on “a credible political path that achieves self-determination and Statehood” for a Palestinian terror enclave.
The Hamas deal, like the administration’s arrangement with Hezbollah-controlled Lebanon and Trump’s repeated and unrealized threats against Iran, is evidence that the president is in danger of losing the plot, if he hasn’t already.
The White House includes the cease-fires between Israel and Hamas and between Israel and Iran as two of the eight peace deals Trump has arranged since taking office. Some of those deals are holding up, like the one between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and some aren’t, like the agreement struck between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo. But none of that really matters to most Americans, nor should it. We go to the polls every four years to vote not for the candidate most likely to win cease-fires for foreigners, but rather for the one who will advance our prosperity by imposing our peace.
Rome imposed its peace on rivals, and on those who might someday cause trouble, to bring wealth and glory to Rome. Caesar Augustus turned Rome from brick to marble, but the architecture of the Pax Romana was made of steel and blood. They make a desert and call it peace, said one victim of Rome’s devastations to serve Roman interests. Our version of peace has been much gentler, but the purpose of the 80-year Pax Americana is the same: to make things better for Americans, regardless of what that might mean for foreigners.
Trump seemed to grasp this most fundamental concept of statesmanship more clearly than his most recent predecessors, from Bill Clinton through Joe Biden. He seemed to understand what peace, outside of the clichés promoted at beauty pageants, really means. “Peace through strength” is how he formulated the true nature of peace, or the only kind of peace that can matter to Americans: America’s peace.
One of the pillars of the postwar order is the Strait of Hormuz, through which the free flow of oil stabilizes international energy markets. Of late, administration validators have argued that the strait is becoming less strategically important with the construction of Saudi and UAE pipelines that bypass the strait and reach the Red Sea directly. But as those who can read a map or even a newspaper understand, the Red Sea is also vulnerable to Iran via its Red Sea proxy, the Houthis.
The strait is still crucial to America and its allies. And losing it to Iran would mean a strategic defeat for the United States, one significantly more consequential than losing in Iraq and Afghanistan. But White House messaging tells adversaries and allies alike that the Pax Americana is a broken reed. Sure, the Americans once protected the strait against a nuclear superpower—for decades—but under Trump, America’s patrimony is up for grabs.
Leaks from Trump officials that plans to take the Strait by force are complicated by the lack of interceptors tell American adversaries little about our stockpiles they haven’t already counted. Rather, they indicate that, since a massively funded military has many other ways to ensure victory against an obscurantist third-world regime like Iran’s, the president is looking for excuses to fail to win. When the administration publicly frets over the possible targeting of desalination plants in the Arab Gulf states, it is indicating that it doesn’t truly understand the stakes and sacrifices involved in stopping Iran’s nuclear weapons program. And when Trump reasons, as he did in a Truth Social post Saturday, that he is once again walking back his plans to strike Iran for “the future benefit of the WORLD and, likewise, the survival of a successful and prosperous Iran,” he is saying that America’s peace, now and for future generations, is not his priority.
Trump can’t say how these ghoulish puppet shows with Iran and its proxies augment America’s wealth and glory because they don’t. Rather, they make America complicit with monsters. They put us in the same room as Hamas, whose cruelty, Trump said less than a year ago, “struck to the core of humanity itself.” He vowed then that America stands with Israel under the motto “Never again,” but now he’s leaning on a wartime ally to play along with phony deals he’s struck with Hamas and Hezbollah that deter Israel while shielding the terrorists on its borders. These aren’t the acts of a president of peace, never mind a commander in chief who understands the nature of America’s peace and the character of our adversaries who want to break it.


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