Study: Academic Bias Shaped International Law’s Israel Consensus
On September 2, Israeli legal scholar Avraham Russell Shalev released a forthcoming paper arguing that the international legal consensus shaping many judgments about Israel has developed within an academic environment that Shalev argues systematically marginalizes Jewish and Zionist perspectives.The E1 debate is not just about West Bank settlement construction - it’s about security
In his forthcoming paper From Blogs to Boycotts: Anti-Zionist Biases in Legal Academia, Shalev examines how international-law journals, conferences, professional networks and academic platforms help create the “expert consensus” later invoked by international institutions.
His central argument is not simply that individual scholars hold anti-Israel views. Rather, he argues that the infrastructure producing international-law expertise has developed institutional mechanisms that marginalize Jewish and Zionist perspectives, allowing a narrow ideological framework on Israel to become embedded as a dominant interpretation within parts of international legal discourse.
The paper examines controversies involving Opinio Juris, the Columbia Law Review, the Leiden Journal of International Law and what Shalev describes as informal “grey boycotts” against Israeli scholars.
The Battle Before the Courtroom
International legal campaigns involving Israel often rely on claims of expert consensus. Arguments about occupation, proportionality, self-defense, genocide and state responsibility frequently cite academic commentary and legal scholarship as evidence that a particular interpretation represents mainstream international law.
That influence is recognized within the international legal system itself. Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice identifies “the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations” as a subsidiary means for determining legal rules.
Shalev argues that this creates an overlooked power center: the academic institutions that determine which scholars, arguments and interpretations receive legitimacy.
When certain perspectives are excluded from journals, conferences and professional networks, he argues, the resulting consensus can become self-reinforcing and influence the legal positions adopted by international bodies.
From October 7 to the Legal Narrative
A central focus of the paper is the reaction of parts of the international-law community following Hamas’ October 7 massacre.
Shalev examines international-law blogs such as Opinio Juris, arguing that some platforms have provided space for scholars whose responses to October 7 framed Hamas’ attack through anti-colonial theory while leaving Zionist perspectives underrepresented.
One example discussed by Shalev is an October 2023 Opinio Juris post by legal scholar Mohsen al-Attar responding to an interview with Professor Noura Erakat. The discussion situated October 7 within a broader anti-colonial framework and referenced Frantz Fanon’s argument that “decolonisation is always a violent phenomenon.”
The post also included an addendum published after October 7 that continued discussing the conflict through the lens of anti-colonial struggle. Critics argued that the framing risked treating Hamas’ attack primarily as an anti-colonial event rather than confronting Hamas’ deliberate targeting of civilians and the scale of the atrocities committed during the attack.
University of Haifa legal scholar Yahli Shereshevsky later criticized elements of the response within international-law circles, arguing that some reactions reflected a failure to fully acknowledge the nature of the October 7 attacks.
For Shalev, the episode represents a broader pattern: legal discourse surrounding Israel often begins from frameworks of colonialism, oppression and state violence while placing less emphasis on Israeli security concerns, Hamas terrorism and the legal obligations of non-state armed groups.
The Institutions Defining Acceptable Debate
Shalev also examines the controversy surrounding the publication of Rabea Eghbariah’s article Toward Nakba as a Legal Concept in the Columbia Law Review.
The article became controversial after the journal acknowledged that it had been commissioned and did not undergo the journal’s standard review process.
Shalev argues that the episode reflected a broader asymmetry: arguments challenging Israel’s legitimacy often gain access to prestigious academic platforms, while scholars defending Israel or contesting dominant narratives face greater professional barriers.
The paper also discusses cases involving Israeli scholars whose submissions were rejected or altered during publication processes, including Anne Herzberg and Tal Mimran.
Shalev also examines the controversy surrounding the Leiden Journal of International Law. He argues that the journal’s decision to add a disclaimer to an article by Israeli authors after criticism on social media reflected broader concerns about the treatment of Israeli scholars publishing on Israel-related issues.
Twenty-nine Democratic senators have demanded that Israel halt proposed construction in the E1 area between Jerusalem and Ma’aleh Adumim, an Israeli city of 40,000 people.Toronto Film Festival to Feature Speaker Who Called Hezbollah Attacks “Legitimate Resistance”
E1 has long been a lightning rod for advocates of Palestinian statehood, who argue that Israeli construction would sever the Ramallah-Bethlehem corridor and destroy the contiguity of a future Palestinian state. But any viable Palestinian state would likely require tunnels, bridges, or dedicated roads to connect separated areas. Moreover, E1 lies in Area C, where Israel retains planning and zoning authority under the Oslo framework, despite international opposition.
Still, I believe building in E1 now is ill-timed. Israel’s most important ally, the United States, is already grappling with growing anti-Israel sentiment and antisemitic intimidation from the Democratic Left and the conspiratorial Tucker Carlson Right. Israel gains little by creating another unnecessary political confrontation with Washington at this time.
But Washington is asking the wrong question about E1.
The Democratic senators wrote, “The United States must remain committed to a two-state solution that delivers lasting peace and security for both the Jewish, democratic State of Israel and for a future Palestinian state.… development in E1 would seriously jeopardize the prospects for a Palestinian state.”
Their call for Israel’s security and a Palestinian state deserves more scrutiny.
Obstacles toward Palestinian state
The obstacles to Palestinian statehood did not begin with E1. They began with the Arab rejection of two states in 1948 and their subsequent refusals for a state in 1967, 2000, 2001, and 2007-08, the last offered Palestinian sovereignty in Gaza and nearly all of the West Bank, with a Palestinian capital in east Jerusalem.
Underlying those failures is a question those American policymakers too often avoid: whether Palestinian society is prepared to accept a permanent Jewish state anywhere between “the river and the sea.”
After October 7, that question can no longer be treated as theoretical.
The real E1 debate should not be whether Israelis can build homes there. It should be whether Israel could ever safely relinquish security control of this strategically critical corridor.
Highway 1 runs east from Jerusalem, past Ma’aleh Adumim and E-1, toward the Jordan Valley. It is an essential artery connecting Israel’s major population centers on the coast with its eastern frontier, and provides a vital route for rapidly moving troops, weapons, and supplies toward Israel’s longest border with Jordan.
That matters because Jordan’s long-term stability cannot be taken for granted.
The Hashemite monarchy remains an important American and Israeli security partner, but Jordan is economically fragile and faces significant demographic and Islamist ideological pressures. American and Israeli strategists must contemplate the possibility that over the coming decade Jordan could face increased Sunni Islamist influence, Iranian destabilization efforts, or serious internal disorder.
If that happens, Israel’s eastern frontier could rapidly transform from one of its quietest borders into one of its most dangerous.
During visits with Israeli military personnel and intelligence officials, I saw firsthand the concern about weapons and narcotics smuggling across Israel’s eastern frontier. Weapons entering Judea and Samaria, the West Bank, can strengthen an already formidable Hamas and other armed groups’ presence, operating only miles from Israel’s major population centers.
Today, Israel is confronting increasing tensions inside the West Bank. Israeli security officials have warned repeatedly about the potential for significant escalation.
The Netanyahu government deserves criticism for failing to adequately restrain extremist Jewish violence. Those who attack Palestinians violate Israeli law and should be prosecuted. A future Israeli government should enforce the law aggressively.
But Jewish extremism is only one part of a much larger security problem. For decades, Palestinian Authority schools, official media, and religious institutions have promoted incitement and narratives that reject any Jewish sovereignty, while the PA’s notorious “pay for slay” system has financially rewarded terrorists and their families, incentivizing violence that makes territorial compromise increasingly dangerous.
This brings us back to E1.
There are actually two separate questions that Washington has mistakenly conflated.
The first is whether Israel should build in E1 today. I believe it should not. With an election approaching, beginning construction looks more like a political gesture to the Israeli Right than an urgent security requirement.
The second question is far more consequential: Should E1 ever come under Palestinian security control? From an Israeli security perspective, the answer is no, certainly not in the foreseeable future.
The Muslim Public Affairs Council’s Hollywood Bureau is bringing its Muslim House cultural hub to the Toronto International Film Festival for the first time on September 13 and 15, with MPAC President Salam Al-Marayati scheduled to interview filmmaker Bassam Tariq inside TIFF Lightbox.
Al-Marayati’s appearance comes 25 years after he suggested, during a Los Angeles radio interview on September 11, 2001, that Israel should be investigated over that day’s terrorist attacks. “I think we should put the state of Israel on the suspect list,” he said on KCRW’s Which Way, L.A.? The Los Angeles Times later reported the remarks.
The episode was not his first national controversy involving terrorism. Two years earlier, his appointment to a federal commission examining terrorism was withdrawn amid objections over his previous statements concerning Hamas, Hezbollah and attacks against Israel.
The Hollywood Bureau and Muslim House operate under the Muslim Public Affairs Council Foundation, a federally recognized 501(c)(3) nonprofit whose charitable contributions are generally tax deductible. Muslim House does not appear to be a separate nonprofit entity. MPAC describes it as a program produced by the Hollywood Bureau. “Legitimate Resistance” and the Marine Barracks Bombing
In November 1999, Al-Marayati described Hezbollah attacks against Israeli soldiers in Lebanon as “legitimate resistance” during an appearance on PBS.
That year, an MPAC counterterrorism position paper addressed the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, which killed 241 American servicemen. The paper said the bombing was “not in a strict sense, a terrorist operation,” instead characterizing it as a military attack against a noncivilian target. The language was later quoted in witness testimony before the 9/11 Commission.
Then-House Minority Leader Richard Gephardt had appointed Al-Marayati in June 1999 to the National Commission on Terrorism, a 10-member body tasked with reviewing U.S. counterterrorism policy.
Jewish organizations and members of Congress objected to the appointment, with critics accusing Al-Marayati of failing to unequivocally condemn Hamas and Hezbollah. Gephardt withdrew the appointment the following month amid the controversy.
MPAC’s framing of the Hamas-led October 7, 2023 attack also drew criticism.
In a statement issued as the attack unfolded, MPAC identified Israeli “occupation” as “the source of the problem.” It said Israeli policies had created a political vacuum that allowed Hamas and other groups to gain support and “justify their violent attacks.”
MPAC has since described Israel’s military campaign in Gaza as genocide. Its archived Palestine page states, “It is a genocide.”




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