Twenty-six years after Camp David, Israel needs a new security doctrine
At Camp David, we negotiated with the man who was then regarded as the supposed partner, the only figure who was allegedly willing to sit down and negotiate with Israel (while the rest of the Palestinian leadership rejected the very idea outright). Yet we still reached a dead end. The result of those concessions was not peace, but the outbreak of the Second Intifada, a planned wave of terrorism that claimed the lives of more than one thousand Israelis.Turkey, Israel, and the New Ottoman Empire
By demonstrating a willingness to make those concessions, we created an extraordinarily dangerous precedent, one in which the international community came to regard Israeli territorial concessions as the natural starting point for every future negotiation.
That precedent must be erased. It must be erased from the pages of our diplomatic and security history, and it must be made clear that those proposals are null and void and cannot serve as the opening position for any future discussion.
The lesson of the Camp David Summit (2000) is even deeper and more relevant today. The summit definitively shattered the assumption that territorial concessions, in and of themselves, would bring reconciliation. It proved that the root of the conflict is not the scope of Israel’s presence in Judea and Samaria, but the very existence of a sovereign Jewish state in the Land of Israel.
Even at the point of Israel’s maximum willingness to compromise, it became clear that a historic compromise was not the objective of the other side.
From this understanding emerges the diplomatic doctrine that Israel must adopt for the decades ahead: lasting arrangements are not achieved through territorial gestures, but are built upon strength, deterrence, and security.
The only practical foundation for any future arrangement will emerge only when a profound change in Palestinian consciousness takes place, one that includes full recognition that Israel is a permanent and indisputable reality, with no intention of withdrawing or relinquishing its right to exist as the nation-state of the Jewish people.
Only when the other side becomes convinced that it cannot defeat Israel or alter reality through terrorism, international pressure, or rejectionism, and that the continued illusion that the Jewish presence in the region is temporary bears no fruit, will the foundation for a stable and realistic arrangement truly be laid.
The key to peace lies not in the breadth of Israeli concessions, but in the strength of Israeli deterrence and the depth of Palestinian recognition of our legitimate existence here.
What Is Behind Erdogan’s Antagonism Toward Israel?Half Won, Half Lost By Abe Greenwald
So, why has President Erdogan shifted Turkey away from being a regional partner of Israel to one of its chief antagonists in the Middle East and on the world stage?
There seem to be two leading causes of Erdogan’s anti-Israel posture: His personal animus toward the Jewish people and his regional ambitions.
As an Islamist politician, Erdogan has been influenced by the ideological circle that surrounds him, which is contemptuous of Jews and views the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and establishment of the secular Turkish state as part of a secret Jewish plot.
The existence of Israel as a Jewish state in what is viewed as a traditionally Muslim region only amplifies this dislike and suspicion of Jews.
Aside from Erdogan’s personal ideology, Turkish society has become more open to public expressions of antisemitism in recent years, which has allowed the Turkish strongman to use his public opposition to the Jewish state as a means of garnering more votes among the Turkish public.
Perhaps even more consequential than antisemitism in the worsening of relations between Israel and Turkey are Erdogan’s long-term regional ambitions, which place him in direct confrontation with the Jewish state.
As opposed to other leaders who ruled Turkey before him, Erdogan subscribes to the idea of “neo-Ottomanism,” which aims to position Turkey as a leading force in the Sunni Islamic world.
As the Ottoman Empire controlled much of the Middle East for hundreds of years, Erdogan seeks to return Turkey to this position of power by spreading its influence (and sometimes even its military forces) into neighboring states.
This expansion of Turkey’s role in the Middle East can be seen over the past 10 years, with Turkey sending forces into Iraq to fight ISIS (against the wishes of the Iraqi government), establishing itself militarily in Qatar, extending its influence in the West Bank, Gaza, and Israeli Arab communities, placing a foothold on the Red Sea, and becoming the patron of the new Syrian government since the fall of the Assad regime in 2024.
With the recent diminishment of Iran’s position in the Middle East, Erdogan is even more determined to increase Turkey’s influence in the region and become the new hegemonic power.
So, how do Turkey’s regional ambitions affect its relationship with Israel?
First, Israel’s own security needs can come into direct conflict with Turkey’s desires. This is most clearly seen in Syria, where Israel has established a buffer zone along its border due to its suspicion of the new regime, while Turkey has openly embraced it.
Second, in Erdogan’s view, by becoming increasingly and publicly hostile to the Jewish state, he is leveraging the anti-Israel sentiment of the Arab street to catapult Turkey into being the leading voice of the Muslim world, at the expense of more moderate regimes such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
Thus, it appears likely that as Erdogan’s Turkey becomes a growing force in the Middle East and seeks to dominate the region, it will increasingly become more antagonistic toward Israel.
However, as opposed to this remaining a problem for the Jewish state, Turkey’s regional ambitions will likely become a problem for all Middle Eastern states that do not wish to become subservient to one hegemonic power in the region.
Via Commentary Newsletter, sign up here. Trump now seems to understand that the whole negotiation saga was an Iranian ruse. So we’ve gone back in time. The U.S. is once again pounding Iran from the air, and Trump just announced that we’d be reimposing a blockade on Iranian vessels.
But given this administration’s penchant for stopping short of victory, it’s hard to see where this goes, even in the next few days. And why is it that Iran won’t play along with the U.S., abide by the MOU, and collect the billions it has been promised?
The man who’s had the clearest understanding of this war from the start is Trump’s former national security adviser John Bolton. While Bolton is a committed Iran hawk, he’s been sounding the alarm about Trump’s lack of strategy since the run-up to the operation. In yesterday’s Wall Street Journal, Bolton argues that the U.S. and Israel have weakened Iran’s government to the point that there is no cohesive Iranian leadership to make a deal. “This disarray explains why some in Iran are again reportedly plotting to murder Mr. Trump,” he writes, “while others are still negotiating with his representatives.”
I’m sure Bolton is correct about the difficulties posed by our semi-victory. But there’s another piece of the puzzle: our semi-failure. American planning blunders have done their part to make a tidy exit impossible. The U.S. was unprepared for and ultimately checked by the Iranian threat on shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. Trump has argued that energy markets will organically overcome this challenge. That could be, but he’s not so confident that he’s ready to leave the strait in the regime’s hands.
So the U.S. has fought itself into a perverse Goldilocks zone where we won just enough and lost just enough to prevent our leaving. The administration has taken a long, winding path merely to reach this point of clarity. I’ll take it, with the hope that the president finally commits to total victory. But I expect that getting from here to there will involve at least as many foolish diversions.






















