A War of Psychological Attrition
In physical terms, the damage Iran is inflicting on the Americans, the Gulf states or Israel is minimal.Col. (ret.) Richard Kemp: Iran Has Miscalculated Disastrously
By contrast, Iran is sustaining extremely heavy blows. Its economy was already shattered before the campaign began. Its military capabilities are being stripped away hour by hour.
That means the pace at which it is harming Israel and other countries in the region is negligible compared with what it had planned.
Unlike Iran, those countries are, by and large, continuing to function, while the disruption to daily life caused by missiles and drones remains relatively limited.
Iran is trying to create the impression that the cost of the war is unbearable.
But what is worse: gasoline at $4 a gallon, or Iran with an arsenal of intercontinental nuclear missiles?
What poses a greater threat to the world: a short-term recession, or a deranged regime operating an ocean of drones in the Strait of Hormuz, terrorist cells across the planet, and seeking to impose Shiite belief on humanity by force?
Iran knows the West's weak points, its short-sightedness, short patience, and short-time horizon.
In Tehran they know that in the West, people will talk about one American aircraft being shot down a thousand times more than they will about dozens of Iranian aircraft destroyed, hundreds of missiles intercepted and thousands of drones thwarted.
That is the asymmetric psychological war they are hoping to win.
The ayatollahs never expected to find themselves in a sustained, direct, high-intensity war with the U.S. and Israel. Their thinking had been based on gaining ascendancy in the Middle East by proxy groups and ultimately by nuclear weapons.WSJ Editorial: The North Korea Lesson for Iran
The rulers of Iran spent billions of dollars building a series of terrorist networks that would do their dirty work for them. Yet Hizbullah, Hamas, and the Houthis have been very severely handled by Israel (and in the case of the Houthis, the U.S.) since Oct. 7, 2023, and their combined contribution to the defense of Iran over the last few weeks has consequently been strategically negligible.
In the minds of the ayatollahs, attacking their Arab neighbors would lead the Gulf states to pressure Trump to call off the war. It had the opposite effect. Behind the scenes, both Saudi Arabia and the UAE have reportedly urged the president to keep attacking until the job is done. Iran's strategy has instead consolidated opposition to Tehran.
Another strategic miscalculation has been the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. As a global economic attack, it reinforces the narrative that Iran is a worldwide threat. Both China and India have been significantly impacted, despite Tehran's selective permission for some ships and cargoes to pass through the strait.
Additionally, the regime is probably inflicting greater harm on its own economy. It depends on the strait for the import of food and other essentials, and for its own oil exports.
President Trump decided to use military force to stop Iran from getting a nuclear weapon after diplomacy failed. This was a risky choice. But the U.S. experience with North Korea suggests the alternatives were even riskier. That history shows the limits of nuclear diplomacy with a determined foe, as well as what happens when the U.S. puts conflict-avoidance above all else.
During the Clinton Administration, North Korea denied International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors access to camouflaged nuclear sites and announced it would withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Clinton threatened sanctions. The U.S. military drew up plans for strikes on nuclear installations, and Defense Secretary Bill Perry presented a plan for a large military buildup in the region. Clinton deployed Patriot missile-defense systems to South Korea.
Former President Jimmy Carter informed the Clinton Administration that he intended to visit North Korea and try to defuse the situation. Clinton decided to let Carter proceed as a private citizen. Carter feared conflict above all and even opposed sanctions. He went beyond what he had been authorized by Clinton to discuss and announced a tentative agreement on CNN. The press and foreign-policy establishment hailed nuclear peace in our time.
Military options came off the table and Clinton embraced the deal, which became the 1994 Agreed Framework. For a time the deal seemed to work. Yet weaponization research continued on the sly. The regime's intent to build a bomb never changed. In 2002, North Korea reneged on the Agreed Framework and expelled inspectors. The George W. Bush Administration employed threats, sanctions and diplomacy but ultimately ruled out the use of force. In 2006, North Korea conducted its first nuclear test.
After that, U.S. military options became riskier. North Korea is now believed to possess 50 warheads, and it tests ICBMs that will one day be able to reach the continental U.S. The lesson is that U.S. presidents waited too long to stop North Korea. The risks of war were always said to be too high, it was never a good time, and there was always another diplomatic option to exhaust. North Korea is now a nuclear power.
Iran's radical regime will not have a nuclear program when the current Iran conflict ends. This has made the world a safer place.




















