John Spencer: What Does America Get for $3.8 Billion in Israel? And the Way Ahead
The value of the relationship becomes even clearer when compared with other recipients of American military assistance. Egypt contributes to regional stability and maintains peace with Israel. Jordan remains an important security partner and counterterrorism ally. Both relationships advance legitimate American interests. Neither generates the same intelligence cooperation, defense technology innovation, industrial integration, or battlefield lessons that flow from the U.S.-Israel partnership. The United States does not gain access to hundreds of defense technology startups through Egypt. It does not field combat-proven active protection systems developed through Jordan. It does not receive the same volume of battlefield lessons on missile defense, drones, tunnels, artificial intelligence, and urban warfare from either country. Israel's value derives not only from its location but from the capabilities it continually produces.Iran’s fanatical regime would rather embrace death than peace
There is also a political dimension to the alliance. The United States and Israel are democracies. Neither is perfect. Both experience fierce political disagreements, contentious elections, and intense public debate. Both operate under the rule of law and maintain independent institutions. Shared values alone do not determine foreign policy, but alliances tend to endure when interests and political traditions reinforce one another. That reality has helped sustain the relationship across administrations of both parties.
Reasonable people can debate aid levels. They can debate specific policies pursued by either government. They can argue about how the relationship should evolve over time. Those are legitimate discussions. What is far more difficult to sustain is the argument that America receives little in return. The United States gains access to intelligence that helps prevent attacks against Americans and American interests. It gains military technologies refined through combat experience. It gains battlefield lessons that would otherwise cost billions to acquire independently. It gains access to one of the most dynamic defense innovation ecosystems on the planet. It gains a capable ally operating in a strategically important region against many of the same adversaries confronting the United States.
The future of the relationship may itself demonstrate the success of the investment. In recent interviews, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has suggested that Israel should gradually reduce its reliance on American military financing as its economy and defense industry continue to expand. He has spoken about eventually transitioning from traditional assistance toward deeper cooperation in areas such as cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence, missile defense, directed energy, and other emerging technologies.
Whether that transition occurs in the next Memorandum of Understanding or further in the future remains uncertain. Israel continues to face significant security threats and remains engaged in multiple conflicts. The broader point is that the relationship has evolved. American assistance helped support Israel during periods when its economy was smaller, its defense industry less developed, and its security challenges no less severe. Today Israel possesses one of the world's most advanced defense sectors, a thriving technology economy, and military capabilities that generate value not only for its own security but for the United States as well.
If future agreements place less emphasis on direct financing and greater emphasis on joint research, co-development, and technological collaboration, that would not signal a weakening partnership. It would reflect a mature partnership built on decades of successful investment. American assistance helped Israel build capabilities that now generate value for both countries. If Israel eventually requires less direct assistance while contributing more technology, innovation, intelligence, and operational expertise, that would not represent the failure of the partnership. It would represent one measure of its success.
So the next time someone asks what the United States gets for $3.8 billion in Israel, the answer is straightforward:
Jobs: American jobs and manufacturing supported through purchases of U.S.-made military equipment.
Industry: A stronger U.S. defense industrial base through joint production, co-development, and missile defense cooperation.
Intelligence: Intelligence that helps prevent attacks against Americans, American forces, and American interests.
Technology: Military technologies refined in combat, from active protection systems and missile defense to counter-drone capabilities and artificial intelligence.
Laboratory: Access to one of the world's most active laboratories for modern warfare, generating operational data, experimentation, innovation, and combat experience that would be difficult, expensive, and in some cases impossible to reproduce independently.
Lessons: Battlefield lessons in urban warfare, tunnel warfare, missile defense, drones, and modern combat without having to learn them first through American casualties, American mistakes, or American wars.
Innovation: A defense innovation ecosystem producing technologies and ideas that benefit both countries.
Ally: A capable ally helping deter common adversaries and maintain stability in one of the world's most strategically important regions and, if necessary, willing and able to fight alongside the United States.
Strategy: Greater freedom for the United States to focus military and economic resources on long-term competition with China in the Indo-Pacific while helping preserve a favorable balance of power in the Middle East.
That is what America gets in return.
Trump’s belief that he could pull off a ground-breaking agreement, one that guarantees freedom of passage through the Strait of Hormuz and neutralises Iran’s nuclear programme, led in recent weeks to tensions with Israel, with the American president highly critical of Israeli premier Benjamin Netanyahu and his military strikes against Iran and Hezbollah terrorists in southern Lebanon.Losing Hizbullah Is a Major Source of Stress for Iran
The real threat, though, to Trump’s hopes of achieving a breakthrough never came from Israeli aggression, or the maintenance of Washington’s naval blockade in the Gulf. It has come from the hardline clique that controls Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), an organisation whose sole raison d’être is to defend and propagate the uncompromising ideology that underpins the pillars of Iran’s 1979 Islamic revolution.
While Washington may feel comfortable engaging with the smooth-talking sophisticates of Iran’s foreign policy establishment, the real challenge is to engage directly with the hard men of the IRGC, whose authority derives directly from the country’s divinely appointed Supreme Leader.
The IRGC – which the Starmer Government still has not proscribed as a terrorist entity – is the Islamic Republic’s Praetorian Guard, and is meant to take orders directly from the Supreme Leader.
Apart from his divinely appointed status, the Supreme Leader’s authority over all the instruments of the Iranian state originates from an obscure Islamic concept, the velayat-e faqih (roughly translated as the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist), which gives the ruling Shia clergy absolute control over the Iranian people and their destiny.
Dr. Menahem Merhavy, an expert on Iran at the Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, said the latest Iranian missile attack on Israel "appears to be an attempt to save face....Iran has been unsuccessful in leveraging what it believes was victory over the U.S. and Israel."Is Shi'ite Support for Hizbullah Weakening?
"Iran is on the verge of catastrophe, and losing Hizbullah is a major source of stress for it. The 'ring of fire' [surrounding Israel] is currently stuttering, but Iran won't give up the idea and will not abandon Hizbullah." Yet, "Iran's latest attack, and its quick signal that it finished retaliating, signals its unwillingness to enter another prolonged conflict because they cannot afford it."
"Hizbullah can be pounded all over Lebanon, but Beirut and Iran can do absolutely nothing about it. Israel has been able to act freely in Lebanon for months....There is a lot of frustration with both Hizbullah and Iran among the Shiite community in Lebanon. Iran has yet to provide funds to rebuild homes that were destroyed by the Israeli military in the past two years. Hizbullah terrorists are also unable to move freely in Lebanon for constant fear of being targeted by Israel."
Amatzia Baram, professor emeritus at the University of Haifa and an expert in Middle Eastern politics, said, "Hizbullah has been weakened to about half of its previous abilities, but still, they have significant ability to fight. Hizbullah is busy rebuilding itself," and Iran "is still helping Hizbullah - financially, militarily, and strategically - by positioning itself as its defender and savior."
"Israel didn't attack Hizbullah between 2006 to 2023 for one reason - it was afraid that the massive missile and rocket arsenal would cause major damage to Israel. Now, Israel isn't afraid of attacking Hizbullah because of its potential to cause damage, but rather Israel is concerned that Iran will get involved and the U.S. will not support Israel if it chooses to respond."
"Attacks against Hizbullah targets in southern Lebanon are small, tactical, and have little significance to Hizbullah's standing in Lebanon. Attacks against command headquarters, weapons depots, and assembly factories in Beirut and north of Beirut are at an almost strategic level that can weaken Hizbullah, and that needs to be Israel's target for the future." Hizbullah, once the centerpiece of Tehran's regional deterrence strategy, is increasingly busy preserving its own survival.
On May 31, a Hizbullah-affiliated group called on supporters to gather in downtown Beirut to protest the Lebanese government's support for diplomacy with Israel. Only a few dozen people showed up, a striking contrast to past years when Hizbullah could mobilize tens of thousands with ease. Days later, residents of Bayssarieh clashed with Hizbullah members who were reportedly moving military equipment into the southern Lebanese town. Meanwhile, activists in Nabatieh and Tyre are increasingly voicing demands for stronger state authority in the southern towns, long dominated by Hizbullah, reflecting growing unease among the Shia over conditions in southern Lebanon. However, any effort to loosen Hizbullah's grip on the Shia community will depend on a broader realization among its constituents that supporting Hizbullah is a losing strategy.
Lebanese political writer Mona Fayad said that while more Shia appear willing to criticize Hizbullah, this should not be mistaken for a structured opposition capable of competing for power, which would need to overcome the social and psychological legacy of Hizbullah's decades-long dominance. "We are talking about forty years of conditioning and entrenchment," she said.
"The biggest indicator that Hizbullah lost the narrative of resistance is the military defeat happening in the south," Fayad said. "Hizbullah's supporters are today displaced, and many of them are living in the streets because of Hizbullah. Today, many are in shock or denial."


















