Seth Mandel: The Weight Israel Carries
Israelis aren’t blind to the mental-health challenge posed not just by the war but by what started it: scenes of inhumanity reminiscent of the Nazis. In September, Israel’s health minister, Uriel Buso, warned that Israel was facing “the largest mental health event the state has known since its establishment. A crisis that requires us, as a state and a society, to change perceptions and upgrade the public mental health system.”Seth Frantzman: Future of the Middle East: What does 2025 hold for Jordan and Egypt
The following month, Buso introduced legislation designed to decentralize mental-health treatment. Though it went mostly unnoticed at the time (even in the Israeli press), Buso had hit on something important: Just as is the case with physical ailments, you don’t want the last resort to be the first intervention. The goal of primary-care medicine is to keep you out of hospitals and emergency rooms. That prevention can be even more difficult in the chaos of wartime and regarding mental health, the deterioration of which is not always noticeable to others.
Buso also sought to take advantage of Israel’s close-knit society. He got a boost to his department’s budget, and instead of keeping it all under his nose at the national level, he disbursed it throughout local community healthcare providers. Psychiatric institutions would merge with major hospitals to make treatment easier and, the Health Ministry’s director general seemed to suggest, reduce the stigma of seeking help.
All of which is yet another reminder that Oct. 7, 2023, caused a seismic change in Israel and the Jewish world. In the immediate aftermath of the Hamas attacks, Israel’s HMOs “reported record levels of requests by patients for sleeping pills, painkillers, and tranquilizers,” Tablet’s Hillel Kuttler reported. According to the IDF, of the 17 soldier suicides in 2023, seven of them—40 percent—happened in just the final three months of the year after the attacks.
Meanwhile Hamas continues to torment the country over the remaining hostages by refusing to let the parents of these captives even know whether their children are still alive. Missiles from as far away as Yemen continue to fall on Tel Aviv. Homes in the north have spent a year empty, as have communities in the Gaza envelope.
Israel continues to be the only Western country that truly acts like it has a stake in how this now-global conflict ends. A country of barely 10 million has been putting the rest on its shoulders. Yet still, Israelis somehow seem immune to the paralysis that most would inevitably succumb to. The CEO of Israel’s largest mental-health organization told the Times of Israel that she doesn’t want people to merely say “the country is in trauma. That doesn’t help us. It’s vital that we look at what we can do, how we can be proactive.”
Here’s hoping Israelis have less of a burden to carry in 2025, or, at the very least, that they get some help carrying it.
Jordan and Egypt are both important states in the Middle East, and they have been Israel’s historic peace partners from the 1980s to 1990s.Seth Mandel: Hamas’s War on Gaza’s Electric Grid
This means that these two countries share certain qualities that are of great importance to Israel and the wider region.
Egypt, the most populous country in the area, is a historic center of military power and culture.
Jordan, by contrast, is less populated and is a relatively modern country straddling an expanse of desert between Israel, the Gulf, and Syria.
The Kingdom of Jordan enters 2025 with concerns about the outcome of the changes in Syria. Jordan had worked to reconcile with now-toppled president Bashar al-Assad’s regime over the last several years.
The kingdom has hosted hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees. Many Syrians who fled southern Syria have clan or tribal ties in northern Jordan, so their appearance in Jordan did not change Jordan’s demographics.
However, this is a burden for Jordan, which is a relatively poor country compared to others in the Gulf. Jordan is a historic monarchy that grew out of the British Mandate era.
The monarchy has to balance the interests of former Bedouin tribes with the townspeople of northern Jordan and the Palestinians who fled to Jordan in 1948.
Amman views itself as having unique rights in Jerusalem, and even though it gave up its claims to the West Bank, it has a keen interest in the Palestinians. It has been concerned about the outcome of the October 7 massacre and how that might propel Hamas to power in the West Bank.
Jordan is also concerned about being used as a conduit for Iranian weapons smuggling via Iraq. The Iranian-backed Kataib Hezbollah group in Iraq attacked US forces in Jordan in January 2024, killing three Americans. The kingdom is aware that it is sandwiched between Iran’s interests in Iraq, Israel, the Palestinians, the Gulf, and Syria.
Thus, it knows it must balance all these nations that surround it. Jordan is likely concerned that the Syrian shift in power to a new government could lead to troubles at home.
What if Jordanians get the idea that they could have similar changes in Amman?
The new Syrian administration run by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the leaders of the successful rebellion and overthrow of Bashar al-Assad, is at least making a pretense of constructing a functioning government. What that government does, of course, is a separate conversation entirely. But simply as a case study of Islamist institution-building, one gets the impression that, unlike Hamas, HTS wants to be seen as giving a whit about the people who depend on them.
To take one example, from Aaron Zelin’s daily diary of the Syrian transition yesterday: “Syrian Minister of Electricity Omar al-Shuqruq: Six months of maintenance are required to fully restore the electricity network. Re-establishing electrical linkage with Jordan is one of the key solutions to securing power supply for Syria.”
Electricity has been one of the main challenges in Gaza, because Hamas refuses to do the one thing that would solve the problem almost overnight: stop its forever war against Israel. Now, it’s possible that HTS is planning to launch semiannual wars against Jordan and sabotage its own power supply, but I consider the possibility unlikely. That is, however, what Hamas does daily.
Here’s how the electricity in Gaza works. Israel provides 50 percent of the enclave’s power—and I do mean “provides.” Technically, Israel is selling electricity to Gaza, and the Palestinian Authority is supposed to pick up the tab. But they very often don’t, and certainly Hamas doesn’t pay, and every so often Israel threatens to cut off electricity for lack of payment—the debt is usually somewhere in the neighborhood of half a billion dollars. But Israel always backs down or accepts low partial payments.
How much does Hamas value that electricity? Well, it is not uncommon for their own rockets to hit the power lines and cut off parts of the grid. Usually, Israel just fixes the lines when Hamas destroys them. (Israel is terrible at doing genocide.) But on Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas knocked down more than half of their own power lines and Israel did not fix them; it had, if you remember, a few other priorities.