Lyn Julius: There is no distinction between Jews and Zionists - ask Jews from Arab countries
It has been six months since 15 people were gunned down on Bondi Beach in Sydney, Australia, prompting the establishment by a shocked government of a Royal Commission on Antisemitism and Social Cohesion.Between Jakarta and Jerusalem
The Commission has received over 16,000 submissions, and a block of hearings is slated to begin at the end of June.
My organization Harif – the UK Association of Jews from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) – was asked to make a submission on behalf of the 10 to 20% of Australian Jews who are Sephardi or Mizrahi (easterners), i.e., hailing from the Middle East and North Africa.
They may be a minority within the Jewish minority, but their experience of living in Arab and Muslim countries and fleeing from these lands can bring an essential perspective to understanding the causes of antisemitism sweeping through the West today.
The Commission might be able to learn useful insights from them, the first being that almost a million Jews were ethnically cleansed from the MENA, even though they had no part to play in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Almost no Jews live in the Arab world today because Arab governments conflated Jews with Zionists. Jews were victimized as potential spies for Israel.
Whatever their political leanings and however spurious the pretext, Jews could be arrested, tried, and even executed for the crime of Zionism.
The second insight is that one cannot perceive a distinction between Jews and Zionists in Western antisemitism. Today, supporters of the Palestinian cause say they are against Zionism, not Jews.
When 'Zionism' becomes the cover
They point to the small number of Jews who join their protests.
However, it doesn’t take much to see that “legitimate criticism of the Israeli government” takes the form of verbal and physical abuse of Jews, firebombings, arson, and shootings at Jewish schools and synagogues, and ultimately, the murder of Jews simply for being Jews.
Left-wing Jews attempt to deflect by claiming that antisemitism is a problem for the Right. They claim that curbs on incitement proposed by the Commission are in reality limitations on free speech.
But the two gunmen who slaughtered Jews celebrating Hanukkah on Bondi Beach never asked what their victims’ views on Israel were.
Mizrahi Jews who are now resettled in the West are experiencing a sense of déjà vu, reliving the trauma they experienced in their birth countries. The bullying and harassment they thought they had escaped are back with a vengeance.
The slogans chanted in every anti-Jewish riot in Arab countries never did distinguish between Jews and Zionists.
Conclusion: The dawn of functional normalisation
Ultimately, Indonesia’s calculated steps toward the Gaza post-war architecture reveal a sophisticated paradox. President Prabowo’s conciliatory rhetoric and his willingness to engage with the Board of Peace demonstrate a level of pragmatic goodwill that would have been unthinkable under previous administrations. The strategic benefits of the move – currying favour with Washington, positioning Indonesia as a responsible global middle power and securing a seat at the table in Middle Eastern affairs – are simply too lucrative for Jakarta to ignore.
However, Western observers must avoid the illusion of an imminent, warm normalisation. The path to formal diplomatic ties remains firmly blocked by the domestic Palestinian veto and is entirely contingent upon a prior breakthrough between Israel and Saudi Arabia.
What we are witnessing instead is the birth of “Functional Normalisation”. The massive logistical realities of a potential Indonesian deployment, combined with daily operational coordination within the Board of Peace, will force Israeli and Indonesian defence, intelligence and diplomatic officials into unprecedented direct contact.
A stark preview of this reality occurred recently with the interception of the Global Sumud Flotilla, where the detention of Indonesian activists forced Foreign Minister Sugiono to utilise the Board of Peace as a direct de-escalation channel with Jerusalem. This crisis proved that while institutional ambiguity can be “quicksand”, the operational imperatives of crisis management create an unavoidable, functional dialogue.
For Israel, securing the active involvement of the world’s largest Muslim nation in securing its post-war periphery is an extraordinary geopolitical achievement. For Indonesia, it is a high-risk domestic tightrope walk. Therefore, functional, quiet and deeply cautious coordination is the maximum the current geopolitical architecture can bear, and even that is only feasible if the ISF mandate remains strictly defined and a Saudi catalyst remains on the horizon.




















