To Win the Peace, We Must Fund the War
Donald Trump said Thursday that he is readying "a massive attack" on Iran, but the most consequential battle this week was on Capitol Hill. On Tuesday, the Pentagon's top civilian and military leaders, Pete Hegseth and Gen. Dan Caine, spoke to the Senate Appropriations Committee about a bill to offset the costs of the Iran conflict. The House passed a defense act including those funds the next day, but the Senate package remains in limbo.Lee Smith: Trump’s Lebanese Fantasy
Senators on both sides of the aisle raised questions not just about the funding itself, but also about the strategy for dealing with Iran and for some of Hegseth's unrelated but controversial decisions. Grandstanding in front of the cameras is par for the course in Washington, but even the Democrats should want to pass this bill.
For most Democrats, a no vote is a no-brainer. Even before anti-Jewish and pro-appeasement forces began to gain momentum, the party generally has viewed defense spending with skepticism for decades. Most members do not want to cast votes that could be seen as endorsements of Trump's campaign to cripple Iran's nuclear and conventional long-range missile programs. Even if they want to see the threat from Iran reduced, supporting the Obama-era nuclear deal is practically an article of faith in the party. And opposition parties usually fare best when they oppose whatever the president wants to do.
But, even so, there are strong reasons to let through the funds. The first is that blocking the supplemental will not compel U.S. forces to withdraw. Caine echoed an earlier warning from Admiral Daryl Caudle, chief of naval operations, that the services will cut elsewhere to keep up the fight. That includes reducing operations in other parts of the world, canceling training, cutting back on equipment and weapon purchases, and potentially even letting go of servicemembers who want to reenlist.
As the editors noted Wednesday, moreover, the campaign's estimated $37.5 billion cost is a reasonable price for taking the fight to a vicious and fanatical enemy. Even if the overall cost surpasses $100 billion, as some anonymous Washingtonians believe it will, defeating the "death to America" crowd would be money well spent.
A delay on the Hill might even prolong the war. The Iranian strategy is to hold out until economic and domestic political pressures force Trump into more concessions. The House, which voted on Wednesday for the Iran supplemental and on Thursday to limit Trump's war powers, is already sending mixed messages. Congress could inadvertently lead the mullahs to believe their strategy is working and encourage them to hold out longer. The surest way to peace is for the Iranians to conclude that antagonizing the United States is a losing proposition, not a pathway to further gains.
So when Trump says that Lebanon has “been a very badly treated place and country, and we’re going to have it properly treated and treated with the respect it deserves,” he should know that Lebanon’s biggest problem is Lebanon. Sure, Hezbollah is an Iranian implant, but the Islamic Republic having the final word on matters of war and peace for more than three decades is evidence there’s something deeply wrong with Lebanon and its political culture that can’t be fixed with infusions of U.S. taxpayer money.The Strange Story of Kurt Gerstein
Thus, when Lebanese President Joseph Aoun visited the White House this week to ask for money, he was selling a mirage. The “ultimate objective” of the framework agreement, he said, is “ending the state of hostility between Lebanon and Israel forever.” But to reach that objective, “America needs to support the LAF,” said Aoun. “Without the LAF,” he continued, “everything will collapse.” And as he told a group after his meeting with Trump, the aid must be “immediate and unconditional.”
What he means is the same thing Lebanese officials have been saying since the United States started funding the LAF in 2006: You have to pay us to disarm the terror group that threatens our own sovereignty, but you can’t condition the aid on us disarming Hezbollah.
Could the Lebanese army plausibly disarm Hezbollah? If it can’t get the job done after two decades of U.S. handouts—since 2022 Washington has been paying LAF salaries directly—more cash now isn’t going to change the balance of power. The crucial issue is that the interests of the government and the army are so closely tied to Hezbollah that disturbing the status quo with an attempt at disarming it would be like killing the goose that lays golden eggs.
Seen in this way, Hezbollah is Lebanon’s top investment vehicle. Without a terror group parked on the eastern Mediterranean that’s at war with a U.S. ally, and that poses a potential threat to offshore energy platforms while it’s engaged in drug- and human-trafficking enterprises around the world, Lebanon would have to join the long line of failed states waiting for handouts. But Hezbollah makes Lebanon the squeaky wheel that needs to be oiled, or else it’ll blow up in everyone’s face. It’s fundamentally an extortion racket.
Can’t the Lebanese make it on their own? They’re an inventive and industrious people whose diaspora has made invaluable contributions across the world—surely, they can make a go of it in their own country! Look at all the aides of Lebanese origin Trump has named to the diplomatic corps: Tom Barrack, Michel Issa, and Massad Boulos, all successful men. But that’s not how most people think in Lebanon.
The default impulse of the Lebanese, hardwired over the course of millennia, is to draw in larger powers to do their dirty work, basically treating them like the live-in maids from Sri Lanka and the Philippines that the country’s leading classes employ: Pretty up the house, but don’t disturb our daily lives by making inconvenient demands, or you’ll break something and ruin madame’s dinner party on the veranda. And so, if the Americans are paying, why go and do something crazy like fight Hezbollah and mess up the Italian leather sofa? And to keep the Americans paying, you need Hezbollah.
According to Aoun and other Lebanese in on the scam, taking on Hezbollah is a long-term process, very long-term indeed. “It’s going to take time,” says Trump adviser Boulos. “This is not easy. Nobody believes for a second that this is going to be an easy task in any way.”
Why, yes, the money is for strengthening the Lebanese military—just not for the purpose of getting rid of Hezbollah—but that’s not all Lebanon needs to rebuild Lebanese society. Because Hezbollah is Lebanese and not “a foreign mercenary force,” as Aoun told an audience of high-level administration officials at the Lebanese Embassy in Washington, Lebanon needs funding for programs to reintegrate Hezbollah’s “Lebanese citizens” back into the fabric of Lebanese society. And, added Aoun, Lebanon needs U.S. investment, lots of it—enough to at least match Iran’s decades-long “massive and sustained investment” that funded Hezbollah.
And yet, as Aoun warned, Hezbollah will continue to be an issue until the Americans “remove the root cause” for Hezbollah’s existence—the “Israeli occupation.” All Aoun means is that Trump has to pressure the Israelis to withdraw. That’s the Lebanese consensus because it’s Hezbollah’s position: Get the Israelis out, and we’ll rebuild our tunnels and restock our arms supply while the Americans pay us through you and protect us from future rounds of Israeli military action even as we prepare to renew the terror war with rocket and missile fire and plans to invade Israel’s north as Hamas sacked its south on Oct. 7.
Hezbollah is weakened, thanks to Israel, but nothing has changed with the LAF since Washington started paying it in 2006. What’s different is that the Iran war has illuminated what is real and what is fake, and who America’s allies are. The way to disarm Hezbollah is not by paying the LAF to protect it, but rather by letting Israel finish off the terror group on its border.
When I tried to shift our conversation toward Gerstein, Tomasz gave a dismissive wave of the hand. “He was a member of the SS and part of the Nazi machine. We know his story,” he said. He was less interested in Gerstein’s biography than in his report and how it can be used to scrape the “rust” off Bełżec. “He gave us something from the interior, something about the activity of the camp, the process.”
“And was it a form of resistance for him to provide that kind of information?” I asked. Tomasz shook his head and sighed heavily. “That’s a good question. ‘I’ve seen everything here,’” he said, as if he were Gerstein speaking, “‘and I must give testimony.’ That’s the essence of his resistance. He was the witness. He went inside the Holocaust. He touched evil and he talked about his experience. He told the truth. He broke the silence. ‘I gave information to diplomats and embassies,’” he says, again as if he were Gerstein speaking. “‘I tried to do something. A little—but something.’”
After the war, Gerstein’s widow, Elfriede, and a handful of archivists created Kurt Gerstein House, an educational institution for children in Germany. They also built a collection of Gerstein’s personal documents and papers, including his report on Bełżec. Gerstein’s descendants and future generations of archivists kept adding to the collection, collaborating with organizations around the world to unearth ever more documents and to frame his story in a wider context. The House shut down in the early 2000s, though, having gone bust. The collection was then donated to the Evangelical Church of Westphalia.
Today, the collection is managed by the archivists Ingrun Osterfinke and Martin Kamp in Bielefeld, a small city in northeast Germany. They struck me as a dynamic pair, jumping between German and English to fine-tune individual words throughout our conversation, ensuring that no meanings were lost. I asked them if Gerstein is better known in Germany than he is in the United States.
“I can’t think of any situation where Germans nowadays are really familiar with the fate or the figure of Kurt Gerstein,” Martin said. “It’s very obvious, when we’re doing a tour through our archives, and we talk about the Gerstein collections, that not many people know anything about him.” This surprised me. Why isn’t he famous, like Oskar Schindler or Anne Frank? “The popularity of Oskar Schindler and Anne Frank is based on the successful media processing of their stories,” Martin said, dryly. “I’m pretty sure that before Schindler’s List, comparatively few people knew the name and story of Oskar Schindler. Plus, Anne Frank’s diary is an unusually dense and well-written source that documents the persecution of the Jews in Europe on a personal level and through the eyes of the victim. I have to say …” He leaned back in his chair, as if to let his thoughts settle. “I have to say that I find the comparison with Kurt Gerstein a bit difficult. He’s a much more ambivalent figure than Schindler. Schindler saved the lives of hundreds of Jews, which was personally dangerous for him. Whether Kurt Gerstein really joined the SS only to gain insight into the murder machinery and to inform the outside world is open to doubt.”
“And figures like Anne Frank or Oskar Schindler are easy to understand,” Ingrun added. “Anne Frank’s diary is a real, singular document, and Oskar Schindler’s success is measurable. He saved a measurable number of people. Kurt Gerstein didn’t succeed measurably. His efforts to inform the Allied nations didn’t succeed. His actions and his motivations are all complex and not easy to comprehend,” she said with a resigned laugh. With all these thoughts in mind, I asked how they thought Gerstein resisted Nazism, if at all?
“That’s a very difficult question to answer,” Martin said. “It basically depends on whether you believe Gerstein’s statements to be true. And maybe that’s what we can learn from his story: that categories like perpetrators, bystanders, and resisters, and even victims, can be extremely difficult to define.” We discussed this point for a moment. As someone who was almost certainly sympathetic to the Nazis at the start, and who then turned on them, and who then joined the SS for uncertain reasons, and who then gathered information on the Nazis’ murderous activities, and who then failed to achieve anything with that information, and who finally ended his own life after going into Allied captivity voluntarily, Gerstein, you could argue, was a perpetrator and a bystander and a resister and a victim.
Ingrun took a slightly warmer view. “If we believe everything in Gerstein’s Report,” she said—and from the way that she talked about him, I think that she did—“then he resisted Nazism in not giving up his beliefs, his convictions, and his conscience.”
It is clear that Kurt Gerstein never looked away from Nazism or its crimes. He committed himself to telling the truth because it was the truth, he constantly interrogated his convictions, and he set out to gain knowledge however he could and to inform others of the crimes he witnessed. The ripples of these simple acts spread through the generations in ways that he could never have predicted. His report has been used as evidence in trials against Holocaust perpetrators and Holocaust deniers, for example, and by historians trying to understand what the Holocaust was and how it happened. He may not have been able to save any lives or stop any part of the Holocaust. But he did successfully resist the possibility of it being forgotten.


















