The Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC detailed her potential charges against Israel (and Hamas) in paragraphs 94-96 of the 112 page report released Friday, "Prosecution request pursuant to article 19(3) for a ruling on the Court’s territorial jurisdiction in Palestine." Those charges include:
The Israeli Government, in turn, has considered the settlements to be lawful. And while the Israeli High Court of Justice has examined the legality of discrete actions taken by Israeli public authorities connected to the Government of Israel’s settlement policy based on individual claims before it, despite the High Court’s recognised independence, it has consistently held the broader policy question of the Government of Israel’s settlement policy as such, which has been deemed to be predominantly political in nature, to be “non-justiciable”.[572]
See Ayub et al. case, pp. 12-13 (Vice-President Landau: “I have more willingly reached the conclusion that this court should refrain from considering this issue of civilian settlement in an occupied territory under international law, knowing that this issue is in dispute between the government of Israel and other governments and that it may be debated in the context of a crucial international negotiation of which the government of Israel is a party. Any opinion expressed by this court on such a sensitive issue which cannot be said other than as an obiter dictum, will neither add nor derogate, and issues which by their nature belong to the realm of international politics should better be discussed in that realm only. In other words, although I agree that petitioners' complaint is generally within the court's jurisdiction, in view of the fact that it involves proprietary rights of individuals, this special aspect of the matter should be regarded as not within the jurisdiction of the court when the petition is submitted to this court by an individual.”); Bargil et al. case, p. 9, President M. Shamgar ((referring to HCJ 852/86 Aloni v. Minister of Justice): “As we said there, attempts have been made to bring predominantly political disputes into the jurisdiction of the court. In that case I pointed out that I personally do not believe that it is, in practice, possible to create a hermetic seal or filter that are capable of preventing disputes of a political nature from penetrating into litigation before the High Court of Justice. The standard applied by the court is a legal one, but public law issues also include political aspects, within the different meanings of that term. The question which must be asked in such a case is, generally, what is the predominant nature of the dispute. As explained, the standard applied by the court is a legal one, and this is the basis for deciding whether an issue should be considered by the court, that is, whether an issue is predominantly political or predominantly legal./ In the case before us, it is absolutely clear that the predominant nature of the issue is political, and it has continued to be so from its inception until the present.”); Bargil et al. case, p. 11, Justice E. Goldberg: (“does this case fall into the category of the few cases where this Court will deny a petition for lack of institutional justicity [...] I believe that we must answer this question in the affirmative. This is not because we lack the legal tools to give judgment, but because a judicial determination, which does not concern individual rights, should defer to a political process of great importance and great significance. Such is the issue before us: it stands at the centre of the peace process; it is of unrivalled importance; and any determination by the court is likely to be interpreted as a direct intervention therein. The special and exceptional circumstances referred to, which are unique, are what put this case into the category of those special cases, where the fear of impairing the public’s confidence in the judiciary exceeds ‘the fear of impairing the public’s confidence in the law...’”). See also Green Park International Inc v Quebec 2009 para. 265, observing with respect to the scope of what the HCJ has deemed non-justiciable: “On its face, the Bargil case plainly does not support the view that the HCJ would refuse to hear the Action on the basis that the alleged violation of Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention is non justiciable. It merely expresses the well-established principle of judicial economy whereby a court may abstain from considering a question in the abstract.”