Why Isn’t Trump Finishing the Job in Iran?
In a completely unforeseen development, Lucy has once again yanked the football away from Charlie—sorry, President Donald Trump has once again backed away from his threats to annihilate Iran and opted for more diplomacy.Jake Wallis Simons: Hamas ‘disarmament’ deal is more Trump fantasyland
We were also shocked—shocked!—to learn one of the alleged reasons Trump decided to stop bombing Iran on Friday night: a shortage of key munitions. Indeed, The Washington Post, The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, Axios, and CNN all ran stories over the weekend on the supposed “munitions” shortfall, reportedly raised by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Dan Caine during a meeting with the president last week.
“Any major operation against Iran will face challenges because the U.S. munitions stockpile has been significantly depleted by Washington’s ongoing defense of Israel and support for Ukraine,” the Post reported Caine as telling the president. “Intensifying the war could dangerously drain the Pentagon’s already diminished stockpile of Patriot antimissile interceptors and other air defense munitions in the Middle East,” was the Times’ gloss on the same meeting. CNN and the Journal corroborated the claims about Caine, with CNN adding that Vice President JD Vance also warned Trump against resumption of the war. In an “analysis” article posted on Monday, CNN’s senior political reporter, Aaron Blake, argued that the question of “munitions stockpiles” had become “pivotal” to U.S. planning. Blake linked to an April analysis from CNN, which argued that there was now a “near-term risk” of the United States “running out of ammunition” in a conflict with a near-peer adversary such as China.
So, is the United States just too short on ammo to continue fighting? Unsurprisingly, the answer is that there is a partial truth here—but one wrapped in a whole lot of BS and spin.
The first point to make is that much of the media coverage—presumably guided by figures such as Colby—is intentionally conflating “munitions” with “air defense munitions,” used to defend against drones and ballistic missiles. U.S. inventories are classified, but most media coverage refers to estimates from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, which, according to CNN, “closely align” with classified U.S. data. Here’s a table on “key munitions” stockpiles from CSIS’s estimates published in April, at the conclusion of the intensive wave of fighting:
Of these “key munitions,” the Tomahawks, JASSMs, and PrSMs are all high-end standoff (i.e., offensive) weapons, for which the United States has plentiful cheaper substitutes. The concern is specifically with high-end air defense munitions such as Patriots, THAADs, and SM-6s (used to defend ships from missiles and drones).
However, none of these shortages precludes further operations against Iran. In U.S. military doctrine, air defense is not intended to provide an indefinite shield against drone and missile strikes; given enough time, any sufficiently capable enemy can overwhelm air defenses—a problem known as “overmatch.” The purpose of air defenses is to protect U.S. and allied forces long enough to suppress and destroy the enemy’s launch capability. Indeed, this was precisely the point reportedly raised by CENTCOM chief Adm. Brad Cooper during the president’s recent war council. According to The Wall Street Journal, Cooper “believes the U.S. can cope with the limited stocks of Patriot and other air defense interceptors because stepped-up U.S. strikes, if they are approved by Trump, would blunt Iran’s ability to launch large numbers of missiles.”
What is true—and what we suspect was the basis of Caine’s reported warning—is that munitions shortages do somewhat raise the risk of combat operations. “The United States and Israel definitely still have the capacity to conduct operations, but they’re going to have to maybe accept a little bit more risk than they have in the past,” Colby Badhwar, an independent defense analyst and fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis, told The Scroll in an interview. “They’re going to have to get in a little closer using things like small-diameter bombs, JDAMs, and glide bombs. The United States still has a lot of munitions available, but they definitely will have to be a little bit more judicious, perhaps, in how they execute and plan operations.” Indeed, as the CSIS report quoted above notes, “the United States has enough missiles to continue fighting this war under any plausible scenario.”
It’s all an obvious strategy to buy some time while embedding itself even more deeply amongst Gaza’s civilians. There’s even word for it: “Hudna”, or “truce”, which in Hamas parlance means “strategic pause”. Yet Trump is apparently so keen for progress that he’s willing to play along. Forgive me if I do a little sick.NYPost Editorial: A few questions about the new hopeful Gaza peace plan
To the detail, which as usual with Trump remains rather vague. The four-page plan, which reportedly has 15 points, sets out a phased disarmament for the jihadis – sorry, I’m struggling to keep a straight face here – mirrored by a reciprocal IDF withdrawal from its current positions behind the “Yellow Line” buffer zone.
Weapons are to be handed over to a transitional body before being removed from Gaza, the Strip is to be fully demilitarised and, in the words of The Donald: “The International Stabilization Force will work with a new Palestinian police force to take responsibility for Gaza being safe for its residents and its neighbours.”
The most obvious of many practical questions presents itself right away. Where is this “Palestinian police force” going to come from? The Palestinian Authority, which was routed by Hamas in a bloody coup in 2007, is shambolic, corrupt, inept and supportive of terror, if another flavour of terror to that perpetrated by Hamas. Disarming the group, as the IDF discovered, means risking the lives of a great many troops.
It means going house-to-house in unfamiliar territory, amid booby-traps, tunnel shafts, snipers and child soldiers, and forensically searching hundreds of thousands of properties for arms. Israeli troops were willing to risk their lives in Gaza, as they were defending their families. Would Palestinians really do the same?
Even if the creation of such a force was realistic, it would take up to a year to recruit, train, equip and deploy. During that time, Hamas would take advantage of the reduced pressure to prepare strategies of resistance of survival, such as burying caches of weapons in layers of obscurity underground.
Similarly, where is the supposed Palestinian technocratic government going to come from? There is nobody with any support on the street, and anyone shipped in by Washington and Jerusalem will immediately be seen as a traitor. Not a good place to start.
In the final analysis, the best way to see this development is as another Trumpian fantasy, to join his failed Gaza Riviera plan in the dustbin of history. In recent months, the president has wantonly squandered his credibility with unhinged rhetoric towards Iran. When you vow apocalyptic consequences without delivering them and announce historic peace agreements that collapse at the first breath of air, how are your enemies supposed to take you seriously? Answer: they don’t. Having seen the Iranians taking Trump for a fool, Hamas are doing the same.
Fine, Hamas has said it’s agreed to lay down its arms as per that 15-point plan from President Donald Trump’s Board of Peace, but color us skeptical.The Israel-Lebanon agreement will be won or lost in the first 150 meters
We absolutely hope it proves to be a genuine step toward bringing permanent peace to Gaza, but before we deem it a “historic agreement” as the prez announced, we need some questions answered.
For starters, who decides that Israel and Hamas and its allied terror groups have ceased “all military operations”?
We guarantee that some terrorists will keep shooting at Israel forces (and even more so, at any Gazans who defy them).
It seems a new International Verification Committee needs creating, but who’ll be on it, where will the staff come from, how long will it take to set up — and what happens when one side insists the IVC is wrong about the other side complying?
One enforcement arm is supposed to be the International Stabilization Force, but it’s meant to have a mere 5,000 troops — and so far only seems to actually have 200 or so even pledged by a few countries.
Also: What is the “Palestinian law” the plan mentions repeatedly?
There’s never been an actual Palestinian state to have any laws; are we talking about statutes created by the Palestinian Authority? By the rump government Hamas has run in Gaza? Something else?
And what judges are to interpret this “law”?
More generally, what parts of the Hamas-controlled government will transfer over to the new one under the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza, and again who does the vetting of these “civil servants” selected by various gangs of terrorists?
Above all, how can any “existing police structures” possibly be trusted?
Before anyone could determine whether the Lebanese Armed Forces could dismantle Hezbollah’s infrastructure, seize its weapons and establish state sovereignty in Southern Lebanon, the new pilot program designed to provide the Lebanese army with an opportunity to do so encountered its first test.
It did not involve missiles, tunnels or units of Hezbollah’s elite Radwan Force. It involved approximately 150 meters.
On July 21, the Lebanese army began deploying in the village of Zawtar al-Gharbiyeh after the Israeli military withdrew as part of the first stage of a U.S.-brokered framework. Lebanese teams began clearing unexploded ordnance. A neighboring village, Zawtar al-Sharqiyeh, remained inside the Israeli-held buffer zone.
The Israel Defense Forces said Lebanese soldiers and an engineering vehicle crossed barriers and advanced about 150 meters into the security zone near Zawtar al-Sharqiyeh, outside the agreed pilot area and without coordination. Israeli troops fired warning shots, and the Lebanese force withdrew without casualties.
The Lebanese army said its soldiers remained inside Zawtar al-Gharbiyeh and were operating through the prescribed coordination mechanism when Israeli troops opened fire nearby. It described the shooting as an act of aggression that endangered its soldiers and could obstruct the pilot program.
Perhaps this was a navigation error. Perhaps the maps were unclear. Perhaps the vehicle crossed the agreed line unintentionally. Perhaps the Lebanese account is correct. The facts should be investigated immediately through the established mechanism.
But this is not an argument about a 150-meter tactical dispute.
The strategic question is how Israel, Lebanon and the United States will resolve the first disputed incident. Will it be documented, investigated and corrected, or dismissed as a local misunderstanding too small to justify endangering a major diplomatic initiative?
Israel knows this trap well. Quite often, violations of agreements become precedents.

















