The Genocide Claim in Gaza Has Collapsed. Hamas Supplied the Evidence.
This distinction is critical. Civilian deaths alone do not establish genocide, which requires specific intent to destroy a protected group, in whole or in part, as such. When attacks presented as evidence of deliberate civilian targeting are later shown to have killed identified combatants, the inference of genocidal intent is directly undermined. As the evidence accumulates, the claim that these strikes demonstrate a systematic policy of targeting Palestinians because they are Palestinians becomes unsustainable.New book ‘In the War Room’ offers candid look at Netanyahu’s wartime decisionmaking
Perhaps the most important implication is methodological. Many investigators reached conclusions without knowing who was actually killed. They declared particular strikes war crimes, or even evidence of genocide, without knowing that Hamas commanders had been present. That missing information is critical to assessing whether the IDF was targeting civilians or legitimate military objectives, and whether the attacks complied with the laws of war.
The starkest example is Amnesty International’s “genocide report,” which highlighted 15 airstrikes as evidence that Israel intentionally targeted civilians. Amnesty reported finding no military targets and identified all the victims as civilians. Yet subsequent Hamas and PIJ publications have revealed combatants, mostly commander-level, killed in five of those strikes (thus far). These discoveries demolish Amnesty’s analysis of those incidents: its central factual premise, that no military targets were present, was false. They also expose a fundamental flaw in the report’s broader methodology, which treated the absence of publicly identified combatants as evidence that none existed. When the factual foundation of an investigation collapses, its conclusions cannot simply be left standing. Amnesty’s genocide analysis must be withdrawn in light of the evidence it failed to uncover.
Ironically, organizations that spent nearly two years dismissing Israeli claims are being contradicted by Hamas itself. The evidence reshaping the historical record is no longer coming primarily from Israel. It comes from the Gaza military organizations that fought the war and are now publicly commemorating and lauding their own dead.
The genocide allegation has always depended heavily on the claim that Israel systematically targeted Palestinian civilians in Gaza because they were Palestinians. With approximately 2,500 identified Hamas and PIJ operatives now linking more than 600 allegedly civilian only incidents to acknowledged military personnel, the factual foundation of that narrative has been fundamentally undermined. The claim that these incidents demonstrate a systematic policy of destroying Palestinians as such is no longer sustainable.
In the end, the most consequential witnesses against the genocide allegation may not be Israel or its defenders. They may be Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad themselves.
As Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu heads toward what could be one of the most consequential elections of his career next month, a new book is offering an unusually candid look at the decision-making that will define how history — and Israeli voters — judge him.Secret 1993 Peres-Hussein meeting helped pave way for Israel-Jordan peace, revealed documents show
In the War Room: The Inside Story of Israel’s Fight Against Hamas and the Iranian Axis, by Jerusalem Post military correspondent Yonah Jeremy Bob and Wall Street Journal editorial writer Elliot Kaufman, draws on two years of interviews with Israel’s political, military and intelligence leadership to reconstruct the internal battles that shaped the war — battles that often pitted Netanyahu against his own defense establishment.
Both Bob and Kaufman criticize some of Netanyahu’s choices, from the delayed ground invasion of Gaza to the “unforced error” of the 2025 aid blockade, though each credits him with historic gains against Hezbollah, Iran and Syria.
The authors sat down with Jewish Insider on Tuesday, the book’s publication day, to talk about what their reporting reveals about Netanyahu’s wartime leadership, and what it might mean for how he’s remembered at the ballot box.
Jewish Insider: In your view, what is the most impactful revelation in your book that has not previously been reported on?
Yonah Jeremy Bob: This is the first book that’s an inside story about the war. There are a lot of books about Oct. 7. There hasn’t been a book that’s covered the full war from the inside. We really got deeply into the beepers and walkie talkies [Israeli operation against Hezbollah] of September 2024. There had been coverage of these issues but in terms of the depth, IDF sources, Mossad sources in Israel, in the U.S., we tell the story — there was actually a debate, should they go first with the beepers or should they go first with the walkie talkies? The things that we learned were stunning: what could have been done differently, how they accomplished it.
Elliot Kaufman: I would point to just how much it took to convince Prime Minister Netanyahu to launch a ground invasion of Gaza at all. You’d think after Oct. 7, of course, Israeli troops are going to roll into Gaza, but in fact Netanyahu was very hesitant, worrying — with good reason, by the way — that Israeli troops could be walking into a death trap. More than that, he had certain Israeli generals telling him, “Don’t do it, the IDF isn’t ready.” He had all the top American generals, sent by President [Joe] Biden, telling him the same thing. He really had to gain confidence in the plan. We tell that story, which I think most people, the way they think about it, would rush right over. But it did take Israel 20 days from the Oct. 7 attack until Oct. 27 to be able to invade Gaza.
Newly revealed documents from a secret November 1993 meeting between then-foreign minister Shimon Peres and Jordan's King Hussein show how the two leaders helped lay some of the early groundwork for the Israel-Jordan peace treaty, the Peres Center for Peace and Innovation revealed on Tuesday, marking the 10th anniversary of Peres's death.
The documents were released on the day of the state memorial ceremony for Peres and the naming of the Jerusalem International Convention Center in his honor. They include excerpts from the minutes of the meeting, which was held at the king's palace in Amman under strict secrecy.
According to the records, Peres's appearance was even altered to prevent identification.
The Peres Center now describes the exchange as a kind of "testament for peace" by two leaders who sought to change the region. During the meeting, Hussein spoke candidly about the urgency he felt and his desire to use the time he believed he had left to advance an agreement.
"Perhaps I have only a year or two left; I will put everything on the line," the king said.
According to the documents, the Jordanian royal palace received a message on October 26, 1993, saying that King Hussein wished to meet with then-foreign minister Shimon Peres. According to the record, Hussein viewed Peres as a creative thinker and was willing to hold a secret meeting as part of the preliminary contacts that ultimately led to the peace agreement signed in 1994.
The meeting did not emerge in a vacuum. It followed years of secret contacts and ties between Israel and King Hussein, including Peres's attempt to advance an agreement with Jordan under the 1987 London Agreement.

















